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Abstract 
____________________________________________________________________ 
This dissertation explores the interpretation of Ecclesiastes with a specific focus on the 
epistemology of its author. Chapters 1 and 2 lay the groundwork for this thesis by 
examining Qoheleth’s ideas about the world and humans’ place in it. The use of three 
key terms – lbh, lm[, and !wrty - reveal a man with a very strong, negative, and 
pessimistic outlook that sets the tone for the whole book. Qoheleth’s observations and 
reflections have suggested to some that he was an empiricist. These claims are 
described in chapter 3, where we also present a working definition of empiricism, and a 
short survey of epistemological theory.      
  Chapters 4 and 5 explore the epistemic claims Qoheleth makes about God. We 
found that Qoheleth’s very substantial theological claims could not have been derived 
from an empirical grounding; rather, we concluded that his theology was not only non-
experiential, but also counter-experiential. Qoheleth’s use of three crucial experiential 
verbs har, [dy, and acm are examined in chapters 6 -10. Despite the prima facie 
experiential potential of these verbs, our interpretation of the evidence did not, in the 
main, endorse the claim that Qoheleth was an empiricist. However, it was 
acknowledged that the description ‘empiricist’ was only partly justified with reference 
to Qoheleth’s personal experiments recounted in chapter 2.     
 Chapter 11 briefly surveyed some facets of Qoheleth’s argumentation that I 
submit strengthen my thesis that Qoheleth does not warrant the appellation ‘empiricist’. 
I argued that the early material in the book revealed a man with a very large ego whose 
dogmatic assertions on many issues lacked the necessary supporting evidence. Finally, 
in the conclusion, I succinctly drew all the strands of my arguments together, and on 
this basis I advanced the case that in epistemological terms, Qoheleth is better 
understood as a foundationalist, rather than an empiricist. 
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Introduction 
___________________________________________________ 
There are three books in the Old Testament that are generally recognized as coming 
within the scope of Wisdom literature: Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes. Weighty issues 
are dealt with in Job such as the nature of God in the face of unmerited human 
suffering, while a more unquestioning orthodoxy epitomizes Proverbs. But as regards 
Ecclesiastes in its thought and outlook, the ethos and tone of the author’s writing are far 
removed from the contents of any other book that can be found in the Hebrew Bible.
  Ecclesiastes is arguably the most puzzling book in the Old Testament canon. 
There is, moreover, a most unusual aspect of the book. Rarely does a reader find a 
health warning in the Hebrew Scriptures, but there is one of sorts in this brief literary 
creation. In 12:12 the author declares: “Of making many books there is no end, and 
much study is a weariness of the flesh.” Also in 6:11, Qoheleth, the main protagonist in 
the book, offers no consolation to the reader when he writes, “The more words, the 
more vanity, so how is one the better?”1       
  Notwithstanding these warnings, this short book continues to attract the scrutiny 
of an increasing number of commentators. Robert Scott once observed that 
“Ecclesiastes is the strangest book in the Bible, or at any rate the book whose presence 
in the sacred canons of Judaism and of Christianity is the most inexplicable.”2 He went 
on to say that the very strangeness of the work in its literary and religious context in the 
Bible is part of its fascination.3 James Crenshaw has also described the book in similar 
language,4 while another scholar, Elias Bickerman, also holds Ecclesiastes to be one of 
the strangest books in the Bible, alongside the trio of Jonah, Daniel, and Esther.5 He 
writes, “Ecclesiastes has no known antecedents or spiritual posterity in Jewish thought. 
                                                
   1 I propose to adopt the Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version (London: SPCK, 1989) 
translation. On occasion I may differ from this translation and adopt a different rendering; if so, I will 
draw attention to this where appropriate. Citations from the Hebrew text will be taken from the Biblia 
Hebraica Quinta, ed. A. Schenker, et al., (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2004).  
  2 R. B. Y. Scott, Proverbs: Ecclesiastes: Translation with an Introduction and Notes (Anchor 
Bible 18; New York: Doubleday, 1965), 191. 
  3 Scott, Proverbs: Ecclesiastes, 193. 
  4 J. L. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes: A Commentary (Old Testament Library; Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1987; London: SCM, 1988), 23. 
  5 E. Bickerman, Four Strange Books in the Bible (New York: Schocken Books, 1967). 
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To understand the book we cannot go to linear evidence in the Bible or to the Rabbinic 
mentality.”6          
 In the late nineteenth century Edward Plumptre stated, “Among the many 
enigmas of the Old Testament the book of Ecclesiastes is pre-eminently enigmatic. It 
comes before us as the sphinx of Hebrew literature, with its unsolved riddles of history 
and life.”7 Commenting on 4:1-3, H. L. Ginsberg writes, “It is not a cheerful view of the 
world that greets us in these verses, nor indeed from the Book of Koheleth as a whole.”8 
A more graphic comment can be found in Wheeler Robinson’s observation, “The book 
has indeed the smell of the tomb about it.”9 More recently, Norman Whybray, adopting 
a more positive contrasting view, has assessed Qoheleth to be a “Preacher of Joy.”10 
There also have been various disputations among commentators as to the peculiar 
nature of the book’s language, especially in relation to dating the book. As Leong Seow 
has noted, “There is perhaps no other book in all of the Hebrew Bible where the 
language has received more attention than Ecclesiastes.”11     
  Many more diverse responses in this vein could be cited from a variety of 
contemporary scholars but enough has been said to indicate that there are different 
opinions about the nature of this enigmatic literary creation. It is truly remarkable how a 
relatively small volume can attract so much contrary scholarly opinion; and even today, 
notwithstanding the vigorous interest that has emerged over the past forty to fifty years 
in this unique book, there remains a wide-range of interpretative issues that, as yet, lack 
                                                
  6  Bickerman, Four Strange Books, 142. 
  7 E. Plumptre, Ecclesiastes: Or, the Preacher, with Notes and Introduction (The Cambridge 
Bible for Schools and Colleges; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1882), 7. 
  8 H. L. Ginsberg, “The Quintessence of Koheleth,” in Biblical and Other Studies (ed. Alexander 
Altmann; Philip W. Lown Institute of Advanced Judaic Studies, Studies and Texts 1; Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), 47-59, (at 56). 
  9 H. W. Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1946), 258. 
 10 R. N. Whybray, “Preacher of Joy,” JSOT 23 (1982): 87-98. Repr. pages 141-52 in Wisdom: 
The Collected Articles of Norman Whybray (SOTS Monograph Series. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
 11  C. L. Seow, Ecclesiastes: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (Anchor 
Bible 18C; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 11. For a discussion of the language issue see Francesco 
Bianchi, “The Language of Qoheleth: A Bibliographical Survey,” ZAW 105 (1993): 210-13; Daniel C. 
Fredericks, Qoheleth’s Language: Re-evaluating its Nature and Date (Ancient Near Eastern Texts and 
Studies 3. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1988); Ian Young, Diversity in Pre-Exilic Hebrew (FAT 5. 
Tübingen: Mohr, 1993); Gleason L Archer, “The Linguistic Evidence for the Date of Ecclesiastes,” JETS 
12 (1969): 167-81.  
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scholarly consensus.         
 As we launch out on this voyage of discovery, it seems necessary at this stage to 
set out how the present interpretative enterprise is to proceed. In the remainder of this 
introduction I will attempt two things. First, I will briefly set out my views on some 
general matters relating to the book, such as authorship, provenance, and the nature of 
the book’s contents. And secondly, I will indicate the nature of my methodology to be 
employed in this interpretative enterprise, along with a study outline.   
(i)  General background matters relating to Ecclesiastes  
Concurring with the majority of commentators, my view is that this book was not 
written by King Solomon in the tenth century BCE but instead was the creation of an 
unknown author who, quite plausibly, lived sometime in the Greek period of the third 
century BCE.12 The most likely place of the book’s origin is Palestine. I regard the case 
advanced by Michael Fox that the entire work is essentially a literary unity as most 
convincing. While it is possible to have some reservations about the interpretation of 
some of the words in the Epilogue being the work of one person or several, 
nevertheless, in the main, I view the book as the creation of one mind, especially the 
monologue.13         
 Regarding the nature of the book’s contents, it will be obvious to the careful 
reader of Ecclesiastes that it is largely written in the first person. However, the unit, 1:1-
11 is written in the third person, that is, Qoheleth’s words are reported by someone else. 
This section is usually referred to as the Prologue. But at 1:12, there is a notable shift to 
the use of the first person. The personality of Qoheleth now takes centre stage and he 
continues in the first person right down to 12:7 with only one significant exception – the 
intrusion of the third person in 7:27 by the words, “says Qoheleth.” This interjection 
clearly reinforces the reader’s attention that Qoheleth’s words are being reported by an 
unnamed third person. This section, 1:12-12:7 is referred to as the Monologue. Finally, 
in 12:8-14 we have the Epilogue, which reverts to the third person; here someone, or 
some persons (editor/author) speaks about Qoheleth and his work.    
                                                
 12 The traditional attribution of Solomon as the author of Ecclesiastes has largely been 
abandoned in modern biblical scholarship. A very recent attempt to reverse this trend is found in Robert 
V. MaCabe, “Pondering the Authorship of Ecclesiastes,” DBSJ 20 (2015): 3-20. For McCabe the entire 
book, including 1:1-2 and 12:8-14, is the work of Solomon. However, the overwhelming consensus is that 
the peculiarities of the Hebrew, and especially the presence of two Persian loan words, ~ysdrp = 
“gardens” (at 2:5) and, ~gtp = “sentence,” (at 8:11), point to a late date for the composition of the book. 
  13 M. V. Fox, “Frame-Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qohelet,” HUC 48 (1977): 83-
106.  
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 The overall shape of the book therefore has a tripartite structure: Prologue, 
Monologue and Epilogue. How the epilogue relates to the rest of the book is, in itself, 
an intriguing question but it is not an issue that will command our attention in this study 
due to the fact that our remit concerns the reported words of Qoheleth, these being 
confined to 1:2-11 and, more substantially, to his own words in the Monologue: 1:12-
12:7.14           
 As to the genre of the book, there is a wide spectrum of opinion. William Brown 
has made the observation that “The work is a messy mixture of autobiographical 
references, theological reflections, philosophical musings, and proverbial instructions. 
Ecclesiastes is sui generis in the literary landscape.”15 Certainly on reading Ecclesiastes 
it is clear that there are numerous examples of characteristic genres that are also found 
in the Old Testament and ancient Near East wisdom literature. Indeed, as Norman 
Whybray has observed, from the point of view of style and literary form, one of the 
most remarkable features of the book is the variety of its material.16 As far as James 
Crenshaw’s assessment of the book’s genre is concerned, he observes - 
 Qohelet makes effective use of many sapiential forms which occur throughout the ancient Near 
 East, but two set the tone of the book: reflection and royal instruction. The former stamps the 
  conclusions with personal authenticity, while the latter maximizes the impact by attributing such 
 findings to the wisest and richest of men. Who speaks here? One who has subjected all of reality
 to a test.17       
Before moving to the next sub-section, I would like to stress that I am not concerned 
with situating Ecclesiastes within a theological hermeneutic, that is, I am not seeking to 
                                                
 14 According to C. Bartholomew, “Qoheleth in the Canon?! Current Trends in the Interpretation 
of Ecclesiastes,” Themelios 24 (1999): 4-20, this issue is one of the most important questions in the 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes (at 13). In the view of M. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), Ecc 12:9-12 is “manifestly an addendum to the book.” (at 30). Others would 
identify two epilogues, usually vv. 9-11 and vv.12-14, see Podechard, L’Ecclésiaste (Etudes Bibliques; 
Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1912), 472-485; W. Zimmerli, Das Buch des Predigers Salomo (Das 
Alte Testament Deutsch 16/1 Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 248-251; K. Galling, “Der 
Prediger,” Pages 73-125 in Ernst Würthwein, Kurt Galling, and Otto Plöger, Die fünf Megilloth. 2nd ed. 
Handbuch zum alten Testament 1/18. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, (Paul Siebeck), 1969, (at 123-25); A. 
Lauha, Kohelet, Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament 19. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 
1978), 217-23; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 190; N. Lohfink, Qoheleth: A Continental Commentary (trans. S. 
McEvenue; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 142-44; R. N. Whybray, Ecclesiastes (NCBC; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans; London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1989), 169.  
  15 W. P. Brown, Ecclesiastes: Interpretation – A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching 
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 2000), 17. 
  16 R. N. Whybray, Ecclesiastes (Reprinted 1997. OTG; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989), 
32. 
  17 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 35. One may agree that “reflection” is a prominent feature of 
Qoheleth’s discourse, but to what extent the book exhibits “royal instruction” is a much-discussed issue. 
(See f/n. 56). An extended discussion can be found in Yee von Koh, Royal Autobiography in the Book of 
Qoheleth (BZAW 369. Berlin: de Gruyter), 2006. 
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determine the theological significance of Ecclesiastes via an inter-textual engagement 
with other parts of the Hebrew Bible, or the Christian Bible as a whole.18 That might 
make for a very attractive if challenging enterprise, but it is not the project that I am 
pursuing. I simply wish to engage with the thought of this most unusual Old Testament 
sage, particularly regarding his epistemic claims, to determine whether or not he can be 
usually described as an empiricist, as some scholars have asserted.     
(ii) Methodology and Outline of this Study 
This study is not concerned with offering a textual commentary on the book as a whole, 
or even a specific section of it, per se: that has been admirably achieved elsewhere with 
an unprecedented choice of exegetical commentaries and monographs now available. 
But what it is concerned with is the examination and analysis of a very targeted subject: 
the epistemology of Qoheleth. We will be concerned with the nature and extent of 
Qoheleth’s epistemic claims; that is to say, we want to carefully examine what Qoheleth 
claims to know, and how he came to acquire that knowledge. While there may be 
various approaches to achieving these objectives, I propose to pursue the following 
pathway.          
 One of the major topics in the book concerns Qoheleth’s references to God. 
There are over 50 references to the generic divine name in the text. That without doubt 
represents a major focus in Qoheleth’s exposition of reality. One might conclude, 
therefore, that there are two main protagonists in the book: Qoheleth and God. But there 
is a very significant third element: mankind. In fact references to Xya/~da exceed those 
to the deity. God and mankind thus sit in symbiotic relationship for it is rare for 
Qoheleth to talk about God without referencing mankind at the same time. He has quite 
significant ideas and comments to make about divinity and humanity, as will become 
evident as this study proceeds.        
 And finally, Qoheleth presents himself as a man who has made observations and 
reflected much on the nature of human life “under the sun.” He makes great claims 
about what he knows; but he also pulls no punches when he categorically asserts the 
manifold nature of human limitations. He certainly has plenty to say about how his 
fellow humans behave, and how they should behave in various contexts. Briefly put, in 
                                                
 18 A recent excursion into this area of interest can be found in Katharine Dell and W. Kynes, eds. 
Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextuallly (LHBOTS 587; London and New York: Bloomsbury: T & T Clark), 
2014. This is an interesting volume of essays. For a review of this volume see J. L Crenshaw, JTS  66 
(2015): 710-714. He says the fruit gained from this approach may be meagre, “but the gardener in me 
thinks the enjoyment of blossoms is nearly as satisfying as tasting the ripe fruit.”  
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general terms then, we are concerned with Qoheleth’s theology, his anthropology, and 
his sociology, i.e., his understanding of human society.    
 After we examine the extensive theological assertions that Qoheleth presents to 
his readers, we shall then move to examine what Qoheleth claims to know in his 
employment of three crucial verbs that have rich experiential potential: har = “to see”, 
[dy = “to know”, and acm = “to find.” Examining all this material will be a substantial 
exercise for it will be found to cover most of the contents of the book. In pursuing this 
strategy I believe we will be in a good position to ascertain the nature of Qoheleth’s 
epistemology.           
 I should, however, indicate that I have found no evidence in Ecclesiastes to 
suggest that Qoheleth was an epistemologist per se, nor is there any explicit 
epistemology claimed in the monologue. That said, any writer who makes a diverse 
range of epistemic claims, as Qoheleth does, has some underlying theory of knowledge, 
even though he does not give expression to it. However, I do not want to fast-forward 
Qoheleth into the present century and present him as a modern-day epistemologist; but 
what I think would be valuable is to offer some understanding of contemporary 
epistemological theory [see chapter 3.4 to 3.6 for this], which may enable us to present 
a nuanced understanding of the nature of Qoheleth’s claims to knowledge.  
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  PART 1.    QOHELETH’S  UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD 
 
Chapter 1:   Qoheleth’s World and His Quests 
 
1.1 Introduction to Qoheleth’s World       
At the very commencement of this thesis I think that it is most important to come to 
some understanding of Qoheleth’s underlying assumptions and outlook on the world for 
it is, I believe, the most natural and obvious way to lay the foundations of this study. In 
presenting an exploration of Qoheleth’s understanding of the world, I do not have in 
mind an attempt to identify the genesis of his vision of reality by investigating the 
social, economic, and historical conditions that may have been influential in its creation. 
Various methodological approaches applied to the interpretation of Ecclesiastes have 
undoubtedly their own justification and validity, but the path I wish to pursue in this 
context is not a materialist explanation of what Qoheleth’s world may have been like. 
Rather, it is much more appropriate for my purpose to explore the worldview of 
Qoheleth derived from the words attributed to him in the book. In following this line of 
enquiry I believe that his understanding of the world has a direct causative bearing on 
his extensive knowledge claims that will be examined later.  
  In the current chapter I propose to examine the contents of the first two chapters 
of Ecclesiastes which I believe will prove to be a most fruitful exercise due to the fact 
that they contain a plethora of key words and phrases that exemplify Qoheleth’s world 
outlook. Indeed, the one term that reverberates throughout the entire book is the very 
puzzling term lbh, which is dramatically introduced to the reader by a fivefold 
superlative in 1:2. This term is of such signal importance in Qoheleth’s exposition that 
we will devote chapter 2 of this study to it, along with other related terms. Its 
importance in the interpretation of the book and in elucidating Qoheleth’s attitude to the 
world at large is difficult to over estimate. To complete Part 1 of this thesis, in chapter 3 
I will, (i) outline the claims of a variety of scholars who, to varying degrees, believe that 
Qoheleth employed an empiricist methodology, and (ii) discuss issues relating to a 
definition of empiricism, and to epistemological theory more generally.   
  Opening the door into Qoheleth’s world is best achieved by exploring the 
opening verses of the book; for it is here that we have immediately revealed Qoheleth’s 
view of the world. These verses form part of the larger literary unit, 1:1-3:15, which  
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contains the longest continuous deliberations of the learned sage, setting the tone for the 
whole book.19 
  The opening declaration appears to be a fairly straightforward superscription, 
one that yields no immediate clues to the surprises that are to follow. The only unusual 
feature of this superscription is the use of the term tlhq, which does not attract a 
scholarly consensus as to its exact meaning. Sometimes the term appears with the 
definite article (7:27 [as emended], 12:8) that suggests that it is a title, but here in v. 1 
the absence of an article might have encouraged original readers to view the term as a 
name.           
  Whatever the case, at the very beginning of the book there is ambiguity 
surrounding the identity of the book’s protagonist. The reader is informed that the 
words of Qoheleth are the words of a son of David, but with no certainty as to his 
identity. Up to this point we know little about the character of Qoheleth; in fact the 
grammatical oddity of the name creates a certain air of mystery about him. As noted by 
Gary Salyer, “ ‘Qoheleth’ has both a personal and public meaning. It designates at once 
both an individual identity and a public office whose precise function remains clouded 
in lexical and historical obscurity.”20        
  Immediately following the superscription, the author flags up Qoheleth’s cosmic 
hebel theme in verse 2 in compelling terms: lbh lkh ~ylbh lbh tlhq rma ~ylbh lbh. 
These are the first quoted words of Qoheleth by a third party, i.e., the frame-narrator, 
and they leave a negative impression on the psyche of the reader. One wonders how an 
all-embracing dogmatic statement is to be followed by such an outburst. The natural 
expectation is that an explanation will instantly follow to support and validate the thesis 
advanced in such forthright terms. But as Pauline Viviano points out,   
  . . . the reader is drawn into the text by the extreme nature of the opening statement that all 
  is vanity . . . The reader wants to know why, to know how, the author came to such a  
  conclusion. The author does not proceed by answering any of these questions; rather he asks 
  a rhetorical question: ‘What profit has anyone from all the labor which one toils at under the 
  sun?’21            
  
This rhetorical question in verse 3 pushes the aura of negativity to extremes:  
                                                
 19 Diethelm Michel, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart des Buches Qohelet (BZAW 183; Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1989) suggests (at 2) that the first part of the monologue, 1:1-3:15, sets out Qohelet’s ideas and 
substantially addresses the issues thus raised.  
  20 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric: Private Insight and Public Debate in Ecclesiastes (JSOTSup 327; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001), 246.   
 21 P. Viviano, “The Book of Ecclesiastes: A Literary Approach,” BT 22 (1984): 81.         
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         XmXh txt lm[yX wlm[-lkb ~dal !Iwrty-hm  
 What do people gain from all the toil at which they toil under the sun? 
The expected answer is nothing, and so it will be throughout the book. The identity of 
the arena in which humans live out their lives is communicated to the reader by 
repetitive ingenuity in one of Qoheleth’s favoured and most graphic phrases, XmXh txt, 
“under the sun.” It occurs no less than twenty-nine times and is unique in biblical 
literature.22 This phrase, crucially placed in the programmatic question, reinforces the 
universal sweep of the thematic statement in verse 2. Qoheleth’s extensive use of this 
phrase points us to the main area of activity for human beings. It evokes the oppressive 
heat of the human workplace in the ancient Near East and its widespread use throughout 
the book is most likely intended by the learned sage to distinguish the created world of 
the living from the heavens and the world of the dead (laX). As Michael Fox has 
commented, “. . . most of the facts that Qohelet observes “under the sun” can hardly be 
imagined to exist in any other domain but human life,”23 an observation strongly 
reinforced by Qoheleth himself when he distinguished the divine and human domains in 
4:17 [ET 5:1] “. . . for God is in heaven and you upon earth;” 
 It is most significant that in this opening question Qoheleth frontloads two other 
key words for the reader’s attention: !wrty = “profit, advantage,” and lm[ = “work, toil.” 
We will not explore their importance at the moment as their significance in the lexicon 
of Qoheleth will become apparent as this chapter, and the next, unfolds. Considering 
that in 1:2 there is a fivefold use of the lbh leitmotif, and in 1:3 we have the use of !wrty, 
lm[, and the phrase XmXh txt, it will not be surprising to observe that repetition of key 
words and phrases by Qoheleth represents a notable use of this literary device to telling 
effect. 
1.3   Ecclesiastes 1: 4 - 7 
Consequent upon Qoheleth’s forthright announcement of his cosmic lbh theme (verse 
                                                
 22 The phrase is of course known in other Semitic literature. Earlier Semitic parallels are, the 
Elamite inscription of the twelfth century BCE; the Phoenician inscriptions of Tabnit from the sixth 
century BCE, and Eshmunazar, from the fifth century BCE. It is also mentioned in the Gilgamesh Epic, 
“Only the gods [live] forever under the sun. As for mankind, numbered are their days; whatever they 
achieve is but wind.” (Akkadian version from the neo-Assyrian period). Cited in Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 
60. 
 23 Fox, A Time to Tear Down and a Time to Build Up: A Rereading of Ecclesiastes (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 165.  
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2) and the rhetorical !wrty question (verse 3),24 the author immediately responds to these 
negative tones by presenting to the readers his own distinctive understanding of the 
relationship which obtains between people and the world. Salyer aptly observes: “After 
inviting the reader through the doorway to Qoheleth’s consciousness in 1:2-3, the 
frame-narrator proceeds to give a short guided tour of the narrator’s world in 1:4-11.”25 
Qoheleth begins the tour with these memorable words in 1:4.     
 
 A generation goes, and a generation comes, but the earth remains forever.    
 
The term rwd (generation) has occasioned some debate among commentators. The issue 
is: does rwd refer to the cycles of nature or to the passing of human generations? Most 
commentators adopt the latter position. Ogden, however, argues for the former. He 
writes,           
 The contrast in 1:4 is not between the natural order as permanent and mankind as transient, as 
 generations moving across a permanent world; it is between the ebb and flow of nature, its 
 perennial and cyclic movement on the one hand, and on the other, a world-order which 
 remains fixed and immutable. 26         
Norman Whybray also takes the view that rwd appears to have a cyclical connotation.27 
His approach is not surprising due to the fact that he believes Qoheleth to be a 
“Preacher of Joy.”28 Thus he tends towards giving a positive interpretation of 1:1-11, as 
does Ogden. For example, Whybray asserts that the word lbh does not occur in verses 
4-11 and remarks that, “Nature is observed without such comment.” From the context of 
1:1-11, and the book as a whole, however, it is very difficult to view Qoheleth extolling 
the “Wonders of Nature.”29 According to James Crenshaw, “The word dôr, an 
                                                
 
 24 There is some discussion as to whether verse 3 is a rhetorical question. It seems clear that it is. 
Fox, A Rereading, 165, points out that a negative answer is implicit in the choice of the term rwd to 
designate human activities, and the negativism of lbh and !wrty in verse 2. 
 
  25  Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 262. 
  26 Ogden, “The Interpretation of Dôr in Ecclesiastes 1: 4,” JSOT  34 (1986): 91-92, esp. 92. See 
M. Fox, “Qohelet 1:4,” JSOT 40 (1988): 109, who responds by saying that rwd never means “cycle” in 
Hebrew. D. N. Freedman and J. Lundbom, TDOT 3: 174, however, positively confirm that any reference 
to eras in the word rwd is firmly based on the notion of human generations. 
             27 R. N. Whybray, “Ecclesiastes 1: 5-7 and the Wonders of Nature,” JSOT 13 (1988): 105-12; 
repr. pages 233-39 in Reflecting With Solomon: Selected Studies on the Book of Ecclesiastes (ed. Roy B. 
Zuck, Grand Rapids: Baker Books), 1994. 
  28 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 87-98. 
       29  N. Lohfink, Qoheleth, affirms (at 40) that, “The poem praises the cosmos as glorious and 
eternal in this image of cyclic return.” 
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appropriate choice because of its ambiguity, suggests both nature and people. The 
primary sense here is probably the former: the generations of natural phenomena.”30 But 
as noted above, it is unlikely that there is any ambiguity in the term.  
 Immediately following verse 4, in verses 5-7 there is a list of natural 
phenomena. The general sense of this verse is clear. The sun goes down and thus 
hastens (pants) to the place where it rises. Since in pre-scientific times the movement of 
the sun was held to be cyclical (so here), one might expect that this would apply to the 
other listed phenomena – the wind, and the streams flowing to the sea. The nature of 
these activities has a certain monotony that is brought to the reader’s attention by the 
dense repetition of words: “generation” (verse 4), “sun” (verse 5), “wind” (verse 6), 
“streams” (verse 7), and “sea” (verse 7). Moreover, the verb $lh = (to go) occurs no less 
than six times in verses 4-7; bbs = “to go round” is found in verse 6, and a few other 
verbs appear twice. The plethora of participles, fifteen in all, is staggering in this short 
passage. As Crenshaw has noted, “The breadth of nuance is remarkable, for $lwh yields 
the following senses: die (verse 4), blow (verse 6 twice), flow (verse 7, twice).”31 
  Many interpreters, ancient and modern, have adopted the cyclical view of the 
natural phenomena depicted in verses 5-7. According to this interpretation the prologue 
is viewed as an analogy between the passing of human generations and cycles of nature. 
Typical of this approach is Murphy’s comment, “The point of their constant repetition, 
which serves as an analogue to aimless and futile experience.” 32 Stuart Weeks, 
however, advances an alternative view:   
 
  Qoheleth is concerned here neither with human ephemerality per se, nor with some cyclical 
   aspect to human existence, but with the fact that each human life is too short to observe the 
   true character of the world (physical and human), while each human memory is too short  
  for humanity as a whole to accumulate such an understanding.33   
  
                                                
  30 J. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 62. Doug Ingram, Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes (LHBOTS 431; New 
York: T & T Clark International, 2006), at 59, adopts this “two meanings” approach to rwd, which leads to 
claim that this “lends immense irony to the observation that the stage on which the human drama is 
played outlasts the actors themselves.”  
  31 J. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 65.  Arian J. C. Verheij, “Words Speaking For Themselves: On the 
Poetics of Qohelet 1:4-7,” in Give Ear to My Words: Psalms and Other Poetry in and Around the Hebrew 
Bible: Essays in Honour of Professor N. A. van Uchelen (ed. Janet Dyk; Amsterdam: Societas Hebraica 
Amstelodamensis, 1996), 183-8, considers how the contents of 1:4-7 are reflected by its form. He 
concludes (at 188) that, “The writer shows great ingenuity in manipulating his language to this effect. 
Morphology, phonology, syntax and the lexicon in this poem create a world of words that resembles the 
world of things as Qohelet sees it: a world of continuous movement.”  
 32 Murphy, Ecclesiastes (WBC 23a; Dallas: Word, 1992), 9.  
  33 Weeks, Unpublished script on Ecclesiastes. 
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This interpretation, I suggest, fits in much better, not only with the immediate context, 
but with Qoheleth’s outlook on life throughout the book. Regarding the interpretation of 
the ensuing verses, Weeks holds that the relationship between verses 5 and 6a poses 
difficulties for the cyclical view. In the Hebrew text of verse 6a there is no explicit 
subject in the first half of the verse; each of the two clauses begins with a participle, 
$lwh = (goes) and bbws = (goes round) respectively. In verse 5, the sun rises, goes down, 
and hurries (pants) back to the place where it rises. But in verse 6 the subject of the 
verse (the wind) is delayed (five participles appear before xwrh = (the wind), which 
could give the immediate impression to the reader that the subject is the sun.34 
   On balance, Weeks recognizes that there is a certain ambiguity, deliberate or 
not, regarding the interpretation of verses 5 and 6, and so prefers not to force one 
subject or the other on verse 6a.35 But in assessing the meaning of verses 5-7, he 
maintains that consideration must be given to verse 8. Here, discussion has focused on 
the first clause, particularly the meaning of ~y[gy ~yrbdh-lk = (All words/things are 
weary).36 Bearing the close proximity of the term ~yrbdh with its cognate verb rbdl 
(verse 8a), Weeks turns verse 8a into a rhetorical question thus, 
  When all words are worn out, can one no longer speak?    
  An eye will not be too sated for seeing, nor an ear filled with listening. 
                                                
 34 According to L. Wilson, “Artful Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes 1:1-11. A Wisdom Technique?” in 
Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (ed. by Antoon Schoors, Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (BETL 
136: Leuven: University Press and Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), 357-65, this unexpected reference to the 
wind as subject is “ . . . an example of deliberate, purposeful, artful ambiguity.” (at 358). In similar vein, 
E. M. Good, “The Unfilled Sea: Style and Meaning in Ecclesiastes 1:2-11,” in Israelite Wisdom: 
Theological Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien  (ed. J. G. Gammie et al.; New York: Scholars 
Press, 1978), 59-73. 
  35 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism (LHBOTS 541; New York: T&T Clark International, 
2012), at 49. For the time-honoured exegesis that vv. 5-6 represent a literary unit whose subject is the 
sun, see Sara Japhet, “ ‘Goes to the South and turns to the North’ (Ecclesiastes 1:6): The Sources and 
History of Exegetical Traditions,” JSQ 1 (1993/94): 289-322. 
  36 The term ~yrbd can refer to “words” and “things,” but it only means “words” in the other 
contexts in which it occurs in Qoheleth. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, states (at 66) that,“ The translation 
“words” may be too restrictive for Qohelet frequently uses vocabulary that connotes two different 
meanings at the same time.” He further remarks that the argument that all other uses of the plural ~yrbd in 
Ecclesiastes connoting “words,” including 1:8, is “persuasive only for interpreters who posit absolute 
consistency of linguistic usage to the author.” Very few scholars would hold to “absolute consistency of 
linguistic usage” for any biblical author. Crenshaw’s preference for the rendering “things” is more in 
keeping with his understanding of Qoheleth’s negative vision of the world. In any case, the rendering 
“words” for ~yrbd fits in much better with the immediate context where the emphasis is on speaking 
(words), hearing and seeing. Regarding the term ~y[gy = “wearisome,” Graham Ogden Qoheleth (2nd ed. 
Readings: A New Bible Commentary. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2007) denies (at 37) that the term has 
negative connotations. He suggests that the root [gy 12:12 speaks of the fruit of one’s labour, and on that 
basis a positive rendering is also appropriate for ~y[gy in 1:8. This is very doubtful in the context of 1:2-11.  
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On this translation, Qoheleth is not merely concluding his discussion from natural 
phenomena: “These human actions – speaking, seeing, and hearing- similarly reach no 
conclusion, but they are quite definitely not cyclical. Taken altogether, then, verses 5 to 
8 offer a list of activities characterized not by circularity or repetition, but by their 
common lack of completion and consummation.”37  
1.4   Ecclesiastes 1: 9-11   
Qoheleth now, in verse 9, appears to move the discussion in a new direction.  
 What has been is what will be,         
 and what has been done, is what will be done;       
 there is nothing new under the sun.  
    
These observations do not flow naturally from the subject matter in verses 5-8. It seems 
more persuasive to understand verses 9-11 in conjunction with verse 6 regarding the 
claim that the world is constant.     
  Verses 9-11 can be interpreted as an attack on the wisdom tradition on two 
counts. First, Qoheleth claims that no one is able to speak due to the inadequacies of 
human memory (verse 11). But the more important aspect to these verses is the claim 
that there is nothing new under the sun (verse 9b). The implication of this statement is 
that, since there is nothing new under the sun, humans are seriously limited in their 
knowledge of what will happen in the future due to the unpredictability of events. 
Hence, knowing the right time to speak and act is highly problematic. The inability to 
know what will happen despite all the appearance of routine is a crucial issue for 
Qoheleth that is reiterated throughout the book.  
  Qoheleth’s understanding of history seems out of kilter with Hebrew 
historiography thus putting himself on a collision course with Israel’s prophets who 
proclaimed that God was going to do new things for his people. As David Hubbard has 
noted, Qoheleth’s attitude completely ignores the concept of redemptive (salvation) 
history that we find in the eighth century prophets.38 Mic 6:5 reminded the Israelites of 
Yahweh’s past deliverances so that, “you may know the saving acts of the Lord.”  
Qoheleth’s claim that there is nothing new runs counter to Deutero-Isaiah’s insight, 
“Behold, the former things have come to pass, and new things I now declare; before 
they spring forth I tell you of them” (Isa 42:9). And again, in 43:19, “Behold, I am 
                                                
  37  Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 52.  
  38  D. Hubbard, Beyond Futility (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 20-21. It should, however, be 
noted that the concept salvation-history is also absent in Job and Proverbs. 
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doing a new thing; now it springs forth, do you not perceive it?” Other prophets, circa 
the exilic period, also announced the impending awareness of newness. Ezek (18:31; 
36:26) speaks of a new heart and new spirit; Jeremiah announces a new thing on earth 
(31:22) and a new covenant (31:31). Trito-Isaiah’s eschatological vision was for a new 
heaven and a new earth that would endure forever (66:22).    
  The possibility of radical newness does not come within the purview of 
Qoheleth. For him, “there is nothing new under the sun,” and “there is no remembrance 
of former things, nor those who come after,” all of which resonates with his view in 
verse 4 that generations go and come: “Just as verse 4 sets the passing of generations 
beside the lasting constancy of the world, so these verses (9-11) now assert the 
inadequacy of human memory, perhaps cumulative human memory, when confronted 
by the vast spans of the world’s existence.”39  
1.5    Qoheleth’s Quests: Introduction 
After the very impersonal style of the poem on nature, 1:3-11, it is clear that verse 12 
points to the beginnings of a new literary unit. There is truly a sea change in both mood 
and person compared with the preceding section. “From its focus upon the world in 
general the text now focalizes on the experience of the world by an individual person.”40 
With the agility of a weathervane, the reader is immediately catapulted into the private 
experience of Qoheleth by these attention-grabbing words: `~lXwryb larXy-l[ $lm ytyyh 
tlhq yna = “I Qoheleth, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem.” With this grand 
opening of Qoheleth’s royal credentials we are presented with the notion of a “royal” 
experiment, for only a king would be in a position to carry out such an all-embracing 
enterprise.41 Thus begins the most striking and original monologue to be found in the 
Hebrew Bible. From this point onwards we are transported into the very private and 
personal world of a highly unusual sage.         
1.6   Ecclesiastes 1:12-2:3          
There is a consensus of opinion that the section, 1:12-2:26 presents the reader with a 
                                                
 39 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 54.  
  40 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 271. 
  41 Seow, Ecclesiastes, points out (at 144) that Qoheleth’s self-presentation is reminiscent of the 
introduction of kings in royal inscriptions throughout the ancient Near East. He views it as a type of royal 
propaganda, thereby giving much added weight and authority to what is to follow. See also T. Longman, 
Fictional Akkadian Autobiography (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1991). He affirms (at 215) that this type 
of introduction, “I, _______ King of,” is a well known autobiographical tradition in the Near East.  
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fictional royal autobiography, a genre well attested in the ancient Near East.42 This royal 
setting initially ensures that the speaker will be given rapt attention. The natural 
expectation of the reader is that the king will relate extraordinary achievements, the 
anticipated conclusion being that he will have attained a high level of success and 
personal satisfaction in the process. But a different tone emerges in the verses that 
ensue. 
  Instantly, Qoheleth sets out his agenda. He informs his readership that he is 
launching out on an investigation in vv 13-15. 43   
  13 [I]. . . applied my mind to seek and to search out by wisdom all that is done under heaven; it 
  is an unhappy business that God has given to human beings to be busy with.  
  14 I saw all the deeds that are done under the sun; and see, all is hebel and a chasing after wind.44
  15 What is crooked cannot be made straight, and what is lacking cannot be counted. 
 
The language of vv 13-14a clearly demonstrates the intensity of Qoheleth’s quest. In 
addition, the ambit of his aspiring endeavours has a universal sweep. As James 
Crenshaw has noted, “Qoheleth undertakes an impossible task: the exploration of 
everything within human experience. This scope extends far beyond the modest pursuits 
of earlier sages.”45 Indeed, his investigations concern “all that is done under heaven” 
(~ymXh txt hX[n rXa-lk l[). But the nature of his claim goes much further than this for 
he specifically states that he, personally, has seen all the deeds (everything) that are 
done under the sun (XmXh txt wX[nX ~yX[mh-lk-ta ytyar), v 14a. As Alexander A. Fischer 
puts it, verses 13-15 are absorbed with “die Gesamtheit menschlichen Tuns” = “The 
totality of human activity.”46 No other writer in the Hebrew Bible makes such a 
dogmatic claim as this.        
  The initial verb yttnw = “I gave/applied,” governs the ensuing two infinitives, 
                                                
 42 The presentation of Qoheleth to his readership has parallels in the ancient Near East. For 
example, “I am Mesha son of Chemosh-[Yat], king of Moab,” in J. B. Pritchard, ed. Ancient Near 
Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament (3d ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 320; “I 
am Yehawmilk, king of Byblos,” idem, 656; and “I am Sennacherib, king of Assyria,” in  D. D. 
Luckenbill, ed.; Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia Vol 2; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1926-
27; repr., 1989, 193. 
  43 H. W. Hertzberg, Der Prediger (KAT 17/4; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 
1963), 81, refers to 1:12-15 as “Das Programm”; H. Louis Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth (Texts and 
Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America 17; New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of 
America, 1950), 4. This view is only partial correct, I suggest, as Qoheleth proceeds to further elaboration 
on his enterprise in 1:16-2:26. There is also a further nuanced edge to Qoheleth’s agenda (programme) in 
7:23-29. 
  44 I am leaving this term untranslated for the moment. The meaning and significance of this 
prominent term in the book will be considered in the next chapter. 
  45 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 72.  So also A. A. Fischer, “Beobachtungen zur Komposition von 
Kohelet 1:3-3:15,” ZAW 103 (1991): 72-86, at 76.   
  46 Fischer, “Beobachtungen,” at 76. 
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Xwrdl = “to seek,” and rwtlw = “to explore/spy.” George Barton states that “search” and 
“explore” are synonyms that refer to different methods of investigation. “Search,” he 
holds, means to investigate the roots of a matter, and “explore” points to investigations 
of a subject on all sides.47 Crenshaw explains the distinction by observing that the first 
verb indicates the length and breadth of the search, while the second adds the inner 
depth dimension, the penetration beyond the surface of reality.48 Whatever the merits of 
the distinction, certainly the coupling of these two infinitives strongly suggests the 
comprehensive nature and earnestness of Qoheleth’s enterprise.     
  There is a strong sense of verbal continuity between these verses and 1:2-3. The 
emphatic lbh theme in v 2 is picked up in v 14b (lbh lkh), and the human activity 
referred to in v 3 (wlm[-lkb) is echoed in v 13, which focuses on all human activity under 
heaven (~ymXh txt hX[n rXa-lk l[). The negative outcome of the rhetorical question in v 
3 is confirmed in v 14 in which Qoheleth concludes that human work is but lbh and a 
chasing after wind. It seems that for Qoheleth, human work is directly linked to 
irredeemable loss, which represents for him a gigantic deficit (!wrty).  
  A further point of interest is that Qoheleth ostensibly sets out in his 
investigations with a clear methodology (hmkxb) – by wisdom, a stance associated with 
the inherited traditions of earlier sages with their emphasis on observation and 
reflection. Also significant is the fact that in v 13 we have the first mention of God, who 
is not the object of Qoheleth’s praise and adoration but the giver (!tn) of  “an unhappy 
business” ([r !yn[).  James A. Loader comments,  
 
 . . .  all that is done on earth is an unhappy business with which God burdens men and is 
 therefore meaningless. A more negative judgment of human labor is hardly possible . . . man is 
 inescapably doomed to toil at his senseless and vexing labor because God has laid it on him.49 
 
The negative view of human toil in these verses is further endorsed by the aphorism 
cited in v 15. What the exact reference here is difficult to determine, but emendation of 
the text is unnecessary, as some commentators have suggested. The essential point is 
that in Qoheleth’s opinion certain tasks in life are insoluble, whether one’s highly 
acclaimed wisdom is applied or not. The last line could indicate that there is little point 
                                                
  47 Barton, Ecclesiastes, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Ecclesiastes (ICC; 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1912), at 78. So also R. Gordis, Koheleth: The Man and His World: A Study of 
Ecclesiastes. 3d aug. ed. New York: Schocken, 1968), at 209. 
  48 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 72.  
  49 Loader, Ecclesiastes: A Practical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 25. 
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in planning to spend if a method of execution is not available.50  
  One might suspect that Qoheleth would now push forward to offer a defence of 
his negative conclusions relating to all human activity; instead, he moves into a more 
reflective mode in vv 16-18 and adopts a very introverted perspective by talking to 
himself (ybl-~[ yna ytrbd).  
  16 I said to myself, “I have acquired great wisdom, surpassing all who were over Jerusalem 
 before me; and my mind has had great experience of wisdom and knowledge.”  
 17 And I applied my mind to know wisdom and to know madness and folly. I perceived that this 
 also is but a chasing after wind.       
 18 For in much wisdom is much vexation, and those who increase in knowledge increase in 
  pain.51 
 
The wording here suggests that Qoheleth is moving into a more intellectual frame of 
mind, there being a noticeable shift from his wording in v 13a, where wisdom is his 
methodological tool - hmkxb = “by wisdom,” to the desirable acquisition and possession 
of hmkx per se, in v 17a.  
  Qoheleth’s interest now moves from the subject of human activity to an 
exploration of wisdom and its associated counterparts – twlkXw twllwh = “madness and 
folly.” (v 17). There is no restraint shown here by the sage. His claims in v 16 could not 
be described as measured; indeed, his acclaimed superiority relating to his wisdom and 
knowledge, over all who preceded him in Jerusalem, is tantamount to a virtual claim of 
omniscience. Qoheleth seems to be seeking meaning and purpose in life as well as !wrty, 
but not withstanding his self - proclaimed status as a sage, his conclusion remains 
negative. This time he omits the descriptive term lbh, but he still comes to the decisive 
conclusion that there is no advantage accruing from his great experience of wisdom and 
knowledge.   
  The seemingly arbitrary introduction of “madness” and “folly” in verse 17 is, at 
first glance, most unusual. It does appear paradoxical, even contradictory, that a man 
with such a self-propelling ego, who claims to possess such an exalted level of 
achievement as a wise man, would embark on an enterprise to explore wisdom, and 
madness and folly. Perhaps as Qoheleth thought about wisdom and knowledge he 
                                                
  50 It is instructive to observe Qoheleth’s outlook on life with that of the Egyptian educational 
text, The Instruction of Ani, which refers to pedagogical issues. The main character offers the assertion 
that a crooked stick can be corrected, an observation notably more positive than Qoheleth’s claim. As 
Weeks, Ecclesiastes (OBC; ed. J. Barton and J. Muddiman; Oxford: OUP, 2001), at 424, puts it, this text 
“. . . does emphasize Qoheleth’s distance from more optimistic ideas of human effectiveness.” Optimism 
in Qoheleth’s outlook appears to be in short supply, as we will observe at various stages in this study.  
 51 The noun bwakm = “pain” (BDB, 456) is a more accurate rendering (so Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 
51). 
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wanted to keep the alternative counterparts in view in order to thoroughly maximize his 
enterprise. Loader’s assessment is - “Qoheleth takes to folly in order to see if something 
positive may be said of it – having just established that such a thing cannot be said of 
wisdom.”52             
 Verse 18 is cast in the form of an aphorism (cf. v 15). The asservative yk links this 
verse to the previous ones by way of supporting evidence. This saying seems like a 
warning from a teacher to a student that learning and intellectual discovery cannot be 
achieved without some effort and pain (even corporal punishment).53 However, 
Qoheleth puts a different interpretation of the adage. Pain and vexation are brought 
about by wisdom and knowledge. Whether this is a quotation or written by Qoheleth is 
impossible to say, but what is clear is that those who strive to attain more wisdom and 
knowledge will face mental anguish and pain. 
 Despite Qoheleth’s confession of failure in his quest for wisdom and knowledge, he 
moves on to another investigation. On this occasion, it is neither human work, nor 
wisdom and knowledge that attract his attention but the human sensations of pleasure 
that are now pushed to the forefront of our attention. He writes at the beginning of 
chapter 2:- 
  
 1 I said to myself, “Come now, I will make a test of pleasure; enjoy yourself.” But again, this 
 also was hebel.  
  2 I said of laughter, “It is mad,” and of pleasure, “What use is it?” 
 
With these words Qoheleth completes his trilogy of investigations into human work, 
human wisdom and now, human pleasure. In all these areas, Qoheleth reaches a 
negative conclusion, though his negative response in these two verses is expressed more 
explicitly about pleasure and laughter. In brief, for Qoheleth, all are without meaning or 
value. Immediately following this very pessimistic evaluation of pleasure, Qoheleth 
appears to set out on another investigation in 2:3.  
 
 3 I searched with my mind how to cheer my body with wine – my mind still guiding me with 
 wisdom – and how to lay hold on folly, until I might see what was good for mortals to do under 
 heaven during the few days of their life. 
Though the meaning of this verse is obscure in the Hebrew, the general thrust of the 
meaning points to a new investigation. Up to this point Qoheleth appears to be carrying 
                                                
 52 Loader, Polar Structures in the Book of Qohelet (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979), 40. 
 53 Michel, Untersuchungen, interprets this verse as a warning rather than as an encouragement, 
which may have been its original meaning in an educational context. As Michel would have it, "Ohne 
Fleiß kein Preis . . . Eine Fülle von Wissen und Kenntnis macht nicht glücklich und zufrieden, sondern 
führt zu Kummer und Leiden an der Welt!” (At 14): “No pain no gain … A wealth of knowledge does not 
make you happy and satisfied, but leads to grief and suffering in the world.” 
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out a cerebral conversation about his investigations as indicated by the terminology –  
 “I applied my mind to seek and to search . . .” 1:13, 
  “I said to myself . . .” 1:16; 2:1, 
  “I applied my mind to know . . .” 1:17, 
  “I searched with my mind. . .” 2:3. 
Given the very private nature of Qoheleth’s investigations, which is indicated by the 
pleonastic use of the personal pronoun yna in each of these projects 1:12-15, 16-18, 2:1-
2, and the dominant use of the personal pronoun generally in this chapter, the 
impression that emerges is that of a man self-absorbed with no engagement with his 
contemporaries. In this respect it is hugely significant that the verb [mX = “to hear, 
listen” is never used by Qoheleth of himself as he reflects on life under the sun. To 
listen to others implies that as one listens, one learns and acquires knowledge. But for 
Qoheleth, he prefers to declare what he knows ([dy), what he sees (har), and what he 
finds (acm). [Epistemologically speaking, these verbs are, potentially, of crucial 
importance in the book, and their role in Qoheleth’s epistemic claims will occupy our 
attention in later chapters]. 
  In the immediate context of Qoheleth’s agenda, however, the vocabulary used 
undoubtedly points to an experiential dimension. What is quite remarkable in this 
chapter is the dominance of the use of the first person pronoun by Qoheleth.54 With 
these verses, then, we enter the deeply personal, existential reality of Qoheleth’s 
concrete experiences, which points to an experiential tone that is new to wisdom 
literature.55  
1.7   Ecclesiastes 2:4-11 
Chapter 2: 4-8 form a catalogue of pleasurable projects: creating great works like 
building projects; making reservoirs for irrigating vineyards, gardens and parks, and 
planting a variety of fruit trees. Qoheleth also acquired male and female slaves, and 
accumulated substantial herds and flocks of animals. His success in searching and 
gathering silver and gold, and the treasures of kings and provinces (these being the 
                                                
  54 For an assessment see Bo Isaksson, Studies in the Language of Qoheleth: Emphasis on the 
Verbal System (Studia Semetica Upsaliensia 10; Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1987), 163 -71. The 
chart on page 167 reveals the immense concentration of the personal pronoun in chapter 2. 
  55 So Ellen F. Davis, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Songs (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2000), 177.  
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symbols of monarchial power)56 presented him with the ability to acquire male and 
female singers, and “man’s delight” – many concubines.57 
  Verses 9-11 form a kind of summary to Qoheleth’s intensive experiment with 
pleasure. All of this diverse activity, he claimed, excelled the achievements of his 
predecessors in Jerusalem (v 9a).  
 So I became great and surpassed all who were before me in Jerusalem.  
 
This monumental claim to greatness echoes his superior claims made in 1:16 where 
emphasis was laid on his great experience of wisdom and knowledge. And he confirms 
in v 9b that, “… my wisdom remained with me,” despite his excursion into a full-
blooded appropriation of pleasure. Verse 10 drives home to the reader the all-embracing 
nature of his intense engagement with pleasure.  
 
 10 Whatever my eyes desired I did not keep from them; I kept my heart from no pleasure, for 
 my heart found pleasure in all my toil, and this was my reward for all my toil. 
 
Qoheleth unquestionably found pleasure in this experiment; it was his portion, reward 
(qlx) from all his toil.58 Qoheleth’s experiment with pleasure was in his own words, a 
very intensive affair. But his words, “I kept my heart from no pleasure,” directly 
contravenes the admonition in Numbers 15:39 when Moses told the people to keep the 
commandments and “not follow the lust of your own hearts and your own eyes.” This 
did not appear to be a limiting factor controlling Qoheleth’s conduct. In any case, he 
viewed his experiment as a success for it gave him hxmX = “pleasure, joy.”  
 There is a positive feel to verse 10 as well as a total commitment on Qoheleth’s 
part to get the most from his experiment in pleasure. Qoheleth’s purpose in v 3b, cited 
above, was to determine “what was good for mortals to do under heaven during the few 
                                                
   56 To what extent the royal persona extends in the first two chapters is a question that invites 
scholarly discussion. Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, suggests (at 61) that “Qohelet does not seem to 
recount the establishment of his business in terms that are deliberately evocative of Solomon, and 2:4-8 
is, at best, muted in its references to kingship more generally.” Weeks is therefore more inclined to see 
Qoheleth as a business-man than a king (esp. at 62). But why cannot Qoheleth be viewed as a king and a 
business-man? There is nothing inherently contradictory in being viewed as both.    
  57 The meaning of twdXw hdX is uncertain. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, translates “-a mistress, many 
mistresses.” (At 69). Seow, Ecclesiastes, suggests (at 131-2) that the terms may be related to a 
Postbiblical Hebrew term iddâ = “chest, box.”  The construction is a singular noun followed by the same 
noun in the plural, and while the phrase is obscure, the context determines the meaning. Most scholars 
agree that the phrase, only found here in the Hebrew Bible, refers to sensual gratification in the context of 
these verses.   
 58 The term qlx is another of Qoheleth’s key words. It is found in 2:10, 21; 3:22; 5:17-18 [ET 
5:18-19]; 9:6, 9. Some scholars view qlx as distinct in meaning from !wrty. For example, D. Michel, 
Untersuchungen, holds (at 19-20) qlx as referring to something that is momentary, while wrty is 
something permanent. For him, qlx is time (t[), - !wrty is ~lw[ (at 20).  
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days of their life.” Now that the experiment has come to an end he delivers his 
considered judgment with unhesitating candour.  
 
 11 Then I considered all that my hands had done and the toil I had spent in doing it, and again, 
 all was hebel and a chasing after wind, and there was nothing to be gained under the sun. 
 
As E. H. Plumptre puts it, “There was no real “profit” that could take its place among 
his permanent possessions, no surplus to his credit on the balance-sheet of life.”59 In his 
decisively negative response, Qoheleth draws on several of his crucial word/phrases: 
lbh lkh, XmXh txt, xwr tw[r, and !wrty. Another of Qoheleth’s prominent key words lm[, 
is used four times in verses 10 and 11.60  
 
1.8 Ecclesiastes 2: 12-23 
Qoheleth has already, if ever so briefly, touched on the topic of wisdom, madness and 
folly in 1:17, and came to a negative judgment by using one of his key phrases xwr tw[rw 
= “a chasing after wind.” His intense and comprehensive experiment with pleasure 
fared no better (2:1-11). Qoheleth, one might say, “had it all, saw it all, and did it all;” 
yet, with this experiment of self-gratification, a firm and negative conclusion is 
forcefully confirmed. In his own words, XmXh txt !wrty !yaw xwr tw[rw lbh lkh hnhw (2:11). 
  Coming to verse 12, the opening phrase yna ytynpw = “So I turned . . .” echoes the  
opening phrase of the previous verse, yna ytynpw, thus providing verbal continuity.  
Notably, both phrases have the pleonastic use of the first person yna, which tends to 
emphasize Qoheleth’s seriousness in his intent and outlook. Verse 12 announces the 
topics that are to follow: 12a raises the issue of wisdom and folly (vv 13-17); 12b, raises 
the problem of succession.61 The contents of verses 13-14a reflect the language of 
tradition wisdom literature as found in Proverbs and Job.      
 13 Then I saw that wisdom excels folly as light excels darkness,    
 14a The wise have eyes in their head, but fools walk in darkness. 
 
But immediately Qoheleth begins the process of deconstructing this aphorism. He 
writes,               
 
                                                
 
 59  E. H. Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 118.  
 60 The use of lm[ in the book has, in the main, negative connotations. There are thirty-five 
occurrences of lm[ in various forms in Ecclesiastes: twenty-two as nouns and thirteen as verbs.  
  61 The meaning of v 12b is far from clear. The intricacies of the debate need not concern us here, 
but suffice to say that the reference to the “king” suggests succession problems after Solomon’s demise. 
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   14b Yet I perceived that the same fate befalls all of them.      
  15 Then I said to myself, “What happens to the fool, will happen to me also; why then have I 
  been very wise?” And I said to myself that this also is vanity. 
 
It is at this point that the reader becomes conscious of the first clear sign of tension in 
the book. According to Fox, 2:13-14a “is a superlative affirmation of the superiority of 
wisdom over folly.62 Yet vv 14b-15 yield a sober recognition of the ultimate equality of 
circumstance: - the leveling effect of death on the wise and the foolish alike. Hence, 
what use is wisdom? And there is also the fact that vv 13-14a sits ill at ease with 
Qoheleth’s comments in 2:11 where he painfully concluded that all his deeds amounted 
to lbh, like chasing after wind, with no lasting gain achieved under the sun. As we shall 
observe later, this is not the only tension in the thought of this sensitive sage. 
  In verse 16 Qoheleth goes on to say that there is no enduring remembrance of 
either the wise or foolish persons, which echoes the reference at 1:11 where he states 
that there will not be any remembrance of people yet to come, by those who come after 
them. Tersely stated, the wise man and the fool have two things in common: all will die, 
and all will be forgotten. Qoheleth drives these reflections home by floating the 
question, “How can the wise die just like fools?” (v 16b). The depth of his desperation 
is powerfully expressed in the next verse. 
  17 So I hated life, because what is done under the sun was grievous to me; for all is lbh and a 
  chasing after wind. 
 
Qoheleth’s despair appears to deepen. Not only does he hate life, he states that he hates 
all his toil because he has to leave it to someone else (v18).     
  In the segment vv 18-23 it becomes very clear just what is eating away at his 
mind. Qoheleth is deeply troubled because he has no choice in respect of leaving his 
property to those who come after him.  
  19 - and who knows whether they will be wise or foolish? Yet they will be master of all for 
  which I toiled and used my wisdom under the sun. This also is lbh. 
 
This anguish of Qoheleth’s spirit reflects something of a response to his initial 
programmatic question in 1:3, the implication of that important question being that 
there is no permanent or lasting gain accruing from all his labours under the sun.  
  But there is another disturbing cause of concern for the unhappy sage in that he 
is still fixated on this pressing problem of toil (lm[). Thus with his characteristic phrase, 
yna ytwbsw, which indicates a new direction, he writes: 
  20 So I turned and gave my heart up to despair concerning all the toil of my labors under the sun.  
                                                
  62 Fox, A Rereading, 183. 
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The deeply troubling aspect that now surfaces in Qoheleth’s mind is that, despite the 
wisdom, knowledge, and skill he exercised over a lifetime of toil, the fruits of his work 
will inexorably pass to someone “who did not toil for it” (v 21b). This despairing 
realization immediately elicits another hebel refrain. `hbr h[rw lbh hz-~g = “This also is 
lbh and a great evil.”   
  In vv 22-23 the pain and grief is palpable; it is as if, on further reflection, 
Qoheleth can hardly bear the thought of the lack of permanence which is attached to all 
his material achievements.  
  22 What do mortals get from all the toil and strain with which they toil under the sun? 
  23  For all their days are full of pain, and their work is a vexation; even at night their minds do 
  not rest. This also is lbh.  
 
This rhetorical question echoes the first one to occur in the book: “What does man gain 
by all the toil at which he toils under the sun? (1:3).” But here in v 22 Qoheleth omits 
his favourite term !wrty (profit, advantage) using the more ambiguous hwh which has the 
basic sense of “fall” or “happen.”         
 Verses 22-23 deliver a resounding negative assessment, which is communicated to 
the reader by the specific vocabulary employed. Thus we find the key word lm[ is used 
twice in v 22 along with the term !wy[rbw (!wy[r) meaning “striving, longing.” Qoheleth’s 
much used phrase, XmXh txt = “under the sun.” is also found in verse 22 (cf. verses 17, 
18, 19, 20, 22). During the toil of daylight hours there is s[kw ~ybakm = “pain and 
vexation” (cf. 1:18 where s[k-br hmkx brb yk = “For in much wisdom is much 
vexation”). And at night there is no mental refreshment from the turmoil of the day, 
which for Qoheleth has only one consequence: insomnia (v 23b). Thus Qoheleth comes 
to a resigned inevitability about his toil, once more having recourse to his cosmic 
theme” - awh lbh hz-~g. 
1:9  Ecclesiastes 2:24-26 
 
Verse 24 opens with the form bwj-!ya = “There is nothing better than . . .” which occurs 
on three further occasions in the book, 3:12, 22; and 8:15.63 In this superlative manner  
Qoheleth sets up his response to the programmatic question in 1:3,64 a question that we 
                                                
 63 For a discussion of the function of this form see G. Ogden, “Qoheleth’s Use Of The “Nothing 
Is Better” – Form,” JBL 98 (1979): 339-50; ________, “The "Better"-Proverb (Tôb-Spruch), Rhetorical 
Criticism, and Qoheleth,” JBL 96 (1977): 489-505. 
 64 According to W. Zimmerli, Die Weisheit des Predigers Salomo (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1936), 
the programmatic question in 1:3 is a fundamental question in the wisdom tradition as a whole (at 18). W. 
Johnstone, “ ‘The Preacher’ as Scientist,” SJT 20 (1967): 210-21, follows a similar line (at 215). “It 
seems to me that the problem at issue in the book is stated in 1.3, ‘what profit is there for man in all his 
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noted is echoed in 2:22.65 Given the positive language of this Tôb-Spruch literary 
device, the reader now expects something of an upbeat response after a journey of 
despondency with Qoheleth’s discourse (1:2-2:23). By this “nothing is better than” 
form, Qoheleth initiates the first of a sevenfold call to enjoyment `wlm[b bwj wXpn-ta harhw 
= literally, “should see for himself good in his toil.”66      
  As one reads 1:3-2:23 we observe the emergence of radical pessimism; now at v 
24 we have a veritable ode to joy. 
  24 There is nothing better for mortals than to eat and drink, and find enjoyment in their toil. This 
  also, I saw, is from the hand of God;        
  25 for apart from him who can eat or who can have enjoyment? 
  26 For to the one who pleases him God gives wisdom and knowledge and joy; but to the sinner  
  he gives the work of gathering and heaping, only to give to one who pleases God. This also is 
  lbh and a chasing after wind.67 
 
When the depressing contents of 1:3-2:23 are carefully considered, the Tôb-Spruch 
form in 24 is a most unexpected opening to what is Qoheleth’s first major summary of 
the preceding material. Unquestionably, Qoheleth’s discourse at v 24 takes off in a 
different direction. As Salyer has it, “The chief effect of the call to enjoyment in 2:24-
26 is to engender a reversal of argumentative direction for the reader.”68  
  However, any attempt to understand these verses must first acknowledge their 
theological setting. As noted earlier, God first appears in the book at 1:13 as the giver of 
an unhappy business ([r !yn[), after which Qoheleth’s thoughts follow a pattern of 
negativity. That negativity is now reversed at v 24. The ability to eat, drink, and to 
enjoy one’s toil is explicitly said to be “from the hand of God” (v 24b).69   
  We noted earlier Qoheleth’s attachment to wisdom and knowledge (1:13, 16-17) 
                                                                                                                                          
work which he does under the sun?’, i.e. what lasting advantage does one derive from the labour and toil 
of life? The following 31 sections form a series of observations of aspects of life, made in the search for 
permanent profit within it.” So also H. L. Ginsberg, Studies in Koheleth, 4. 
 65 Regarding the place of the rhetorical device in wisdom literature as a pedagogical device, G. 
Ogden, “Qoheleth’s Use,” says (at 342) that its purpose is that of “eliciting agreement with the conclusion 
reached as a consequence of certain empirical observations.” 
 66 The other joy passages are found at 3:12-13, 22; 5:17-19 [ET 18-20]; 8:15; 9:7-10; 11:8-10. 
 67 The phrase “apart from him” in v 25 has occasioned some debate. The MT has ynmm #wx = 
“apart from me.” As Fox, A Rereading, 189, has commented, the phrase should read “except for him,” 
meaning except for God. The MT has Qoheleth saying that no one will eat or drink other than himself. 
This would both be irrelevant and untrue in the context. This rendering is supported by LXX, Syr, SyrH, 
and some Hebrew MSS. Also the meaning of the verb Xwxy is disputed, as it has a wide semantic range. 
For full discussion see F. Ellermeier, “Das Verbum Xwx in Koh. 2:25,” ZAW 75 (1963): 197-217; Seow, 
Ecclesiastes, 139-41. The two main options are “to enjoy” or “to worry.” The normal sense found 
elsewhere is “to hasten,” but the context favours the former meaning, “to enjoy.”  
 68 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 293. 
 69 The theme of “God as Giver” is a very important one for Qoheleth as we shall see in chapter 4.  
	   37	  
but he found them to be the source of vexation and sorrow (1:18).  Now, God gives 
wisdom, knowledge, and joy to mankind (vv 25b -26). The important term bwb occurs 52 
times in the book. According to A. Schoors, “Its most striking connotation is that of 
“enjoyable” in connection with Qoh’s advice to enjoy the good things of life.”70 
Schoors goes on to observe that “. . . bwb never refers to an absolute good but always  
means “good for the human being.”71 However, in the light of the opening words of v 
26, a qualification of this assessment is called for. The gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and 
joy are not available to everyone as God only apportions these gifts to those who please 
him (~yhlah ynpl bwjl). But to the sinner (ajwxlw) God gives “the work of gathering and 
heaping.” Verse 26 makes it abundantly clear that those who please God are those who 
are already favoured by God (cf. 9:7), but the sinners are not pleasing to him.  
  This verse is difficult to interpret, especially concerning the meaning to be 
assigned to ajwx. Some scholars regard the noun as meaning “to miss the mark.”72 
Others, like Whybray, prefer the more common translation “sinner.”73 Given that this 
translation, “sinner” is found at 7:20, 26; 8:12; 9:2 (9:18 may be uncertain) it seems 
reasonable to accept this rendering. If this view is adopted it implies that Qoheleth 
accepts the traditional view of divine reward and punishment, a point of view which 
grates with the thought of 2:21 where the act/consequence principle of just reward is not 
in force.              
  Tremper Longman favours a non-moral meaning for ajwx and emphasizes the 
context to determine his interpretation. Because he cannot see congruity of thought 
between 2:21 and 2:26 he replaces the term “sinner” by “one who is offensive.”74 But if 
we compare the immediate context, the issue in v 21 is totally different from that 
obtaining in 2:26. In v 21 the issue is the problem of succession to property. Qoheleth’s 
angst is that the person who comes to own his property after his (Qoheleth’s) demise 
                                                
  70 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, to Find Pleasing Words. A Study of the Language of Qoheleth. 
Part 2, Vocabulary (OLA 143; Leuven: Peeters and Department of Oosterse Studies, 2004), 44.  
 
 71 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, at 44. This term occurs four times in vv 24-26. 
 72 So Seow, Ecclesiastes, 141, who claims that the term “is not a religious category in the 
wisdom tradition.” So also Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 26; H. L. Ginsberg, “Structure and Contents of the 
Book of Koheleth,” in Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East (ed. M. Noth and D. Winton 
Thomas; SVT 3; Leiden: Brill, 1955), 139, prefers the terms “pleasing to God” and “displeasing,” or 
“lucky” and “unlucky” as opposed to “righteous” and “wicked.”; Fox, A Rereading, 189-91.  
 73 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 54-5. 
 74 Longman, Ecclesiastes, The Book of Ecclesiastes (NICOT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans), 1998, at 
109. 
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has had no hand in toiling for it. The text states that Qoheleth “must leave all” to 
another who comes after him. But the fact is that he does not actually leave anything, 
rather, he is “taken from” his lifetime of toil by the grim reaper, a universal reality for 
all humans. When God’s appointed time comes all humans have no choice (cf. 3:1-8).
  In 2:26 what is at issue is the action of a sovereign creator who acts arbitrarily as 
he so desires. As the inscrutable creator of all things (cf. 3:11), God’s actions are 
unpredictable and do not necessarily have to conform to ideas of human justice and 
merit, or to the strictures of the modern Western mind. The free actions of the 
inscrutability of a sovereign God cannot be understood by humans, as Qoheleth so 
pointedly reminds his readers as his discourse proceeds, especially in the second half of 
the book. It is widely acknowledged that there are contradictions in the book as a whole, 
but such perceived contradictions are but a reflection of Qoheleth’s own experiences of 
life under the sun.75           
  It is not very clear what “heaping and gathering” refer to, but it is for the benefit 
of those who please God. Nor is it obvious to Qoheleth just what is involved in pleasing 
God. But for him, “The best humans can do is to accept and enjoy God’s gift whenever 
it is offered. Enjoyment, thus, is not something one seeks. Rather, it is what one may, by 
the will of God, have.”76 Notwithstanding the possibilities for human enjoyment, 
Qoheleth allows no relief for his readers as he brings this important section to a 
predictable conclusion - xwr tw[rw lbh hz-~g. The antecedent of “This” is unclear, but in 
K. Farmer’s estimation, “It may be taken to mean that however one acquires an 
abundance of possessions (either by one’s own labors or an unearned gift), these 
possessions are “a breath” which cannot be relied upon to endure.”77   
1:10  Summary and Conclusion  
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the first two chapters of Ecclesiastes 
due to the fact that they give remarkable access to the nature of Qoheleth’s spirit, ideas, 
and outlook on the world. It is a most noteworthy fact that these chapters set out many 
                                                
 75 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes (BCOTWP; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), holds (at 153) 
that we “must allow the contradictory perspectives to stand side by side. What we have here is an 
example of deliberate contradictory juxtaposition.” 
  76 Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment in Qohelet’s Theological Rhetoric (BZAW 353; Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2005), 37.  
  77 K. A. Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? A Commentary on Proverbs & Ecclesiastes (ITC; 
Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1991), 159. 
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of the main themes of his thought.78 His vocabulary is also remarkable in its scope, 
which include leading terms and phrases like, lbh, lm[, !wrty, qlx, hxmX, bwj/hbwj, 
~kx/hmkx, xwr tw[r, and XmXh txt, which are strewn throughout the book. Also very 
significant from an epistemological perspective is the presence of several verbs: har = 
“to see,” [dy = “to know,” rwt = “to search out, explore,” Xrd = “to seek,” hsn = “to 
test.” This range of terminology is highly suggestive of a man deeply involved in 
empirical investigation. 
 Qoheleth is greatly perplexed about life under the sun. One matter of the greatest 
concern to him is the fact of universal death, initially mentioned in 2:14-16. Over the 
entire book there are references made to death in every chapter, except chapter 10, 
which is mainly focused on aphorisms. Thus, the spectre of death is never far from the 
thoughts of Qoheleth.79 And this concern is inextricably linked with the term lm[, 
especially in chapter 2. Qoheleth sees all his toil as having no lasting permanence 
because following his demise his property devolves to a successor. This prospect is 
deeply troubling for him. First, his successor could be someone who is completely 
unknown to him and could be either foolish or wise. And second, the successor may not 
have in any way toiled for it. There is for Qoheleth no lasting !wrty. Hence, a great 
problem for Qoheleth concerns toil; but there is an even greater issue concerning human 
mortality. As Gerhard von Rad has remarked, for Qoheleth death “casts its shadow over 
every meaningful interpretation of life.”80 
  What is further revealing in these two chapters are the negative vibrations about 
Qoheleth’s personality and character. The concentration on the personal pronoun in 
these first two chapters is enough to suggest that Qoheleth is something of an egotist, a 
self-centred man with no apparent attachment to his community. As Weeks so aptly 
puts it, “The image we are given . . . is of a man in conversation with himself (cf. 1:16; 
2:1), not in dialogue with the world around him.”81 While 9: 9 does suggest that 
Qoheleth had knowledge of some personal intimacy in life, his relationship with the 
                                                
  78 There are some topics in the monologue that are not explicitly mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, 
namely, the judgment of God, the injunction to fear God, and the limitations of human knowledge, all of 
which appear for the first time in chapter 3.  
 79 See Jean-Jacques Lavoie, La penseé du Qohelet: Étude  exégétique  et intertextuelle (Quebec: 
Fides, 1992). Lavoie makes the observation (at 53) that death is “la veritable nemesis du Qohélet.” 
(Original emphasis). See also Shannon Burkes, Death in Qoheleth and Egyptian Biographies of the Late 
Period (SBL Dissertation Series 170; Atlanta: SBL, 1999). 
 80 G. von Rad, Wisdom in Israel (SCM: London, 1972), 228. 
 81 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 60.  
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female sex does not appear to have been a roaring success, if 7:26-28 is anything to go 
by.82   
  The monologue format of the book might also suggest that Qoheleth was 
something of a loner. Indeed, the very personal dogmatic claims he makes right from 
the beginning at 1:2, and throughout the book, point to an individual who did not relish 
the cut and thrust of social interaction and debate. A man who claims to have more 
wisdom than any of his predecessors, who believes he has seen everything done under 
the sun, and who makes wide-ranging dogmatic, grandiose claims about God, humanity, 
and society at large, has reached a position where, as Michel has it, “. . . collective 
experience is no longer available to him.”83        
  There is also another unfortunate aspect to Qoheleth’s character revealed in 
these early chapters. This concerns his striking selfishness. On the evidence he presents, 
Qoheleth’s acclaimed business ventures brought to him a considerable material fortune. 
Whether some of this fortune was handed to him on a plate at the commencement of his 
enterprise involvement is not clear. If this was the case, then his selfishness becomes 
even more disagreeable. But, in any case, there is not the slightest trace of ethical 
concern for succeeding generations when he contemplates his own demise. His 
observations and attitude displayed to his readers in 2:18-21 present a picture of a very 
unattractive sage. Qoheleth appears completely unable to think of anything, or of 
anyone else, other than his own mortality and how that event will impact his material 
achievements. Essentially, his worldview starts from his ego-centered observations with 
no hint of magnanimity or generosity of spirit, or moral concern for succeeding 
generations.            
  To add further to an assessment of Qoheleth’s outlook and thought we need to 
give some attention to the key word lbh that defines Qoheleth’s writing more than any 
other. It would be most difficult to read Ecclesiastes without being constantly reminded 
that something or some situation is lbh. To come to some understanding of the meaning 
and commanding presence of this word in the thought of Qoheleth is a necessary 
undertaking at this stage, and it is to this task that we now turn in the next chapter.  
                                                
 82 Frank Zimmermann, The Inner World of Qohelet (New York: Ktav, 1973), suggests (at 2) that 
“All the signs point to the fact that Qohelet was a married man and had a child, a son.” Contra R. Gordis, 
Koheleth: The Man and His World: A Study of Ecclesiastes (3rd  aug. ed. New York: Schocken, 1968), 78, 
and most commentators.  Zimmermann further claims (at 12) that Qoheleth had “neuroses and 
compulsions.” His claim that Qoheleth was a neurotic stretches the putative evidence to the point of 
incredulity. 
 83 Michel, Untersuchungen, 81. 
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PART 1:    QOHELETH’S  UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD 
 
Chapter 2:  lbh in Qoheleth’s Thought 
 
2.1 Introduction 
If there is one word that epitomizes the Book of Ecclesiastes then it is the Hebrew term, 
lbh. As Leong Seow has noted, “No other book in the Bible is as readily identified, 
indeed, caricatured by perceptions of a single term.”84 lbh appears no less than a total of 
thirty-eight times, which amounts to slightly over half the total occurrences of the term 
in the Hebrew Bible.85 A term that occurs eight times in the framing statements of 1:2 
and 12:8, and thirty times in the monologue, all occurring at strategic positions in the 
text is, by any benchmark, a word of monumental significance in interpreting this 
puzzling book of only twelve chapters. 86 
2.2 The Term lbh         
At its simplest and most basic level, lbh has the meaning of “a vapour,” “a breath,” “a 
puff of air.”87 Yet in translation lbh has proved to be a magnet for attracting a diverse 
variety of renderings. In the words of Douglas Miller, “. . . commentators and 
translators have found the term confusing, so that its interpretation has become perhaps 
the most crucial of many challenges involved with the book of Ecclesiastes.”88 Some of 
                                                
  84 C. L. Seow, “Beyond Mortal Grasp: the Usage of Hebel in Ecclesiastes,” ABR 48 (2000): 1-
16, at 1. While the term lbh is very prominent in the text, there are forty occurrences of the generic word 
for the deity, ~yhla, with a further dozen examples implied by the use of various verbs and pronouns.  
 85 The number remains at thirty-eight if one retains the MT. Some scholars would emend lkh to 
lbh at 9:2, and some would delete the second occurrence of lbh at 9:9.  
 86 Michael Carasik, “Qohelet’s Twists and Turns,” JSOT 28 (2003): 192-209, suggests (at 195) 
that the recurrence of lbh and other terms is not only for stylistic reasons, “but is intended to alert the 
reader . . . to the repetitiveness and circularity which, in Qohelet’s view, charactize the world.” 
  87 On the meaning of this term see K. Seybold, “lb,h, ” TDOT; 111, 313-20. Seybold states (at 
313) that the meaning of the term is attested by “later Aramaic dialects that were influenced partly by the 
Old Testament,” and could suggest an onomatopoeic word formation in the Hebrew. See also Schoors,  
The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 119-129. 
  88 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric in Ecclesiastes: The Place of Hebel in Qohelet’s Work (Atlanta: 
SBL, 2002), 2. See also his “Qohelet’s Symbolic use of lb,h, ” JBL 117 (1998): 437-54. Note especially 
the review on pages 438-43 of the latter article that presents various scholarly opinions. For a most 
interesting interpretation of lbh see John Jarick, “The Hebrew Book of Changes: Reflections on Hakkol 
Hebel and Lakkol Zeman in Ecclesiastes,” JSOT 90 (2000): 79-99. According to Jarick the terms lbh and 
lkh occur together only in Ecclesiastes. The only difference between the two terms is a serif-mark. He 
suggests that this juxtaposition may be deliberate in order to portray a visual word-play. 
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the renderings of lbh include the following: “incomprehensible,”89 “meaningless,”90 
“absurd,”91 “futility,”92 “bubble,”93 “ transience,”94 “breath.”95 “a vapour of vapour!”96 
The NKJV and the NRSV stay with the traditional Latin influenced term, “vanity.” 
Some other Bible versions render the superlative, ~ylbh lbh, “it is useless, useless” 
(GNB), “utterly vain, utterly vain” (Moffatt), “meaningless, meaningless” (NIV), 
“emptiness, emptiness” (NEB), and “nothing is worthwhile” (TLB).97   
   In determining the meaning of a word, James Barr has indicated that there is a 
danger in excessive reliance on a dictionary definition of the term, especially if that 
dictionary has been influenced by etymological emphasis.98 In essence, there are two 
ways to determine the meaning of lbh, (i) the etymological, and (ii) the contextual. 
According to E. A. Nida and C. R. Taber, the most important principle to guide 
translators is, “. . . the priority of contextual consistency over verbal consistency.”99 
Few scholars would dissent from this criterion.       
   In Hebrew, as in other languages, a word may take on different meanings 
according to the context in which it is used. In a seminal work on the semantics of 
                                                
  89 R. E. Murphy, “On Translating Ecclesiastes,” CBQ 53 (1991): 573. Murphy does not elaborate 
on this rendering, but in his commentary, Ecclesiastes, (at lxxi) he opts for the traditional term “vanity.”  
 90 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 59.        
  91 Fox, A Rereading, 9, 10, 30. Fox argues that lbh means “absurd” in nearly the same sense as it 
is for A. Camus in his Myth of Sisyphus. See also his Ecclesiastes: JPS Commentary (Philadelphia: JPS, 
2004), xix. A. Barucq, Ecclésiaste. Qohéleth. Traduction et Commmentaire (Verbum Salutis. Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1968), 27-8, 55, says that life for Qoheleth seems to be absurd in certain respects.    
  92 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 57 adopts this term but switches to “absurd” at various points in his 
commentary, see 2:26 and 4:4 as examples. T. Krüger, Qoheleth: A Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2004), 42, has “Futile and fleeting,” for the superlative ~ylbh lbh.   
 93 F. C. Burkitt, “Is Ecclesiastes a Translation?,” JTS Old Series 23 (1921): 27-8.   
 94 D. C. Fredericks, Coping With Transience (JSOT; Sheffield: SAP, 1993): 11-32; Kathleen A. 
Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, 142-46.  
 95 Lohfink, Qoheleth: A Continental Commentary, 19.       
 96 Scott, Proverbs: Ecclesiastes, 209.    
 97 For a survey of the history of the interpretation of lbh see Russell L. Meek, “Twentieth- and 
Twenty-first-century Reading of Hebel (lb,h,) in Ecclesiastes,” CBR 14 (2016): 279-97. Meek shows just 
how difficult it has been, particularly in the modern period, to achieve a scholarly consensus on the 
meaning of this crucial noun in the lexicon of Qoheleth. The unrelenting interest in the modern study of 
Ecclesiastes has resulted in a plethora of interpretative options for this troublesome term.   
  98 James Barr, Comparative Philology and the Text of the Old Testament (Oxford: OUP, 1968), 
118. 
  99 E. A. Nida and C. R. Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 15-
22.      
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biblical language, Barr points out that, “. . .word meanings have to be investigated by 
asking what is specific about the word.”100 Put succinctly, what does the actual usage of 
a word inform us as to its meaning? Thus I suggest that the most useful strategy in this 
context is to examine (i), the usage of lbh in a general sense in the Old Testament and 
(ii), its use(s) by the author in Ecclesiastes. This seems a reasonable procedure to 
follow. 
2.3  General Usage of lbh       
As we indicated above, the basic, literal meaning of lbh (breath, vapour) is related to  
the movement of air, and this sense is found in Isa 57:13. Here, lbh parallels xwr (wind):  
 
 When you cry out, let your collection of idols deliver you!      
 The wind will carry them off, a breath (lbh) will take them away.  
 
Also in Ps 62:10 [ET 62:9] we read,          
 
 Those of low estate are but a breath (lbh), those of high estate a delusion;     
 in the balances they go up; they are together lighter than a breath (lbh).  
 
The sense of lbh as breath is also found in Ps 144:4 where the text reads,    
 
 Humans are like breath (lbh); their days are like a passing shadow.    
  
The use of lbh here suggests its use as a figure of transience, something insignificant. 
But when we turn to Isa 30:7 the author states,       
 
 For Egypt’s help is worthless and empty (lbh), . . .  
  
the meaning of the uselessness of Egyptian aid is more a reference to lack of substance, 
or ineffectiveness, than to “transience.”         
 Sometimes lbh has other meanings as in Job 27:12 that suggests that Job’s 
friends were somehow confused or misguided. Then in Ps 94:11, lbh seems better 
understood as characterizing intellectual limitations. The notion of lbh as “transience” 
is suggested in Ps 39:6 [ET 39:5] due to the brevity of man’s life on earth, but in the 
following verse a sense of confusion is discernible as humans are unable to detect who 
will gather what they pile up. The sentiment expressed here echoes the thought 
expressed in Ecclesiastes 2:26,  
                                                
  
  100 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford: OUP, 1961), 171. 
	   44	  
 . . . but to the sinner he gives the work of gathering and heaping, only to give to one who pleases 
 God. This also is hebel and a chasing after wind. 
  
Another sense of lbh is to be found in 1 Kgs 16:13 and 16:26 where it is said that the 
Israelites provoked “. . . the Lord God of Israel with their idols (~hylbhb).” Here lbh 
points to sin, or useless obsession.          
 From the above brief review of the usages of lbh in the Old Testament, we may 
conclude that lbh is a multivalent term that takes on a variety of meanings.  According 
to Eric Christianson, in the Old Testament, but excluding Ecclesiastes, there are at least 
eight distinct connotations of lbh to be found. He identifies “breath/vapour,” “idols,” 
“worthless/false,” “no purpose/useless,” “futile,” “nothing/empty,” “fleeting,” and 
“deceptive in appearance.”101 Stuart Weeks sums up the matter regarding the use of lbh 
in the rest of the Old Testament as follows:   
  What we can say of hebel is that its principal biblical use is in figurative descriptions, which 
  use the physical characteristics of hebel to evoke notions of transience, uselessness or  
  misguidedness. While the interpretation of various passages remains open to debate, and  
  while there has been lively discussion about some aspects of the sense, none of this seems 
  especially doubtful or problematic. 102 
  
We now turn to the question: how is lbh used in Ecclesiastes? 
2.4 lbh in Ecclesiastes            
It has been well observed that the thirty-eight occurrences of lbh in Ecclesiastes are 
sited at strategically important points in the text, very often marking out discrete 
pericopae and sub-units, thereby encapsulating the thought and mood of the book.103 
The most prominent position of lbh is found at the beginning of the book (1:2) where, 
as noted above, the author boldly inserts a five-fold alliterative use of the term, while a 
three-fold use is found at 12:8. Between these framing statements, the remaining thirty 
instances of lbh are strewn throughout the monologue, but not evenly distributed.  In 
the first six chapters, which comprise approximately half the entire book, lbh has 
twenty-six entries. Thereafter, the term is found twice in each of chapters seven, nine, 
and eleven, three times in each of chapters eight and twelve, with no entry in chapter 
                                                
 101 Christianson, A Time to Tell: Narrative Strategies in Ecclesiastes (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic, 1998), 79-80. 
  102 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 108. 
  103 Notably at 1:2, 14; 2:1, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26; 3:19; 4:4, 8, 16; 5:9; 6:2, 9; 7:6; 8:10, 14; 
12:8. 
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ten.104 
 The various ways that lbh is distributed throws up some interesting information. 
First, lbh is given a universal application in 1:2,14; 2:11,17; 3:19 and 11:8 in the form 
lbh lkh = “All is hebel.” Secondly, the term is presented in a few formulas, chief of 
which is lbh hz-~g (or similar wording) = “This is hebel.” referring to some situation or 
phenomenon – as in 2:1,15,19,21,23,26; 4:4,8,16; 5:9; 6:2,9; 7:6; 8:10,14. lbh is also 
found with the well known descriptive phrase xwr tw[rw = “and a chasing after wind” in 
1:14; 2:11; 2:17, 26; 4:4; 6:9, while the associated phrase xwr !wy[rw is found in 4:16. 
Further amplification of lbh occurs in  
        2:21- `hbr h[rw lbh hz-~g = “This also is hebel and a great evil.”  
 4:8 - `awh [r !yn[w lbh hz-~g = “This also is hebel and an unhappy business.”  
 6:2 - `awh [r ylxw lbh hz = “This is hebel; it is a grievous evil.” 
Then in 11:10 youth is described as lbh, and in 6:11 lbh is linked to spoken words. In 
7:15 and 9:9 lbh is attributed to the days of one’s life.  
 Qoheleth asserts in 8:14, #rah-l[ hX[n rXa lbh-Xy = “There is lbh that takes place 
on earth, . . .” which constitutes the reversal of the deed/consequence principle so 
demonstrably taught in the Book of Proverbs and Deuteronomy. In 5:6 [ET 5:7] the 
plural form, ~ylbhw is associated with words and dreams; in 6:4, lbh is applied to a 
stillborn child; in 6:12, 7:15 and 9:9, Qoheleth associates lbh to his own life, or to the 
days of one’s life, and in 7:6, the laughter of the fools is designated lbh. The love of 
money/wealth that never satisfies in 5:9 [ET 5:10] is also termed lbh, as are the wicked, 
who used to go in and out of the holy place, and yet were praised in the city (8:10). 
2.5 lbh , lm[ and ! wrty in Ecclesiastes 
Another interesting facet to Qoheleth’s use of lbh is the way he employs his cosmic 
theme with other key terms, notably those found in 1:3.       
       `XmXh txt lm[yX  wlm[-lkb ~dal !wrty-hm 
 What do people gain from all the toil at which they toil under the sun?  
This is a question of the first magnitude in the book’s interpretation as significantly it 
                                                
 104 Elisabeth Birnbaum and Susanne Gillmayr-Bucher, “The Wise King’s Vanity: The lbh Motif  
in the Reception of King Solomon,” Biblical Reception 3 (2014): 265-90, assume a Solomonic 
authorship. They build a composite picture of Solomon using data from the books of Kings and 
Chronicles, Song of Solomon and Qoheleth. In the latter book these scholars view Solomon as a person 
who struggles with the finite limitations of human life; in response, Solomon is sometimes depicted as 
overcoming these limitations, while at others, he merely endures lbh.  
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contextually links lbh with two other noticeable terms in Qoheleth’s vocabulary, !wrty 
(profit, advantage) and lm[ (toil). These three terms in total cast a long shadow over the 
book’s thought. Given their syntactical importance in relation to lbh, it will be helpful 
to consider briefly the semantic range of both terms, especially of lm[. 
 In the Hebrew Bible the root lm[ occurs seventy-five times with its presence in 
Ecclesiastes amounting to thirty-five occurrences; this represents almost half of the 
occurrences found in the OT.105  Schoors states that the root has the basic meaning of 
“tiredness.”106 The noun refers to “toil,” “work,” particularly “painful work.” A. D. 
Power translates lm[ as “. . . toil involving troublesome labour almost amounting to 
misery and suffering.”107 In F. Foresti’s analysis he points to a clear distinction in 
respect of the meaning of the term. First, it has the sense of “hard, assiduous work, toil,” 
and second, the term has the meaning of “fruit of work, income, profit.”108 But it is very 
difficult to deny that, as Fox indicates, lm[ carries gloomy predictions through the 
Hebrew Bible, a mood that is broadly represented in cognate languages as well. In the 
manner in which Qoheleth deploys the term, there is an overwhelming sense that the 
futility of lm[ dominates his world outlook.       
 Also present in 1:3 is the term !wrty, which, as noted earlier, has the sense of 
advantage/profit. While the term rty, meaning “exceed, remain over,” is well known in 
the OT, the noun !wrty (advantage, profit) is used only by Qoheleth, and has synonyms 
in rtwy (cf. 2:15; 6:8,11;7:11,16; 12:9, 12) and rtwm (cf. 3:19). !wrty is found ten times in 
the book (1:3; 2:11,13 (2x); 3:9; 5:8 [ET 5:9],15 [ET 5:16]; 7:12; 10:10,11). Fox 
distinguishes the use of  !wrty by observing that in some contexts it means “advantage” 
(the comparative sense), while in others it means “profit” (the absolute sense).109 Much, 
                                                
  105 According to Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 139. However, F. Foresti, “ ‘amal in 
Koheleth: Toil or Profit,” ECarm 31 (1980): 415-30, gives the number as seventy-six (at 420). This is due 
to the fact that Foresti includes the use of the term as a person’s name in 1 Chron 7:35, which is omitted 
from Schoors’ count.    
  106 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 139. 
  107 Power, Ecclesiastes or Preacher (London: Longman, Green and Co. 1952), 136.  
  108 Foresti, “ ‘amal in Koheleth,” 430. Foresti’s comparative study includes a consideration of 
lm[ in the cognate languages of Akkadian and Aramaic. On this basis he concludes (at 430) that “ . . . the 
book of Koheleth was written very late in the history of Hebrew biblical literature.” A. F. Rainey, “A 
Second Look at Amal in Qoheleth,” CTM 36 (1965): 805, suggests (at 805) that the noun lm[ can be used 
as a synonym for “skill”, which he translates as “trade”. Applying the meaning to 2:18-21, Qoheleth says, 
“I hate my trade . . .” The net result of this move is to give a more positive interpretation to Qoheleth’s 
use of lm[. 
  109 Fox, A Rereading, 112. 
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however, depends upon the exegesis of an individual passage, as indicated by Michel.110 
As earlier intimated, Plumptre said of the term !wrty, “Its strict meaning is “that which 
remains,” the surplus, if any, of the balance sheet of life.”111 This suggests that Qoheleth 
was some kind of business man/entrepreneur.112  
 Some scholars have noted the commercial character of Qoheleth’s thought and 
language.113 It was W. Zimmerli who once observed that Ecclesiastes 1:3 advanced the 
“central” question of wisdom: what profit !wrty?114 There does not seem to be any doubt 
that “. . . the commercial terms which he employs do seem to affirm that Qohelet is 
supposed to be seen as a businessman, who looks at the world in ways shaped by that 
perspective.”115 Certainly !wrty is used by the author in an economic sense as in 1:3; 3:9; 
5:8 [ET 5:9],15 [ET 5:16], and 7:12.116 But Graham S. Ogden holds that with the term 
!wrty Qoheleth creates a neologism which has a peculiar and circumscribed field of 
reference. He asserts that “It is vital for an understanding of this book that we be as 
clear as possible about the semantic field of this term.”117 Ogden’s review of the term in 
Ecclesiastes leads him to claim that the original commercial application of rty is absent 
from Qoheleth’s use of the term !wrty. The essence of Ogden’s claim is that !wrty is 
bound up with an eternal dimension.118         
                                                
  110 Michel, Untersuchungen,105-15. 
  111 Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 104. 
 112 An observation that Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, develops to good effect at 34-7. 
 113 A. R. Ceresko, “Commerce and Calculation,” 222-36. Ogden, Qoheleth, 27-30; W. E. Staples, 
“Profit” in Ecclesiastes,” JNES 4 (1945): 87-96; J. G. Williams, “What Does it Profit a Man? The 
Wisdom of Koheleth,” Judaism 20 (1971): 179-93; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 103-4; Weeks, Ecclesiastes and 
Scepticism, 34-7; Fox, A Rereading, 109-13.  
 114 Cited in Murphy, Ecclesiastes, lix. J. F. Genung, Words of Koheleth (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin and Co., 1904), makes the point (at 20) that !wrty expresses a pivotal idea of the whole book. He 
writes (at 214), “This question, [v 3] as a kind of obverse, follows naturally on the exclamation of 
vanity,— as much as to say, Since all is vanity, what profit? the first implication being negative and 
challenging, — no profit at all”.  
 
  115 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 36.   
  116 So M. J. Dahood, “Canaanite –Phoenician Influence,” Biblica 33 (1952): 191-221. As a result 
of his identification of almost thirty terms which carry commercial connotations, Dahood writes, “. . . the 
overall picture delineated by Ecclesiastes suggests a distinctly commercial environment” (at 220-21). J. L. 
Kugel, “Qohelet and Money,” CBQ 51 (1989): 51-62, examines Qoheleth’s attitude to money and 
observes that Qoheleth “. . . inhabits a world, or more precisely a class, of financial high-rollers’ (at 46). 
It should be noted, however, as indicated by Weeks Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, (at 36), that, “his 
[Qohelet’s] attitude to wealth is rather complicated, and that money itself is only one issue among many 
in the book.”  
  117 Ogden, Qoheleth, 27.   
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 It is very difficult to accept this claim as the evidence which Ogden posits is 
somewhat thin.119 Seow resiles from the view that !wrty is potentially located in another 
world. “Qohelet does not deny that yitrôn is possible in this world because he thought it 
might be possible in another realm . . . The problem for Qohelet in this passage is not 
this world, but toil.”120  
  The link between lbh and lm[ is mainly found in the first few chapters of the 
book. Significantly, 1:2-3 set the tone for the entire book. The rhetorical question in v 3 
is answered in 2:11, with the question virtually repeated in 3:9, the main difference 
being that the unique phrase XmXh txt found in 1:3 is missing in 3:9 (cf. 2:22). In 2:11 
Qoheleth reflects on all his toil (lm[) and what he had achieved by it, but his immediate 
conclusion was that all of his efforts amounted to lbh, which term is further 
strengthened and enhanced by his use of lm[ and !wrty. For Qoheleth, his very forthright 
conclusion at this very early stage of his monologue is boldly stated:  
 
                       2:11 
 
              xwr tw[rw lbh lkh hnhw
           `XmXh txt !wrty !yaw 
 
 All was vanity and a chasing after wind,  
 and there was nothing to be gained under the sun. 
 
The combination of these three key terms in 1:3 and 2:11, along with the two much 
repeated phrases in the book, xwr tw[rw and XmXh txt, act like a type of compass for the 
reader indicating the direction of the ensuing discourse. The content of these verses 
powerfully demonstrates the downbeat nature of Qoheleth’s world outlook. 121 
 Another significant pericope, in which lbh and lm[ are linked, is to be found in 
Chapter 2, vv 18-23. In v 18, lm[ is the object of Qoheleth’s ire, goading him to such an 
                                                                                                                                          
  118 Ogden, Qoheleth, 30.  
  119 See Murphy, Ecclesiastes, lx. 
  120 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 104.   
 121 For a different view see Stephen Garfinkel, “Qoheleth: The Philosopher Means Business,” in 
Bringing the Hidden to Light: The Process of Interpretation. Studies in Honor of Stephen A. Geller (eds. 
Kathryn F. Kravitz and Dianne M. Sharon; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns/Jewish Theological Seminary, 
2007), 51-62. He finds numeric or mathematical strands running through the book. He thus presents an 
economic interpretation of the term lm[, which leads him to present an economic understanding of the 
book as a whole. He concludes (at 62), “I suggest that the numeric and mathematical hints throughout the 
book should cause readers to accept the economic approach, which leads to an uplifting message.” 
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extent that he hated toil. The problem concerns the fact that there is no lasting gain from 
all his toil since he must leave everything to someone after his death. His property and 
personal possessions could pass to either a fool or a wise man (v 19). The predictable 
conclusion is: lbh hz-~g = “This also is hebel.” The cognitive pain Qoheleth feels 
continues in verses 20-23 by admitting that his heart is given to despair when he reflects 
on all the toil of his labours under the sun. What really is at issue here is the fact that the 
person who will succeed to his property did not work for it. For Qoheleth this represents 
not only another instance of lbh, but additionally hbr h[r. The lack of permanence 
seems to trouble Qoheleth deeply.        
 Qoheleth’s anguish continues unabated in vv 22-23. The rhetorical question in v 
22 is but a variation on the !wrty question in 1:3. There is no lessening of Qoheleth’s 
anguish on this question of relentless toil, as is evident from the language used in v 23. 
Days are full of s[kw ~ybakm = “pain and vexation,” and contemplation of the night only 
suggests restless minds get no sleep. There is only one irreducible conclusion for the 
troubled sage: awh lbh hz-~g = “This also is hebel.” The intense feeling that lm[ afflicts 
on Qoheleth at this point of the discourse is reflected by the fact that this term occurs a 
remarkable ten times in 2:18-23, with the lbh theme emphatically stated on three 
occasions, one of which is described as hbr h[r.       
 The lbh declaration is linked again with lm[ in 4:4 where Qoheleth introduces 
the new idea that hX[mh !wrXk-lk taw lma-lk )= “all toil and skill in work” are attributable 
to envy. Here the object of lbh hz-~g is not focused on work per se but on the 
competitive motivation and ambitious nature of human envy. This also is xwr tw[r. Then 
in 4:7-8, Qoheleth instances another example of lbh with great intensity, which is 
discernible from his pleonastic use of  yna at the beginning of v 7 (it is also employed at 
the start of 4:4). In this case, the solitary individual is the subject of Qoheleth’s lbh 
theme. Toil for the individual is unrelenting, and there is no personal satisfaction or 
lasting pleasure achieved with riches. “For whom am I toiling,” is the memorable 
exclamation that opens up the recognition that deprivation of pleasure is both lbh and 
[r !yn[ awh = “an unhappy business.” The lbh theme is pronounced in this passage in that 
it commences v 7 and closes the topic at the end of v 8, thus stressing the very personal 
nature of the discussion.            
 Finally, in 6:7-9, one can detect a certain cynicism in Qoheleth’s outlook. In v 7 
lm[ is viewed as merely assuaging human hunger, though no one is ever satisfied. The 
following verse (8a) picks up on his earlier theme of the relative value of wisdom vis-à-
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vis folly. Here the term rtwy = “advantage” is employed. Qoheleth then reflects on a 
maxim in v 8b whose referent is difficult to determine. Whatever the meaning, this 
pericope is also significant in that it contains three crucial terms in Qoheleth’s lexicon: 
lbh, lm[ and rtwy/!wrty (cf. 1:3).    
 Notwithstanding the fact that the term lm[ adds a certain negativity to the dark 
colour of lbh, some scholars argue that not all instances of lm[ are powerfully negative 
in Ecclesiastes, especially in 3:13, and 5:17 (ET 5:18), where the term seems to have 
joyful and positive connotations.122 In William Brown’s illuminating article on “work,” 
he divides his material into two sections: (i) To Labor in Vain, and (ii) To Labor in Joy. 
Of the former he writes, “In his sobering acceptance of death, the sage ultimately comes 
to a positive appreciation of work. By dislodging toil from its market-driven, death-
denying context, Qoheleth arrives at his own work ethic.”123  
 The “joy passages” are identified as integral to his interpretation of work. “The 
significance of Qoheleth’s commendations within the book as a whole is the interpretive 
crux of Ecclesiastes.”124 He thereby maintains that in Qoheleth’s commendations there 
is an indissoluble relationship established between enjoyment and work. But the 
difficulty with this claim is that the joy passages indicate enjoyment that is very 
restricted to activity consisting of (i) eating, (ii) drinking and (iii) enjoying one’s toil. 
And given the overpowering presence of negativity associated with lm[ in the book, not 
to mention the dominant ethos of lbh and the syntactic linkage of both terms in 1:2-3, it 
is difficult to accept that “Qoheleth’s taxonomy of joy incorporates, rather than rejects, 
the value of work.”125 The reality is that in 1:2-3 there is an arsenal of negativity 
attached to the book’s cosmic theme (verse 2) and the programmatic question (verse 3).            
 While the relative importance of the joy passages for assessing Qoheleth’s 
outlook on life cannot be denied, yet when they are placed in the overall scheme of the 
book’s narrative, it is equally difficult to deny that the overwhelming use of lbh  has 
negative connotations. And this negativity is further reinforced by the variety of ways 
                                                
  122 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 109, states that to interpret labour as negative in these texts 
prejudges the very question Qoheleth will explore. To fully acknowledge the negativity of lm[ in a wide 
variety of contexts in the book hardly justifies the concept of “prejudges.” It is very clear to observe that 
scholars who hold Qoheleth to be an optimist tend to downplay the negativity associated with lm[ in 
Ecclesiastes, so Whybray, Ogden, et al.  
  123 Brown, “Whatever Your Hands Finds to Do: Qoheleth’s Work Ethic,” Int  Vol. 55  (2001): 
271-84, at 278. 
  124 Brown, “Whatever Your Hands,” 279. Original italics. 
  125 Brown, “Whatever Your Hands,” 282.  
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Qoheleth uses lbh in conjunction with lm[ and rtwy/!wrty.     
 Carefully assessing the usages of lbh in the book, we discover that toil and what 
toil produces – wealth and property - and the negating effects of death in 2:11, 15, 17, 
19, 21, 23; 3:19; 4:4,7-8; 6:2; 9:2, constitute very prominent concerns of Qoheleth when 
he refers to something as lbh. At times it is by no means clear what the antecedent is 
when Qoheleth states awh lbh hz ~g. For example, it is difficult to discern what is lbh in 
4:16b which comes in the context of the rather ambiguous story of the king and the 
youth in 4:13-16a. The referent of hz in 6:9 is also difficult to identify, as the relevance 
of the meaning in the context of 6:10-11 is not immediately apparent. From the 
foregoing data, we may conclude that most of the incidences of lbh in the monologue 
are applied to a diverse range of phenomena and situations.  
2.6 The Meaning of lbh in the Monologue       
From the above observations it is evident that Qoheleth’s use of lbh is anything but 
straightforward. As Dominic Rudman puts it, “Many of the exegetical problems arising 
from a reading of the text of Ecclesiastes can be traced to Qoheleth’s peculiar use of the 
term lbh to characterize the nature of existence, and humanity’s role within it.”126 
Words in every language have a dynamic range of meaning and in this regard context 
sensitive interpretations play a crucial role in determining meaning. Michael Fox states 
that Qoheleth’s usage of lbh cannot simply be directly derived from the lexical 
meanings it has elsewhere.127 This I suggest is due to the unique blueprint of Qoheleth’s 
writing style, and one must therefore take cognizance of the creative literary skills of the 
author that tend to lower the threshold of grammatical and artistic predictability in his 
writing.             
  While we did briefly consider the general usage of lbh in the OT (excluding 
Ecclesiastes), lbh did not attract a singular meaning throughout. As we now turn to 
consider the meaning of lbh in the monologue, we need not be surprised if Qoheleth’s 
use of the term does yield a degree of ambiguity.  
                                                
 126 Dominic Rudman, “The Use of  lbh As An Indicator of Chaos in Ecclesiastes,” in “The 
Language of Qohelet in its Context: Essays in Honour of Prof.  A. Schoors on the Occasion of his 
Seveneth Birthday” (eds. A. Berlejung et al.; BETL 164; Louvain, Paris and Dudley, MA; Peeters and 
Dept. of Oriental Studies, Louvain, 2007), 121-41, (at 122). 
  127 Fox, “The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet,” JBL 105 (1986): 409-27 (at 412). A similar view 
is found in John E. McKenna, “The Concept of Hebel in the Book of Ecclesiastes,” SJT 45 (1992): 19-28. 
Of lbh he writes (at 21), “We must be content to appreciate the particular context as deeply as possible 
without imposing upon it a significance we have obtained from other contexts in some general manner.” 
McKenna translates lbh as “contingency.”     
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2.7 lbh as a Metaphor 
Kathleen Farmer argues that the phrase lbh lkh, “all is hebel” is a metaphor, and since 
metaphors are intentionally provocative figures of speech they can be understood in 
quite different ways.128 Given that a certain degree of ambiguity is attached to the 
interpretation of metaphors, “It is possible, then, that hebel (meaning a puff of air) 
might be understood in either a positive or a negative sense.”129 Farmer continues her 
argument:   
 If the translation preserves the metaphor (as Scott does), the reader is forced to decide in what 
 sense the comparison should be taken. In my opinion it is unfortunate that many modern 
 versions of Ecclesiastes have chosen to take the decision away from the reader. Most 
 translators obscure the metaphorical nature of the original statement and replace the concrete, 
 nonjudgmental phrase (“breath” or “a puff of air”) with various abstract terms – all of which 
 have decidedly negative connotations in English.130 
 
It is the transitory qualities of a breath that are foremost when Qoheleth appropriates the 
metaphor, according to Farmer.  She bases her understanding of the term’s use in the 
Psalms, which emphasizes the brevity of life and the transitory concerns of humans in 
relation to the eternal nature of God. “A breath, after all, is of considerable value to the 
one who breathes it . . . It is airlike, fleeting, transitory, and elusive rather than 
meaningless.”131 Farmer also points to the frequency of lbh with xwr (“spirit” or “wind” 
in 1:14; 2:11, 17, 26; 4:4, 16; 6:9) and thus asserts that lbh does not mean “absurd” 
(contra M. Fox) but is best rendered “ephemeral” or “fleeting,” thus fitting in well with 
several passages in the Psalms and Job.132       
 Farmer accepts that the thematic metaphor lbh lkh “all is hebel” is 
fundamentally ambiguous, which in effect leaves the door open for different 
interpretations. As far as those who have taken lbh to mean “worthlessness, 
                                                
 128 Daniel Fredericks, Coping With Transience, also adopts (at 11-12) the metaphorical sense of  
“transience,” for lbh. He does concede that lbh could mean “futility” in 5:6 [ET 7], 6:4 and 6:11, but he 
claims that such cases are few in number and that they should not be allowed to skew the meaning in the 
direction of futility for the book as a whole.  
           
 129 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? 143. Menachem Fisch, “Ecclesiastes (Qohelet) in 
Context – A Study of Wisdom as Constructive Skepticism,” in Critical Rationalism, Essays for Joseph 
Agassi, Vol. 2. The social sciences and the humanities. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 162  
(ed. J. C. Jarvie and N. Laor: Dordrecht: London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 167-87, makes the 
comment ‘. . . the the human condition is characterized, according to Qohelet, not by its perpetual 
meaningless or absurdity, but by its ultimate uncertainty; by man’s essential inability ever to achieve 
atemporal certitude.’ (176).  
  130 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? 143. 
 131 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? 145. 
 132 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? 145. 
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meaningless, or futility” the result is to assume that the author was a man who lacked 
piety and faith and that Ecclesiastes is an anomaly in the biblical canon. From this, a 
negative, pessimistic interpretation follows. However, Farmer prefers the more positive 
reading of the book whereby lbh is understood to refer to a lack of duration 
(“transitoriness”) which applies to everything “under the sun” in contrast to the 
permanence of God.133           
 How we view Qoheleth’s use of lbh does, to some degree, reflect our own 
predisposition to life’s mysteries. Farmer’s approach to the book is theological and 
positive, and there is much to commend her rationale concerning the interpretation of 
this troublesome term. But, is her analysis of Qoheleth’s use of lbh comprehensively 
persuasive?            
 The major difficulty with Farmer’s translation of lbh as “breath/transitoriness,” 
which also applies to scholars who adopt this stance like Scott and Fredericks, is that 
this understanding of lbh will not fit well with every passage where it occurs. 
Moreover, Farmer does not defend her theory across the board, as she omits discussion 
of 4:7-8 and 6:1-6. Scholars, who find this position of viewing lbh as having one 
primary sense applied to all cases, are forced to acknowledge at some point that 
“transience/fleeting” does not fit with every context. This translation of lbh can 
therefore be viewed as a version of the multiple-senses approach, one by which some 
scholars use a multiplicity of terms in translating it, particularly when their chosen term 
for lbh does not fit. The upshot of this “one metaphor” approach to the translation of 
lbh is that Qoheleth is deemed not to be using the term in a consistent manner.134 
 Douglas Miller attempts to appropriate this single metaphor approach, but with a 
difference from Farmer, et al. His underlying belief is that if one is to understand lbh in 
Ecclesiastes then its metaphoric and symbolic nature has to be taken seriously.135 Miller 
                                                
 133 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good? 146. 
 134 For an interesting view on the meaning of lbh see Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 248-57, where he 
discusses the diverse approaches to the lbh metaphor of Fox and Farmer. Salyer draws on the work of I. 
A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: OUP, 1936) whereby he refers to the two components 
of a metaphor. First, there is the general idea of the statement, which is called the “tenor”; secondly, there 
is the non/literal/pictorial image, which imbues the statement with a comparative meaning. This aspect is 
referred to as the “vehicle” of the metaphor. Thus, when Qoheleth asserts that, “lbh lkh,” the term lkh = 
“everything” refers to life in general; this is called the tenor, while lbh “breath, vapor, mist” is the 
vehicle. According to Salyer, Fox emphasizes the vehicle, while Farmer opts for the tenor. Hence, the 
lack of agreement. Salyer concludes by saying that Qoheleth’s use of lbh is very difficult to understand 
due to the linguistic and semantic difficulty of understanding what is meant. In the words of S. Halloran, 
“Language and the Absurd,” PR 6 (1973) at 98, “the writer tries to say what is fundamentally unsayable.” 
(Cited in Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, at 255). 
 135 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 2. 
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adopts an approach to the problem of Qoheleth’s use of lbh by suggesting that lbh 
functions as a symbol in Qoheleth’s exposition. He believes that Qoheleth holds to the 
root metaphor of lbh as “vapour” thus constructing “a symbol to represent the entirety 
of human experience.”136 According to this approach, Qoheleth is not consistent in his 
use of lbh and ponders whether this inconsistency is part of his purpose.137  Building on 
the work of Philip Wheelwright, whereby “symbol” is being used as Wheelwright’s 
“tensive symbol,” Miller states that an image holds together a set of meanings that can 
neither be exhausted nor adequately expressed by any single meaning.”138 
   On this reckoning, Miller thinks that, “Given the extent of Qoheleth’s creative 
use of literary devices, it should not be surprising that his thesis statement (1:2; 12:8) 
involves lbh, a term capable of several senses, which Qoheleth employs with 
multivalency.”139 Miller postulates that there are three referents of lbh: transience, 
insubstantiality, and foulness,140 and concludes that, “None of the three metaphors by 
itself applies to all of human experience, and yet with this symbol, Qoheleth can 
demonstrate that “all is lbh” in one way or another.”141 Miller claims that if his symbol 
thesis is accepted, then his “proposal provides that Qoheleth is internally consistent in 
regard to his use of lbh.”142 
 While it is generally true that the term lbh in Ecclesiastes does not connote 
something that is good, it is another matter to describe it as bad. lbh can be transient 
and insubstantial but that is not essentially bad. Miller applies the notion of “foulness” 
to the metaphor of lbh in 2:21; 4:8; 6:2; 9:2 (as emended) but these instances of lbh are 
more suitably rendered as incomprehensible or enigmatic. The essential problem with 
Miller’s thesis is that it is not a convincing theory notably regarding the unsuitability of 
“foulness” as a referent for lbh, and thus it suffers the same disadvantages of the single 
metaphor theory.            
                                                
  136 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 443. 
  137 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 443. 
  138 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 444. Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 256, has noted that Qoheleth has 
chosen such a polyvalent and fertile term, which is in keeping with the rhetoric of ambiguity that operates 
throughout the book. 
 139 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 445.  
 140 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 444. 
  141 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 454. Original italics. 
 142 Miller, Symbol and Rhetoric, 454. 
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 The notion that lbh means something “absurd” has been appropriated by some 
scholars, most notably by Michael Fox, whose advocacy has been influential.143 Like 
most scholars, Fox acknowledges that no English word corresponds exactly to the 
semantic shape of lbh as Qoheleth uses it.144 But he claims that the best translation 
equivalent for lbh in Qoheleth’s usage is the term “absurdity,” a choice that is 
ostensibly indebted to existential philosophy, notably from the concept of “absurdity” as 
advanced in Albert Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus. For Fox, “The absurd is an affront 
to reason, in the broad sense of the human faculty that looks for order in the world about 
us.”145 Fox, however, concedes that,   
  A word can, of course, be used in various ways in a single book, but Qohelet’s thematic  
  declaration that everything is hebel and the formulaic character of the hebel-judgments show 
  that for Qohelet there is a single dominant quality in the world and that this quality inheres in 
  the particular habalim that he identifies.146 
 
Fox therefore eschews the multiple senses approach whereby some Bible translations 
use various glosses to translate lbh. He states that,  
 If Qohelet were saying, “X is transitory; Y is futile; Z is trivial,” then the summary,  
 “All is hebel” would be meaningless. . . . To do Qohelet justice, we must look for a concept 
 that applies to all occurrences, or, failing that, to the great majority of them. Then the summary 
 statement “all is hebel” can use the word in the sense established in the particulars.”147 
  
Following from this concession Fox admits that, “it is frequently difficult, sometimes 
virtually impossible, to identify the antecedents of the pronouns in the hebel-judgments. 
Thus, in particular cases it is uncertain what exactly is being judged – a thing or action 
mentioned in the context.”148          
 On a first reading, Fox’s choice seems to fit appropriately in many contexts, 
such as 2:15, where the wise man has no real advantage over the fool – both share the 
                                                
 143 Fox, A Rereading, 27-49; ________ , Qohelet and His Contradictions (JSOTSup 71; Sheffield: 
Almond, 1989), 29-51;________ , “The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet,” JBL 105 (1986): 409-27.  Schoors, 
The Preacher Sought, Part 2 also adopts this translation of lbh, especially at 129. However, he does note 
that Fox has some difficulty in fitting in “absurdity” in every context. For example, Schoors states (at 
127) that Fox has a problem in 6:4 with “absurdity” and proceeds to help “himself out of a jam.” See also 
Michel, Untersuchungen, at 40-51, who defines “absurd” as “meaningless” (at 44). Bruno Pennacchini, 
“Qohelet ovvero il libro degli assurdi,” ED 30 (1977): 491-510, takes the word “absurd” in the sense of 
“incomprehensibility.” (at 496). 
  144 Fox, Qohelet and His Contradictions, 31. 
 145 Fox, “The Meaning of Hebel,” 409. 
 146 Fox, A Rereading, 35. 
  147 Fox, A Rereading, 36. 
 148 Fox, “The Meaning of Hebel for Qohelet.” (at 415). Fox’s adoption of “absurd” was earlier 
referenced by A. Barucq, Ecclésiaste, 54-55, when he employed the term absurdité as a translation of lbh.  
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same fate; 2:21, where the wealthy man must pass it on to someone who does not 
deserve it; 4:7, the lonely man who labours on with no companionship or joy in life. 
While it is true that the idea of “absurdity” may pervade the text of Ecclesiastes to a 
degree, it nevertheless remains the case that Fox’s translation of lbh by this one term, 
suffers the same weakness as the multiple senses approach: it cannot be coherently and 
consistently applied in every one of lbh’s occurrences. It also attracts another crucial 
objection; lbh does not have this meaning elsewhere.149     
 How the intensified form of lbh in the opening and closing thematic statements 
relates to the thirty particular instances of lbh in the monologue in terms of unified and 
consistent meaning, is an interpretational challenge yet to be met. Seybold has noted,  
  . . . that this word [lbh], which was not as yet overworked, and whose onomatopoeic basis gave 
  it a certain attractiveness, was especially well suited for radical polemic and the definition of 
  new insights. . . . Consequently, the range of meaning of hebhel is open. It has a broad emotion-
  laden stratum with strong evocative possibilities, and it is especially suited therefore to be 
   keyword or catchword.150 
This highlights the problem of interpreting this ambiguous term, especially since the 
writer has a unique and unpredictable writing style. The effect of this is that the feeling 
of obscurity that attaches to the use of lbh contributes to the overall ambiguity with 
reference to the book’s principal theme. Gary Salyer offers a pertinent analysis of 
Qoheleth’s use of this metaphor. 
  In short, readers have a problem isolating which connotation in such a lively tensive-symbol is 
  the salient aspect that succinctly sums up the overall meaning of the work. The basic problem 
  is that tensive-symbols, which hold a variety of meanings, are poor vehicles for expressing 
  unitary meanings, which is what most readers expect from a summarizing statement.151 
 
Qoheleth’s worldview is intimately connected to his use of  lbh. In the words of 
Walther Zimmerli, the fivefold repetition of lbh in the superlative degree is “the 
                                                
    149 So Weeks, An Introduction to the Study of Wisdom Literature (Approaches to Biblical  
Studies; London: T&T Clark International, 2010), 81. As Weeks notes (at 81), “. . . it is difficult to see 
either how ‘breath’ could have come to mean ‘absurd,’ or how the original readers were supposed to 
deduce this meaning.” Mark Sneed, Ecclesiastes and the Politics of Pessimism (Atlanta: SBL Press, 
2012) observes (at 174), “. . . in Qoheleth, “futility” and “illusion” (a few times as “transience” [e.g., 
7:15]) or “worthlessness” seems the best options, and this fits in with the primary intent of the book: a 
polemic against traditional wisdom. . .” Whether the primary intent of Ecclesiastes is a polemic against 
traditional wisdom is a point of view far from convincing for it assumes that (i) all traditional wisdom 
was bad, and (ii) that the author of 12:9-14 effectively deconstructs the contents of the previous 216 
verses. This is the same view as advanced by M. Shields, The End of Wisdom, A Reappraisal of the 
Historical and Canonical Function of Ecclesiastes (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2007).  
  150 Karl Seybold, “lb,h, ” TDOT; 111: 318, 315.  
 151 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 256. 
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supreme intensification of lbh.”152 Unequivocally, these opening words of Qoheleth are 
programmatic for the whole book. And given the suggested onomatopoeic character of 
lbh, - the blowing of air – this makes his opening salvo all the more significant for the 
book’s interpretation.           
 We also noted Graham Ogden’s suggestion that to interpret lbh in context, one 
must do so paying attention to the painful scenarios to which the hebel-phrase is added 
as a response; the meaning of parallel and complementary phrases, “striving after 
wind,” “a sore affliction,” and “an unhappy business”; and the calls to enjoyment which 
punctuate the book at key points. This seems a sound hermeneutical procedure. But 
even if we were to acknowledge the importance of contextual meaning, it is still very 
difficult to deny that throughout the book the base meaning of lbh has very strong 
negative connotations, a fact recognized by many scholars. Furthermore, the essence of 
the advice given in the joy passages is that the recommended enjoyment is set within 
very narrow limits. It is, therefore, very difficult to view Qoheleth as an optimist in any 
substantial way, bearing in mind the overarching mood of prevailing pessimism that 
echoes throughout the book. Weeks assesses the commanding presence of lbh thus: 
  . . . what hebel seems principally to represent for Qohelet is bound up with a misapprehension 
  of the world, and their place in it, by humans: they invest effort for things they cannot gain, or 
  for reasons which are false, and fail to pursue or to accomplish the only truly beneficial option 
  which is open to them – pleasure in their activities – either because their concerns lie  
  elsewhere, or because they have been misled into behaviour which may shorten their lives or 
  prevent their enjoyment.153         
      
2.8  Summary and Conclusion 
In the light of the above survey, it is clear that there is no agreement on what the 
English equivalent of lbh should be. But what is generally recognized is that this 
Hebrew term has a basic, literal meaning of “vapour,”  “breath,” or something 
concerned with air, or the movement of air. However, Qoheleth’s use of lbh is generally 
acknowledged to be a metaphor/figure and as such he employs it to cover a wide range 
of phenomena that he wants to discuss.         
 No matter how we approach the resolution of this problem, it is timely to recall 
that we are over two millennia removed from the culture in which Qoheleth was active. 
It is quite possible, therefore, that when Qoheleth employed this multivalent term, it 
may have had connotations for his readers that are forever hidden from our modern 
                                                
 152 Zimmerli, Das Buch des Predigers Salomo, 144. 
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culture with all its linguistic conventions and ideological assumptions. Therefore, even 
if there were universal agreement today as to an agreed rendering to lbh, there still 
would be that nagging doubt that we do not have sufficient clarity to what Qoheleth had 
in mind when he used it, for at no point in the monologue does he inform the reader 
what it means. By the same token, it is also not possible to retrieve the understanding of 
lbh that his audience would have known.   
 Furthermore, due to Qoheleth’s literary dexterity, his use of lbh is hardly likely 
to conform to its use in the Old Testament or elsewhere. We did note, however, that 
other authors employed the term to convey notions of transience and ineffectiveness, 
but cognizance was taken of the fact that these ideas do not give us a complete picture 
of its meaning in the rest of the Old Testament, and certainly not in Ecclesiastes. In the 
end, no matter how this ambiguous term is to be rendered in English, it will be 
impossible to capture the varied nuances that are employed in Qoheleth’s writing.  
 In view of the above observations and complexities, there really is no 
satisfactory resolution of this issue. Whatever translation is preferred, it will not be 
possible to adopt one word that captures all the nuances that Qoheleth may have 
attached to lbh.  I therefore think that, for want of a better term, the traditional rendering 
“vanity” will serve our present purpose adequately, but, at the same time, it should be 
kept in mind that the various ways Qoheleth applies the term cannot be reduced to any 
single term or phrase in the English language, be it “vanity” or otherwise.154   
 The lbh cosmic theme undoubtedly captivates the spirit and outlook of Qoheleth 
like no other. This is especially so when we observe how he employs it along with other 
important key words and phrases like lm[ (toil), !wrty (profit, advantage), and xwr tw[rw 
(chasing after wind). By far the most striking employment of lbh is in conjunction with 
lm[. The ensuing symbiotic relationship occurs in 2:11,17,19,21,23; 4:4, 7-8. There is 
no other term that is coupled with lbh so extensively. Qoheleth’s use of lm[ has the 
distinctive effect of adding a dark shade to the colour of his cosmic lbh theme.  
 In this and the previous chapter it was our intention to gain entry into the mind 
of Qoheleth to determine what was his understanding of the world as he saw it. Our 
attention was especially drawn to the first two chapters of Ecclesiastes for in them we 
found that the majority of Qoheleth’s major themes, key words and phrases were laid 
down as the groundwork for the rest of the book, so to speak. In fact, as is well 
                                                
 154 Graham Ogden has clear certainty that lbh should not be rendered “vanity.” See G. Ogden,     
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recognized, all these words and themes found in chapters one and two are picked-up in 
later chapters and are developed to devastating effect, especially with respect to the 
limitations of human knowledge.  
 From the evidence thus far deduced from these early chapters it is my contention 
that it provides us with an invaluable insight into the mind, spirit and outlook of this 
unique sage. That being so it is very difficult to resile from the view that Qoheleth was 
something akin to a pessimist. To a great extent, he appears to have been an existential 
loner who did not walk all that often on the sunny side of the street. Nor in these 
chapters does he appear to have engaged in contemporary debate about the claims he 
makes. Yet even when he invokes his call to joy in the first “joy passage” in the book at 
2:24-6, his enjoyment is heavily undercut by his belief in the arbitrariness of God who 
gives wisdom, knowledge and joy to humans who please him. But it is not immediately 
clear how God can be pleased, and in any case, there is no joy for the sinner who loses 
out in his toil.            
 Moreover, notwithstanding this call to enjoy life, there is an accompanying sting 
in the tail in 2:26b, where Qoheleth strikes out with a ringing endorsement of the lbh 
cosmic theme. There is also a notable incongruity when we compare this call to joy 
where God is said to give “wisdom, knowledge and joy” to the person who pleases him, 
which all seems very positive, yet in 1:16-18 and 2:13-16, Qoheleth’s assessment of 
wisdom and knowledge evokes once again the negative connotations of a lbh 
conclusion.            
 After laying the above foundation for our study, we will now turn in the next 
chapter to offer a descriptive analysis of claims made by several commentators 
regarding the nature of Qoheleth’s epistemology to the effect that he was an empiricist 
in making his epistemic claims about God, mankind, and the nature of life for humans 
in the world.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   60	  
PART 1.    QOHELETH’S  UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD 
 
Chapter 3:   Claims that Qoheleth was an Empiricist 
 
3.1   Introduction 
Several scholars have made claims concerning the nature of Qoheleth’s epistemology to 
the effect that he was an empiricist. I will now present a descriptive survey of these 
claims, after which I will proceed in section 3.4 to tap into contemporary 
epistemological discussion with a view to situating Qoheleth’s epistemic claims in a 
wider conceptual framework. My intention here is not to view Qoheleth as a modern 
epistemologist conversant with current Western philosophical debate, but rather to 
present a more nuanced and comprehensive perspective on Qoheleth’s knowledge 
claims.           
  Our starting point is with the work of Michael Fox, who has made many 
insightful observations about the interpretation of the book of Ecclesiastes. We have 
already, in chapter one, alluded to his seminal article published in 1977, which argued 
for the literary unity of the book, a view that has had considerable influence.155 Ten 
years later Fox presented another important article entitled, “Qohelet’s Epistemology,” 
which has also exerted a very discernible impact on the study of Qoheleth’s thought. 
We will now turn our attention to this substantial article as it has set the benchmark 
relating to the specific study of Qoheleth’s epistemology.156      
                                                
  155 Fox, “Frame –Narrative,” 83-106. Fox’s contribution to Qohelethian studies has been 
substantial. In addition to the two above cited works, see his Qohelet and His Contradictions; ______ , 
“Qohelet 1:4,” JSOT 40 (1988): 109; ______ ,The JPS Bible Commentary: Ecclesiastes tlhq; _______ , 
“Wisdom in Qoheleth,” in In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie (ed. by L. Perdue 
et al.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1993), 115-31; ______ , “A Study of Antef,” Orientalia  46 
(1977): 393-423;______ , “The Identification of Quotations in Biblical Literature,” ZAW 92 (1980): 416-31;  
________ ,  “What Happens in Qohelet 4:13-16,” JHS 1 (1997): 1-10; _______ , “The Inner-Structure of 
Qohelet’s Thought,” in The Language of Qohelet in its Context: Essays in Honour of Prof. A. Schoors on 
the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (OLA 164; ed. by A. Berlejung and P. Van Hecke. Leuven: 
Uitgeverij Peeters en Departemant Oosterse Studies, 2007), 225-38; Michael V. Fox, and B. Porten. 
“Unsought Discoveries: Qoheleth 7:23-8:1a,” HS 19 (1978): 26-38. 
 156  Fox, “Qohelet’s Epistemology,” HUCA 58 (1987): 137-55. Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, states 
(at 41, f/n. 146) that this topic was anticipated by Bonaventura, Nicholas of Lyra, the evangelical 
Reformers and the distinguished Hebraist, I. Nordheimer, “Philosophy of Ecclesiastes,” American 
Biblical Repository 12 (1838): 197-219. Nordheimer regards Ecclesiastes as a philosophic didactic poem 
(at 198). He writes (at 204), “The preacher . . . seems ever solicitous to lead his readers with him along 
the path of experience, and thus cause them to arrive at the truth as it were simultaneously with himself.” 
He later states (at 207) that the author [for Nordheimer, this is Solomon] adopts, “the Socratic or sceptical 
	   61	  
3:2  Michael V Fox          
Speaking of Qoheleth’s teaching, Michael Fox states that, “. . . the problem of 
knowledge – its possibility, its power, and its limitations – is the central concern in his 
book.”157 Fox sets out to argue that,         
  . . . Qohelet has an essentially empirical methodology: he seeks both to derive knowledge from 
  experience and to validate ideas experientially. He often reports his findings introspectively, 
  communicating his discoveries as perceptions. And he conceives of knowledge as the  
  product of human thought.158 
He then proceeds to briefly consider the concepts of  {hmkx and t[d (wisdom and 
knowledge) that Qoheleth conjoins in 1:16 where he claims that his mind has had great 
experience of hmkx and t[d. Fox points out that the term {hmkx as understood by 
Qoheleth does not conform to the English term “wisdom” which denotes sagacity, i.e., 
the ability to take the long view, and to be able to assess issues by moral as well as 
practical criteria. In this sense “wisdom” thus involves discerning the best ends as well 
as practical criteria. If a person knew the right course of action but did not take it, s/he 
would not be wise. But Qoheleth does not use {hmkx of this kind of wisdom. {hmkx in the 
Hebrew Bible certainly includes sagacity but also denotes other skills and knowledge as 
well; in fact, {hmkx is experience of all sorts.       
  According to Fox, {hmkx has two aspects: faculty and knowledge. Of faculty he 
says that wisdom is an intellectual power broadly similar to intelligence in its 
application. In this sense {hmkx encompasses practical skills and common sense as well 
as the capacity to exercise logical thinking whereby one draws valid conclusions from 
premises. {hmkx also exists as knowledge, that is, the communicable content of 
knowledge, that which is known.          
  As a preparation for his task, Qoheleth accumulated wisdom surpassing that of 
his predecessors (1:16). This wisdom must be knowledge because it is something 
learned which grows and develops. Qoheleth does not say exactly what the content of 
this learning was. One cannot assume it to be equated with the genre referred to as 
Wisdom Literature just because it is called {hmkx.  Since Qoheleth’s lexicon, style and 
presuppositions are mainly rooted in the wisdom tradition, Fox holds that Qoheleth 
                                                                                                                                          
method of induction” . . . which, “. . . is the most perfect mode of attaining absolute certainty that can be 
conceived.”  These comments apart, there really is little reference in this article either to epistemology in 
general, or to empiricism in particular.  
  157 Fox, “Qohelet’s Epistemology,” 137. 
  158 Fox, “Qohelet’s Epistemology,” 137-8. 
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never openly deploys his vaunted learning in his inquiry, but rather relies on his powers 
of observation, analysis and reason.  Qoheleth’s approach can, therefore, be termed, 
perhaps somewhat loosely, “empirical” insofar as it assumes that the foundation of 
knowledge is experience. He seeks experience, observes it, evaluates it, then reports his 
perceptions and reactions.           
  Fox goes on to elaborate on the method and theory of Qoheleth’s epistemology. 
His central thesis concerning Qoheleth’s claims is:- 
 Qohelet’s epistemology is essentially empirical. I am applying this term to Qohelet’s thought by 
  analogy to the Western philosophical theories known as empirical, although Qohelet does not 
  offer a philosophical theory or pursue a consistent methodology. Much that he says comes from 
  traditional learning, impulse, or vague deduction. Many of his ideas he formulates a priori (e. g., 
  3:17, 8:12b), or derives from assumptions that lack experiential grounding (e.g., 7:11-12). 
  Nevertheless, the “empirical” label is justified, first, by Qohelet’s conception of his  
  investigative procedure, which looks to experience as the source of knowledge and the means of 
  validation, and second, by his concept of knowledge, which views knowledge as created by 
  thought and dependent on perception.159  
According to Fox, the methodology of Qoheleth by which he attained new knowledge 
involved two inseparable components, (a) the procedure of discovery and (b) the form 
of argumentation. Regarding (a) Qoheleth has a particular distinctive procedure of 
discovery. In 1:12-18 and 2:1-3, Qoheleth states he will investigate the world with the 
aid of {hmkx, that is to say, he will use his reason rather than his prior knowledge in his 
inquiry. The nature of his investigations is stated in 1:13, 17; 7:23, 25, 27 and 8:16. 
Overall, Qoheleth’s procedure, described in these passages, underlies his teachings as a 
whole, though he does not follow it at every step.      
  Fox states that, “He [Qoheleth] never invokes prior knowledge, anything he 
“heard” as an argument for his convictions.”160 The learned sage proceeds by seeking 
experience, observes what he sees and evaluates it. He thenceforth reports his 
perceptions or reactions. He also declares that Qoheleth seeks experience as a source of 
knowledge as indicted in 1:13- “ . . . [I] applied my mind to seek and to search out by 
wisdom all that is done under heaven.” Qoheleth then proceeds to investigate various 
activities, facts and situations, hence, the significance of his first experiment in 2:1-11 
that is centred on pursuing pleasure.       
  However, before experience becomes knowledge, it must be interpreted by 
reason. Qoheleth uses {hmkx, that is, reason as an instrument of guiding, organizing and 
interpreting experiences. Qoheleth speaks very often to his bl = heart, e.g., 1:13, 16, 17; 
                                                
  159 Fox, “Qohelet’s Epistemology,” 141. 
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2:1, 3 (x2); 3:17, 18; 7:25; 8:9, 16; 9:1, which, according to Fox, is not a habit of his 
literary style, but rather because the “heart” has a central role in the process of 
perception and discovery. Fox, however, claims that Qoheleth does not always present 
arguments on behalf of his ideas, but when he does, he generally uses experiential ones. 
  With respect to (b), form of argumentation, Qoheleth’s argumentation is 
experiential. Fox identifies two forms. One is testimony in which Qoheleth claims to 
have observed the fact that is being asserted, or the data from which the conclusion is 
drawn. This form of testimony is to be noted in 2:1-10. Here he confirms to the reader 
the value of pleasure on the basis of his own experience of it. A further example is 
where Qoheleth observes oppression. “Again I saw all the oppressions that are practiced 
under the sun. Look, the tears of the oppressed      with no one to comfort them.” (4:1). 
This is a conclusion as well as a basis for a further inference about the value of life. 
“And I thought the dead, who have already died, more fortunate than the living, who are 
still alive; . . .” (4:2).           
  Testimony is only effective, however, if the audience accepts the speaker’s 
credibility. Qoheleth, states Fox, tries to bolster his credibility by reiterating and 
emphasizing that his ideas are all first-hand perceptions. At various points in the 
narrative Qoheleth hammers this home by the pleonastic use of ינא giving great 
emphasis to his introspective reporting. Qoheleth also uses experience as validation. 
This employs publicly observable facts as premises as in 2:21-23 where Qoheleth draws 
the conclusion that toil is absurd due to the indisputable fact that at death a worker must 
leave his wealth to someone else, whom he may not know, and /or to someone who 
never worked for it (cf. 2:3-9; 5:7-8).       
  A more complex example of validation is found in 1:4-7 where there is a 
description of the publicly observed natural phenomena that recur endlessly. Qoheleth 
then takes this publicly accessible observation to justify (validate, verify) his conclusion 
in verse 9: “What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be 
done; there is nothing new under the sun.” This conclusion (deduction) in turn validates 
Qoheleth’s programmatic question in 1:3, “What do people gain from all the toil at 
which they toil under the sun?” As Fox puts it, “The implicit rationale is that if even the 
powerful incessant forces of nature can achieve nothing new, certainly human toiling 
cannot do so. The fate of human toil is subsumed to a universal rule which is learned 
from, and validated by, observations of particulars.”161    
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  In demonstrating the significance of Qoheleth’s validation (verification) 
methodology, Fox claims that “The importance Qohelet gives to validation is unique in 
Wisdom Literature.”162 But in assessing Qoheleth’s procedures, Fox issues an important 
qualification. 
  Qohelet’s argumentation is not, it should be stressed, always valid. Its main flaws are those to 
  which all induction is susceptible; generalisation from too few examples and transference of 
  conclusions to inappropriate categories. His argumentation is, however, significant because of 
  what it attempts to do: to prove the propositions of wisdom from experiential evidence.163 
Fox comments that the contrast between the Wisdom sages and Qoheleth, in terms of 
the investigative procedures and the forms of argumentation employed, is of striking 
consequence. He states that Wisdom Literature’s epistemology is not empirical: “. . .  
the sages do not offer their experience as the source of essentially new knowledge, and 
they rarely invoke experiential arguments on its behalf.”164 Admittedly, Fox concedes 
that a few passages in didactic Wisdom do refer to something the sage saw, which 
initially gives the impression of empiricism. However, Fox says that this is mostly a 
rhetorical strategy, which is far removed from Qoheleth: for him, it is the expression of 
a fundamental methodology.          
  The last step in Qoheleth’s procedures, according to Fox, is to report his 
discoveries. Qoheleth does this by looking back and then proceeds to tell the reader 
what he earlier saw t[d “discovered” or found acm “apprehended,” and “said” rma, i.e. 
“thought.” Qoheleth’s style of reporting is intensely introspective. For example, he says 
of the wise and the fool, “But I also realized that the very same fate befalls them both.” 
(2:14), not, “But they have the very same fate.” Or again, “I turned and saw that under 
the sun the race does not belong to the swift . . .”  (9:11), and not, “Under the sun the 
race does not necessarily go to the swift . . .” 
  It seems important to him that the reader not only knows what the truth is, but also be  
  aware that he, Qohelet, saw this, felt this, realized this. He is reflexively observing the  
  psychological process of discovery as well as reporting the discoveries themselves.  
  Qohelet’s introspective reporting has no parallels in other Wisdom Literature.165 
Fox then proceeds to make the following assertion: “Qoheleth conceives of knowledge 
as a product of thought and discovery, not as an entity independent of the individual 
mind.”166 Knowledge for Qoheleth is subsequent to and independent upon observation. 
                                                
   162 Fox, “Qohelet’s Epistemology,” 145. 
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Qoheleth does not picture himself as receiving transmitted knowledge but as 
discovering truths that would not otherwise be known. Put differently, Qoheleth’s 
epistemology makes knowledge (at least knowledge of the sort that interested sages) 
dependent on the knower’s perceiving it.      
  Knowledge proceeds from perception, according to Qoheleth. But this belief 
may lead to scepticism as a person is likely to acknowledge the inherent fallibility and 
unverifiability of his own knowledge. This is exactly what Qoheleth does in 6:12, which 
is one of his key rhetorical questions. “For who knows what is good for mortals while 
they live the few days of their vain life, which they pass like a shadow? For who can tell 
them what will be after them under the sun?” There is huge irony here when one 
discovers that this undercuts what he says in 7:1-12, thus undermining the possibility of 
certain knowledge. Hence, what Qoheleth claims to know is both unverifiable and 
uncertain.          
  Between the sages in the Wisdom tradition and Qoheleth there is a huge 
contrast. For example, the teacher in Prov 1-9 encourages his pupil to “hear” and “keep” 
his father’s wisdom. For Qoheleth, “seeking” and “finding” wisdom refer to exploration 
and discovery. There is very little attempt to argue for individual experience in Wisdom 
Literature as a whole. Fox states that Qoheleth is most unusual in his emphasis on 
validation, especially validation by empirical evidence. “In brief, if one could ask a 
more conventional sage, ‘How do you know this?’, he would, I believe, answer: 
‘Because I learned it.’ To this question Qohelet would reply: ‘Because I saw it’. The 
shift is profound.”167         
  Fox expresses the view that in his opinion Qoheleth’s epistemology is foreign to 
the ancient Near East, but it is paralleled in his Hellenistic environment, the 
fundamental tenet of this environment being the autonomy of individual reason. In other 
words, the “. . . belief that individuals can and should proceed with their own 
observations and reasoning powers on a quest for knowledge and that this may lead to 
discovery of truths previously unknown.”168  The conclusion that Fox draws from 
Qoheleth’s methodology is, 
  So Qoheleth did not merely go through life commenting on what he had noticed. He  
  chose a heuristic procedure deliberately and pursued it with determination, if not with  
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  consistency. This, I believe, is unparalleled: a sage choosing to seek sensory experience  
  as a path to insight.169 
3.3 Further Claims Concerning Qoheleth’s Empiricism 
Some other scholars have also made similar comments to the effect that Qoheleth 
employs an empirical epistemology, though their treatment of the issue has not been as 
extensive as Fox’s. In an interesting article Peter Hayman sets out to compare Qoheleth 
and Sefer Yezira – The Book of Creation, (SF) believed to be a fourth century CE 
work.170 Hayman states that both works have much in common in that scholars find 
them so difficult to incorporate in their definitions of Yahwism and Judaism. He 
observes that “Qohelet is one of the very few biblical texts quoted in SF and both his 
creation-based theology and his empirical methodology reappear in this much later 
work.”171          
  According to Hayman both these texts claim, “the sources of truth and 
knowledge is human observation of the phenomena of nature.”172 For Hayman, these 
different authors have the same epistemological basis.      
  How do the authors of these two texts know what they claim to know? Qohelet leaves us in no 
  doubt whatsoever about this. His repeated use of the verbs har and [dy, plus supplementary verbs 
  like rwt (to inspect) and hsn (test by experience), reveal a thoroughly empirical epistemology. 
  Qohelet pits his ytyar (I saw) against the whole received tradition of Jewish wisdom (see Eccl. 
  2:24; 3:10, 14; 8:17). It seems from time to time that what Qohelet is doing is to cloak empirical 
  statements in theological language. . . . This cloaking of empirical observation in  
  theological language is particularly clear in the way in which in 8:17 Qohelet immediately 
  rephrases ~yhlah hX[m lk-ta (‘all the work of God’) as XmXh-txt hX[n rXa hX[m-ta (‘that which 
  is done under the  sun’).173 
Hayman makes a further comment about both authors: “For them, God’s existence and 
role as creator and sustainer of the universe is self-evident truth derived from empirical 
observation and not from any prophetic pronouncements.”174 Hayman’s assessment of 
Qoheleth’s empiricism is arguably the most robust statement one is likely to find in the 
literature on this topic.175 From an epistemological viewpoint it is very difficult to 
                                                
  169 Fox, A Rereading, 77.  
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accept the claim that God’s existence as creator and sustainer of the universe is “a self-
evident truth derived from empirical observation. . .”    
   We need say no more on the subject at present as this claim and others about 
Qoheleth’s epistemology will surface in our discussion on Qoheleth’s theological 
claims in the next two chapters.        
  In his recent commentary, Craig Bartholomew has highlighted, both in a lengthy 
introduction and throughout the commentary, the importance of Qoheleth’s 
epistemology.176 With reference to Fox’s description of Qoheleth’s epistemology as 
empirical, Bartholomew states that this view is too restrictive.177 For him, Qoheleth’s 
epistemology is better described as “autonomous.”178 Bartholomew holds that 7:23-29   
is an important passage for Qoheleth’s epistemology, and it is in his treatment of these 
verses that he elaborates on this topic. In response to Fox’s claim that Qoheleth’s 
epistemology is best viewed as “empirical,” Bartholomew writes,    
  “Empirical” is not the best word to describe Qohelet’s epistemology, because classically it refers 
  to dependence solely on sense perception, whereas reason and experience play a major role in 
  Qohelet’s epistemology. . .  [Qohelet’s] epistemology cannot be equated with any particular 
  school of Greek philosophy, but it shares with many of the Greeks the sense of human  
  and the role of reason and experience and observation as the route to true knowledge.179 
He goes on to observe, “For Qohelet, investigation of the world “by wisdom” means 
that he will use his powers of reason applied to his experience and observations rather 
than traditional knowledge in his inquiry.”180 For these reasons, Bartholomew 
concludes, “Qohelet’s epistemology is thus better referred to as “autonomous.”181 Again 
and again, throughout the commentary, Bartholomew affirms that observation is a key 
element in Qohelet’s epistemology, a recurring phrase being, “Qohelet’s autonomous 
epistemology.”182 He also singles out “the autonomy of individual reason” on 
Qoheleth’s part as he feels Fox’s emphasis on the term “empirical” does not bring out 
                                                
  176 C. G. Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes. See also his earlier work, Reading Ecclesiastes: Old 
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this aspect sufficiently.183         
  Building on the work of Fox’s 1987 article on “Qoheleth’s Epistemology,” M. 
Patrizia Sciumbata examines the lexical field of the verbs relating to knowledge and 
perception in Ecclesiastes.184 She offers a range of evidence for pre-exilic and post-
exilic use of vocabulary associated with Jewish biblical epistemology and suggests that 
“. . . è però possibile dare un contributo all' esegesi del libro di Qohelet, fornendo un 
sostegno alle tesi che espone M.V. Fox nell' articolo ‘Qohelet's Epistemology.’ ”185 In 
the event, however, she advocates a positon more emphatic than Fox in her description 
of Qohelet’s empiricism. Sciumbata holds that other wisdom traditions are essentially 
non-empirical and that Qoheleth intentially employs “un sistema epistemologico di tipo 
empirico-induttivo sia la polemica con le altre correnti sapienziali.”186 She does 
however note that Qohelet has a preference for the verb har over [dy, and this crucial 
fact will be examined at length in a later chapter.     
  In a more recent study Ryan O’Dowd focuses his attention on the epistemology 
in the Hebrew Bible.187 This presentation of the issues of epistemology is wide-ranging 
in its scope taking in Genesis 1-11, Deuteronomy and Proverbs before drawing attention 
to Job and Ecclesiastes. Essentially this study explores the relationship between torah 
and wisdom in the Old Testament, O’Dowd’s central assumption being that wisdom and 
law have a “shared view of reality.”188 He writes, “Israel’s way of knowing is grounded 
in a storied, ethical, and religious way of life. Knowing, in fact is a matter of divine-
imitation where creating, or imagining, is at one and the same time obeying God and 
knowing.”189 He views the books of Ecclesiastes and Job as “late” or “critical” 
responses to traditional Jewish religion, viewing them as “typically pitted against torah 
(Deuteronomy) and early wisdom (Proverbs).”190     
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  According to O’Dowd, in the Old Testament, “Ecclesiastes has been the crown 
prince of epistemological studies.”191 He reads Ecclesiastes by keeping in view four 
threads or themes: (i) epistemology, (ii) rhetoric, (iii) structure, and (iv) the use of a 
priori wisdom concepts. However, because of the nature of his comprehensive 
examination of early traditional material, he does not engage with Ecclesiastes in a 
sustained way, restricting his observations to two passages, (i) 1:12-2:26, and (ii) 4:17-
5:6 [MT].           
  In his reading of 1:12-2:16, O’Dowd sets out to demonstrate the “inconsistent or 
broken irony in Qoheleth’s speeches that indirectly affirms the order and foundations of 
traditional wisdom.”192 This speech is said to be the peak of Qoheleth’s irony. But 
significantly, O’Dowd confirms that there is “an underlying a priori view of reality 
behind his [Qoheleth’s] thoughts.”193 He disagrees with Harold Fisch in that the latter 
sees Qoheleth breaking stride with his radical empiricism. For O’Dowd, “. . . this 
misses the obvious turn from empirical (observational) statements to the faith based 
declarations of what Qoheleth assumes to be true. It is these unexpected turns from 
empirical to rational/traditional judgments which force readers to question Qoheleth’s 
epistemological foundations and his relation to his tradition.”194   
  Of 4:17-5:6, O’Dowd says that the reader is struck by Qoheleth’s positive 
conclusions in matters of cult, wisdom and the fear of God. But when the question 
arises: how does Qoheleth know about these matters? no answer is forthcoming. He 
concludes that the reference concerning ary ~yhlah ta is to be taken as a   
  “ . . . subversive way to deconstruct the fruitless, disengaged rhetoric which dominates the 
  speech in 1:12-2:26. The ultimate function of these subversive phrases is fully confirmed in the 
  conclusion (12:13-14). Like the present passage (4:17- 5:6) these phrases also mark the “shared 
  view of reality” between wisdom and law and expose the moments in Qohelet’s thought which 
  are obscured by his empirical, hyper-subjective epistemology.”195  
In his summing up, O’Dowd observes that there is a modern tendency to set Proverbs 
against Ecclesiastes and Job, a tendency accruing from inattention by scholars to the 
storied-based worldview of the ancient world. O’Dowd offers an alternative new way to 
hear these books. He claims that the important relationship between Ecclesiastes’ 
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frame-narrative structure, irony, and a priori material explains the epistemology at work 
in the book.         
  While it is possible to see Qohelet at odds with the tradition, there is also good reason to expect a 
  more complicated message – one which carefully pits lbh statements against carpe diem sayings 
  in order to draw an audience into an unresolved bi-polar experience. . . . The answer to the 
  ambiguities in the world is not perfect or better knowledge, but “to fear God and keep his  
  commandments” in the search for wisdom.196  
The net effect of O’Dowd’s thesis is that he homogenizes the uniqueness of Qoheleth’s 
thought by wrapping it with a conservative hermeneutic: the outcome is that he makes 
12:13-14 the interpretational key to the book’s meaning. O’Dowd does hold Qoheleth to 
be an empiricist, but he also acknowledges that there is much a priori material in the 
book. He does not, however, discuss the nature of empiricism per se, nor does he 
advance a detailed analysis of the nature and extent of Qoheleth’s epistemology.  
 Finally in this chapter I wish to draw attention to the wide-ranging study of 
Annette Schellenberg who explores the problem of human cognition in the Old 
Testament.197 This study is not so much concerned with the nature of knowledge as with 
its sources and limitations. Schellenberg presents a polyphony of texts in the Hebrew 
Bible: (i) Qoheleth, (ii) Job, (iii) “Theologized Wisdom” – Proverbs 1-9, Sirach, The 
Wisdom of Solomon, (iv) Genesis 2-3 and related texts, (v) excerpts from the prophetic 
literature – notably Isaiah, and (vi) the Apocalyptic Literature.198         
 Schellenberg examines Qoheleth’s skeptical outlook, i.e., his concern with the 
limitations of knowledge, e.g., (i) death, (ii) the future, and (iii) God’s doing/activity.   Thereafter she moves to consider his empirical side in which she examines his     Schellenberg examines Qoheleth’s skeptical outlook, i.e., his concern with the limitations of knowledge, e.g., (i) death, 
(ii) the future, and (iii) God’s doing/activity.199 Thereafter she moves to consider his 
empirical side in which she examines his sources of knowledge.200 Unfortunately, 
Qoheleth does not spell out in explicit terms what his sources of knowledge are. 
Schellenberg suggests that there are indirect allusions to the sources of knowledge in the 
book. The usual tripartite sources – experience, tradition and divine revelation – are 
found in “theologized Wisdom,” but in Qoheleth divine revelation is missing. 
Schellenberg emphasizes personal experience (Efrahrung) as Qoheleth’s major source 
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of knowledge, that is to say, living is the prime source of knowledge. Human experience 
is an essential part of cognition, or human knowing. In this respect Schellenberg 
stresses Qoheleth’s constant use of first person verbs, and in the great majority of these 
instances there is a clear connection with the cognitive process, what Schellenberg calls 
Erkenntnisgewinnung (knowledge acquisition). 
 Furthermore, Schellenberg discusses Qoheleth’s various forms of 
argumentation. She identifies three: (i) Beobachtung mit freier Reflexion (Observation 
with free reflexion, as in 4:1-3); (ii) Induktion  (Induction, as in 1:13-15) and 
Falsifikation (Falsification, as in 7:15-18).  Qoheleth’s use of some verbs are analysed 
such as har, [mX, [dy, and rbd, along with other words and expressions which are less 
frequently employed. Schellenberg draws a distinction between Qoheleth’s use of the 
two verbs that are crucial for sensory perception and the cognitive process, namely, har 
and [mX.201 She asserts that Qoheleth’s preference for the use of har is not a literary 
gimmick. She defines the principle difference between the two verbs thus: har is 
associated with denoting visual perception and thus is characterized by the immediacy 
of the experience, as opposed to the indirect nature of auditory perception.202   Schellenberg correctly notes that har has a range of meanings in the book, as in 8:16-17 where the term designates an object of vision (empirical fact), and also refers to cognitive engagement (understanding/recognizing).  
 Schellenberg correctly notes that har has a wide range of meanings in the book, 
as in 8:16-17, where the term designates an object of vision (empirical fact), and also 
refers to cognitive engagement (understanding/recognizing).  She holds that this 
insistence on one’s own experience as a source of knowledge is closely linked to 
cognitive perception, indeed it is so close that the verb har refers not only to visual 
perception but also is used in the figurative sense of cognitive recognition.203 The 
recognition of this fact will be of the first importance when we later discuss the 
significance of har.     A second source of knowledge for Qoheleth, according to Schellenberg, is the concept of creationism (Schöpfungsdenken).204 Thus, Qoheleth acquires knowledge from this foundational concept that he takes as 
 A second source of knowledge for Qoheleth, according to Schellenberg, is the 
concept of creationism (Schöpfungsdenken).49 Thus, Qoheleth acquires knowledge from 
this foundational concept that he takes as axiomatic, without direct recourse to 
argumentation.  In her view, while Qoheleth gives expression to “some 
unreflective/uncritical notions, it is primarily his explicit reflections on human cognition 
                                                
  201 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 181. 
  202 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 181. 
 203 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 183-84. 
 202 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 188.   
	   72	  
and its limits that define the character of the book.205 This claim that Qoheleth 
expressed “uncritical presupposed ideas,” is an issue of some note, as I will seek to 
show in the ensuing chapters. There is no doubt, however, that on the whole, the stress 
Schellenberg lays on Qoheleth’s “empirical” outlook, i.e., the prominence given to his 
personal experience (Efrahrung) as a source of knowledge and reflection, indicates her 
acceptance that Qoheleth was in essence an empiricist in his epistemology.  
 To round off this section, I will briefly refer to some other scholars who hold 
Qoheleth to be an empiricist. For example, Tomáš Frydrych posits the view that 
observation and experience are the two decisive sources of knowledge for Qoheleth and 
Proverbs.206 He states that for Qoheleth, “. . . the personal experience is the primary 
modus operandi, as is shown by the frequent appearance of the 1cs forms of har, [dy, 
and acm.”207 According to Frydrych revelation plays some role in Qoheleth’s 
epistemology in the light of his exposition of 2:24-26 and 4:12-5:1 [MT].208 Thus, 
epistemology in Proverbs and Ecclesiastes is, for Frydrych, primarily empirical, but 
both are different. “In Proverbs the cumulative collective experience is the standard 
against which every new experience is measured and by which, if necessary, it is 
overruled. Qoheleth’s attitude toward secondary information is much more critical, for 
him the immediate personal experience is the criterion . . .”209    
 According to Aron Pinker, “The Kohelet relied on experience and keen 
observation when formulating topics for consideration. Reason and experience are the 
key elements of its epistemology (1:13; 2:3; 7:23).”210 William Johnstone goes further 
by depicting “ ‘The Preacher’ as a Scientist.”211 This title carries with it the clear 
impression that Qoheleth was an empiricist due the fact that in the history of modern 
science, empirical evidence is the touchstone of scientific inquiry. In assessing 
Qoheleth’s outlook on the world, Johnstone states that in the book “ there is to be found 
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a technique, a method of procedure which may not improperly be described as 
scientific.”212 Johnstone sees the problem for Qoheleth as stated in 1:3: “What do 
people gain from all the toil at which they toil under the sun?” There follows 31 
sections in the book, which according to Johnstone, form a series of observations of 
aspects of life. He writes, “The strong emphasis on empiricism, Koheleth’s brand of the 
traditional wisdom procedure, is notable: ‘I observed,’ the implication being, what I 
have not observed I cannot accept on hearsay.”213 He also observes that “A resumé of 
Koheleth’s position in a word, then: he sets out deliberately to observe in an empirical 
way, leaving no area of life untouched.”214     
 We have succinctly shown that a substantial number of scholars adhere to the 
view that Qoheleth’s methodology was essentially empirical in making his diverse 
epistemic claims. We will critically respond to these claims later in this study, but 
meantime I would make the observation that it is one thing to state that someone is an 
empiricist; it is quite another to offer an account of what it means to be an empiricist. 
To do so is more difficult than it appears. In approaching this issue of defining an 
empiricist, I think it necessary to examine the notion of empiricism in the wider context 
of contemporary philosophical debate with specific reference to epistemology.      
3.4  Epistemology                advance an analysis of the nature and extent of Qoheleth’s3. Whatis?.4 Empiricism:      
As far as I can observe, the above commentators do not address this question of 
defining the term “empiricist.” It is, therefore, of the first importance to come to a 
determination on this issue as in so doing we will be in a much better position to assess 
whether or not Qoheleth meets the requirements of being termed an empiricist in a 
meaningful sense. In pursuance of this task it will be necessary to broaden the scope of 
our enquiry so that we may be able to situate Qoheleth’s epistemic claims in a wider 
epistemological perspective. To this end we will, at the outset of this section, consider 
various key issues in contemporary epistemological debate. As the literature in this area 
of philosophical study is vast our aim will be to delineate some of the key concepts and 
distinctions in epistemological discussion that may prove helpful in coming to a 
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working definition of empiricism. It will also have the added benefit of placing 
Qoheleth’s knowledge claims in a more informed epistemological framework.215   In pursuance of this task it will be necessary to broaden the scope of our enquiry so that we may be able to set Qoheleth’s epistemic claims into a wider epistemological perspective.215 To this end we will, at the outset,  
3.5   What is Knowledge?       
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that principally addresses three defining 
questions.          
  (i)  What is knowledge?       
      (ii)  How can we gain knowledge?     
      (iii)      What are the limits of knowledge? 
As we shall observe later, Qoheleth has much to say about the limits of human 
knowing, especially in the second half of the monologue. For the moment we will 
concentrate on questions (i) and (ii).       
  Various responses have been advanced to the question: What is knowledge? The 
term “knowledge” and its cognates are employed in a variety of ways. For example, one 
common use of the verb “know” is where a person expresses a psychological 
conviction; “I just knew that John would not come to the concert.” But consider this 
example: “Jack knows that London is the capital city of England.” This claim is called 
propositional knowledge because it is a proposition that is known.    
  Yet another kind of knowledge can be identified by “how to” clauses; “Johnny 
knows how to mend a tyre puncture.” This kind of knowledge is referred to as 
procedural or non-propositional knowledge. Epistemologists tend to be more interested 
in the word “know” in its “factive” sense. A proposition is therefore something that can 
be expressed by a sentence that seeks to describe a fact or a state of affairs as when 
Qoheleth writes, “. . . yet I know that it will be well with those who fear God” (8:12).
  Knowledge requires belief, but not all beliefs constitute knowledge. When we 
say that we believe that something is the case, the belief in question could be true or 
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false. Belief formation is a mental process and typically the purpose of belief is to 
capture and describe the way things actually are. If a belief is not true, it therefore 
cannot constitute knowledge. Accordingly, if there is no such a thing as truth, then there 
can be no knowledge: in sum, knowledge necessitates truth. If Jack does not believe in 
the proposition that London is the capital city of England, then it is clear that this is not 
a proposition Jack knows. Thus, knowledge requires true belief. But even if Jack held a 
belief to be true, this does not wholly capture the nature of knowledge. A third element 
is essential since it is conceivable that Jack’s belief could be a matter of luck.  
  This third constituent element of knowledge is usually referred to as 
justification, which means that there must be good reasons/warrant/evidence to hold the 
epistemic claim in question.  One might therefore conclude that to constitute 
knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified. But the fact that a belief is held to 
be true does not confirm one way or the other that it is justified. For example, prior to 
the work of Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543), it was authoritatively held that the earth 
was the centre of the universe with the sun revolving around the earth, a belief referred 
to as the geocentric view in cosmology. People in that era adhered to a worldview that 
inhibited them from seeing that the nature of the solar system was much more complex 
than had previously been thought. Yet the evidence for their worldview was, at least for 
them, conclusively final; but their belief, as it turned out, did not constitute true 
knowledge because what they believed was untrue.      
 We have briefly outlined the nature of knowledge as consisting of (i) belief, (ii) 
truth, and (iii) justification. These three elements constitute what is referred to as the 
tripartite analysis of knowledge known as justified true belief (JTB). To further expand 
on this, let us consider the following schema where Q refers to Qoheleth, and P 
indicates a proposition. Three conditions must be satisfied if a genuine instance of 
propositional knowledge is to be established. 
 (1) Q must believe that P,       
  (2) P must be true, and       
 (3) Q’s belief that P must be adequately justified. 
Let us now flesh this out with a concrete example from Ecclesiastes 3:14.  
  (1) Q confidently believes that “Whatever God does endures for ever.” 
  (2) The proposition, “Whatever God does endures for ever.” must be true. 
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  (3) Q’s belief that, “Whatever God does endures for ever.” must be  
       adequately justified. 
When we bear in mind how much Qoheleth speaks about God in his monologue there 
cannot be any doubt that for him, the statements in (1) and (2) are beyond question. In 
fact, he prefaces the above claim in 3:14a with the words, yk yt[dy = “I know that . . .”, 
which represents an unambiguous epistemic claim. From an epistemological 
perspective, however, decisive issues surround validating the truth of proposition (2), 
and the justification problem in (3). For Qoheleth, there is no problem with the truth 
claim of (2), as he certainly believes that (2) is assuredly true. Regarding (3), in the text 
Qoheleth advances no explicit warrant for its epistemic justification (EJ). The problem 
with justification, which is held to be adequate and secure, is a central issue in 
epistemological theory today. This is an interesting question and it will occupy our 
attention at a later stage. Meantime, let us pick up on our treatment of the definition of 
knowledge as JTB.         
 Until recent times the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief 
was held to fulfil all the requirements of knowledge. In 1963, however, Edmund 
Gettier, in a very influential article, presented a pair of counter-examples that sought to 
show that knowledge could not be defined as justified true belief.216 On the basis of his 
two counter-examples, Gettier showed that a person could have a true and justified 
belief but did not have knowledge, because luck seemed to play a role in his belief – a 
belief which turned out to be true. The justification element in the traditional account of 
knowledge was meant to establish that knowledge was based on strong evidence rather 
than on misinformation or luck. Yet, Gettier-type counter-examples seemed to show 
that JTB can, on occasion, still involve luck, and consequently, fall short of an adequate 
definition of knowledge.         
  After Gettier, the justified true belief account of knowledge was held to be 
defective, with JTB loosing its exalted status. Nevertheless, even though justification 
together with truth is not sufficient for knowledge, it is possible to hold that it is 
necessary and nearly sufficient for knowledge. In the opinion of Laurence BonJour, the 
traditional account of knowledge is “at least approximately correct.”217 I would add that 
a belief constitutes knowledge when it is true and justified and there are no defeating 
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propositions to the justification of that belief. Keeping this modification in mind, we 
may conclude that the explication of knowledge as “justified true belief” is essentially 
sound.           
 The principal issue that has emerged from the knowledge debate, post-Gettier, 
concerns the nature of justification and central to any discussion of justification is the 
epistemic regress problem. The essence of this problem can be stated as follows. If a 
belief is to be justified, one must appeal to another belief on which it depends. Any 
further justification will in itself depend on another belief for its justification, and so on. 
In other words, for an inferential belief to be justified the beliefs that support it must of 
themselves be justified. This appears to lead to an infinite regress, with each belief 
justified by some further belief. If this line of reasoning was followed without bringing 
the series to a termination some way or another, then some commentators think that the 
only outcome would be scepticism, i.e., since no beliefs are justified, therefore, no one 
really knows anything. Few people would accept such an extreme outcome. 
  Epistemologists therefore have responded to this issue by advancing various 
explanatory theories by attempting to bring the infinite chain of reasoning to a halt. The 
two principal approaches that have emerged are foundationalism and coherentism. I do 
not deem it necessary to delve into this area of epistemological theory in great detail, as 
that would be superfluous for our requirements in this study. But I believe it will be 
helpful to briefly outline these two responses to the ingress problem, and then outline 
some of the reactions to them. In this way a range of ideas will emerge which we can 
draw on later in this thesis in order to assess the nature of Qoheleth’s epistemology. 
 I must stress that my intention is not to attempt to press gang Qoheleth into 
being a modern type epistemologist.218 It is rather to enable us to nuance the nature of 
Qoheleth’s methodology as applied to his epistemic claims. While Qoheleth makes no 
explicit claim to have an interest in epistemology that does not mean that he has none. A 
writer who claims to know so much about God, mankind, and the world, must have 
some underpinning theory about knowledge and its acquisition.    
 A foundationalist theory of empirical justification holds that an empirical belief 
is justified if and only if it is either a basic belief justified by the subject’s experience, or 
an inferred belief justified in some way by the support of basic beliefs. By way of 
further explication in the form of a metaphor, justified beliefs are like the structure of a 
building. We have the foundation and the superstructure. Beliefs that belong to the 
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foundation are basic; beliefs that are part of the superstructure are non-basic and find 
their justification in the justified beliefs in the foundation. This approach to the regress 
problem acknowledges that the subject’s experience is significant and relevant to how 
justified he/she is in his/her beliefs about the world.     
  This line of reasoning has not escaped censure, however, the main criticism 
being that foundationalism ultimately leads to the arbitrary or unjustified acceptance of 
certain beliefs. It is also claimed that it accords a privileged status to basic beliefs that 
are justified by experience alone, but ignores the interdependence among a person’s 
beliefs. In response, one might suggest that a belief could be justified if its warrant is 
premised on perception or certain a priori knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is known 
independently of experience. It could also be said that a belief could be deemed 
foundational in that the person who holds that belief believes it to be true until defeating 
evidence emerges.         
 There are of course several versions of empirical foundationalism. Bonjour 
distinguishes three grades. In strong foundationalism basic beliefs are “not just 
adequately justified, but also infallible, certain, indubitable, or incorrigible.”219 As far as 
moderate foundationalism is concerned, the non-inferential warrant possessed by basic 
beliefs need not amount to absolute certainty, but it must be “sufficient by itself to 
satisfy the adequate justification condition of knowledge.”220 By implication, in weak 
foundationalism the basic beliefs possess only a very low degree of epistemic 
justification on their own. Such beliefs are only “initially credible” rather than fully 
justified.           
  Coherentism, on the other hand, is the theory that denies the assumption that the 
infinite chain of reasoning proceeds according to a pattern of linear justification. To 
evade the charge of circular reasoning, advocates of coherentism hold that a belief is 
justified by the way it fits together or coheres with the rest of the belief system of which 
it is a constituent part. In this way coherentists avoid the infinite regress by not claiming 
a privileged status for some particular class of beliefs. But detractors of this theory 
suggest that while a system can cohere it can also be wrong, which means that 
coherentists have the problem of ensuring that the whole system corresponds to the real 
world.221 This problem is referred to as the “isolation objection.”   
                                                
 219 Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 26. 
 220 Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, 26. 
 221 A combination of foundationism and coherentism, known as foundherentism, has been 
proposed by Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Oxford: 
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  Naturally, there have been various critical responses to both of these positions. It 
is, for example, claimed by Peter Klein that neither foundationalism nor coherentism 
can solve the regress problem.222 He opts for the view known as infinitism. According 
to this theory it is not impossible for an infinite justificatory series to exist. Typically, 
for infinitists, the infinite series of beliefs is held to be potential. For example, an 
individual may have indefinitely many reasons available to him/her, without having 
consciously thought through all the reasons. Moreover, infinitism does not require that 
we hold an infinite number of beliefs, but it does require that there be an infinite non-
repeating set of propositions each of which is an available reason for the preceding one. 
In this sense it is like foundationalism. In practice, however, a person need only have 
the ability to bring forth the relevant reasons when the need arises.   
 Finally, I wish to refer to an important distinction that crops up consistently in 
the literature, i.e., that between epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism.  
Internalists claim that the justification of an epistemic belief is entirely determined by 
factors that are relevantly internal to the subject’s perspective on things. Conversely, 
externalists deny this. They claim that the epistemic status of a belief is not entirely 
determined by factors that are internal to the subject’s perspective. Factors deemed 
external are held to be outside of the psychological states of subjects, and can be 
conditions of knowledge. For a true belief to count as knowledge, the externalist 
maintains that it must be caused in the right sort of way, by relevant facts. To the extent 
that is outside the mind, such causation would be regarded as an external, knowledge-
yielding condition. On the other hand, internalists claim that all knowledge-yielding 
conditions are within the psychological states of those who gain knowledge.  
 There are various shades of opinion among internalists and externalists, but we 
have briefly outlined the principal thrust of their ideas, which will be adequate for our 
purposes. Whether any of the above responses in explicating the nature and structure of 
knowledge have any explanatory power with regards to Qoheleth’s outlook on the 
world remains to be seen as our study unfolds in the following chapters.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
Blackwell, 1993). The essence of this theory is captured by the use of an analogy. The regress of reasons, 
which are  “shaped” like a straight line, are in Haack’s view, more like a crossword puzzle, with multiple 
lines interlinked and supporting each other.  
 222 See Klein, “Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? Infinitism is the Solution to the 
Regress Problem,” in Steup and Rosa, Contemporary Debates, 131-55.  
	   80	  
3.6  How can we gain Knowledge? 
Just as there are various kinds of knowledge, so also there are various sources of 
knowledge. These include, intuition, reason, perception, introspection, memory, 
testimony and social dependence, customs and traditions, revelation, and experience. 
The latter term, “experience,” is our principal concern for the moment. The term 
“empirical” is derived from the Greek ὲµπειρία that translates to the Latin experientia, 
from which we in turn derive the word “experience.” Most epistemologists agree that 
we acquire knowledge about something through sense experience, by seeing it, hearing 
it, smelling it, touching it, and tasting it.       
 In explaining the nature of empiricism, it is common to distinguish between 
concepts that are said to be a posteriori and concepts that are a priori. The proposition 
“3 + 5 = 8” is an a priori statement. It is called a necessary truth because the truth of 
this type of proposition is independent of, and prior to, any experience. Other examples 
of a priori statements are “bachelors are unmarried,” and “a triangle has three sides.” 
These a priori propositions are also referred to as “analytical” statements for their truth 
is determined by the meanings that we assign to the words that we express. Simply 
stated, the truth of analytical statements is self-evident. In making the assertion, “Better 
is a handful with quiet than two handfuls with toil and a chasing after wind.” (Ecc 4:6), 
Qoheleth is not making an a priori statement, but is merely affirming an observation, an 
opinion, and therefore not advancing a necessary truth.   
 Propositions are said to be a posteriori if they are knowable only on the basis of 
sensory experience. For example, “All metals expand when heated.” is a proposition 
which is not a necessary truth because it needs to be verified by the evidence of 
experience. Thus when Qoheleth makes his opening declaration in Eccl 1:2, “Vanity of 
vanities. . . All is vanity,” he is not advancing a necessary truth. Therefore, propositions 
that are to be verified by experience are called “empirical” or “contingent” propositions, 
i.e., their truth is not necessary. This is especially important in the philosophy of science 
in which the scientific method must be empirically based on the evidence of the senses, 
which means that working hypotheses are tested by observation and experiment. 
Scientific knowledge is but a particular species of knowledge, though some 
epistemologists would go so far as to view science as the ultimate epistemological 
authority, but this is not a majority view.       
 In relation to our topic, two key questions emerge between rationalism and 
empiricism: Is sense experience the only avenue whereby we can acquire knowledge? 
Do we ever know anything independently of sense experience? Broadly speaking, an 
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empiricist holds to a theory of knowledge that emphasizes the role of experience, 
especially experience based on perceptual observations by the five senses. On the other 
hand, a rationalist believes that knowledge is primarily acquired by a priori processes, 
or is innate, as for example, in the form of concepts not derived from experience. 
 Historically, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori propositions has 
been a hotly contested area in the rationalist/empiricist debate, especially in the 
eighteenth century, but contemporary epistemologists have demurred from such 
extreme disjunctive positions preferring instead more nuanced approaches to 
understanding reality. Consequently, empiricism comes in a variety of shades and 
strengths, the implication being that, today, there is not one standard definition of 
empiricism that will attract universal assent among epistemologists. Be that as it may, 
our aim is to arrive at a working definition of empiricism that will be adequate for our 
purpose. As a useful starting point let us consider the following formulation: 
  Empiricism is a doctrine that holds that the senses do provide us with knowledge in some sense 
  of the word.223        
This definition achieves two objectives: (i) it captures the essence of the term 
“empiricism” in that some knowledge is gained by sensory experience, and (ii) it does 
not make exclusory claims to the effect that other possible sources of knowledge are 
unwarranted. It certainly would be very difficult to deny that we acquire knowledge 
about the physical world by the use of the five senses, particularly those of sight and 
hearing. When Qoheleth makes the observation, “When clouds are full, they empty rain 
on the earth;” (11:3a), there is no doubt that this was a statement borne of past 
experience observing weather changes derived from the use of the faculties of sight, 
touch, and hearing. Thus to say that we have learned something from experience is to 
say that we have come to “know” it by the use of our senses. Most people would not 
dissent from this common-sense view.       
  However, some epistemologists would describe the above definition as a weak 
form of empiricism, viewing it as too feeble and lacking in semantic precision. At the 
other end of the spectrum we have this exclusive claim that could be described as the 
strong form of empiricism.   
  Empiricism holds that all of our knowledge is derived from our senses.   
                                                
 223 This definition is taken from D. W. Hamlyn, “Empiricism,” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7 
Volumes: Vol 2, (eds. Paul Edwards, et al: New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967), 499-505, at 
499. 
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This extreme view led to the emergence of the logical positivism movement of the 
1930’s, a view that held that statements that are not tied to our experiences are 
meaningless. Such radical empiricism entails the abandonment of religious and ethical 
discourse and not surprisingly this extreme view is not in vogue today among 
epistemologists. A less dogmatic approach would be to hold that there are some cases in 
which the senses are not the basis of our knowledge, as for example, mathematical 
concepts and logical truths.         
  These two definitions can be generalized as follows. The weak form of 
empiricism could translate to: all knowledge comes from experience, while the extreme 
form could be rephrased by the claim: no source other than experience provides 
knowledge at all. If we take both of these definitions at face value, and apply them to 
Ecclesiastes, there is much in Qoheleth’s claims to knowledge that could not be 
regarded as knowledge at all. The crucial issue is how are we to understand the term 
“experience” in this context. This question is germane to the sources of Qoheleth’s 
epistemic claims that we will examine in a later chapter.    
  For now, in nestling down to an acceptable definition of empiricism I think it is 
desirable to adopt a moderate form of empiricism compared with those just stated. Thus, 
my proposal is to adopt the following definition:   
  An empiricist is a person who holds to a theory of knowledge that elevates the role  
  of experience, especially experience based on perceptual observations by the five senses.  
This definition catches the essential element of “experience” implicit in the term 
“empiricism.” Qoheleth claims to have had a varied range of experiences, so it remains 
to be seen if those experiences were the foundation of his epistemic claims. 
3.7  Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we have endeavoured to offer descriptive accounts by a number of 
scholars who claim that, in essence, Qoheleth was an empiricist in his outlook. 
However, we did draw attention to the fact that to claim that an author is an empiricist is  
one thing, quite another to enquire into what an empirical outlook entails. Since the  
authors under review did not consider in any detail what an empiricist is by definition, it 
was thought necessary to situate the term “empiricism” in a wider philosophical context 
by briefly examining some of the concepts and discussions that obtain in contemporary 
epistemological debate. This, I suggest, will enable a more nuanced understanding of 
Qoheleth’s epistemic claims to be attained as we move to examine and assess his 
epistemological credentials.          
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 As the reader makes his/her way through the text of this unique book it is 
remarkable how the divine name is so prominent in Qoheleth’s thought. On any analysis 
of the book’s vocabulary, one can only conclude that the references to the divine 
presence assume an importance of the first magnitude for Qoheleth. God is first 
mentioned in Ecclesiastes 1:13. However, that reference initiates a raft of over fifty 
occurrences of the divine name in the book which is rendered exclusively by the generic 
name ~yhla. Yet, at no point in Qoheleth’s narrative do we find divine revelation as an 
explicit source of his epistemic claims about God’s nature and activity. That being so, it 
is interesting to note that James Barr has made the claim that wisdom literature, as a 
whole, is typically empirical or has a ‘natural theology.’224 Since Qoheleth gives no 
explicit clues as to the source(s) of his knowledge of God, and given the plethora or 
references to God in the text, it therefore seems necessary to thoroughly investigate 
what Qoheleth claims to know about God, his nature, character and activity in the 
world.              
 Because of the extensive references to God by Qoheleth, I will examine this 
material over the next two chapters. My express purpose is to determine what Qoheleth 
claims he knows about God. Thus in our next chapter, i.e., chapter 4, we will consider 
“God Who Gives,” and “God as Creator Doer/Maker.” In chapter 5 all the remaining 
claims that Qoheleth makes about God will be brought to our attention. At the end of 
chapter 5 a summary and assessment of all this theological material - with specific 
reference to its epistemological significance - will be undertaken.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 224 J. Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: The Gifford Lectures for 1991: Delivered in the 
University of Edinburgh (Oxford: OUP, 1993), at 93-4; _________, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An 
Old Testament Perspective (London: SCM,1999), 476-78. Whether a strong case can be made for 
viewing Qoheleth as a proponent of natural theology is questionable. Because there is no ostensible 
reference in Ecclesiastes to divine revelation as a source of knowledge about God, that fact does not 
automatically imply that the learned sage “stands closer to the standpoint of natural theology.” (Biblical 
Faith, at 94). At no point in the monologue does Qoheleth offer a philosophical defence of the existence 
of God. Neither is there any attempt in the book to postulate a divine creator from contemplation of the 
natural order. Like his fellow Hebrew authors, Qoheleth accepted God’s existence as a known and felt 
reality, but unlike the Psalmist et al he never extols the majesty and power of the created order. 
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PART 2.   QOHELETH’S EPISTEMIC CLAIMS ABOUT GOD  
 
Chapter 4: Qoheleth’s Theological Claims (Part A) 
 
4.1  Introduction 
It is a well-known fact that in the literature of the Old Testament there are two principal 
names that refer to the deity, ~yhla and hwhy. The latter name was dramatically made 
known when God revealed himself to Moses in an unprecedented theophany in Exod 
3.225 Very significantly, it is only the generic name ~yhla that is exclusively employed 
by the author of Ecclesiastes - nowhere in the text of the book can the tetragammaton, 
hwhy be found.           
  Robert Salters offers the suggestion that the omission of hwhy by the author may 
perhaps be explained by the fact that in the post-exilic period the personal name of 
Israel’s God fell into disuse and the generic name became more prominent.226 Perhaps 
this is so, but it could also be suggested that the primary use of the generic name for the 
deity makes the message(s) of Ecclesiastes more universal in outlook. In any case, 
reference to the deity is widely dispersed throughout the book, with the divine name 
being more prominent in the first half of the book.227    
  In fact, in the monologue alone (1:12-12:7), Qoheleth explicitly refers to the 
deity thirty-seven times,228 with a further twelve implicit occurrences via the use of 
pronouns and subjects of various verbs. This very high incidence of ~yhla in Qoheleth’s 
thought makes the deity a major theme in the book, and one that is unquestionably 
foundational for his outlook on the world. In pursuance of our objective in this study to 
                                                
 225 The natural implication of Exodus 3 is that the divine name was given for the first time to 
Moses, and through him to Israel. Yet the name hwhy appears extensively in the book of Genesis. How can 
this be explained? See R. W. L. Moberly, The Old Testament of the Old Testament: Patriarchal 
Narratives and Mosaic Yahwism (OBT; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992) who offers an insightful canonical 
approach to the problem. 
 226 Salters, “The Word for “God,” in the Peshitta of Koheleth,” VT  21 (1971): 252-54, at 251. 
 227 There are thirty-three occurrences of ~yhla (explicit and implied) up to 6:9. Most of the time 
the author employs the divine name with the definite article, but on eight occasions the article is not used: 
1:13, 3:10, 13; 5:3, 18; 7:18; 8:2, 13. Bo Isaksson, Studies in the Language, suggests (at 145) “In spite of 
its frequency, one gets the impression that the article is without consequence, and its syntactical 
significance seems to diverge from that in the classical prose.”  
 228 These are 1:13; 2:24, 26; 3:10, 11, 13, 14 (x2), 15, 17, 18; 4:17; 5:1 (x2), 3, 5, 6, 17, 18 (x2), 
19; 6:2 (x2); 7:13, 14, 18, 26, 29; 8:2, 12, 13,15,17; 9:1, 7; 11:5, 9; 12:7.  The Epilogue 12:9-14 has two 
references to ~yhla thus bringing the total occurrences of the generic divine name to forty. 
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critically examine and determine the nature of Qoheleth’s epistemology, there are two 
distinct questions directly related to Qoheleth’s theological claims that need to be 
addressed.    
  (1)  What does Qoheleth claim to know about the nature, character, and activity 
   of God?         
 (2)  What are the sources of Qoheleth’s theological knowledge? 
The first question will be addressed in this chapter, while question 2 will be discussed at 
the end of the next. In considering the first question it will be found from the text that 
Qoheleth has substantial information to impart to his audience regarding God’s activity 
and work, but little that comes in the form of a systematic treatment about the nature 
and character of God per se.229  What is particularly striking is the fact that Qoheleth 
employs a diverse range of verbs with ~yhla as subject. I therefore propose to examine 
these verbs with the deity as subject, for in so doing we will be able to extrapolate the 
knowledge claims he makes about God. In this respect the two most important verbs are 
!tn = “to give” and hX[ = ‘to do, make.” It will presently become clear that Qoheleth 
portrays God as a very active deity, perhaps more than is realized.230  
  Kieran Heskin has advanced an interesting suggestion to the effect that divine 
activity in Ecclesiastes falls into two categories: (i) endogenous divine activity, and (ii) 
reactive divine activity. The former refers to the divine activity which originates within 
God’s person and which is not affected by outside stimuli such as human virtue or 
human sinfulness. Reactive divine activity, as the name suggests, is used in relation to 
divine activity that is affected by external stimuli. Endogenous divine activity is 
arbitrary, incomprehensible in human terms, and unchangeable; the latter has the 
opposite qualities.231  Heskin concludes that the endogenous activity of God is more in 
evidence in the book, while God’s reaction to human activity is less marked. This 
dichotomy is certainly borne out in Ecclesiastes.      
                                                
 229 Qoheleth is viewed by R. N. Whybray, “Qoheleth as a Theologian,” in A. Schoors, (ed) 
Qoheleth in the Context of Wisdom, (at 239), as a theologian and, at the same time, an apologist. I rather 
doubt that Qoheleth is either one or the other. I think that Whybray is nearer the mark when he says (at 
239) that Qoheleth is something like a philosopher. 
  230 A point made by Murphy, Ecclesiastes, lxviii. Murphy indicates that God is the subject of the 
verbs !tn and hX[ no less than eighteen times. Seow, Ecclesiastes, makes the observation (at 146), “This 
God described by Qohelet is very present and very active in the cosmos, always giving . . . and 
doing/making. . .”  
  231 K. Heskin, Qohelet’s Concept of God (Phd diss., Leeds University, 1985), 5.  
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Let us now move to consider the context in which the first mention of  ~yhla appears in 
the book, as I believe this sets the theological/anthropological agenda for Qoheleth’s 
endeavours. 
4.2   God Who Gives 
                  1:13b
            `wb twn[l ~dah ynbl ~yhla !tn [r !yn[ awh
  It is an unhappy business that God has given to human beings to be busy with.    
The context in which the deity is first mentioned is at the commencement of Qoheleth’s 
monologue. There is an aura of negativity about this statement. The immediate 
preceding words outline Qoheleth’s enterprise in which his mind will be preoccupied 
with investigating and exploring what is done under the sun. This will be achieved by 
his wisdom, for which he makes a colossal claim in 1:16. Immediately following v 13, 
Qoheleth’s cosmic theme is stated: “. . . and see, all is vanity and a chasing after wind.” 
(v 14), a theme which is riveted into the structure of the book.   
  The grammatical force of these verses is entirely negative, without the slightest 
glimmer of optimism about human life under the sun. While the generic name for the 
deity looms large in the book overall, yet equally significant is the fact that the generic 
term for man, ~da = “humankind/mankind,” occurs an amazing forty-nine times.232 But, 
as we will see as this study proceeds, what is more remarkable is that on virtually every 
occasion Qoheleth refers to the deity, he inextricably links reflection on God with 
reflection on the nature and condition of humans in the world.   
  This juxtaposition of God and mankind is a conspicuous feature of Qoheleth’s 
thought. It entails that when we consider what he says about God, (his theology) we are 
inevitably locked into considering his understanding of humanity (his anthropology). In 
this respect, it is not far off the mark to say that Ecclesiastes encapsulates what is 
generally regarded as the profoundest issue in the Bible as a whole: the troubled 
relationship between divinity and humanity.       
 Chapter 1:13 not only introduces God for the first time, it is also the first time 
the verb !tn appears. The giving of God is a topic that constitutes an important thread in 
the tapestry of the book’s structure. It becomes clear that, according to the sage, God 
gives a range of gifts which, at the outset, appear in positive terms, but almost 
invariably it is the case that there is a negative connotation associated with God’s giving 
                                                
  232 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 44. 
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to humans.           
 What then is the referent of the phrase [r !yn[ awh in relation to God’s giving? 
That is, what is it that God has given to mortals? Verse 13a outlines Qoheleth’s 
intellectual quest. Wisdom is the guiding principle whereby he sets out to seek and to 
search all the activity on earth.233 Whatever the task/occupation alluded to, it is 
described as [r.234 But is the activity on earth referring to what God is doing in the 
world, or is it what man is doing? The inquiry by wisdom is, for Qoheleth, a very 
comprehensive undertaking: the phrase “all that is done” (1:13a) refers to all that is 
happening on earth not just what humans do.235 In the context of Qoheleth’s 
programmatic statement of intention, the adjective [r casts a dark shadow over the task 
God has assigned to humanity.       
  Qoheleth’s outlook on life in 1:13 points to God as one who is a great giver to 
humankind. The verb !tn appears a total of twenty-five times in the book. Of these 
occurrences, ~yhla is the subject of the verb eleven times.236 As pointed out by Anton 
Schoors, “In sum, the most striking features of the verb !tn in Qoh are the relative 
frequency of its use with God as subject, and the combination with ‘heart,’ in order to 
connote an intellectual endeavour.”237  
             2:24-26 
               bwj wXpn-ta harhw htXw lkayX ~dab bwj-!ya 24
          `ayh ~yhlah dym yk yna ytyar hz-~g wlm[b 
         `ynmm #wx Xwxy ymw lkay ym yk 25 
                                                
 233 This intention is repeated in 2:3, 9 and 7:23. 
  234 The term !yn[ only occurs in Ecclesiastes (2:23, 26; 3:10; 4:8; 5:2, 13 (ET verses 3, 14); 8:16. 
According to Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, at 72-73, the related verb has four related meanings (i) to answer, 
(ii) to be occupied with, (iii) to be oppressed or afflicted, and (iv) to sing or chant. Either (ii) or (iii) are 
appropriate in the context. The adjective [r can mean “bad,” “inferior,” “disagreeable,” “adverse,” “evil.” 
Sometimes !yn[ has the meaning of something that causes anxiety.  
  235 See 1:9, 14; 4:3; 8:9, 17; 9:3, 6. 
  236 The number would come to twelve if we include the occurrence of !tn in 12:11. While there is 
a strong exegetical tradition to interpret “one shepherd” as referring to God, the more convincing view is 
set out by Fox, A Rereading, 355-6; see also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 388. The eleven occurrences are: 1:13; 
2:26 (x2); 3:10, 11; 5:17,18; 6:2; 8:15; 9:9; 12:7. On several occasions the term bl “heart” is then subject 
of the verb !tn: 1:13, 17; 7:21; 8:9, 16. Also in 7:2; 9:1 we find the related expression bl la !tn. The use of 
the word bl has the deep emotional utility of drawing the reader into a very intimate conversation with 
the author. 
  237 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 159. 
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            t[dw hmkx !tn wynpl bwjX ~dal yk 26
           swnklw @wsal !yn[ !tn ajwxlw hxmXw
                   `xwr tw[rw lbh hz-~g ~yhlah ynpl bwjl ttl 
  24 There is nothing better for mortals than to eat and drink, and find enjoyment in their toil.
  This also, I saw, is from the hand of God;      
  25 for apart from him who can eat or who can find enjoyment?   
  26 For to the one who pleases him God gives wisdom and knowledge and joy; but to the sinner 
  he gives the work of gathering and heaping, only to give to one who pleases God. This also is 
  vanity and a chasing after wind. 
These verses represent the first appearance of the so-called “joy passages” that occur in 
the book at strategic points.238 In verse 24a Qoheleth acknowledges and commends 
enjoyment. His taxonomy of joy is, however, tightly circumscribed as it consists of the 
simple gifts of eating, drinking and the enjoyment of one’s toil. Nonetheless, as 
Qoheleth puts it, “This too, is from the hand of God.”239    
 There follows in verse 26 the statement in which Qoheleth views God as the 
giver of wisdom, knowledge and joy. But there are two caveats. First, the object of such 
giving is only for those who please him; and second, God gives to the offensive person 
the task of gathering and amassing, but only for the purpose of giving to the one who 
pleases him. The statement is, paradoxically, consonant with the orthodox view of 
retribution, i.e., Qoheleth appears to confirm the traditional view of divine reward and 
punishment. Consequently, his conclusion can be stated as follows: God gives tangible 
rewards to those who please him, but to the wrongdoer he gives the thankless task of 
working for those who please him. Essentially, enjoyment comes from the mysterious 
and inscrutable will of a sovereign deity. Therefore, what Qoheleth is emphasizing here 
with his lbh conclusion is that God disposes of all things in accordance with his own 
sovereign unlimited will. 
 
             3:10-11 
        `wb twn[l ~dah ynbl ~yhla !tn rXa !yn[h-ta ytyar 10 
         rXa ylbm ~blb !tn ~l[h-ta ~g wt[b hpy hX[ lkh-ta 11 
                           `@ws-d[w Xarm ~yhlah hX[-rXa hX[mh-ta ~dah acmy-al 
 10 I have seen the business that God has given to everyone to be busy with.   
 11 He has made everything appropriate240 for its time; moreover he has put a sense of eternity241 
                                                
  238 The other “joy passages” are found in 3:12-13; 3:22; 5:18-20; 8:15; 9;7-10 and 11:8-10. 
 239 This phrase, ~yhlah dyb is also found in 9:1 with reference to “the righteous and the wise and 
their deeds” who are said to be in the “hand of God.” 
 240 The term is hpy, which has the meaning “right, proper, appropriate, good.” The RSV and the 
KJV have the translation “beautiful,” but it is unlikely that an aesthetic judgment is intended here. See 
5:17 (ET 5:18) “It is right (hpy) to eat and drink.”  
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 into their minds, yet they cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end.
    
Verse 10 quotes 1:13b almost word for word, the major difference being that in 1:13b 
the business/occupation (!yn[) that God has given to mankind attracts the pejorative 
adjective [r, whereas in 3:10 Qoheleth leaves open the question as to whether the !yn[ 
referred to is good or bad.242 Yet a negative connotation is clearly evident.243 Murphy 
believes that !yn[ refers to problems of indeterminate times alluded to in 3:2-8,244 a view 
similar to Crenshaw and most scholars.245      
  When Qoleleth states that ytyar – “I have seen . . .” the sense is “I have 
examined.”246 It could be equally rendered, “I observed . . .” But what has Qoheleth 
examined or observed? This is the same question as in 1:13 above, and the same answer 
equally applies. On this occasion the observation of Roland Murphy is worth noting. Of 
God’s giving he writes, “It is to be interpreted within Qoheleth’s own religious 
traditions: God controls everything and grants ‘gifts,’ even if arbitrarily. This is all part 
                                                                                                                                          
  241 The NRSV has “a sense of past and future in their minds.” I see no reason to deviate from the 
traditional rendering “eternity” as it is in keeping with that meaning in 3:14. See further comments below. 
 242 According to M. Jastrow, A Dictionary of the Targumin, the Talmud Bible and Yerushalmi, 
etc, (New York: Traditional Press, 1903), (at 1095) !yn[ is attested in post-biblical Hebrew and has the 
meaning “subject, business case.” In a recent article, A. Schellenberg, “Qoheleth’s Use of the Word !yn[,” 
in The Language of Qohelet, 143-55, states (at 150), “After verse 10, it most likely has to be understood 
as Qohelet’s report on his insights gained by contemplating the !yn[.” Schellenberg’s definition of !yn[ is 
too narrow as it limits its meaning  to Qoheleth’s quest for knowledge.  
  243 Crenshaw, Commentary, states (at 97) that this term retains an oppressive connotation 
throughout Ecclesiastes, even when the translation is neutral (task/business). Contrary to this view N. 
Lohfink, Qohelet: A Continental Commentary, writes (at 61), “In fact, the position that now follows is 
totally positive, taking for granted, as he does, that human activity is always God’s activity.” This is, I 
suggest, a very questionable assumption. It is like saying, in Hegelian terms, “Whatever is, is right.” 
While it is an incontestable fact that there is an emphatic, towering belief in God’s absolute sovereignty in 
the thought of Ecclesiastes, there is also room for man’s free will. Witness the way Qoheleth issues 
ethical imperatives from 4:17 (MT) onwards.  
  244 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 34. 
 245 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 96-97. Also see Rudman, Determinism in the Book of Ecclesiastes 
(JSOTSup 316; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001), 90-1; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 72.  According to J. 
Blenkinsopp, “Ecclesiastes 3:1-15: Another Interpretation,” JSOT 66 (1995): 55-64, Ch. 3:2-8 is not from 
the hand of Qoheleth; he added the title, 3:1 and a brief commentary, 3:9-15, in which the learned sage 
sought to refute the thesis of 3:2-8. He argues (contra Rudman) against a determinist reading of 3:2-8, 
involving Stoic philosophical influences on Qoheleth (at 61). For Blenkinsopp this passage is to be 
interpreted as meaning that everything has its appropriate time in which humans can exercise their 
freewill.  
 246 Ginsburg, Coheleth Commonly Called the Book of Ecclesiastes:Translated from the Original 
Hebrew, with a Commentary, Historical and Critical (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 
1861), states (at 307) that Qoheleth is engaging in “. . . a minute inspection of the different employments 
which God has assigned to the children of men.” Michel, Untersuchungen, comments (at 190), “Dies ist 
is, was ich jedenfalls als gut, d.h. angemessen betrachtet (eingesehen?) habe . . .” 
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of the inscrutable divine action, which defies understanding.”247   
  It should be observed that this forthright statement of Qoheleth’s is yet another 
observation he makes, just like the one found in 1:13, considered above. It amounts not 
to empirically grounded knowledge, but is a clear personal statement of opinion that 
reflects how Qoheleth viewed the world of divinity and humanity through his own 
idiosyncratic lens.         
 Verse 11a picks up on the theme of t[ in verses 2-8, and in verse 11b a well-
known crux interpretum presents itself. The same God who made everything 
fitting/appropriate (hpy), is ironically the same deity who has !tn = (placed/ put) ~l[h in 
human hearts. But to what does ~l[h refer? Various proposals have been advanced.248 
The basic idea is that ~l[ is the opposite to t[, that is, something which transcends time. 
In the same passage, ~l[ occurs in verse 14, and here the meaning “that which 
transcends time” fits in very well.       
  This “giving” by God to mankind has a negative effect in that man’s limitations 
are once again decisively asserted: humans cannot find out what God is doing from the 
beginning to the end. Characteristically, this negative stance is the preparation for 
another ode to joy in vv 12-13, which is the second “joy passage” to appear up to this 
point. In the light of humanity’s inability to comprehend the actions of God, Qoheleth’s 
response is to signal another “better/than” saying. The enjoyment invoked in verse 12 is 
further enumerated into its component elements in verse 13: eating, drinking and 
working, all of which are positively confirmed as the gift of God, ~yhla ttm.   
             5:17-18 [ET 5: 18-19] 
         hpy-rXa bwj yna ytyar-rXa hnh 17
             wlm[-lkb hbwj twarlw twtXlw-lwkal
          wyh-ymy rpsm XmXh-txt lm[yX
                    `wqlx awh-yk ~yhlah wl-!tn rXa  
                      lkal wjylXhw ~ysknw rX[ ~yhlah wl-!tn rXa ~dah-lk ~g 18
       `ayh ~yhla ttm hz wlm[b xmXlw wqlx-ta taXlw wnmm 
              
                                                
 247 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 13. In his comments on 1:14, (at 13) Murphy goes on to state, “The 
“deeds” are the events that make up the fabric of human life, and they are inseparable from the “work of 
God.” 
 248 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, (at p. 97) has summarized the various approaches to the meaning of 
~l[h thus: (i) eternity, (ii) world, (iii) course of the world, and (iv) knowledge or ignorance. For a detailed 
discussion see his “The Eternal Gospel (Ecclesiastes 3:11),” in Urgent Advice and Probing Questions: 
Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom (eds. James L. Crenshaw and J. T. Willis; Macon: Mercer 
University Press, 1995), 548-72. 
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 17 This is what I have seen to be good: it is fitting to eat and drink and find enjoyment in all the 
 toil with which one toils under the sun the few days of the life God gives us; for this is our lot. 
 18 Likewise all to whom God gives wealth and possessions and whom he enables to enjoy them, 
 and to accept their lot and find enjoyment in their toil – that is the gift of God.  
This traditional Jewish belief that God is the giver of life is asserted in yet another “joy 
passage.” What Qoheleth states in these verses is clearly intended to be a counterpoint 
or antithesis to what he has observed in verses 12-16 regarding the unfortunate rich 
man. Thus, the clause, “It is a good thing . . .” is in striking contrast to “a sick 
misfortune,” “to his harm” (verse 12); “unfortunate business,” “he owns nothing 
whatsoever” (verse 13), “nothing of his toil” (verse 14); “darkness,” “vexation” and 
“resentment” (verse 16).249 In verses 17-18, what is good (bwj) and appropriate/fitting 
(hpy) is highlighted and this is, for Qoheleth, the enjoyment of eating and drinking, 
notwithstanding all the toil. Yet, as William Brown reminds us:- 
 The theme of death is more important here than in the sage’s previous commendations of 
 enjoyment . . . Enjoyment for the sage is a deadly serious matter. The shortness of an 
 individual’s existence (“the few days of life”) serves not to neutralize but rather to underscore, 
 all the more, the efficacy of life’s simple pleasures.250 
Thus, according to Qoheleth, the love of wealth can pose problems (verses 12-16), yet 
having wealth and possessions is a gift of God, but only for those people to whom God 
gives it (verse 18a). Not only does God give, he also empowers a person to enjoy his 
gifts. That God enables a person to enjoy wealth and possessions, and not lose their 
riches, is solely an expression of his sovereign activity.251     
                               8:15 
           yk XmXh txt ~dal bwj-!ya rXa hxmXh-ta yna ytxbXw
          -rXa wyyx ymy wlm[b wnwly awhw xwmXlw twtXlw lwkal-~a
                                      `XmXh txt ~yhlah wl-!tn
  
 So I commend enjoyment, for there is nothing better for people under the sun than to eat, and 
 drink, and enjoy themselves, for this will go with them in their toil through the days of life that           
 God gives them under the sun. 
Qoheleth further demonstrates that God is the ‘Giver’ of life in yet another “joy 
passage.” At face value this verse seems to exhibit a very positive approach to life that 
advocates the unqualified enjoyment of some of the simple, but necessary, pleasures of 
                                                
  249 Verse 17 is essentially a paraphrase of material in 2:24-6; 3:11-12; 3:21-2; 8:15 and 9:7-10. 
  250 Brown, Ecclesiastes, 62. 
 251 The next unit to consider under this heading would be 6:1-2. However, these verses come 
under another sub-heading in chapter 10, “Evils Observed.” These verses will be examined there. 
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life.252 Whybray argues that Qoheleth speaks with increasing confidence as each of the 
“joy passages” unfolds in the text. Thus the verb ytxbvw (So I commend) with the 
pleonastic yna is used before the well-known formula, “there is nothing better than” as 
found in 2:24; 3:12, 22.  And in later passages, 9:7a and 11:9a, Qoheleth changes to the 
imperative mood.253 But Whybray’s thesis is not really persuasive: 8:15 must be seen in 
its present context.         
 When reading the exhortation to joy in the context of injustice previously 
described in verse 14, in which the lbh theme is repeated twice, verse 15 takes on a 
very different semantic colour. This is further exemplified by the contents of 8:16-17 
where human ignorance is again highlighted in the face of the impenetrable nature of 
the work of God.254 In this light, it could be said that, “Qoheleth is recommending 
pleasure as a distraction from the painful awareness of realities such as he has just 
described. Man cannot change these things; he can only alleviate the distress they cause 
him as observer.”255          
  The words of 8:15 offer a startling contrast to 2:2 where Qoheleth held joy to be 
a madness, and in 4:2 where he stated that the dead were more fortunate than the living. 
This observation brings to the fore very distinctive features of Qoheleth’s writing that 
can be educed from the material we have so far surveyed, namely, (a) the ability to 
adroitly change perspectives, and (b) the lack of engagement with logically sustained 
argument in the exposition of his ideas.256 Notwithstanding, 8:15 is further evidence that 
for Qoheleth, God is the giver of life.   
 
 
                                                
  252 It is not immediately obvious what the referent of rX[ (that) in verse15b relates to. Does the 
author mean enjoyment, toil, days of life? In the immediate context “life” seems the most likely 
rendering. 
  253 Whybray, “Qoheleth, Preacher of Joy,” 87-98. In his later commentary, Whybray, 
Ecclesiastes, (at 28) appears to be a little more reticent about stating that Qoheleth is a preacher of joy. 
“Whether he was a pessimist or an optimist, therefore, will remain a matter of opinion; what is certain is 
that he was a realist.” 
 254 That one cannot fathom the ways and activity of God is a major theme in Qoheleth’ thought 
(3:11; 7:25-29; 9:12 and 11:5). This important facet of Qoheleth’s outlook will be examined presently.  
  255 Fox, A Rereading, 287. 
  256 This latter point could be explained by the fact that literary conventions may vary from 
culture to culture. See J. Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (2nd ed. London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd (1996), 135-36. Consequently, we need not be surprised at Qoheleth’s alleged 
failure to conform to modern protocol associated with the requirements of academic research. 
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                     9:9 
          XmXh txt $l !hn rXa $lbh yyx ymy-lk tbha-rXa hXa-~[ ~yyx har
               $lm[bw ~yyxb $qlx awh yk $lbh ymy lk
              `XmXh txt lm[ hta-rXa 
 Enjoy life with the wife whom you love, all the days of your vain life that are given you under 
 the sun, because this is your portion in life and in your toil at which you toil under the sun.257 
In yet another “joy passage” we have a unique reference to conjugal love between a 
man and a woman. It is a well-reported fact that there are striking parallels between 
verses 7-9 and the Gilgamesh Epic in which Siduri, the ale-wife, offers advice to the 
hero, Gilgamesh. The sequence of unfolding ideas in these documents is very close, 
especially in the way the similar type events appear in the same order.258  Both of these 
species of ancient literature emphasize the fact that humans cannot live forever. Hence, 
one must make the best of the present. The motto here, as in the other “joy passages,” is 
carpe diem. Everything is in the hand of God (9:1; 2:24).259    
 Qoheleth’s imperative to the reader to enjoy life with the woman he loves (most 
likely one’s wife) must be understood in the section 9:1-12 as a whole. The main topic 
in this pericope is the prevalence of death for both the righteous and the wicked (verse 
2). Verse 9 is sandwiched between verses 1-6 – where the negative and solemn effects 
of death are drawn – and verses 10-12, where “time and chance,” that is, death, happens 
to all (verse 11): and there is no work or thought or knowledge or wisdom in the shady 
world of lwaX (verse 10). On this passage Graham Ogden comments, 
 Qoheleth’s imperative addressed to his male students is that they seek the love of a woman and 
 appreciate her as a divine gift (cf. 4:9-11; Gen 2: 22-24). It is another concrete example of the 
                                                
 257 The term hXa (woman) does not have the definite article. Charles F. Whitley, Koheleth: His 
Language and Thought (BZAW 148; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1979), draws the conclusion (at 80) that without 
the article any woman could be referred to, other than to one’s wife. However, the term by itself may 
refer to one’s wife as in Gen 30:4, 9; 1 Sam 25:43 and Deut 22:22. Seow, Ecclesiastes, writes (at 301) 
that the Akkadian word in the Gilgamesh Epic is rendered “wife” rather than woman. 
  258 See J. B. Pritchard, ed. Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 90. The 
sequence is: eat/drink, feasting, clothing, washing, and wife. The child is not mentioned in Qoheleth. In a 
very recent article Nili Samet, “The Gilgamesh Epic and the Book of Qohelet,” Bib 96 (2015): 375-90, 
explores this relationship. She concludes that Gilgamesh is the only known ANE text that could be 
regarded as a direct literary source for Qoheleth. See also Brown, Ecclesiastes, 94-5; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 
305-6. 
 259 Similar accounts are mirrored in the genre of Egyptian texts known as “Harpers’ Songs.” 
These are inscriptions that reflect on death, and on occasion, the impossibility of human immortality. In 
the light of the inexorable eventuality of death for all, people are urged to enjoy themselves while they are 
able – carpe diem. See M. Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature: A Book of Readings. Vol 1, The Old 
and Middle Kingdoms (Berkley: University of California Press, 1973): 196-7.  
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 general principle which runs through Qoheleth’s work, that the sage knows how, under God, to 
 enjoy life in this world of ironies.260 
In a similar vein, Thomas Krüger observes, “. . . if human beings accept death as a 
destiny that (with justification!) affects everyone in like manner (9:1-6), they gain the 
freedom to actively shape and enjoy their lives in the present.”261 Both these critics 
render a positive interpretation of Qoheleth’s exhortation to human love, but it has to be 
conceded that there is also a touch of irony in the text. Qoheleth is indubitably in 
tandem with mainstream Jewish tradition: God is the Creator and Giver of human life. It 
is an affirmative statement that is replicated throughout the Hebrew Bible. But the sage 
goes on to say that one is to accept this portion ($qlx) for that is the only response to 
God’s bounty, i.e., one’s “vain life” ($lbh).     
 Qoheleth does not make a practice of sustaining attention on one issue or idea 
for too long, and this is particularly the case when he refers to life. Shannon Burkes 
comments, “Even when Qoheleth is not specifically speaking of death, one cannot help 
but notice that almost every time he mentions life, he can hardly refrain from attaching 
‘hebel (ephemeral)’ or ‘few days of’ to the word.”262 (cf. 2:3; 5:17; 6:12; 7:15; 9:9 and 
11:10). This is clearly obvious in this segment 9:1-12 where the spectre of death is 
persuasive and the ethos is one which has a very serious tone. Even in verse 4, where he 
states that the living has hope, he deftly observes, “a living dog is better than a dead 
lion” (verse 4).263 
                        12:7 
   `hntn rXa ~yhlah-la bwXt xwrhw hyhXk #rah-l[ rp[h bXyw   
 and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the breath returns to God who gave it. 
In what is Qoheleth’s grand finale, he depicts the dissolution of human life in terms of 
the reversal of the act of creation. At creation God formed man from the dust of the 
earth and breathed into man’s nostrils the breath/spirit of life (3:19; Gen 2:7). 
Conversely, death brings about the opposite: the spirit of life at death returns to God 
who gave it (12:7). Death as the dissolution of life is similarly described in various Old 
                                                
 260 Ogden, Qoheleth,166. 
 261 Krüger, Qohelet, 172. 
 262 S. Burkes, Death in Qoheleth, 72. 
        263 The referents are hardly akin to human life, especially the mention of a “living dog” which 
was typically associated with filth and even death in ancient Near Eastern culture (cf. 2 Kgs 9: 30-37). 
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Testament texts as man’s return to the dust of the earth (Ps 104:29; 146:4; Job 10:9; 
34:15) and as the taking away of breath (Job 34:14; Ps 104:19).    
 When one compares 3:21 with 12:7, does Qoheleth contradict himself? In 12:7 
he states that the xwr returns to God who gave it. But in 3:21 he makes the observation, 
which is in the form of a rhetorical question, as to whether the xwr of man goes upward 
and the xwr of the beast goes downward to the earth. In the latter text Qoheleth raises a 
question about what happens to the xwr at death, and the anticipated response is: “no one 
knows.” Yet in 12:7 a categorical certainty is evident in Qoheleth’s thinking as to what 
happens at death.264         
 The alleged contradiction is, however, more apparent than real. The context of 
3:21 is polemically charged. Qoheleth may have heard some people assert that there is a 
difference between humans and animals, but he merely denies any qualitative 
difference. What Qoheleth is saying is that at death the life breath returns to God, 
whence it came. That return is neither up nor down (3:21); the breath of life is merely 
returned to God. There is no contradiction here.265 All that Qoheleth is doing is refusing 
to speculate about the destinations of humans or animals. He simply thinks no one 
knows: hence, the rhetorical question in 3:21.      
 There is no issue here regarding immortality. If a man survives after death it is in 
the underworld of lwaX (9:5-6). Nor is a distinction to be drawn between the body and 
the soul. Such dualism is foreign to Hebrew anthropology.266  Qoheleth is merely 
describing the end of life on earth. He believes that life is only possible on the basis that 
God gives the life-breath; the body is only dust. In this respect Qoheleth is well within 
the compass of Old Testament tradition in this area of belief. Fox observes, ‘When, at 
the climax of his grim description of death in chapter 12, he speaks of the departure of 
                                                
        264 Longman, Ecclesiastes, attempts (at 273) to solve the difficulty by viewing Qoheleth as a 
“confused wise man.” This is not a satisfactory solution.  
         265 As indicated by Lohfink, Qoheleth: A Continental Commentary, 171; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 
382; Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 120. Fox, Qoheleth, holds (at 309) that there is a contradiction that cannot be 
resolved but it does not have any major implications for the book’s meaning. In his later commentary, A 
Rereading, (at 331-32), he is more reticent to express this view. More recently in his commentary, JPS 
Bible Commentary: Ecclesiastes, he makes no mention of this issue.  
 266 See A. Schoors, “Koheleth: A Perspective of Life and Death?” ETL 61 (1985): 301-02; 
Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 188-9; Crenshaw, “Beginnings, Endings, and Life’s Necessities.” in Wisdom 
Literature in Mesopotamia and Israel. SBL Symposium Series 36; (ed. R. J. Clifford, Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2007): 93-105, (at 99). 
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the life breath, he perceives it in the ancient way as signifying God’s repossession of the 
life force.’267 
4.3  God as Creator Doer/Maker      
                            12:1 
             `$ytrwxb ymyb $yarwb-ta rkzw 
 Remember your creator in the days of your youth - 
In this famously known verse Qoheleth addresses the youth (possibly his students?) by 
the above exhortation. This verse begins Qoheleth’s commanding and very poignant 
description of old age and death (verses 1-7). ‘Your creator’ in 12:1, and God as the 
giver of life in 12:7, form an inclusio for the poem. While some commentators would 
suggest that the reference to God as creator ill fits the context, the fact still remains that 
the notion of God as creator pervades the whole book.268 As in 12:7, there is an allusion 
to creation (cf. Gen 2:7; 3:19), “. . . and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the 
breath returns to God who gave it.”       
  It is clear to see that Qoheleth stands solidly in the mainstream of Jewish 
tradition in affirming that God is the creator and giver of life, - the life-breath (Ps 
104:29-30; Job 33:4; 34:15; Isa 42:51 and Ezek 37:5). It is noteworthy that this is the 
only instance of the root arb in the book. This verb is used in the creation account in 
Genesis 1, but Qoheleth has a preference for the more common verb hX[ = “to do, 
make.”269           
 
                                                
 267 Fox, Qoheleth, 309. Ogden, Qoheleth, remarks (a 224), “Additionally, by suggesting that at 
death the human spirit/breath returns to God, Qoheleth is again theorizing on the post-death possibility of 
yitrôn. Reversing the process of original creation would seem to imply that Qoheleth reasons that death 
will not separate us from God; rather at that moment we return to his presence. Though the term yitrôn is 
not cited, this return to God is fundamental to Qoheleth’s hope for the future.” This is a theological gloss 
on what some see as Qoheleth’s oppressive message on the finality of death for all humans.  
 268 BHQ has $yarwb, which appears to be plural, but many MSS read the singular form. Various 
proposals have suggested alternative readings, but as Seow, Ecclesiastes, has noted, (at 351), “. . . it is 
difficult to think that something other than “creator” is the primary meaning.” H. L. Ginsberg, “The 
Structure and Contents of the Book of Koheleth,” 138-49, brings a dash of creativity to the interpretation 
of this term by an ingenious emendation (at 145) that gives the rendering, “Remember your vigour in the 
days of your prime.” As Harold Fisch, “Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist,” in Poetry With A Purpose: Biblical 
Poetics and Interpretation (Harold Fisch; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 198), wryly comments 
(at 195), “Critics go to strange lengths to accommodate biblical texts to their own preconceived notions of 
what the biblical authors ought to have said.”  
 269 The root hX[ is found in Ecclesiastes a total of sixty-four times. It occurs in the qal twenty-
nine times and fourteen times in the niphal form, while the noun hX[m has twenty-one occurrences. 
However, despite this impressive listing, the root hX[ occurs thirteen times, with only seven occurrences 
in which ~yhla is the subject.  
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                          3:11 
              rXa ylbm ~blb !tn ~l[h-ta ~g wt[b hpy hX[ lkh-ta
                             `@ws-d[w Xarm ~yhlah hX[-rXa hX[mh-ta ~dah acmy-al 
 11 He has made everything appropriate for its time; moreover he has put a sense of eternity into 
 their minds, yet they cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end. 
The verb hX[ occurs twice in this verse, and there is also an example of the cognate 
noun hX[mh, which refers to “the work” of God (cf. 7:13; 8:17). Although the teacher 
affirms the appropriateness (hpy) of God’s creation, he never refers to the created order 
as something that is bwj (good) (cf. Gen 1:13).270 Fox’s view is that verse 11 does not 
refer to God’s original act of creation. “Everything” in verse 11 resumes “everything” in 
verse 1, and that, as the pairs in verses 2-8 show, comprises the range of events and 
actions in human life rather than the major constituents of creation, described in Genesis 
1.271           
 The positive note in 3:11a and the placing of eternity in human hearts in 11b, is 
now followed by Qoheleth’s negative assertion that humans remain in the dark as to 
knowing what the deity is doing, past, present or future (verse 11c). Murphy makes a 
most fitting comment with respect to the contents of verse 11 in relation to the 
immediate context of 3:2-8. 
 Then it [the poem] culminates with a devastating claim: in the toil that marks these time limits 
 there is no profit for a human being. These are all God’s times, and Qoheleth has no quarrel with 
 them in themselves: they are “appropriate” in the divine plan. But the divinity has played a 
 desperate trick upon humanity, placing that mysterious ~l[h “duration,” “world,” in human 
 hearts so that they can make no sense out of God’s work. This is a fantastic statement of divine 
 sabotage.272 
This observation highlights again a very dominant theme in the book: the vast distance 
between God and mankind. This distinction accentuates the absolute sovereignty and 
incomprehensibility of God on the one hand, and the puniness and finitude of 
humankind on the other. Again and again, Qoheleth presses home the point by studied 
repetition, that no man can understand what God is doing in the world.273 Given the 
context, the irony displayed in 3:11 is palpable.  
                                                
 270 Loader, Ecclesiastes, draws attention (at 39) to the fact that, “In Ecclesiastes there is no sign 
of a positive appreciation for work as a way of exercising dominion over the world (cf. Gen 1:28); nor is 
there to be a found in it a deliberate interpretation of toil as God’s punishment upon sin (cf. Gen 3:17-
19).” 
 271 Fox, A Rereading, 209. 
 272 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 39. 
 273 This is especially the case in Qoheleth’s trenchant rhetorical flourish in 8:16-17, a passage we 
will examine in due course when we consider Qoheleth’s use of the verb acm (to find). 
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           3:14 
       ~lw[l hyhy awh ~yhlah hX[y rXa-lk yk yt[dy
        `wynplm waryX hX[ ~yhlahw [rgl !ya wnmmw @yswhl !ya wyl[ 
 I know that whatever God does endures forever; nothing can be added to it, nor anything taken 
 from it; God has done this, so that all should stand in awe before him. 
Qoheleth comes to another conclusion based on his observations in 3:1-8. This second 
certitude beginning with yt[dy in verse 14a, closely follows the first, indicated by the 
same verb in verse 12. However, what Qoheleth claims to know here is vague and 
generalized. The imperfect form hX[y suggests a possible reference to what God might 
do in the future, though by the end of verse 14c, Qoheleth reverts to using the perfect. 
The key question is: what does Qoheleth know? Seow states that by using the term ~lw[l 
Qoheleth does not mean that everything that God does will last forever.274 Rather, it is 
that whatever God does will not be confined by time. In sum, although God has made 
everything appropriate in its time (verse 11a), everything that God does is not bound in 
time. Thus God’s activity is both temporal (verse 11a) and eternal (verse 14a). The 
language of adding and subtracting is found elsewhere in the Bible (cf. Jer 26:2; Prov 
30:6; Rev 22:18-19).         
 Whatever God has done and will do, Qoheleth makes two remarks that highlight 
once again the disparity between divine sovereignty and human creatureliness. First, 
man is limited in what he can do in relation to what God does, as nothing can be added 
to it or taken from it. The formula in verse 14b has antecedents in Deut 4:1-2 and 
13:1(MT). Secondly, Qoheleth acknowledges that God has made it thus so that humans 
might fear him (verse 14c).275 This is an instance of God desiring to create and maintain 
a disparity between mankind and deity. Hence, his work is immutable which confirms 
once again the distance between humans (dependent beings) and God (absolute 
sovereign over everything). Thus, the major purpose of God’s activity is to arouse in 
humans a “reverential awe.”276     
                                  7:14 
                        hz-tm[l hz-ta ~g har h[r ~wybw bwjb hyh hbwj ~wyb
             `hmwam wyrxa ~dah acmy alX trbd-l[ ~yhlah hX[   
 In the day of prosperity be joyful, and in the day of adversity consider; God has made the one as 
 well as the other, so that mortals may not find out anything that will come after them. 
                                                
 274 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 173-4. 
 275 Hertzberg, Der Prediger, understands (at 108) “fear” in 3:14 as humankind keeping its 
distance from God. 
 276 Ginsburg, Coheleth, 312.       London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861. Translated from the Original Hebrew, with a Commentary, Historical Critical. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1861.  
	   99	  
Qoheleth once again confirms the view that God has made all things and, in the same 
breath, so to speak, characteristically juxtaposes his claim that man is unable to know 
the future. The segment 7:1-14, which is composed of a collection of aphorisms, is 
widely recognized as a distinct section of the book. This pericope imitates the ‘sentence 
literature’ collections as found in Prov 10:1-22:16. Qoheleth marshals together a series 
of proverbs in verses 1-6 that display a preoccupation with death, mourning and sorrow, 
culminating with a repeat of the lbh motif in verse 6b. The contents of verses 7-12, 
challenge the validity of verses 1-6. Specifically, the advantage of wisdom, as stated in 
verse 12b, is directly challenged by the theological conclusion drawn in verse 14b. 
 The fact that God is responsible for prosperity and adversity is set over against 
man’s inability to know the future (verse 14b), thus stressing human ignorance in the 
face of God’s superiority (cf. 6:10-12). In these two verses, which close the unit, 
Qoheleth explicitly describes God’s work as crooked at verse 13 (wtw[ rXa ta). Thus far 
in the book’s unfolding thought, this is the most overt challenge to the deity. It 
constitutes a most daring connection whereby “crookedness” is directly identified as the 
work of God (hX[m). Daring though it appears to be, the contents of this assertion are not 
unique to Qoheleth. It is in fact, quite in keeping with a trajectory of Israelite 
monotheism that holds God responsible for good and evil (cf. Job 2:10; 2 Sam 24, and 
Isa 45:6-7). Robert Gordis has aptly commented on 7:13-14 thus: 
 This verse [13] and the following are an admirable epitome of Koheleth’s thought – God is all- 
 powerful, man must resign himself to ignorance regarding the meaning and purpose of life. 
 Hence, he must take good and evil in his stride, enjoying the good while he can and 
 remembering it during the days of trouble.277 
It is noteworthy that 7:13-14 reflects material about the divine work already alluded to 
in 1:15 and 3:10-14. In Ch 7, however, there is a difference, as Murphy has noticed.  
 Qoheleth is not merely repeating an old saying similar to 1:15 or 3:11-14 about the divine work. 
 He is demolishing the security that was claimed for wisdom in vv 11-12. He invites the reader 
 to “consider” (vv 13,14), and he poses the problem of the incalculable work of God. It can even 
 be said that the main point of the book concerns “the work of God.” 278   
                       
                        7:29 
               ytacm hz-har dbl
                     rXy ~dah-ta ~yhlah hX[ rXa
                     `~ybr twnbvx wXqb hmhw 
                                                
 277 Gordis, Koheleth, 274-75. 
 278 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 66. 
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 See, this alone I found, that God made human beings upright, but they have devised many 
 schemes.  
In this verse the common verb hX[ is employed. The word rXy means “upright,” or 
“correct,” contra “straightforward” in NRSV (cf. Prov 8: 6-9). What is interesting in 
this verse is that in 7:20 Qoheleth acknowledges the problem of wrong doing in human 
nature: “Surely there is not a righteous man on earth who does good and never sins.” A 
similar allusion to man’s nature in found in 9:3 where Qoheleth observes that, “. . . the 
heart of the sons of men is set fully to do evil.” These statements resonate with similar 
sentiments in Gen 1-11.279 And once again Qoheleth’s understanding of God concurs 
with traditional Jewish belief with reference to God as the creator of a flawed humanity. 
  This verse appears to be in conflict with the thought expressed in 7:13, 
considered above. There, some aspect of God’s creation is term “crooked” (wtw[). In 
7:29, mankind was made upright (rXy).  
                  11:5 
           xwrh $rd-hm [dwy $nya rXak 
            halmh !jbb ~ymc[k
              ~yhlah hX[m-ta [dt al hkk
             `lkh-ta hX[y rXa  
 Just as you do not know how the breath comes to the bones in the mother’s womb, so you 
 do not know the work of God, who makes everything. 
Seow has correctly seen this segment as another of Qoheleth’s rhetorical set-ups.280 In 
verses 3-4 the impression is given of the human ability to know. But these verses are 
surrounded by a frame of negativity in verses 2 and 5-6 thus emphasizing the cognitive 
limitations of humans.        
                                                
 279 For the possible influence of Gen 1-11 on Qoheleth’s thought see C. C. Forman, “Koheleth’s 
Use of Genesis,” JSS 5 (1960): 256-63, who connected (at 255-9) these statements by Qoheleth to the Fall 
in Gen 3. The same view is taken by M. V. Fox and B. Porten in “Unsought Discoveries: Qoheleth 7:32-
8:1a,” HS 19 (1978): 26-38, although they argue that the story of the fall gave rise to the polemic against 
women in 7:26-8. See also R.V. McCabe, “The Message of Ecclesiastes.”  McCabe states (at 95) that 
Qoheleth reflects a solid grasp of the early chapters of Genesis.” He also believes that the “joy passages” 
are a Leitmotiv in Qoheleth’s outlook; D. B. MacDonald, “Old Testament Notes,” JBL 18 (1899): 212-15, 
commenting on Eccl 3:11 writes (at 212), “The careful reader of Ecclesiastes cannot fail to notice how 
great must have been the influence of the early chapters of Genesis with the stories of the creation and the 
fall on the mind of the writer.” For a similar strong endorsement of this interpretation see R. Antic, “Cain, 
Abel, Seth, and the Meaning of Human Life as Portrayed in the Books of Genesis and Ecclesiastes,” 
AUSS 44 (2006): 203-11. I agree with Longman, Ecclesiastes, when he comments (at 119), that it is 
difficult to be dogmatic about the influence of the early chapters of Genesis on the mind of Qoheleth. See 
also Katherine Dell, “Exploring Intertextual Links Between Ecclesiastes and Genesis 1-11,” in Reading 
Ecclessiastes Intertextually (ed. Katharine Dell and Will Kynes; London, New York: Bloomsbury T &T 
Clark, 2014), 3-14. After a detailed examination Dell reaches the conclusion that Qoheleth did not have 
Genesis at his hand when writing his book. According to her, the linguistic links are few between the 
Genesis data and Ecclesiastes (at 12). 
 280 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 344. 
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 In the interpretation of 5b the question arises: are two distinct entities referred to, 
e.g., (i) the unknown course of the wind, xwr, and (ii) the development of the human 
embryo? Since xwr means ‘wind’ in 4a, does the meaning stay the same in 5a, or is the 
latter to be rendered life-breath? In the above translation, Fox opts for the latter thus 
giving the sense of one illustration. But as Barton points out, the phrase, lkh-ta hX[y rXa 
can be rendered, “who makes both.”281 This would give the following translation, “As 
you do not know what is the way of the wind or how the bones are formed in the 
mother’s womb, so you do not know the work of God, who does all things.”282  
 Either way, as Crenshaw has noted, “Emphasis certainly falls on human 
ignorance, whatever the number of divine mysteries.”283 Just as man is ignorant of the 
causes of wind change, so also is he cognitively limited in his understanding of the 
development of the embryo in a woman’s womb. This is but another forceful reminder 
of human ignorance (temporality) in the face of the mystery of God’s sovereignty 
(eternality). Of this pericope, 11:1-6, Seow aptly sums it up: “Qohelet moves from the 
elements of nature, to the wonders of life coming into being, ultimately to theology: 
wind is unpredictable (11:4), the life-breath is a mystery (11:5a), and God is inscrutable 
(11:5a).”284 Once again we see that the topic of man’s ignorance in the face of a 
sovereign and distant God is a crucial characteristic of Qoheleth’s thought, especially, 
as we observed earlier, in the latter half of the book.      
4.4 Summary          
In this chapter our main purpose has been to examine what Qoheleth tells us about his 
knowledge of God, especially with respect to the nature of God’s giving and his doings. 
We certainly found that for Qoheleth, God is the great giver of gifts to humankind, a 
fact notably expressed by the distinct phrases – “from the hand of God (2:24),” and 
“this is the gift of God” (5:18 [ET 5:19]), (cf. 3:13). God is also the creator of all things 
and is very active in the world (3:10-11; 11:5; 12:1). He has made humans upright, but 
they seek to pursue a different path (7:29). Whatever God does stands forever, which is 
                                                
 281 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 183-4. 
 282 The MT supports two illustrations, although the syntax is awkward. As Gordis argues, 
Koheleth, (at 331-32) if two illustrations are referenced here one would expect the copula waw to begin 
the clause commencing with ~ymc[k thus giving ~ymc[kw. However, parallel comparisons introduced by k 
without the copula waw are found in Deut 1:17 and Song of Songs 1:5. The MT is supported by the 
Targum, LXX and Vg.  
 283 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 180. 
 284 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 345-6. 
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calculated to make humans be in awe of him (3:14). The days of prosperity and 
adversity are equally at God’s command, but this has a negative connotation: God has 
acted thus to demonstrate that humans will be unable to know what happens in the 
world after them (7:14).         
 This positive/negative approach can also be found in two of the joy passages. In 
9:9 the injunction for a man to enjoy his wife/woman whom he loves has the expressed 
implication that the days of their lives, are in any case, lbh. Also in 2:24-26, the first joy 
passage, it is confirmed that humans can please God, and the ability to enjoy wisdom, 
knowledge, and joy comes from the hand of God. But those who cannot please God (the 
sinner = ajwxlw) have the hapless task of working for those who please God. But how 
one pleases God is not clear. Also in 6:1-2 God is the giver of wealth, possessions, and 
honour, yet God in his sovereign will prevents some humans from enjoying these gifts – 
a stranger enjoys them (cf. 2:18-21). Even though over half the joy passages in the book 
have been cited above, the cosmic lbh theme is not far from the surface of the material 
we have examined.          
 Briefly stated, Qoheleth’s God is the prime mover of all things, the creator of 
everything, including human kind. He is very active in the world but humans are unable 
to understand what is truly happening, now, or in the ages to come. God gives, but he 
also arbitrarily takes away.         
 In this chapter we have examined Qoheleth’s knowledge claims in relation to 
God as giver, and God as creator/maker/doer. What we have found is quite remarkable. 
Qoheleth’s knowledge of God in these two areas of divine giving and divine activity is 
at once extensive and detailed. From an epistemological standpoint, the pressing 
question immediately springs from one’s mind: how did this sage come to know so 
much about God’s nature and activity, when at no stage did God directly reveal himself 
to Qoheleth? Before we address this important question (which goes to the very core of 
our thesis claim) we shall proceed to consider the remainder of Qoheleth’s claims about 
what he knows about God. When all the appropriate material has been examined, we 
shall summarize what Qoheleth claims to know about God. A critical evaluation will 
then be given to determine whether, in the light of his epistemic theological claims, 
Qoheleth can properly be accorded the status of an “empiricist.”         
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PART 2.   QOHELETH’S EPISTEMIC CLAIMS ABOUT GOD  
 
Chapter 5:  Qoheleth’s Theological Claims (Part B) 
 
5.1   Introduction 
Chapter 4:17-5:6 [ET 5:1-7] is a very revealing pericope that gives the reader a most 
unusual insight into the theological thinking of Qoheleth. In what is a most exquisite 
passage, this is the only occasion where Qoheleth considers Jewish cultic worship and 
practice.   
5.2 God in the Context of Worship 
                          4:17 – 5:6  
                ~yhlah tyb-la $lt rXak $ylgr rmX   17
                              xbz ~ylyskh ttm [mXl bwrqw 
           `[r twX[l ~y[dwy ~nya-yk 
            rhmy-la $blw $yp-l[ lhbt-la   1
             ~yhlah ynpl rbd aycwhl 
                #rah-l[ htaw ~ymXb ~yhlah yk 
                  `~yj[m $yrbd wyhy !k-l[ 
              !yn[ brb ~wlxh ab yk   2
        `~yrbd brb lysk lwqw 
          wmlXl rxat-la ~yhlal rdn rdt rXak   3
             `~lX rdt-rXa ta ~ylyskb #px !ya yk  
             `~lXt alw rwdtXm rdt-al rXa bwj   4
     
              $rXb-ta ayjxl $yp-ta !tt-la   5
         ayh hggX yk $almh ynpl rmat-law 
                $lwq-l[ ~yhlah @cqy hml
          `$ydy hX[m-ta lbxw   
        hbrh ~yrbdw ~ylbhw twmlx brb yk   6
           `ary ~yhlah-ta yk 
 4:17 Guard your steps when you go to the house of God; to draw near to listen is better than the 
 sacrifice offered by fools; for they do not know how to keep from doing evil.  
 5:1 Never be rash with your mouth, nor let your heart be quick to utter a word before God, for 
 God is in heaven, and you upon earth; therefore let your words be few.   
 5:2 For dreams come with many cares, and a fool’s voice with many words.  
 5:3 When you make a vow to God, do not delay fulfilling it; for he has no pleasure in fools. Fulfill 
 what you vow.         
  
	   104	  
 5:4 It is better that you should not vow than that you should vow and not fulfill it.  
 5:5 Do not let your mouth lead you into sin, and do not say before the messenger that it was a 
 mistake; why should God be angry at your words, and destroy the works of your hands? 
 5:6 With many dreams come vanities and a multitude of words; but fear God. 
The shift in tone from reflection in the previous chapters to issuing ethical instruction is 
at once immediate and dramatic, a move demonstrably indicated by the use of a string 
of imperatives in the spaces of seven verses. On nine occasions Qoheleth issues 
commands to his readers who worship (presumably) in the Temple in Jerusalem.285 As a 
consequence, the subject matter of this pericope is, on the face of it, intensely 
theological since the generic divine name is mentioned seven times.286   
 Once again the great disparity between the deity and humanity, between the 
sovereign and absolute reality of God and the feebleness of man as a dependent being, 
is graphically confirmed in 5:1 by the words, “. . . for God is in heaven and you upon 
earth.”  In the light of this, Qoheleth therefore advances three clear warnings in relation 
to (i) improper conduct towards the deity in sacrifice (4:17); (ii) in words relating to 
prayer (5:1), and (iii) the lack of seriousness in vow making (5:3-6). Qoheleth is 
adamant that the disparity indicated in 5:1 between God and humanity should be 
respected in cultic matters. The underlying assumption is that this respect for the divine 
presence is not always forthcoming; hence, the imperative warnings. These verses 
reveal a strong cautionary tone aimed at discouraging a casual approach in worship. 
Glibness, loquacity and complacency are all ruled out, but such admonitions are not 
peculiar to Qoheleth. Indeed, this passage deals with common wisdom topoi.287 
 But again, in keeping with the thought of 3:14, Qoheleth’s God is not engaged 
on an intimate basis with mankind. God is transcendent and “Wholly Other” and this 
has practical ramifications for Temple worship. Qoheleth therefore urges, “. . .let your 
words be few” (verse 1). Constraint, sincerity and reticence in approaching God, and 
making vows and sacrifices are befitting the worship of the creator of all things.288 
                                                
 285 That the Jerusalem Temple is assumed here is due to the reference to “the house of God” and 
“sacrifice” in 4:17. A further point in support of this is the fact that the phrase is used of the second 
Temple (cf. Ezra 3:8; 6:22; 8:36; 10:1, 6, 9). 
  286 Explicitly in 4:17; 5:1 (2x); 5:3, 5, 6, and once implicitly in 5:3 where God is referred to by 
the third person pronoun (“for he has no pleasure in fools”). 
  287 For example, the advocacy of thoughtful and restrained speech is found in Prov 10:14, 19; 21: 
23; Eccl 6:11; 10:13-14. Personal accountability in vow-making is addressed in Prov 20:25; Sir 18:22; Ps 
66:13-14. Also, Eccl 5:3-4 has a precise parallel in Deut 23:22-24. In substance, Ecclesiastes, with the 
rest of the Old Testament, regard religious activity and commitment as a serious matter.  
  288 Restraint in worship and piety in ancient Egyptian wisdom literature is also discernible in The 
Instruction of Any, Lichtheim, AEL  2 137, and the Egyptian wisdom text known as The Instruction for 
Merikare, Pritchard, ANET  3d ed., 417. 
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Significantly, Qoheleth does not speak of God on earth (contra 2 Chron 6:14), which is 
indicative for him of the distance between the transcendent One and mere mortals. 
 Verse 5 is significant for several reasons. First, verses 3-5 have a close parallel 
with Deut 23:22-24 (MT) in relation to making vows.289 The warning is clear: if you 
make a vow to God, ensure that it is fulfilled. Once a vow is made but not kept, the 
worshipper may be required to give an account of such erring conduct. The person to 
whom one is to give an account of such conduct is referred to as the $alm (messenger), 
the identity of whom has occasioned some scholarly discussion. It is most likely that 
$alm refers to a priest or some Temple emissary to whom confession of failure or 
impulsively made vows would have to be made (cf. Mal 2:7).290   
  What Qoheleth appears to be saying to his readers is that the $alm will not accept 
one’s excuse for making a rash vow. Hence, the wrongdoing will therefore attract the 
anger of God that will have the devastating effect of destroying the offender’s work. 
The implication is obvious: the motive clause (verse 7) emphasizes the idea that God 
will not tolerate the foolish words of the worshipper who, despite confessing to an 
intermediary, will be punished accordingly.      
 Overall, this sombre passage is one in which there is heightened seriousness in 
relation to cultic worship. As Murphy has noted,       
 The presumption behind verses 4-5 is that God hears what humans say, and that God reacts. 
  There is no sign of the “deed-consequence” mentality here. In short, God judges and even 
 punishes. Qoheleth never denies that there is divine judgment, even if it remains a mystery to 
 him.291  
There is no question of eschatological judgment; the punishment and judgment in this 
context appears imminent. As Fox puts it, “The punishment will take the form of 
material loss, as it is appropriate, since (in terms of votive symbolism) a default on 
vows impinges on God’s material dues.”292 Whatever else the phrase “the work of your 
hands” means, it is clear that Qoheleth’s taxonomy of joy includes the enjoyment of 
one’s toil and life. To have such work destroyed would, therefore, be a disastrous 
                                                
  289 The Deuteronomy text warns that slackness in paying one’s vow is a sin that “God will 
require of you.” It also points out that, “. . . if you refrain from making a vow, it would not be a sin.” Prov 
20:25 also warns against the making of rash vows (cf. Sir 18:22-23).  
  290 LXX (supported by SyrH) and Syr substitute the term with ~yhla. MT is supported by Aq, 
Symm, Theod, and Targ. A good discussion of the issue is found in R. B. Salters in, “Notes on the 
Interpretation of Koh. 5:5,” ZAW 90 (1978): 95-101. Salters holds that the interpretation of $alm (priest) 
has most to commend it.  
  291 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 51.  
  292 Fox, A Rereading, 232-33. 
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outcome.           
  From this important passage it is revealing that at no time does Qoheleth address 
God in a personal capacity, as in offering a prayer. There is a huge contrast, then, 
between the experience of Qoheleth in the context of worship and the close personal 
and direct contact between the Psalmist and his God. Also, in Exod 33:11 we are 
informed that the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend. By 
startling contrast, nowhere in Ecclesiastes does God ever speak to Qoheleth directly. In 
this cultic passage Qoheleth seems to be on the outside, a spectator of society, giving 
people advice as to how they should behave in a Temple worship setting. From it we 
may draw the conclusion that for Qoheleth, his God is somewhat distant (5:1 [ET 5:2]) 
and should only be approached with the greatest care (5:4 [ET 5:5]). It is in this passage 
that we find it most telling that the personal name for Israel’s God, hwhy is absent from 
Qoheleth’s view of the world.    
5.3   God is to be Feared 
The end of the previous segment brings us most appropriately to a core belief in 
Qoheleth’s understanding of God, namely that the deity should be feared. The concept 
of ‘the fear of God’ is one that runs deep in Israel’s sapiential literature.293 As Michael 
Barré has pointed out, the fear of God lies at the heart of the worldview of wisdom.294 
Qoheleth employs the concept of the “fear of God” four times in his monologue (3:14; 
5:6 [ET 5:7]; 7:18; 8:12b-13).295 However, contrary to the other wisdom books of Job 
and Proverbs, the word ‘fear’ only occurs in Ecclesiastes in its verbal form, which 
might suggest that ‘fear of God’ in the book is not a coherent and fixed principle.  
 Franz Delitzsch once described Ecclesiastes as “das Hohelied der Gottesfurcht” 
(the supreme song of the fear of God).296 This rather fulsome endorsement is perhaps 
difficult to sustain, but it is indisputably true that any serious engagement with the 
                                                
 293 See H. Blocher, “The Fear of the Lord as the “Principle” of Wisdom,” TB 28 (1977): 3-28 for 
a general survey of the concept. An earlier article is B. J. Bamberger, “Fear and Love of God in the Old 
Testament,” HUCA 6 (1929): 39-53. Bamberger’s opening sentence (at 39), “Old Testament writers speak 
frequently of fearing God, less often of loving Him,” is highly appropriate in describing Qoheleth’s 
disposition to the deity. 
  294 M. Barré, “ ‘Fear of God’ and the World View of Wisdom,” BTB 11 (1981): 41-43. 
  295 The injunction to “fear God” is found in the Epilogue 12:9-14 and as such is not the actual 
words attributed to Qoheleth. 
 296 Delitzsch, Biblischer Commentar über die poetischen Bücher des Alten Testaments. Vol. 4, 
Hoheslied und Koleleth. Mit Excursen von Consul D. Wetzstein (Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke, 1875), 190. 
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book’s interpretation must consider the meaning and function of ‘fearing God’ in the 
author’s discourse. While the phrase cannot be considered as the leitmotif of the book, 
the following analysis will seek to show that it is a concept integral to the author’s 
thought and outlook.          
 The underlying notion of God in 3:9-22 is that of a sovereign reality who is 
eager to maintain inviolate the distinction between the divine and the human. As Eunny 
Lee puts it: “To fear God in short, means to recognize and respect the distance between 
the divine and the human.”297 Thus, when man takes cognizance of his proper place in 
the scheme of God’s created order, both its limitations and possibilities can be realized. 
In concrete terms, Qoheleth’s stress on the finitude of man is coupled with his 
exhortation to enjoy life. This symbiotic relationship is arguably at the heart of 
Qoheleth’s thought, and is certainly in evidence in 3:13-14.298   
  In sum, Qoheleth’s understanding of God in this verse is one whose eternal 
nature and his work stand at a great distance from the finite creatureliness of humans. 
But this does not mean that in the realization of God’s absolute sovereignty, man has no 
opportunity to exercise his voluntary choice in seeking “to fear before him.” It is 
obvious from this passage, therefore, that ‘to fear God’ amounts to a voluntary human 
attitude that is a genuinely made human response. 
                     7:16-18 
       rtwy ~kxtt-law   hbrh qydc yht-la  16
              `~mwXt hml 
              lks yht-law   hbrh [Xrt-la  17
             `$t[ alb twmt hml 
       $dy-ta xnt-la hzm-~gw   hzb zxat rXa bwj  18
             `~lk-ta acy ~yhla ary-yk
  
 16 Do not be too righteous, and do not act too wise; why should you destroy yourself? 
 17 Do not be too wicked, and do not be a fool; why should you die before your time?  
 18 It is good that you should take hold of the one, without letting go of the other; for the one 
  who fears God fulfills them both. 
These puzzling admonitions have attracted a variety of responses. In seeking an 
explanation of verse 18b, it might prove helpful to examine the correspondence between 
4:17-5:6 [5:1-7], and the immediate context of 7:13-18. In both instances God’s 
                                                
 297 Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment, 85. 
 298 This is the essence of Lee’s thesis, i.e., the “fear of God’ exhortation has, as its flip side, the 
exhortation to enjoy life when this is possible. 
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sovereignty is juxtaposed with man’s creaturely status (5:1; cf. 7:13). Restraint is 
encouraged in offering sacrifice, praying and vow making (4:17; 5:1, 3-5); in 7:16, 
restraint and balance is encouraged in pursuing righteousness, wickedness, wisdom and 
folly. In both passages destruction is threatened (5:5; 7:16) as indicated by the 
interrogative statements commencing with the use of hml. Finally, the climatic use of 
the “fear of God” motif is presented as a positive alternative that is introduced by yk in 
5:6 and 7:18.          
 In the immediate context, what does verse 18b refer to by stating that, “For he 
who fears God fulfills them both?” And especially, what is the meaning of the phrase, - 
“fulfills them both?” It seems best to view verse 18b as referring to the previous and 
most immediate pair of injunctions in verses 16-17. Qoheleth’s own conclusion is that 
both of them are embraced, but not to the point of self-destruction or premature death. It 
has been suggested by some that what Qoheleth is advocating here is the Aristotelian 
doctrine of “the golden mean” whereby one avoids both extremes and adopts a via 
media. This view, however, has not found favour with many commentators.299  
 “The fear of God,” by contrast, embraces both the possibilities and 
impossibilities of being human.300 As a consequence of this stance, Qoheleth’s searingly 
honest realism leads to a form of piety that is more modest and therefore less 
demanding when viewed against human frailty. This recommendation in verse 18b is 
thus both in keeping with the mystery of divine activity adumbrated in verses 13-14, 
and with the overarching lbh theme. Certainly, neither course of action indicated in 
verses 16-17 is profitable because, as far as Qoheleth is concerned, the orthodox 
teaching of divine retribution has lost its power to fully convince (verse 15b). In the 
light of the imponderable observations about human effort and activity, the only course 
for Qoheleth to commend is to fear God because whatever the situation, it is the God-
fearer who will emerge in the best light.        
 
 
 
                                                
 299 Gordis, Koheleth, 275-76; Delitzsch, Biblischer Commentar, 319, and others support the idea.    
For a contrary view see Fox, A Rereading, 259-61; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 266-69.  J. H. Choi, “The 
Doctrine of the Golden Mean in Qoh 7:15-18: A Universal Pursuit,” Biblica 83 (2002): 358-74 reviews 
the two main different biases in the interpretation and holds that this passage does support the golden 
mean doctrine. He argues that the golden mean is not the result of Hellenistic influence, but is a universal 
phenomenon.  
 300 See Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment, 103.  
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                8:12-13 
            wl $yramw   tam [r hX[ ajx rXa  12
             ~yhlah yaryl bwj-hyhy rXa    yna [dwy-~g yk  
               `wynplm waryy rXa 
         lck ~ymy $yray-alw    [Xrl hyhy-al bwjw  13
                     `~yhla ynplm   ary wnnya rXa
  
 12 Though sinners do evil a hundred times and prolong their lives, yet I know that it will be 
 well with those who fear God, because they stand in fear of him,    
  13 but it will not be well with the wicked, neither will they prolong their days like a shadow, 
 because they do not stand in fear before God.     
        
By vivid contrast to 7:16-18, Qoheleth, in these verses launches a forthright avowal of 
traditional Jewish belief relating to divine justice. This is strong approval of retributive 
justice but it is flanked on either side by statements that expressly contravene this 
principle, e.g. verses 10-12a, and verse 14. In the context of the unit 8:10-15, how is this 
cognitive dissonance to be explained? Various attempts have been made to explain the 
tension in the text by positing editorial activity,301 or by the fact that Qoheleth advances 
a traditional wisdom quotation with a view to debunking it. But the contents of verses 
12b-13 are to be regarded as a theological statement from the pen of Qoheleth himself 
for nowhere does he deny outright the doctrine of retributive justice. That being so, if 
8:10-15 is to be understood as a unified text from the hand of the author, how are verses 
12b-13 be interpreted in this context?      
 Many scholars hold the phrase, ~g yk (yet/even though), to be concessive and the 
phrase, yna [dwy (I know), to indicate public knowledge as opposed to knowledge which 
Qoheleth himself had acquired from his own investigations.302 What Qoheleth is 
therefore doing is conceding the truth of conventional wisdom, but he does so 
reluctantly. Seow remarks, 
 But this concession is merely parenthetical, it seems, and without much conviction, for he 
 quickly returns to note the injustice in the treatment of the just and the unjust in v 14. That is, 
  Qoheleth accepts the orthodox doctrine of retribution, but he points to a contradiction of it in 
 reality. He does not deny that there are all sorts of contradictions in the world.303  
Briefly stated, the deed/consequence connection functions in society normatively, but 
there are exceptions to the rule. This is the conclusion reached by Fox. 
                                                
 301 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 53; A. Lauha, Kohelet, 157; Ellermeier, Qohelet, 127; Podechard, 
L’Ecclésiaste, 402-03; Galling, “Der Prediger,” 112. 
  302 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, makes the useful distinction between “private” and “public” 
knowledge in Qoheleth’s discourse. See “The Epistemological Spiral: The Ironic use of Public and 
Private Knowledge in the Narrative Presentation of Koheleth,” 167-238. 
  303 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 288. 
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 Although Qohelet “knows” the principle of retribution and nowhere denies it, he also knows 
 there are cases that violate the rule. It is because Qohelet holds to the axioms of Wisdom that he 
 is shocked by their violations and finds the aberrations absurd.304 
This section, 8:10-15 is not a reflection of Qoheleth’s enigmatic contradictions as 
traditionally understood, but a transparent realization that life, then as now, is replete 
with its contradictory overtures and ironies.       
 Verse 13 is also another reminder to the sage’s readership that for evildoers, just 
retribution will be their lot. While Qoheleth raises the issue of delayed justice in verse 
11, he still holds that there is a “time and a judgment for every matter” (cf. 3:17). The 
judgment implied in verse 13b comes in the form of a shortening of life for the wicked, 
“ . . . because they do not stand in fear of God” (verse 13c). It is evident that despite the 
tension in 3:10-15, the concept of the fear of God dominates 8:12b-13, occurring three 
times. However, the “fear of God” phrase “. . .  does not have the same nuance as in 
3:14; 5:16; 7:18. In those verses fear of God has a tough-minded quality of fidelity and 
devotion. Here it reflects the traditional attitude that is secure and certain, for it is tied to 
clear divine retribution.”305        
 Closely related to the notion of fearing God is another important element in 
Qoheleth’s epistemic claims about God, the strong and consistent belief that God will 
judge humans for their conduct. 
5.4 God as Judge of the Just and the Wicked   
           3:17-18
            
          yblb yna ytrma  17
         ~yhlah jpXy    [Xrh-taw qydch-ta
         `~X hX[mh-lk l[w  #px-lkl t[-yk 
       twarlw ~yhlah ~rbl ~dah ynb trbd-l[ yblb yna ytrma  18 
                 `~hl hmh hmhb-~hX   
 17 I said in my heart, God will judge the righteous and the wicked, for he has appointed a time 
 for every matter, and for every work.306       
                                                
 304 Fox, A Rereading, 286. 
  305 K. Dell, “Ecclesiastes as Wisdom: Consulting Early Interpreters,” VT  44 (1994): 301-29 (at 
328). 
  306 The word ~X at the end of this verse has posed some difficulty. MT, LXX and Syr read this 
word as an adverb meaning “there.” The Vulgate renders it “then.” Either way the referent is unclear. 
Gordis, Koheleth, holds (at 235) that it is a reference to the other world after death. This approach has, 
however, found little support. Whitley, Koheleth, presents a survey of possible solutions. He proposes (at 
34-36) the rendering “. . . for there is a time for everything and for every act too.” He admits that the force  
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  18 I said in my heart with regard to human beings that God is testing them to show that they are 
 but animals. 
These verses appear in the section 3:16-22, which is connected to the previous unit 3: 1-
15. This can be seen from the fact that the opening words of verse 16 – ytyar dw[w 
(Moreover, I saw) – echo in verse 10. In 3:1-15 Qoheleth has considered the absolute 
sovereignty of God in the allotment of times and seasons. Now, in verse 16 he 
introduces a new topic: the specific problem of justice. In addressing the inequity of 
human jurisprudence, Qoheleth sees that the injustice in human courts is the exact 
reversal of normative equity: the innocent are declared guilty and the guilty innocent. 
Verse 16 therefore constitutes a searing indictment on human behaviour.  
 This state of affairs thus described initiates two responses from Qoheleth, both 
introduced by the formulaic phrase, yblb yna ytrma = “I said in my heart,” in verses 17 
and 18 respectively. Qoheleth’s immediate response is to offer a classic statement of 
Jewish belief about divine justice in verse 17a. The reality of divine justice is 
unequivocally and emphatically confirmed by the words: “God will judge the righteous 
and the wicked.”307 In this respect Qoheleth was voicing a belief that was universally 
held in Israel.           
  In verse 17b the claim, “. . . for he has appointed a time for every matter, and for 
every work,” is linked to the statement in 3:1, “For everything there is a season, and a 
time for every matter under heaven.” Qoheleth has considered the sovereignty of God in 
allocating times and seasons (3:1-15), and for him, God is incomprehensibly in control 
of these times and seasons. Since there is a divinely appointed time for everything, it 
follows that there must also be a time for God’s judgment. There is however something 
of a mystery about God’s judgment in Qoheleth’s thought. He seems unable to tell his 
readers much about the nature of God’s judgment or when it will occur. Nevertheless, 
for Qoheleth, what God will do by way of judging human kind is not bound by time. As 
                                                                                                                                          
of the term is uncertain. Some scholars prefer to repoint ~v to ~f (to set, appoint), but this places the verb 
at the end of the sentence which is syntactically awkward. While the text may be corrupt, as Murphy, 
Ecclesiastes, (at 30) suggests, one might accept that ~X is a reference back to 3:16, the place where 
injustice is indicated. See Ogden, Qoheleth, 65.  
 307 The imperfect jpXy (he will judge) is used here; while the imperfect can refer to the future, it 
can also refer to the present. See GKC? 107a-g. In the overall context of Qoheleth’s thought, it is 
unlikely that he has in mind an eschatological judgment after death. Fox, A Rereading, points out (at 
215), “According to the belief prevalent in Biblical times, death means the loss of life-breath (xwr) and 
descent into Sheol, a fate shared by all creatures. When God “takes back” (’osep) the spirit  (that is the 
life-breath common to all creatures, not the “soul”), the creature dies (Ps 104:29; Job 34:14-15). This 
“taking back” of the life-spirit does not imply an afterlife, but merely the dissolution of the components 
of the living being.” For an extended treatment on Jewish belief on death in Old Testament times, see 
Burkes, Death in Qoheleth, 35-80. 
	   112	  
Murphy remarks, “Judgment belongs to God, not human time.”308   
 The declaration, “I said in my heart” in verse 18a signals Qoheleth’s second 
response to the injustice mentioned in verse 16. This second reaction is more protracted 
than the first; it extends from verses 18-21 and closes with a “joy passage” at verse 22. 
It is not easy to see the connection between verses 16-17 and verse 18, the latter being 
extremely difficult syntactically.309 Despite the difficulties associated with the peculiar 
syntax of this verse, Ogden holds that the tenor of the verse is clear: man and beast 
share a great deal in common. The basis of this conclusion is the fate that they share: 
both will die.           
 One may ponder why God is “testing” humans to show that they are but beasts, 
when the deity, on Qoheleth’s understanding, already knows this. Weeks’ interpretation 
tends to follow the suggestion of F. J. Backhaus with regard to the derivation and sense 
of the verb ~rbl = “to separate out.” However, he adopts a future tense for the verb and 
offers the following translation of the second clause of verse 18: “God is going to 
separate them (humans) out, but what they are going to see for themselves is that they 
are cattle.”310 This translation has merit because, as Weeks suggests, “the point is more 
probably that although God will draw distinctions, humans are incapable of perceiving 
them for themselves.”311 Thus in the light of this human ignorance, Qoheleth advocates 
pursuing pleasure in one’s work at 3:22. 
                  11:9 
      $twrwxb ymyb $bl $byjyw   $ytwdlyb rwxb xmX
        $yny[ yarmbw   $bl ykrdb $lhw
            `jpXmb ~yhlah $ayby   hla-lk-l[ yk [dw 
 Rejoice, young man, while you are young,       
 and let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth.    
                                                
 308 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 36. The term hmh ( verse 18) seems redundant and most scholars regard 
it as a dittography. The final hml (verse 18) also seems unnecessary though some scholars regard this 
term as adding emphasis to the somber status assigned to humanity earlier in this verse. See Whitley, 
Koheleth, 37-8 and Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 103. 
 309 The word ~rbl has the form of an infinitive with the suffix “them.” Yet one expects a finite 
verb here to make sense. The verb rrb means “to purge out, sort.” Cf. W. Holladay, A Concise Hebrew 
and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 50. It can also mean, “to purify, select.” 
See BDB, 140. The Vg and the Tg take the term to mean “test” which is followed by many scholars. Also 
the MT reads twarl (verse 18c) but the subject of this Qal infinitive is not clear. The LXX, Syr and Vg 
read this verb as a Hiphil infinitive, twarhl meaning “to show,” rather than “to see.” For a fuller 
discussion see Whitley, Koheleth, 36-8. The final clause is also difficult. The term hmhb hmh seems 
redundant and most scholars hold it to be a dittography. 
 310 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 82, f/n 7. 
 311 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 82. 
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  Follow the inclination of your heart and the desire of your eyes,   
  but know that for all these things God will bring you into judgment. 
Most commentators recognize 11:7 – 12:7 as a distinct unit from what has preceded. As 
Crenshaw has noted, there is a great contrast between the rigour of youth and the 
incapacitation of old age which ultimately leads to death.312 These two entities are 
metaphorized as “light” (verse 7a) and “darkness” (verse 8b), and also in the pathos of 
the evocative poem (12:2-6). With this unit - generally sombre in tone – the author 
draws his readers to a dramatic finale. These are the last thoughts of Qoheleth rounded 
off in typical style with the concluding exclamation of the lbh cosmic theme in 12:8.313 
 If there is one certainty that Qoheleth holds to consistently it is his belief in the 
judgment of God. In 11:9 there is a forthright, unambiguous statement of belief that 
God is the judge of mankind. The recommendations in this pericope, 11:7-10, reflect the 
ancient exhortation, “let us rejoice while we are young.” In verses 7-8a, there is a call to 
enjoyment, but this is immediately followed by the warning of impending dark times 
ahead (verse 8b) which ends with the lbh theme. In the first two parts of verse 9, 
Qoheleth issues an imperative call to the young to rejoice and enjoy themselves. This is 
the most extensive call to enjoyment in the book. It is also a very case specific call for it 
is to a “young man.” But with all the suddenness of an unexpectant bout of theological 
whiplash, the same youth is warned of the grave nature of God’s judgment, which is 
directly related to his behaviour. Noteworthy here is the fact that Qoheleth situates 
enjoyment in a theological framework: “know that for all these things God will bring 
you to judgment.”           
 Since the earliest time, the tension between verse 9ab and traditional teaching as 
in Num 15:39 - (“. . . to do them [the commandments], and not to follow after your own 
hearts and your own eyes, which you are inclined to go after wantonly.”)  - has been 
openly acknowledged. It should not be thought, however, that Qoheleth is encouraging 
excessive indulgence (cf. 10:17-19). The obvious tension in this verse, some would 
suggest, is best explained by positing verse 9c as a redactional gloss to delimit 
Qoheleth’s rhetoric.314 But the contents of this verse are not inimical to Qoheleth’s 
thought and perspective. Enjoyment is, for him, the lot (portion) of humanity (2:10) and 
                                                
 312 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 182.  
  313 Attention has been drawn to this particular pericope as a masterful display of literary artistry. 
See, for example, Graham Ogden, “Qoheleth X1 7-X11 8: Qoheleth’s Summons to Enjoyment and 
Reflection,” VT 34 (1984): 27-38; idem, Qoheleth, 207-12.  
  314 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 184. 
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a gift of God (2:24-26; 3:10-15; 5:17-19 [ET 5:18-20]). Enjoyment is not only desirable 
and permissible; it is a divine imperative.315       
 Yet, in Qoheleth’s thought the notion of lbh is ubiquitous. A structural analysis 
of the passage shows that Qoheleth states his theme – that enjoyment of life is 
imperative -three times, (i) 11:7-8a, b, (ii) 11:9a,b,c, and (iii) 11:10a,b. On each of three 
occasions a reason is advanced, first because life is fleeting (11:8c,d) and second, 
because it is the will of God. On the third occasion both these reasons are stated in 
11:10c and 12:1a.316 There is no doubt that the exhortation to enjoy life is an important 
facet of Qoheleth’s outlook, but this has to be seen in the context of the lbh theme, 
found here in 11:8c and verse 10c.       
 William Anderson states that, “Qoheleth holds a view of God as judge, with an 
eschatological component.”317 This is not, however, a convincing deduction from the 
evidence in Ecclesiastes. What is certain is that, for Qoheleth, God will judge the 
righteous and the wicked (3:17), and despite the longevity of evildoers (8:12) it will not 
go well for them in the long run. That Qoheleth teaches the traditional Jewish belief 
relating to the judgment of God is beyond doubt, but equally in evidence in his thought 
is the fact that the time, place and nature of that divine judgment are all unknowable 
(8:5b-7). 
5.5   General References to God 
For the sake of completeness there are five further references to God to record: (i) the 
sacred oath (~yhla t[wbX) is found at 8:2; (ii) long ago God approved that humans should 
be happy (9:7); (iii) the righteous and the wise and their deeds are in God’s hand (9:1); 
(iv) God keeps those occupied with joy in their heart , i.e., those to whom God gives 
wealth and the power to enjoy it (5:19 [ET 5:20]; and finally, God seeks to do things he 
has already done (3:15). Four of these references to the deity emphasise that God is very 
active: he seeks, he keeps, he approves, and he is in sovereign control. 
                                                
  315 Something similar is found in the Talmud: “Everyone must give an account before God of all 
the things one saw in life and did not enjoy,” (y. Qidd. 4:12). The injunction to enjoy life is also to be 
found in an Egyptian inscription as “The Song of Antef” which includes the exhortation to “follow the 
heart” while one is still alive. See Fox, “A Study of Antef,” 393-423. See also Lichtheim, The Instruction 
of Ptahhotep, Lichtheim, AEL I, 66, where the advice to “follow your heart” completed a series of 
geriatric complaints. 
  316 Gordis, Koheleth, 326-7. 
  317 W. H. U. Anderson, Qoheleth and its Pessimistic Theology: Hermeneutical Struggles in 
Wisdom Literature (Lampeter: Mellen Biblical Press, 1997), 109. 
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5.6  Summary and Assessment 
With the many and varied references to the divine name in the text, the deity’s presence 
is pervasive right across the book. In fact, God is mentioned in every chapter in the 
book apart from chapter 10 [MT].318 In our examination of Qoheleth’s theological 
assertions, we found that his understanding of God is, for the most part, situated well 
within the boundaries of Old Testament monotheism. Qoheleth holds to the orthodox 
Jewish belief that there is only one God who has created the world and humanity: in a 
word, everything (3:11; 11:5; 12:1, 7). This God exercises absolute sovereign control 
over the created order (3:14; 6:10; 7:13; 9:1), and is wholly transcendent and exalted 
above the earth, and quite distinct from all his creatures (5:1 [MT]; 6:10).  
 The world that God created was good (3:11) and God made mankind from the 
dust of the earth and animated him by the life-breath that he gave (3:19; 12:7). While 
God made man upright (7:29a), man is a sinful and weakly creature (6:10) who by his 
own volition turned to follow evil, injustice and oppression (2:11; 3:16; 4:1-3). 
Humans, along with animals, must die in God’s allotted time (3:1-22) but man can, on 
occasion, by his own extreme behaviour, die before his time (7:17). At death the life 
breath returns to God who gave it (12:7) and the earthly bodies of humans and animals 
revert to dust, whence they all came. After death, man only survives in the shady world 
of lwaX (9:5-6), and there appears to be no meaningful existence after death (3:21; 
9:10b). On the other hand, human life, while it lasts, is a gift from God (3:12-13; 5:19; 
8:15), and should be enjoyed to the full (9:10).     
  God separates and judges human actions (3:17-18; 11:9; 12:14), but the nature, 
time, place and duration of that judgment remain a mystery to Qoheleth. God is “wholly 
other,”  distant and silent (5:1 [MT]), and whatever God does, nothing can be added to 
it, or taken from it (3:14; 3:21-22; 6:12; 7:14; 8:16-17; 9:1). The only fitting response to 
the deity is to “fear him” (3:14; 7:16-18; 8:12-13; 12:13).     
 Qoheleth’s God is therefore a mysterious and inscrutable deity who brings about 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences on earth (7:13-14). God has given mankind a 
terrible business to be busy with (1:1b; 3:10; 8:16), yet the opportunity to enjoy life is 
possible and comes from the hand of God (2:24). But even when God is viewed as the 
“giver” of many gifts, his actions appear arbitrary at times (6:1-2). It is possible, 
however, for humans to please God (2:26; 7:26), but it is not clear how this can be 
achieved. Qoheleth envisages his readers attending cultic worship, but God must be 
                                                
 318  ~yhla does not occur in chapter 4 in the English translations but occurs in 4:17 [MT].  
	   116	  
approached with trepidation and awe, as he can be made angry if vows are not honoured 
(4:17-5:6 [MT]).        
 While Qoheleth affirms that God made everything appropriate/fitting in its time, 
yet he has also made some things crooked which man cannot straighten (7:13b, cf. 
1:15a). While there are injustices and anomalies in the world, nevertheless, the 
righteous and the wise are in ‘the hand of God’ (9:1). God approves of human beings 
eating and drinking (9:7), and he keeps people occupied with joy as they enjoy life, 5:19 
(ET 5: 20).         
 Qoheleth has a solemn but distant view of God. He expresses little of the very 
lofty concept of man found in Psalms 8 and 139:13-16. Qoheleth’s enquiry is focused 
and limited to the here and now, the earthly realm. He views man as having no 
advantage over the beasts of the fields in terms of lasting achievement (3:8-22). Indeed, 
his overall picture of human character is very bleak. All humans face the same fate 
(2:14-17; 9:1-3) and while humans live on earth they are inclined to do evil (8:11; 9:1-
3). Human appetite is insatiable (6:7) and one of the most powerful and destructive of 
human emotions – envy, is a prominent factor in motivating people vis-à-vis their 
neighbour (4:4). Given mankind’s finite limitations, there is little advantage to be 
gained in this life – everything is lbh. So the best thing to do is to enjoy life when you 
can. “Even those who live many years should rejoice in them all; yet let them remember 
that the days of darkness will be many. All that comes is vanity” (11:8).  
From the considerable evidence we have marshalled in the present and previous chapter, 
it is clear that Qoheleth has a secure and certain belief in God’s existence whose 
sovereign will cannot be thwarted by human machinations. God is in complete 
sovereign control over all the events that occur in the world. Thus, when one reflects on 
the staggering amount of knowledge that Qoheleth possesses and presents about God, 
both in its sheer scale and depth of expression, it is nothing short of astonishing given 
the brevity of the book.         
  By contrast, what is equally remarkable is the silence of God in this unusual 
book. At no stage does ~ylha enter into the picture as an active protagonist revealing 
himself, his will, and intentions to Qoheleth in the way that we find applicable to God’s 
relationship with Moses and the prophets, all of whom spoke as, “Thus says the Lord.”  
Nor does the author present Qoheleth as directly addressing, or praying to God. What 
we have observed in Qoheleth’s presentation of divinity is that God is always giving, 
always acting/doing, and judging. Yet in a strange sense, God keeps silent.  
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 In attempting to understand the theological dimension to Qoheleth’s 
epistemology, it is necessary at this juncture to observe that at no time in Ecclesiastes 
does Qoheleth present himself as having an interest in epistemological theory per se, as 
Weeks has correctly pointed out.319 It is important to distinguish between a person who 
has a quest for knowledge (which I believe Qoheleth had) and one who is absorbed with 
theories of knowledge and epistemological reflection more generally. This distinction is 
important to bear in mind as we move to explore Qoheleth’s epistemic claims more 
carefully, now and in the chapters to follow.      
 It is also important to note that because Qoheleth does not articulate a specific 
epistemological theory, that does not mean he had no theory of knowledge. Like all 
other OT authors, Qoheleth had certain unexpressed, underlying assumptions about 
knowledge. Since Qoheleth makes so many detailed claims about God, humans, and the 
nature of life on earth, he must have some ideas about the nature and extent of human 
knowledge. More than any other OT author, Qoheleth stands out as someone akin to a 
philosopher who did not explicitly look back to tradition or divine revelation as a 
springboard to launch his ideas. Bearing in mind our introduction to contemporary 
epistemological discussion in chapter 3 in which we highlighted the concept of 
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), it will be of great interest to see if Qoheleth 
offers any explicit justification for his beliefs about God.    
 Let us now round off this chapter by picking up this key question: what were 
Qoheleth’s source(s) of his theological knowledge? First of all, it cannot be divine 
revelation as no divine encounter between God and Qoheleth is recorded in the book, 
nor is any such theophany remotely indicated. A possible source of his knowledge of 
God could have come from being taught by others, which implies the use of his sense of 
hearing. But the verb [mX = “to listen, to hearken,” only occurs 8 times in Ecclesiastes 
and never once is this verb used in the first person with Qoheleth as subject. Of course 
the absence of such usage would not preclude Qoheleth from relying on his Jewish 
upbringing in a monotheistic culture that would have grounded him in God’s past 
dealings with Israel. He could have easily relied on the traditions of his forefathers 
without explicitly mentioning them.       
 Since some commentators have claimed Qoheleth was essentially an empiricist 
in his epistemology, can all the knowledge about God that we have exhumed from the 
                                                
 319 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 161. So also Fox, Qoheleth, when he observes (at 85) 
that, “Qohelet’s epistemology is essentially empirical. … although he does not offer a philosophical 
theory or pursue a consistent methodology.” 
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text be derived from his own personal experiences? We saw in chapter 1 that there is 
some basis for regarding Qoheleth as an empiricist, especially in Eccl 2 where he very 
specifically set out on several quests or investigations into human wisdom, human toil, 
and human pleasure. His business ventures and his pleasure seeking as recorded in 2: 4-
11 undoubtedly imply that he had concrete experiences from which he drew his own 
very personal conclusions. Whether another person who lived through the same 
experiences as recorded by Qoheleth would have reached the same conclusions is very 
debatable.  But certainly, Qoheleth did actually experience certain events in his life and 
learned from them. In that sense he can be called an empiricist for he had drawn 
knowledge from his experiences.320       
  However, when we move to consider the realm of theological assertions, we 
enter a very different field of knowing. In several of the above paragraphs we gave a 
very substantial summary of what Qoheleth claimed to know about God and it 
amounted to very wide-ranging knowledge. In this context, Crenshaw gives us a most 
telling summary of Qoheleth’s knowledge claims when he refers to “. . . the extensive 
impact of non-experiential data on his thinking.” He continues:    
  Where, one asks, did he learn so much about the deity who, on Qoheleth’s own admission, 
 remains hidden, thus concealing the essential character of divine activity? What empirical facts 
 conveyed the following insights: that God has appointed a time for judgment, dislikes fools, will 
 punish rash vows, created the world good/appropriate, dwells in heaven, creates the embryo 
 within the mother’s womb, chases the past, test people in order to make them fear, gives human 
 beings unpleasant business, keeps them preoccupied with joy, made men and women upright, 
 has already approved one’s actions, and rewards those who fear/worship the deity.321 
Of course, very few scholars would deny the experiential nature of the wisdom 
enterprise, and Qoheleth’s desire to communicate his views to his contemporaries was, 
without doubt, in a very general sense, fired by his appeal to experiential data. But on 
the basis of the above considerations, the reality is that Qoheleth’s very extensive 
detailed knowledge about God cannot possibly have been derived from his physical 
observations and experiences under the sun. In fact, not only is Qoheleth’s theology 
non-experiential, I would go further and state that it is counter-experiential especially 
when we take into account (i) how Qoheleth declares that God conceals so much from 
                                                
 320 According to Benjamin Lyle Berger, “Qohelet and the Exigencies of the Absurd,” BI  9, 2 
(2001): 141-79, “Qohelet is ultimately concerned with the experience of existence. The book unfailingly 
returns to the basic question of what it means to be human in the universe that Qohelet sees.” (At 144). 
Berger later refers to Qohelet’s investigations (at 156) as proceeding from an “experiential 
epistemology.” At face value this view accords with Qoheleth’s stated objectives in 1:13 and 7:25, but the 
many claims to knowledge that Qoheleth makes are far removed from an experiential epistemology.  
 321 Crenshaw, “Qoheleth’s Understanding,” in Qohelet in the Context of Wisdom (ed.  
Antoon Schoors. BETL 136. Leuven: University Press and Uitgeverij Peeters, 1998), 212-13.  
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humanity, (ii) the inability and limitations of human knowledge and understanding, and 
(iii) how various situations in life are simply impervious to human comprehension.
  When an author puts pen to paper, so to speak, he/she may not feel obliged to 
outline their sources of information, whatever their epistemic claims. All authors write 
with underlying assumptions about reality that both they and their readers take for 
granted. Qoheleth undoubtedly was an adherent of Jewish monotheism. It is 
inconceivable that Qoheleth would not have been familiar with the teaching of the book 
of Genesis, especially with reference to God as creator and giver of all things.322 When 
addressing his understanding of God to his contemporary audience the teaching about 
God’s creative and sovereign control over all things would have been a known area of 
belief for his audience to relate to. It would therefore not have been necessary for 
Qoheleth to cite the actual source(s) for this foundational belief in the Jewish faith.
  Whatever the source of Qoheleth’s teaching about God in all its manifold 
dimensions, it is difficult to detect any epistemic justification on his part for his 
adherence to, and advocacy of, Jewish monotheism. Indeed, if one surveys the entire 
body of writings of the Hebrew Bible, it is very difficult to detect a philosophical and 
theoretical defence of the existence of God. The Psalmist does make the claim: “Fools 
say in their hearts, “There is no God” ” (Ps 14:1; 53:1), but this is a dogmatic claim that 
stems from faith.        
 However, because Qoheleth does not expressly mention the notion of 
justification as applied to his knowledge claims that does not mean that his “God 
Talk”323 is devoid of some form of justification. In chapter 3 we mentioned the regress 
problem in relation to justified true belief (JTB). One such solution to that problem was 
foundationalism. I suggested that foundationalism might offer a conceptual framework 
whereby Qoheleth’s epistemology may be understood. We shall endeavour to develop 
this line of thought later in this study; meantime we shall explore more aspects of the 
monologue that, on the face of it, have great epistemological import. I am particularly 
referring to Qoheleth’s use of three crucial verbs – har = “to see,” [dy = “to know,” and 
acm = “to find,” all of which have self-evident experiential significance. In the next 
chapter we will examine Qoheleth’s use of the verb [dy = “to know.” Our examination 
                                                
 322 We drew attention to the possible influence of the early chapters of Genesis on Qoheleth’s 
thought in chapter 4 f/n. 54 where scholarly comments are noted. I agreed with Longman’s comment that 
one cannot be certain of this putative influence on Qoheleth. 
 323 The phrase comes from the title of a book by John Macquarrie, God Talk (London: SCM 
Press), 1967. 
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of this verb in the exposition of Qoheleth’s ideas has the potential of further extending 
our understanding of the nature of his epistemic claims.    
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PART 3.   QOHELETH’S USE OF THE VERBS  [dy AND  acm 
 
Chapter 6: The verb [dy = “to know”  (Part A) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this and the next chapter we will examine the verb [dy which has obvious 
significance for examining Qoheleth’s perceptual and cognitive activities. To start with, 
an overview of the principal verbs of epistemological significance in Ecclesiastes would 
be helpful at this stage. Tabulated below is a list of these verbs with the number of times 
each verb occurs.  
Table 1 
 Verb     Occurrences           Verb   Occurrences  
  har   47    Xqb         7    
   [dy  36   bbs       7    
  acm  17   rwt          3    
  [mX    8    Xrd       1    
       hsn           2 
The most used verbs of epistemological significance are those listed in the left column.
  har  = “to see”        
  [dy  = “to know”         
  acm  = “to find”        
  [mX  = “to hear, hearken”        
Those listed in the right column could be classed as associate verbs.   
  Xqb =  “to seek, find”         
  bbs =  “to turn”        
  rwt =   “to search out, explore”      
  Xrd =  “to seek, enquire about”       
  hsn =   “to test, try”          
This latter list of five verbs is important, not necessarily because of the frequency of 
their occurrences but because they convey to the reader the great emotional intensity 
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which Qoheleth brings to his very deeply personal quests.                                                                                                                          
 With reference to the verbs listed in the left column, by far the most significant, 
from an epistemological point of view, are the first three.324 In this present chapter we 
will be concerned with the verb [dy as it seems to present the most obvious starting 
point for understanding Qoheleth’s claims to knowledge.  
6.2   The Verb [dy: Qoheleth’s general knowledge claims    
On a number of occasions Qoheleth utilizes [dy in what one might call a common 
every-day sense. There are eight such examples to briefly consider. In 4:13, Qoheleth, 
in a “better/than” saying, states that a foolish king does not know how to take advice, 
and in 4:17 (MT), where the context is temple worship, fools, declares Qoheleth, do not 
know that they are doing wrong when they offer up sacrifice. Another “better/than” 
saying is found in 10:15 where it is stated that fools do not know the way to the city 
after a wearisome day’s toil.        
  A unique use of [dy in the form of a Qal active participle, masculine plural, ~y[dwy 
occurs in 9:11 where it is used to refer to men of skill, which literally means, those who 
know how to do something well. Then we encounter a rare insight into Qoheleth’s 
views on personal relationships in 7:22 where he addresses the reader directly in the 
second person: “. . . your heart knows that many times you have yourself cursed others.” 
There follows in 8:5, where the Qal imperfect occurs twice, we have a more traditional 
saying in which Qoheleth asserts that an obedient servant will meet (know) no harm, 
and that a wise man will know both the time and the way. This conventional wisdom 
saying, however, is countered in verses 6-9. Two examples of [dy are found in Chapter 
6. One is a commendation for a poor man who knows how to conduct himself before 
the living, 6:8b, and in 6:10 the only example of the passive form of [dy (Niphal) where 
Qoheleth states that it is known what man is. Whatever the knowledge referred to here, 
it is, according to Qoheleth, common knowledge, not an insight he garnered from his 
own experience.         
 None of these eight occurrences of [dy is of any notable significance in 
understanding Qoheleth’s epistemology. His ‘knowing’ in these instances is of a very 
general nature, not necessarily the direct result of his personal experiences.  
         
                                                
  324 Reference will be made to the verb [mX in Chapter 9 when we will examine Qoheleth’s use of 
the very important verb har. 
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6.3   The living and the dead 
The spectre of death is deeply seated in the psyche of Qoheleth. There are two explicit 
references to the dead in the monologue, one in 6:3-5 and the other in 9:5.   
                  6:3-5 
              hyxy twbr ~ynXw ham Xya dylwy-~a  3
         hbwjh-!m [bXt-al wXpnw wynX-ymy wyhyX brw 
       `lpnh wnmm bwj ytrma wl  htyh-al  hrwbq-~gw 
                     $ly $Xxbw ab lbhb-yk  4
                  `hsky wmX $Xxbw 
                 `hzm hzl txn [dy alw     har-al XmX-~g   5 
  3 A man may beget a hundred children, and live many years; but however many are the  
  days of his years, if he does not enjoy life’s good things, or has no burial, I say that a 
 stillborn child is better off than he.       
 4 For it comes into vanity and goes into darkness, and in darkness its name is covered; 
 5 moreover it has not seen the sun or known anything; yet it finds rest rather than he.  
Chapter 6:1-2 was considered in chapter 4 under the subheading “God Who Gives.” 
There, Qoheleth’s complaint concerned a rich man who had all the potential of a very 
fulfilled life, but it was the sovereign act of God that prevented this.  Now in verse 3 
Qoheleth cites another example of a calamity for a man who at face value possesses two 
crucial ingredients of the good life (fathering many children, and having longevity (cf. 
Gen 25:8; Job 42:17). Yet begetting a host of children and living to a ripe old age can 
lead to great adversity. If the person in this hypothetical example is not given a proper 
burial and cannot enjoy his wealth, his status is worse than the still-born child who at 
least finds rest.325 For Qoheleth, the still-born has no experience of life under the sun, 
and thus goes to the grave.326 This total lack of conscious awareness of the puzzling 
nature of life is, in Qoheleth’s view, a distinct advantage.     
  The syntax of verse 3 is uncertain. The major difficulty surrounds the clause 
about the burial: wl htyh-al hrwbq-~gw. The question is: to whom does this refer?  The 
still-born, or the rich man? For Crenshaw the clause is anticipatory, thus applying it to 
the stillborn: “. . . then even it does not have a burial, I say the still-born is better than 
                                                
 325 It is not stated why the rich man failed to enjoy his riches. Krüger, Qoheleth, explores (at 124) 
some scholarly responses, e.g., death, an illness, loss of property, and a readiness to accept his wealth as a 
gift from God to enjoy. 
 326 Cf. Ps 58:8 [ET 58:9] where we have the words, “. . .like the untimely birth that never sees 
the sun.” In this imprecatory Psalm, the Psalmist believes that a more ignoble calamity could not be 
imagined for his enemies than the fate of a stillborn child.  
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he.”327  Zimmerli takes a similar line believing that the above clause originally belonged 
to verse 5, thus he applies the clause to the stillborn.328 Other emendations have been 
made,329 but the consonantal reading of MT is supported by the ancient versions.330 
  The NRSV, as it stands, is probably right. On this reading Qoheleth’s 
observation amounts to saying that if one has it all - wealth, possessions, an abundance 
of children, very long life – that is not necessarily a faultless formula that guarantees an 
enjoyable life. If this good (hbwjh) does not satisfy ([bXt-al), and if one is unable to have 
a proper burial, then the status of a still-born baby is better off.331 This message is 
driven hard into the reader’s consciousness by the use of the ever-incisive rhetorical 
question in verse 6:        
       har al hbwjw  ~ym[p  ~ynX @la  hyx  wlaw  6
          `$lwh lkh dxa ~wqm-la alh 
  Even though he should live a thousand years twice over, yet enjoy no good – do not all go 
 to one place?           
Once again, Qoheleth emphasizes the common fate of all human kind: here both the 
foetus and the man in question come to the same end.332 This is the place of darkness 
(vv 4-5), which is the destiny of all living creatures. The strangeness of the subject 
matter of these verses contrasts sharply with the joy that God gives to some humans as 
positively stated in the previous three verses 5:17-19 [ET 18-20].   
  Qoheleth claims to have had very extensive experience (7:15), coupled with 
unsurpassed wisdom and knowledge (1:16). But in the scenario outlined in these verses, 
it is difficult to see how much of what he claims to know comes from empirical 
observation. Verse 6 states an obvious universal truth: all humans die. Verse 3 ends 
with a statement, the basis of which is an out-and-out value judgment. It is certainly true 
that Qoheleth grants to himself exceptional knowledge, but on the other hand, he is still 
                                                
  327 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 120.   
 328 Zimmerli, Das Buch des Predigers Salomo, 198. 
  329 For example Gordis, Koheleth, vocalizes aOlooo for alu and renders it (at 259), “even if he have 
an elaborate funeral (on which men lay such stress).” This would read, “… even if he have an elaborate 
funeral.” Scott, Proverbs & Ecclesiastes, transposes wl htyh-al hrwbq-~gw to the end of verse 4 and applies 
it to the still-born (at 231-32). He claims this clause has been displaced in MT, but there is no textual 
evidence for this emendation. 
  330 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 211. 
 331 Not having an honourable burial was thought to be a terrible disgrace in the ancient world. 
Cf. the story of Jezebel in 2 Kgs 9:35 and that of Jehoiachim in Jer 22:19.     
  332 The phrase dxa ~wqm-la = “to one place” is a reference to Sheol (cf. 3:20: 9:10).  
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on a par with his fellow humans insofar as human knowledge limitations are concerned. 
Yet no person could know what he claims to know about the status and experience of 
the stillborn. These verses are shot through with value judgment, and what he claims to 
be true could not have been deduced from his own experience.   
                       9:3-5 
         ~gw lkl dxa hrqm-yk XmXh txt hX[n-hXa lkb [r hz 3
         `~ytmh-la wyrxaw ~hyyxb ~bblb twllwhw [r-alm ~dah-ynb bl
   
               !wxjb Xy ~yyxh-lk la rxby rXa ym-yk 4
            `tmh hyrah-!m bwj awh yx blbl-yk
            
                                 hmwam ~y[dwy ~nya ~ytmhw wtmyX ~y[dwy ~yyxh yk 5
                                    `~rkz xkXn yk rkX ~hl dw[-!yaw 
  3 There is an evil in all that happens under the sun, that the same fate comes to everyone.  
  Moreover, the hearts of all are full of evil; madness is in their hearts while they live, and  
  after that they go to the dead.        
  4 But whoever is joined with all the living has confidence333, for a living dog is better than a 
  dead lion.         
  5The living know that they will die, but the dead know nothing; they have no more reward,
  and even the memory of them is lost.  
These verses form part of the unit 9:1-10.334 At verse 1 the opening reflection confirms 
that the righteous, the wise, and their deeds are in the hand of God. The phrase “the 
hand of God” could refer to the actions of the righteous and the wise, or to their 
deeds.335 In any case, the scope for human activity is limited, as is clear from verse 1b: 
“Everything that confronts them is lbh.” The reason for this depressing conclusion is 
that in v 2a the levelling effect of death (dxa hrqm = “one fate”), blows away all human 
distinctions (v 2b).          
 The reference to all that happens under the sun (v 3a) is but another reminder of 
the comprehensive range of Qoheleth’s undertakings. Some suggest that the words lkb 
[r hz = “There is an evil in all, . . .” as a superlative expression, i.e., that this is the most 
evil situation.336 This seems unlikely, however. In v 3a Qoheleth again forcefully 
endorses the reality of dxa hrqm, and immediately in v 3b Qoheleth picks up on the 
language of 8:11 regarding the proclivity of humankind to do evil. The phrase at the end 
                                                
 333 I deviate from the NRSV here as I believe ‘confidence, certitude’ is a better translation. 
  334 Scholars differ as to the number of sub-units in this chapter. I agree with Whybray, 
Ecclesiastes, 139, that verses 1-10 are best taken as a separate section (contra, Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 88, 
who takes 1-12 as a section. So also Ogden, Qoheleth, 155-74; _______ ,“Qoheleth 1X 1-16,” VT  XXX11, 2 
(1982): 158-69. 
 335 So Krüger, Qoheleth, 168.  
 336 See Fox, A Rereading, 292, for discussion. 
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of v 3, ~ytmh-la wyrxaw = “and after that they go to the dead.” presses home the ultimate 
human destiny.          
 The meaning of the phrase ~ytmh-la wyrxaw is not clear. According to Seow these 
words have been incorrectly transposed from the following verse. He also translates yrxa 
as “finality.”337 But this suggestion is not convincing. Weeks views the meaning of yrxa 
in a non-temporal sense, suggesting that the term is sometimes used to describe the back 
of something or someone, citing Ezek 8:16 in support. He writes,  
 This, I think, makes good sense in the context of the next verse [v 4]: humans keep their backs 
 towards the dead because it is in their engagement with life or with the living that they find 
 assurance in their own value.338  
This has some plausibility, and it has the added contextual value of concurring with the 
positive nature of the joy passage in vv 7-9.      
 Verse 4 strikes a positive and memorable invocation to enjoy life. Verse 4b 
appears to be an aphorism, but the use of the living dog as a metaphor for the living is 
quite ironic as the dog was the most reviled of animals in the ANE.339 On this occasion, 
Qoheleth highly values human consciousness for it is to be preferred to non-existence. 
Most commentators acknowledge irony and sarcasm here.340At first sight, there is an 
advantage in being alive (9:4).341 In v 5 Qoheleth comments on the empirical status of 
the living compared with the dead. But the advantage of being alive is that they know 
that they are going to die, while the dead are portrayed as not knowing anything (cf. 
9:3,10). The issue of the failure of human memory is highlighted once again (cf. 1:11; 
2:16).           
  With these reflections on death, Qoheleth plummets new depths of despair and 
foreboding. As Brown observes, “Such is Qoheleth’s indictment against a world that 
                                                
 337 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 300. 
 338 Weeks, Unpublished script on Ecclesiastes. 
 339 Dogs were associated with death and the underworld (cf. 1 Kgs 21:23-4; 22:38; 2 Kgs 9:30-
7). There is some debate as to whether the l in blkl is emphatic at 4b. Weeks, Unpublished script on 
Ecclesiastes, renders it ‘. . . since it seems to a live dog that he is better than a dead lion.’ 
 340 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, (at 92) regards the irony here as inescapable.  
 341 The term !wxjb has attracted some scholarly attention. Does it mean trust, confidence, or 
hope? Seow, Ecclesiastes, states (at 300) that !wxjb does not mean something to wish for. He holds that it 
refers to one’s confidence or certitude that something will happen. He adopts ‘certitude’. Lohfink, 
Qoheleth, prefers the term ‘trust” (at 109), suggesting that ‘trust’ perhaps is meant as a new word for ‘fear 
of God’ (at 112). Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, states that this has little to commend it (at161). 
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offers nothing more than a tomb to die in.”342 I tend to favour Crenshaw’s 
interpretation. 
  No comfort derives from knowing that the dead have already received their rewards and are 
  completely forgotten, for the living will experience the same oblivion. Awareness of such grim 
  prospects can hardly form a basis for hope.343  
Qoheleth goes well beyond Hebraic traditions in this area in that he believes that 
physical death is the end of every conceivable means of continuity. It is true that he 
earlier accepted the traditional valuation of the reputation left by a person after death 
(cf. 7:1). Yet he concedes that the memory of this quickly fades. “The Israelite’s basic 
longing that he/she might live on as part of the family memory, the collective mind, lay 
as a shattered dream.”344       
 Earlier the view was advanced that the provenance of Ecclesiastes is sometime in 
the third century BCE. In the Old Testament the concept of death does not envision a 
clear understanding of life after death that we can discern in later Christian dogmatics. 
What evidence there is on the subject of death in ancient Israel comes mainly from the 
Wisdom literature, Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes and some Psalms. Shannon Burkes 
remarks that the traditions of Israel        
  . . . could handle the potential disruption death might offer through its own version of  
  immortality, which consisted of several related points: survival through one’s offspring, a kind 
  of corporate memory of the just, and the continuation of the people as a nation. Family and name 
  are double insurance against annihilation.345 
In the historical context, Qoheleth was a man of his time, place and circumstance. He 
was not, however, just voicing the beliefs of his antecedents or contemporaries. In her 
comprehensive study, Burkes goes on to state that Qoheleth’s understanding of death 
was in stark contrast to everything else in the Hebrew Bible, but he did not advance any 
new understanding of life after death.346 As Whitley observes,  
  Death has accordingly a finality for Koheleth which we do not find elsewhere in the Old  
  Testament. Such passages as Gen 37:35; 1 Sam 28:3-19; and Job 3:17-19 envisage some mode 
  of existence for those departed to Sheol, but for Koheleth death seems to indicate complete 
                                                
 342 Brown, Ecclesiastes, 91.  
  343 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 161. 
  344 Ogden, Qoheleth, 162. 
  345 Burkes, Death in Qoheleth, 32. For a substantial article on this subject see John Day, “The 
Development of Belief in Life after Death,” in After the Exile: Essays in Honour of Rex Mason (eds. J. 
Barton and D. J. Reimer; Macon: Mercer University Press, 1996), 231-57. Applying a Hegelian/Marxist 
type paradigm, Day writes (at 256), “If Proverbs is the thesis, Job and Ecclesiastes the antithesis, then in 
addition to the Wisdom Psalms 49 and 73, the book of Wisdom represents the synthesis.” Of Ecclesiastes 
he observes (at 252), “Although it accepts the traditional view of Sheol which is common to much of the 
Old Testament (e.g. 9:5), the negative consequences which it draws from it are unparalleled in Scripture.” 
   346 Burkes, Death in Qoheleth, 74-80. 
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  extinction in which the fate of man is indistinguishable from that of an animal.”347 
   
In stating his assertions about the living and the dead, it would have been common 
knowledge to Qoheleth’s contemporaries that they would die at some future time. This 
was not knowledge established uniquely by Qoheleth’s own observation and 
experience. As for his claims as to the condition of the dead and the nature of their 
mode of existence, Qoheleth’s certainty in this area could never have been established 
from an empirical base, not by him or any other human. 
6.4  Qoheleth’s dogmatic claims to knowledge. 
Qoheleth makes many statements that could be designated as dogmatic. In this section I 
am principally concerned with the unambiguous statements that he makes by using the 
verb [dy = “to know.” Of the thirty-six occurrences of [dy, Qoheleth employs this verb 
on five occasions in a forthright manner, 1:17; 2:14; 3:12; 3:14; 8:12, and once, in 11:9, 
he presses the imperative form into service. We shall now turn to an examination of 
these six examples. Interestingly, four of these “I know” statements occur in the first 
three chapters of the book where there is a very prominent use of the “I” narrative. 
 As we noted in chapter 1, after a brief personal introduction of himself in 1:12, 
Qoheleth offers a very resolute introduction as to the nature of his intellectual quest. 
From the concentrated focus on the natural world (1:4-11) the reader is now transported 
into the very private thoughts and reflections of the learned sage.348 
                   1:17 
            yt[dy twlkXw twllwh t[dw hmkx t[dl ybl hntaw  
                       `xwr !wy[r awh hz-~gX
         
  And I applied my mind to know wisdom and to know madness and folly. I know   
 that this also is but a chasing after wind.349 
There is a threefold occurrence of the verb [dy in verse 17, twice as infinitive, and once 
as first person singular. This fact alone indicates that Qoheleth is decidedly intent on a 
                                                
   347 Whitley, Koheleth, 167. See also J. Crenshaw, “The Shadow of Death in Qoheleth.” in 
Israelite Wisdom: Theological and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien (eds. John G. Gammie et 
al.; New York: Scholars Press, 1978), 205-16; A. Schoors, “Koheleth: A Perspective of Life after Death?” 
295-303. He states (at 303) that Qoheleth’s picture of death is rather more negative than it is in other texts 
of the Old Testament: J. Crenshaw, “Beginnings, Endings, and Life’s Necessities,” goes further when he 
states (at 99) that Qoheleth’s preoccupation with death was nearly obsessive. 
  348 Since we have dealt with 1:16-18 in chapter 1 regarding the nature of Qoheleth’s quests, our 
main concern in 1:17 is with the specific epistemic claim that Qoheleth is making. 
  349 The NRSV has “perceived” for yt[dy. 
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very deeply personal quest. His double use of the infinitive construct in such close 
proximity in one verse is most emphatic as these infinitives are linked to ybl hntaw = “I 
applied my mind . . .” (literally, “I gave my heart. . .”). The intensity of his personal 
enterprise is underscored by the use of two other related infinitives in 1:13. There, the 
serious intent of his mind is demonstrated by his use of Xwrdl = “to seek,” and rwtlw = 
“to search out, explore,” the instrument by which he will proceed in his quest being 
hmkxb = “by wisdom.”350        
  Just as he announces his experiment in 1:13, and his acclaimed supremacy in the 
spheres of wisdom and knowledge (1:16), Qoheleth delivers a statement of pessimistic 
certitude in 1:17b. This is the first time in the monologue that Qoheleth uses [dy by 
making what could be described as a dogmatic epistemological assertion. This is not 
entirely a surprise because in the first unit (verses 13-15) Qoheleth concludes in verse 
14b `xwr tw[rw lbh lkh hnhw. This unit (vv 12-15) then closes with an aphorism that 
emphasizes human inability to affect the world. While a stick can be straightened by the 
skill of a carpenter, Qoheleth still reports that nothing can be measured.351  
  The second unit, verses 16-18, follows a similar pattern to verses 13-15, but in 
the second unit, Qoheleth’s enquiry now moves to wisdom itself, and into its opposites, 
twlkXw twllwh = “madness and folly.” As in verses 13-15, he concludes with an 
unequivocal pessimism: wisdom and knowledge bring nothing but vexation and pain 
(verse 18). This manifestly reveals “Qoheleth’s distance from more optimistic ideas of 
human effectiveness.”352 Indeed, when a writer sets out on a new inquiry and delivers 
his pessimistic conclusions almost immediately, one can expect to hear more of his 
pessimistic tones as his discourse proceeds.      
                                                
  350 According to Delitzsch, Biblischer Commentar, at 234, the synonyms Xrd and  rwt do not 
represent a lower or higher degree of search, but two kinds of searching: one penetrating in depth, the 
other going out in extent. Gordis, Koheleth, at 209, states that Xwrdl means “to penetrate to the root of the 
matter,” while rwtlw means “to investigate it from all sides.” See Seow, Ecclesiastes, 145, for discussion, 
and also Longman, Ecclesiastes, 79. What is certain is that the scope of the investigation is 
comprehensive, embracing all the deeds done under the sun. 
   351 The meaning of this aphorism is not certain. Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes & Song of 
Solomon (AOTC 16; Nottingham: Apollos/InterVarsity Press, 2010), comment (at 82) “Qoheleth 
composes (or quotes) a proverb that echoes chiastically the previous metaphors of breath and wind. The 
wind’s path is crooked and twists from one direction to the other: it just cannot be straight.” Murphy, 
Ecclesiastes, (13) holds that the reference in verse 15a “should be interpreted broadly: the physically and 
spiritually crooked.” An educational context has been suggested by Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, (74) with 
reference to the Egyptian, The Instruction of Ani, indicating that careful instruction can straighten out 
recalcitrant students. I think Seow, Ecclesiastes, (147) is nearer the mark when he states, “Like Job, 
Qohelet accepts that there are distortions in the world for which God must ultimately be responsible.”  
   352 Weeks, “Ecclesiastes,” OBC, (at 423). 
	   130	  
  When Qoheleth makes his epistemological claim in 1:17b, `xwr !wy[r awh hz-~gX 
yt[dy, the question immediately arises: what is the referent for the demonstrative in the 
phrase, hz-~gX? Putting 1:17 in the larger literary context of 1:12-18, we could view 
verses 16-18 as presenting a narration and evaluation of the enquiry described in verses 
12-15. What therefore can we conclude about the semantic range of [dy in 1:17b? The 
two infinitive constructs are but a common use of [dy whereby an individual sets out on 
a personal quest for meaning in the world. In brief, there is no epistemological 
significance to be attached to his use of the two infinitives, “to know” in 1:17 as he has 
observed nothing in the physical sense. On these two occasions at least, Qoheleth is not 
making any specific knowledge claims. His use of the infinitives is but to inform his 
readers of his full intention “to know,” that is, he is setting out his credentials in the 
pursuance of a deeply personal intellectual quest.      
 However, in 1:17b, Qoheleth makes a categorical claim as to what he knows. 
The “knowledge” which he dogmatically states he possesses is not theoretical 
knowledge about life, nor is it a Platonic kind of knowledge, independent of human 
experience. Qoheleth’s knowledge in this instance seems to be based on his experience 
of wisdom in his ongoing enquiry, yet we do not find any references to experiential data 
in this verse that may have prompted this negative conclusion. Perhaps “Wisdom” is not 
the issue here, per se, but rather the experience of it. But any attempt to understand how 
the world is governed is, for Qoheleth, utterly futile. “Knowing” in 1:17b is essentially 
about his cognitive perception; [dy could, in this context, have the meaning “I came to 
understand . . .” Qoheleth’s claim to knowledge is not “public knowledge” but rather 
private to him. In this sense, Qoheleth’s claim in 1:17b can best be described as 
personal opinion.   
                      2:14
                        
       $lwh $Xxb lyskhw  wXarb wyny[ ~kxh  
         `~lk-ta hrqy dxa hrqmX   yna-~g yt[dyw
  
 The wise have eyes in their head, but fools walk in darkness. Yet I know that the same fate 
 befalls all of them.353 
After 1:17b, the next occurrence of the first person singular of [dy comes in 2:14. 
Verses 13-14 bring to light a striking feature of Qoheleth’s writing style, namely, the 
frequent use of the first person singular pronoun placed after the verb. According to Bo 
                                                
 353 The NRSV has “perceived” rather than “know” for yt[dy as in 1:7. Here, in 2:14 more 
emphasis is placed on Qoheleth’s knowing by the pleonastic use of yna. N.B. Ch. 2:13-14 will be 
considered in chapter 10 in relation to what Qoheleth claims to have seen (ytyarw). 
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Isaksson, this pleonastic use of the personal pronoun, “. . .gives the sentence an 
enhanced weight, which may emphasize an emotional expression, an important 
conclusion, or the introduction of a new line of thought.”354    
  These two verses need to be seen in their context. In the section, 2:1-26, the sub-
unit, verses 12-17 are pivotal. Qoheleth turns to wisdom, madness and folly (verse 12a). 
The words hmkx (wisdom), ~kx (wise), and ytmkx (I have been wise), together occur a 
total of six times in this sub-unit (verses 12-17); so also, the words twlks (folly) and lysk 
(fool) are found six times in total. This terminology is entirely in keeping with 
traditional Wisdom literature, most notably the wise/fool stereotype that constantly 
crops up in the Book of Proverbs.        
  Qoheleth introduces two statements of conventional wisdom in 2:13-14a, both 
presented in typical proverbial style. The contrast between “wisdom” and “folly” is 
intensified by his use of light and darkness imagery (verse 13a). In Wisdom literature 
darkness is often a metaphor for the lack of knowledge, or plain stupidity (cf. Job 12: 
24-25; 37:19; 38:2). The fool is like a blind man who stumbles as he walks (cf. Prov 
3:23; 4:19). But the wise man has eyes in his head, and since he is in the light, he can 
avoid disaster. Qoheleth is employing the extreme terms of light and darkness here to 
intensify the orthodox view that wisdom has distinct advantages over folly. 
  In 2:14b, however, Qoheleth introduces for the first time the idea that the wise 
man is, after all, no more able to control his ultimate fate than the much berated fool. 
After his superlative affirmation of the advantage of wisdom over folly, Qoheleth 
speaks with a most emphatic tone: yna-~g yt[dyw = “And yet I know (see/understand/ 
perceived that . . .).” His use of yt[dyw followed by the pleonastic yna amounts to a 
dramatic denial and reversal of wisdom’s alleged superior status over against folly. The 
sage admits that the wise have advantages over the fools. Perhaps the thought here is 
that being able to see does not enable the wise to change direction - merely to perceive 
where they are going. Yet, in the unremitting reality of dxa hrqm = (one fate), death 
comes to all, whether one is wise or foolish. Succinctly put: the wise die just like fools! 
As the thought of Qoheleth unfolds in the book, it emerges that the most persistent 
problem that causes him great anguish of spirit is the negative effects that death has on 
                                                
   354 Isaksson, Studies in the Language, 166-67. But see f/n. 617 in chapter 10 for a qualified 
observation. T. Muroaka, Emphatic Words and Structure in Biblical Hebrew (Leiden: Brill; Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 1985), adds (at 49) that most of the verbs used with the pronoun concern the psychological 
activities - meditating, reflecting, perceiving.  
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one’s life achievement.         
  The direct object of [dy, i.e., hrqm, recurs in 3:19 and 9:2-3, and is only used in 
Ecclesiastes with reference to death.355 In Qoheleth’s thought it does not denote an 
impersonal or malignant force, but rather a neutral term meaning simply what happens. 
Both the wise man and the fool have the same hrqm. To this ubiquitous phenomenon 
Qoheleth responds by pondering why he should be so wise. The phrase in 2:15a  yna-~g = 
(even me), refers to Qoheleth as the consummate sage, even Solomon. The occurrence 
of ~g (even) in the protasis and hmlw (then) in the apodosis, goes to the heart of the 
problem for Qoheleth.         
 When Qoheleth thus adamantly claims in this verse that the wise and the foolish 
die, he does not bring an unusual insight to what is a universal truth. No other writer in 
the Hebrew Bible appears to have this very negative and pessimistic outlook on the 
vicissitudes of human life, especially with regard to the most profound reality that 
affects every human: the fact that all die. And this, I think, is a prospect that rocks the 
sage to his existential foundations. So much so that it colours his judgment as he seeks 
to find meaning to his existence. Only rarely do we detect a chink of light breaking 
through, notably, in the seven “joy passages.”     
  Finally, this section raises a central question that we will address in passing. Is 
Qoheleth setting out an anti-wisdom agenda, as James Loader et al suggests?356 This 
view is hard to sustain bearing in mind the evidence in the book. Seow gives a measured 
assessment on this issue by saying that the issue for Qoheleth is not just having wisdom, 
which is a “plus,” but desiring a “surplus” (rtwy) of it.357 And according to Michael Fox, 
in 2:15-16, as in 1:18 and 7:16, “Qoheleth warns against much wisdom, for it opens the 
eyes to painful realities. Some wisdom, like labour, is necessary and valuable, but too 
much of either inflicts discomfort and dismay.”358 These comments are supported by 
Qoheleth’s attitude to wisdom in 2:13; 7:11-12, 19; 8:1, 5; 9:1, 13-16, 18a; 10:10. 
Conversely, wisdom has negative aspects according to Qoheleth, as can be found in 
                                                
 355 So Peter Machinist, “Fate, miqreh, and Reason,” Some Reflections on Qohelet and Biblical 
Thought,” in Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic, and Semitic Studies in Honor of 
Jonas C. Greenfield (ed. Z. Zevit et al.; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 159-75. (At 166). 
 356 Loader, Polar Structures, 1-3; Martin Shields, The End of Wisdom; _____ , Ecclesiastes and the 
End Of Wisdom,” TB 50 (1999), 17-39. A negative view of wisdom is also presented by Aubrey D. 
Spears, “The Theological Hermeneutics of Homiletical Application and Ecclesiastes 7:23-29” (PhD diss., 
University of Liverpool, 2006), See especially in chapter 5. 
  357 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 154.  
  358 Fox, A Rereading, 184. 
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1:16-18a; 2:15, 18-20; 6:8; 8:16-18; 9:18b and 10:1b.    
 In summary, Qoheleth’s use of yt[dyw (2:14b) is a clear dogmatic assertion, but 
that does not imply that he alone has arrived at this conclusion. His assertion is neither 
an expression of theoretical knowledge derived solely from reason, nor did it come from 
his own peculiar experience of life under the sun. Qoheleth’s dogmatic epistemological 
assertion in this instance is based on universal, and verifiable experience. All humans 
observe and experience the reality of death around them, as he himself indicates in 9:5. 
Qoheleth’s “knowing” on this occasion is an example of public common knowledge, 
but he infuses it with his own pessimistic, negative tone. This tone, also evident in 1:17, 
is set in the context of his ever recurring cosmic theme, `xwr tw[rw lbh lkh.  
  Qoheleth’s use of the Qal perfect, first person singular of  [dy is used on only 
two further occasions in the book, at 3:12 and 3:14. We will now examine 3:12-14 as 
these verses comprise a highly significant passage relating to Qoheleth’s knowledge 
claims.  
                    3:12-14 
          `wyyxb bwj twX[lw xwmXl-~a yk ~b bwj !ya yk yt[dy  12
          `ayh ~yhla ttm wlm[-lkb bwj harw htXw lkayX ~dah-lk ~gw  13 
                 ~lw[l hyhy awh ~yhlah hX[y rXa-lk yk yt[dy  14
      `wynplm waryX hX[ ~yhlahw [rgl !ya wnmmw @yswhl !ya wyl[ 
  12 I know that there is nothing better for them than to be happy and enjoy themselves as long 
  as they live;          
  13 moreover, it is God’s gift that all should eat and drink and take pleasure in all their toil.
  14 I know that whatever God does endures forever; nothing can be added to it, nor anything 
  taken from it; God has done this, so that all should stand in awe before him. 
Chapter 3 brings about a marked change in both style and tone compared with the 
previous chapters. The section, 3:1-15 is perhaps the most famous and oft-quoted 
passage in Ecclesiastes, especially the poem on time, verses 1-8. The sage begins with a 
statement that everything and every activity has its t[. In popular understanding the 
poem is taken to mean that every situation is appropriate or fitting (hpy) in its time. After 
fourteen antinomies are enumerated (vv 2-8), Qoheleth refers to the !wrty question in 
verse 9, which is couched in very similar words found in 1:3. This rhetorical question 
predictably anticipates a negative response from the reader. The next verse (3:10) also 
echoes the contents of 1:13b –referring to the business that God has given to humans to 
be busy with. According to 3:11, God is Creator of all things, he has placed a sense of 
the eternal in human hearts, and obscures from humans what he has done.  
  The bewilderment of the mystery of God’s workings in the world (verses 10-11) 
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is immediately offset by a forceful declaration of certain knowledge. In contrast to 2:14, 
Qoheleth uses yt[dy without the pleonastic yna in verses 12 and 14.359 This statement of 
Qoheleth’s knowledge takes the form of a negative “better than” saying;360 in the light 
of the fact that man cannot find out what God is doing in the world, Qoheleth opts to 
exhort his readers to enjoy life as a gift from God, that is, when they are able to do so. 
The object of yt[dy in 3:12 is therefore an exhortation for human beings to seize the 
opportunity to enjoy some of life’s pleasures – eating, drinking, and the good that stems 
from their labour – when they can.       
  Qoheleth’s advocacy to enjoy life is not, however, to be taken as a 
recommendation to plunge into a hedonistic lifestyle in the face of life’s frustration and 
cruelties. He was not in favour of a philosophy based on the pursuit of pleasure for its 
own sake. This is evident from the contents of 2:11 and 7:2-6. Qoheleth advocates 
pleasure and enjoyment in the context of a theological framework: God is the giver of 
all gifts, including enjoyment. The expression bwj twX[lw = “and to do good” normally 
means doing good in the moral sense (cf. 7:20). But Whybray is certain it has the non-
moral meaning to “make, achieve, bring about,” equivalent to bwj twarl = “to see 
good.”361 I tend to agree with this assessment, contra Lee who holds that, “Qohelet 
intimates that the enjoyment of life is indeed a matter of ethical duty.”362   
  Thus, the first certitude in 3:12, yt[dy, is concerned with the ultimate source of 
the ability to derive pleasure in life’s journey. With the second assertive claim to 
knowledge in 3:14, Qoheleth’s interest shifts from humanity in verse 12, to divinity in 
verse 14, i.e., from anthropological to theological concerns. Verse 12 is related to verse 
                                                
 359 The verb yt[dy is also implied at the beginning of verse 13: “Moreover [yt[dy = “I know” that] 
it is God’s gift . . .”  
 360 For an analysis of this form see G. S. Ogden, “Qoheleth’s use of the “Nothing is Better” – 
Form,” 339-50. The bwj !ya is also found in 2:24; 3:22, and 8:15. Ogden concludes that one of the features 
of this form is that “Each example validates the call to enjoyment with the claim that this is man’s God-
given lot.” (At 350). 
 361 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 74. The non-moral view is adopted by Seow, Ecclesiastes, 164; 
Ginsburg, Coheleth, 311; Delitzsch, Biblischer Commentar, 265; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 122; T. P. Dale, 
A Commentary on Ecclesiastes (London, Oxford & Cambridge: Rivingtons, 1873), 23; J. Lloyd, An 
Analysis of Book of Ecclesiastes (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, 1874), 46; Whitley, Koheleth, 34; 
Peter Enns, Ecclesiastes: An Introduction and Commentary (THOTC, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans), 55. 
 362 Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment, 41. This moral view has the support of the versions, e.g., 
LXX, Syr, Targ, and Vulg. Others who accept this view include Fredericks & Estes, Ecclesiastes, 109;  
Krüger, Qoheleth, 81; Treier, Proverbs & Ecclesiastes (Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible. 
Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2011, 156; C. H. H. Wright, The Book of Qoheleth: The Donnellan Lectures 
for 1880-01 (London: Hodder & Stoughton), 344; Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 133.      
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11 by the verb hX[ = “to make” which refers to God’s activity. The contrast between 
divinity and humanity is sharply evident here, a dichotomy which we have noted earlier 
to be a defining featuring of Qoheleth’s world outlook. Man’s finitude and ignorance 
(verse 11b) can be seen in their true perspective in relation to the limitations of t[ = 
“time.”           
 What a sovereign God does is ~lw[ (eternal) in its dimensions (verse 14). 
Qoheleth adds emphasis to this by using the ancient formula, [rgl !ya wnmmw @yswhl !ya wyl[, 
antecedents of which are found in Deut 4:2; 13:1[MT] with regards to God’s 
commandments. What Qoheleth is asserting here would have been traditional orthodox 
belief to his Jewish readers. Although God has made everything appropriate in its time 
(verse 11a), yet everything that God does is eternal (verse 14a), i.e., not bound by time. 
Qoheleth then states that whatever God has done has one clear purpose for humankind: 
wynplm waryX (verse 14b).         
  These two occurrences of yt[dy in close proximity in verses 12 and 14 are an 
integral component of this section, 3:1-15. The opening, “I know” in verse 12 lends 
emphasis to, and is balanced by, the second, ‘I know’ in verse 14, which begins a new 
thought. The pulse and feeling of these verses are typical of the resigned conclusions 
already found in 2:24. Also characteristic of Qoheleth’s thought is the way he refers to 
the joy of life in a context of uncertainty and pessimism. Notwithstanding his frequent 
pessimistic stance, it does not prevent him from making these categorical assertions. 
  In assessing the epistemological significance of these claims, it is clear that the 
object of [dy in verse 12 is but a personal statement made by Qoheleth as to how he 
thinks humans should respond as limited beings in the context of his view of the world. 
In the light of the fact that Qoheleth cannot find out what God is doing in the world he 
opts to exhort his readers to enjoy life when they can, and to accept the opportunities to 
do so as a gift from God.         
  The source of this knowledge claim is not the result of a sustained argument, 
based on factual information about life from which he draws logically arrived at 
conclusions. In terms of epistemology, Qoheleth’s invocation to joyous living is viewed 
as God’s gift does not of itself constitute ‘knowledge’ in any real sense. Quite the 
contrary, it is  (a) the result of a combination of a belief in an unpredictable God, who 
gives, often arbitrarily, to humans, (b) a view of the world and humanity often tainted 
by the author’s negative and pessimistic cast of mind, and (c) a common-sense view that 
the best lifestyle choice is to make the most of life’s opportunities. Briefly stated, 
Qoheleth’s knowledge in 3:12-13 is well within the realm of private, religious opinion. 
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At 3:14, we have an example of a penetrating declaration about the nature of God’s 
action in the world. This is a dogmatic epistemological claim, and at the same time, a 
bold theological one. Qoheleth asserts that there is no possibility that mankind can alter 
the ways of God: the immutability of divine activity has no necessary dependence on 
the machinations of men and women. And the practical lesson that humans should learn 
from this fact is that “they should be in awe of him.”    
 The critical question that arises from the claim made in 3:14 is: what is the 
source of Qoheleth’s knowledge? In other words, how does Qoheleth “know” what he 
asserts about God is true? The fact is that the assertion or proposition which Qoheleth 
advances in 3:14 is neither an analytical statement, i.e., a self-evident truth, nor is it a 
contingent statement, i.e., an empirical proposition which requires for its validation an 
appeal to sensual experience. Rather, Qoheleth’s dogmatic assertion in this instance is 
essentially a religious, confessional statement about the nature of reality.  
 It is certainly true that Qoheleth does not explicitly cite any of the great 
traditions of Israel. And it is also true that he sometimes openly expresses pessimistic, 
skeptical, and radical opinions that are far removed from Jewish piety. But on this 
occasion he expresses a point of view very much in keeping with the teaching of 
Deuteronomy and Proverbs. We conclude, therefore, that regarding the knowledge 
claims that Qoheleth makes in this important unit - one concerning humanity, the other, 
the deity - he did not, due to the very nature of the subject matter, arrive at these 
conclusions by physical observation. 
                 8:12 
            wl $yramw   tam [r hX[ ajx rXa
           ~yhlah yaryl bwj-hyhy rXa    yna [dwy-~g yk  
              `wynplm waryy rXa 
  Though sinners do evil a hundred times and prolong their lives, yet I know that it will be  
  well with those who fear God, because they stand in fear before him, . . .  
Qoheleth’s use of the first person singular yt[dy is found for the last time in 3:14. The 
only other occurrence of Qoheleth making a personal claim to knowledge is in this 
present verse. On this occasion he employs the active participle of [dy, coupled with the 
personal pronoun yna, a combination that is a unique phenomenon in the book. It comes 
in the section 8:10-17 that introduces the problem of delayed punishment for evil deeds, 
which is turn encourages further villainy (vv 10-11).     
  This passage raises the issue of divine retribution. The conventional view in 
Wisdom literature emphatically believed in retribution: a good person will have long 
life and prosperity, and a bad person will be punished (in due time) and will not live 
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long. In the Old Testament, injustice does give rise to complaints similar to Qoheleth.363 
Indeed, some Wisdom texts also struggle with the problem of divine justice (cf. Ps 73 
and the Book of Job). In verse 10a it would seem that Qoheleth agrees that the wicked 
are not punished. Wickedness thrives because there is no apparent punishment for it (v 
11). Immediately following this reflection, Qoheleth confirms the core teaching of the 
Wisdom tradition (v 12).         
  It would be atypical for the radically minded sage if he left this orthodox 
teaching without further comment. This section does reveal the essentially dialectical 
nature of his writing and thought, for, with deft agility of mind he immediately adds that 
there is something amiss. Something is lbh here, and that is because the just are treated 
in life as if they were wicked, and the wicked as if they were just (v 14). The tension 
between vv 12-13 and 14 is tangible. Then virtually in the same breath, there follows 
another oscillation in his thought. The cosmic lbh theme (v 14c) is immediately 
followed by a return to the joy theme in v 15. And that positive exhortation is also 
immediately followed by a sombre assessment of man’s serious limitations in respect of 
God’s doings and actions. This is vintage Qoheleth: the juxtaposition of diverse 
viewpoints along with the triple repetition of the lbh theme (vv 10c, 14a and 14c) is a 
classic demonstration of his tortuous line of thought.364    
  How then is the declaration yna [dwy = “I know/acknowledge” to be understood in 
this context? As we have already observed in 1:17; 2:14; 3:12, 14, Qoheleth uses the 
Qal perfect form yt[dy. Is the change in verbal form in 8:12 significant?  According to 
Bo Isaksson when Qoheleth speaks of himself knowing, he uses a suffix conjugation 
form everywhere, except in 8:12. Of this form in 8:12, he writes, “The verb form speaks 
of the kind of knowledge that represented the comme il faut teaching of the sages. This 
traditional wisdom is not acquired by Qoheleth, simply taken over, as most people 
would have done.”365 On this reading, Qoheleth acknowledges the traditional belief 
about the fate of sinners and good people, but then circumvents it in verse 14. Hence, all 
                                                
  363 On this general topic see J. Crenshaw, “Popular Questioning of the Justice of God in Ancient 
Israel,” ZAW  82 (1970): 380-95. 
  364 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, refers to the fact (at 351) that the optimistic outlook evident in verses 
12-13 is sandwiched between verses 11-14, which negate the orthodox value of the former. He observes, 
“By now the text has trained the model reader to understand both statements as examples of the narrator’s 
radical subjectivity. In allowing these two observations to stand next to each other, the implied author 
alludes to the difficulty of wisdom’s task, that is, the use of human faculties of observation to come to 
certain knowledge.”  
  365 Isaksson, Studies in the Language, 67.  
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is lbh.366          
  Thus, we conclude that on this occasion also, Qoheleth’s acclaimed knowledge 
was not arrived at by observation and experience, but is the personal endorsement of a 
confessional statement of Jewish orthodox doctrine. Qoheleth is really saying that he 
“believes” that it will be well for those who stand in awe of God.  
                   11:9 
         $twrwxb ymyb $bl $byjyw $ytwdlyb rwxb xmX
          $yny[ yarmbw $bl ykrdb $lhw
              `jpXmb ~yhlah $ayby hla-lk-l[ yk [dw 
  Rejoice, young man, while you are young,      
  and let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth.    
  Follow the inclination of your heart and the desire of your eyes,    
  but know that for all these things God will bring you into judgment. 
As we have already considered this verse in chapter 5 under the sub-heading, “God as 
Judge,” we need only concentrate on the last statement of this verse in which we find a 
rare use of the imperative form of [dy. Essentially, Qoheleth is addressing this young 
man as to what God will do with reference to his present and continuing ethical 
conduct. So, in one sense this imperative form of [dy is not referring to what Qoheleth 
has observed and experienced. Since its meaning here is really futuristic, one may 
conclude that it does not carry very much epistemological import. Nonetheless, the 
learned sage comes across to the reader with a large dose of categorical assurance that 
he does ‘know’ something about God’s moral character and activity. The imperative 
form drives the message home to the reader: God will judge you. Such a clear directive 
is based on what Qoheleth claims to know.      
  Thus one might ask: how does Qoheleth know that God will judge humans, 
since the judgment of God is never articulated in detail in the monologue? God’s 
judgment, as we have remarked earlier, is something of a mystery to him. Since 
theological insight of this nature could only be instantiated by some mode of divine 
revelation – something Qoheleth never claims to have encountered - this dogmatic 
affirmation of the certainty of God’s judgment of human conduct is but another 
unsubstantiated assertion about the nature of God. The contingent proposition in 11:9c 
is therefore another knowledge claim of Qoheleth’s that has not been, nor could ever be, 
verified by an appeal to human experience. As with Qoheleth’s knowledge claim in 
                                                
  366 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, comments (at 291), “Thus a gap is opened up in the text between 
what Qohelet observed and what he knows. The gap represents the immense struggle within Qohelet: how 
does one resolve the contradiction between what one observes and what one “knows”?” 
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8:12, so here in 11:9, the source of this knowledge and certainty about God’s judgment 
has no empirical warrant, but is a clear endorsement of transmitted traditional belief.  
6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we were concerned to discover what Qoheleth claimed to know by 
examining his use of the verb [dy = “to know.” At first blush this verb inherently has 
great empirical significance. But it was found that Qoheleth used this particular verb on 
eight different occasions in contexts in which he personally was not asserting any 
personal knowledge as such. His ‘knowing’ in these instances were of a very general 
nature, either mere private opinion or commonly accepted assumptions.   
  Moreover, Qoheleth’s use of [dy in the context of death, at 6:5 and 9:5, is quite 
extraordinary. The epistemic claims that he makes concerning the status of the dead are 
claims that no human being on earth could possibly acquire by observation or personal 
experience. Such claims lack any credible evidential basis. Furthermore, what is really 
astonishing about the contents of 6:1-6 is that this unit immediately follows 5:17-19 [ET 
5:18-20] one of the key joy passages in the book. Here we have irony and ambiguity in 
equal measure.          
 When we turned to consider Qoheleth’s dogmatic claims to knowledge in 1:17; 
2:14; 3:12; 3:14; 8:12, and 11:9 we found these provided more fruitful potential from an 
empirical perspective. In chapter 3 we outlined the nature of knowledge as justified true 
belief, that is to say, for one to have knowledge one has to believe some state of affairs 
to be true, and in addition, there must be good reason [evidence, warrant, justification] 
to hold that epistemic claim in question. We added one caveat: there should be no 
defeating propositions to the justification of that belief. We also distinguished between 
“I know that,” and “I know how to” propositions. This distinction is not found explicitly 
expressed in Qoheleth’s thought, but two examples of the “know how to” statements 
can be found (i.e., by implication) though they are somewhat incidental. 
  6:8b And what do the poor have who know how to conduct themselves before the living? 
  10:15 The toils of fools wears them out, for they do not even know [how to] find the way to 
   town.  
For our purpose, the above-mentioned dogmatic six statements are more significant in 
that they fall into the former category of “I know that . . .” propositions. In summary 
form these are: 
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  1:17 I know that this also is but a chasing after the wind . . . 
  2:14 Yet I know that the same fate befalls all of them . . . (referring to the wise and the fools) 
  3:12 I know that there is nothing better for them than to be happy . . . 
  3:14 I know that whatever God does endures forever; nothing can be added to it . . . 
  8:12 Yet I know that it will be well with those who fear God . . . 
  11:9 but [I] know that for all these things God will bring you into judgment.367 
It is an interesting fact that the topics touched on in these claims are all crucially 
important in Qoheleth’s thought:         
   (i)    the judgment of God (11:9)     (ii)   the fear of God (8:12) 
  (iii)  the joy theme (3:12)         (iv)  the universality of death (2:14) 
  (v)   the hebel theme (1:17)368         (vi)  the absolute sovereignty of God (3:14) 
Another interesting facet of Qoheleth’s language is the fact that the Hebrew term tm,a/ = 
“truth,” does not occur in the words attributed to him in the monologue, though the 
phrase tm,a? yreb.di = “words of truth,” is found in the epilogue; however, this refers to the 
quality of Qoheleth’s scribal activity and comes from a third hand. A further 
observation about Qoheleth’s language is that the Hebrew word for “belief” in the 
cognitive sense is not found in the text either. It would not follow from these facts 
alone, however, that Qoheleth did not believe to be true what he claimed to know. We 
pointed this out in chapter 3 when we considered Qoheleth’s claim about God in 3:14. 
The real issue with Qoheleth’s claims, from an epistemological perspective, is the 
problem of justification.        
 It must be kept in mind, as indicated above, that Qoheleth did not approach the 
exposition of his ideas on God, humankind, and the nature of life under the sun as an 
epistemologist. It is therefore unsurprising that Qoheleth does not expressly lay bare to 
the reader his underlying assumptions about the nature of knowledge with all its many 
facets and distinctions. But there cannot be any doubt that the six dogmatic statements 
                                                
  367 While the imperative form ([dw) is used in 11:9, the meaning is clear. In using the imperative 
form Qoheleth is, in effect, making a theological knowledge claim. What he is saying is: “I know that 
God will bring you into judgment.” All italics are mine and are included for emphasis only. The NRSV 
has “perceived” as a translation of yt[dy at 1:17; 2:14. The verb does have this nuance, but I have used 
“know” to indicate Qoheleth’s personal claims to knowledge more clearly. 
  368 Strictly speaking the word lbh does not occur in 1:17. But the phrase xwr !wy[r is so very 
closely bonded in other texts with the lbh word (as at 1:14b), that its effect by association conveys the 
same negative meaning. 
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considered above, all of which touch on crucial issues, represent for him justified true 
beliefs.           
  In the conceptual framework of foundationalism, referred to at the end of the last 
chapter , it was suggested that belief in the existence of God - with all the implications 
of ethical monotheism for practical living that belief in God entailed – was the basic 
belief to which Qoheleth was unwaveringly committed. This would also account for his 
consistent belief in God as the judge of humankind, that God must be feared, and that 
God is the inscrutable sovereign creator of all that exists. The articulation of these 
epistemic claims represents crucial, indisputable facets of Qoheleth’s exposition and 
they go right to the very heart of his thought.      
 In our synopsis of epistemological theory in chapter 3 we mentioned three key 
questions:  
 (1)  What is knowledge?  
 (ii)  How can we gain knowledge? and  
 (iii) What are the limits of knowledge?       
We have already considered (i) and (ii). In the next chapter we will examine what 
Qoheleth has to say about this last question and it will be found that there is a huge 
contrast between what we have traversed already concerning his epistemic claims, and 
what he claims that humans do not know. This raises further interesting questions from 
an epistemological perspective: how did Qoheleth come to know that his fellow humans 
were so cognitively limited? What were his sources of these claims?  To these topics we 
now turn in our next chapter.                       
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PART 3.   QOHELETH’S USE OF THE VERBS  [dy AND  acm 
 
Chapter 7: The Verb [dy = “to know”  (Part B) 
 
7.1 Introduction: The Rhetorical Question 
It has been noted by various scholars how Qoheleth employs a wide variety of literary 
techniques in his writing style. We have already drawn attention to the fact that verbal 
repetition is a dominant characteristic of the book, a device that Qoheleth employs to 
great effect.369 It was also noticed how the role of ambiguity in the book’s language is 
evident from the opening verses.370 In fact, Doug Ingram has claimed that Ecclesiastes 
is ambiguous by design and that this ambiguity is a deliberative didactic device 
employed by Qoheleth.371 There is much evidence to support this view.   
 Izak Spangenberg, on the other hand, believes that, “Qohelet does not merely 
contain loose ironic statements, but that the entire book reflects an ironic tone.”372 
Several other scholars also hold that Ecclesiastes is a carefully crafted document that is 
laden with ironic turns.373 And according to Bartholomew, “Ecclesiastes is in this sense 
an ironic exposure of an empiricist epistemology as always leading one to a hebel 
conclusion.”374            
 These observations have some merit in explaining the peculiarities of Qoheleth’s 
literary creation, but Qoheleth’s literary toolbox contains many other devices that were 
                                                
  369 See C. G. Bartholomew, “Qoheleth in the Canon?!”, 4-20, who rightly stresses (at 15) this 
feature. This is a major theme in Addison Wright’s much-cited article on the structure of the book, “The 
Riddle of the Sphinx: The Structure of the Book of Qoheleth,” CBQ 30 (1968): 313-34. 
  370 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, speaks of  “Ecclesiastes as a Rhetoric of Ambiguity,” 126-32.  
    371 Ingram, Ambiguity in Ecclesiastes.  For further elaboration on this notion see his “The Riddle 
of Qohelet and Qohelet the Riddler,” JSOT  37 (2013): 485- 509. Cf. also Wilson, “Artful Ambiguity,” 
357-65. 
  372 I. J. J. Spangenberg, “Irony in the Book of Qohelet,” JSOT  72 (1996): 57-69 (at 69). See also 
his interesting article, “Jonah and Qohelet: Satire versus Irony,” OTE  9 (1996): 491-511. This is a 
comparative study in which Spangenberg states (at 501), “The Book of Qohelet is one of the most 
dominant ironic writings in the Old Testament.” 
  373 See E. M. Good, Irony in the Old Testament (2d ed. Bible & Literature Series 3; Sheffield: 
Almond Press, 1981), 168-95; T. Polk, “The Wisdom of Irony: A Study of Hebel and its Relation to Joy 
and Fear of God in Ecclesiastes,” SBT 6 (1976): 3-17; H. Fisch, “Qohelet: A Hebrew Ironist,” 158-78; C. 
J. Sharp, “Ironic Representation, Authorial Voice, and Meaning in Qohelet,” BI 12  (2004): 37-68. 
  374 Bartholomew, “Qoheleth in the Canon?!” 15.  
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at his command. One such, for which he shows a particular fondness, is the rhetorical 
question. “The rhetorical questions permit Qoheleth to highlight once more human 
impotence when it comes to the grand question of life both present and future.”375  
7.2 Qoheleth’s use of the rhetorical question [dwy ym = Who knows? 
We have thus far examined Qoheleth’s general knowledge claims as well as his more 
personal dogmatic claims where the verb [dy was used. By way of contrast, it now is 
time to consider what can only be described as the most directly engaging technique 
which an author can ply on his readers: the use of the rhetorical question. Its main effect 
is to suddenly draw readers into the writer’s world thereby making them intimate 
participants in the author’s discourse. Qoheleth utilizes this literary stratagem to telling 
effect.           
  The interrogative [dwy ym occurs ten times in the Old Testament. James Crenshaw 
points out that the presence of the rhetorical question in the Old Testament naturally 
divides into two distinct groups when viewed from the standpoint of alternative 
outcomes.376 Five of them leave a door open to possible responses that will change the 
situation for human good, (2 Sam 12:22; Joel 11:14; Jonah 3:9; Esth 4:14; Ps 90:11). 
For example, in Jonah 3:9 the King of Nineveh calls the people to repentance: “Who 
knows, God may yet repent and turn from his fierce anger, so that we do not perish.” A 
similar use is found in Joel 2:14 which also involves repentance. The remaining five 
examples seem to assume a closed door to any positive response: Eccl 2:19; 3:21; 6:12; 
8:1, and Prov 24:21-22.        
 For Qoheleth, [dwy ym serves a very specific purpose for in all four instances the 
expected answer is negative. In Crenshaw’s terminology, Qoheleth’s use of this 
particular rhetorical question, “. . . functions overwhelmingly as an expression of 
skepticism. The emphasis falls on an absence of knowledge, and “who knows?” is a 
denial that anyone can achieve information in the area under consideration.”377 Whether 
this claim is correct or not depends on how one defines “scepticism.” (We will briefly 
address the question of definition later in this chapter).    
  The first instance of this interrogative appears in 2:19. In the immediate context, 
                                                
 
  375 Ogden, Qoheleth, 104. 
  376 Crenshaw, “[dwy ym in the Hebrew Bible,” VT 36 (1986): 274-88 (at 274). 
  377 Crenshaw, “[dwy ym in the Hebrew Bible,” 278. 
	   144	  
Qoheleth is concerned with the problem of succession. His mind is deeply troubled by 
the disagreeable prospect that all his business assets will be inherited by someone else 
coming after him. The identity of the person(s) to take up the reins after him could well 
be unknown to him. So he ponders:- 
                 2:19
             lks wa hyhy ~kxh [dwy ymw 
   . . . and who knows whether they will be wise or foolish?  
This rhetorical question is actually an affirmation that nobody knows who will inherit 
this man’s property, least of all Qoheleth himself. He simply does not know whether his 
successor will be wise or not. This reflection leads him to exclaim in 2:19b, lbh hz-~g, 
which for Qoheleth is a depressing business. As with so many of Qoheleth’s 
observations and reflections, there is a strong hint of irony here. The programmatic 
question in 1:3 is very much in the forefront of Qoheleth’s mind. He simply sees no 
lasting advantage (!wrty) to his lifetime of toil.      
  Qoheleth’s cosmic theme returns again in 3:19b; this time he contemplates that 
there is no difference between humans and animals at death. All go to the one place and 
turn to dust again. Then he moves into reflective mode. 
                 3:21 
                           hl[ml ayh hl[h ~dah ynb xwr [dwy ym
         `#ral hjml ayh tdryh hmhbh xwrw   
 Who knows whether the human spirit goes upward and the spirit of animals goes downward 
  to the earth? 
As in 2:19 the expression [dwy ym, is equivalent to saying, “No one knows.” There is a 
possibility that Qoheleth was engaging with contemporaries who claimed that humans 
enjoy a favourable status after death. If this is so, then Qoheleth rejects any view that 
claimed some kind of differentiation between animals and humans, as applied to 
“upwards” and “downwards” terminology.378 Ogden explains, “The significance if the 
phrase ‘going up’ is presumably that it mirrors the notion that the divine dwelling place 
is in the heavens, while the abode of the dead is portrayed as ‘downwards’ and away 
from God.”379 Whatever the reality, for Qoheleth, his use of the interrogative effectively 
puts a damper on such speculation: he simply shrugs his shoulders and says, “Who 
knows?”               
                                                
  378 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 37. 
  379 Ogden, Qoheleth, 67. 
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                          6:12a 
         ~yyxb ~dal bwj-hm [dwy-ym yk
        lck ~X[yw   wlbh yyx-ymy rpsm 
  For who knows what is good for mortals while they live the few days of their vain life,  
    which they pass like a shadow?  
Qoheleth again poses his testing question in the context of human weakness and 
ignorance (vv 10-12). These verses seem to have little connection with the surrounding 
material.380 In the preceding unit (6:9) we have Qoheleth’s favourite refrain, xwr tw[rw 
lbh hz-~g. Now at the beginning of the second half of the book, there is a repeated 
emphasis on what humans cannot know, cannot tell, and cannot discover.     
 Seow argues that the first literary unit of this second half of the book extends 
from 6:10 to 7:14. There is a theological introduction, 6:10-12, and a theological 
conclusion at 7:13-14, which frames a series of proverbial-type sayings from 7:1-12.381 
These sayings concentrate on what is “good” or “better.” Both the introduction and the 
conclusion lay stress on human limitations and ignorance over against God’s 
determinations and his incomprehensibility.       
 This rhetorical question, ~dal bwj-hm [dwy-ym yk touches on a major concern in 
Wisdom literature: What is good for humans? Again, with the negative tone of this 
pointed question, Qoheleth’s anticipated answer is negative: no one knows. In this verse 
he presents his readers with a robust statement of human finitude. Not only is human 
experience limited, the extent of human knowledge and ability is also extremely finite. 
Interestingly the use of lbh as applied to human life, the imagery of the passing shadow, 
with further emphasis on human life condensed into a few days, hammers home the 
ephemerality of life under the sun. The negative mood that laces this rhetorical question 
is one of resigned pessimism.         
                     8:1a 
                       rbd rXp [dwy ymw ~kxhk ym 
 Who is like the wise man? And who knows the interpretation of a thing? 
 Both the interpretation and the immediate connection of 8:1 within the immediate 
literary context throw up a difficult interpretational crux.382 Some scholars believe that 
                                                
  380 D. Michel, Untersuchungen, 159-65, admits that most scholars see 6:10-12 as a unit, though 
he proceeds to argue that it coheres with 6:1-9. 
  381 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 241. 
  382 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, comments thus (at 128), “This verse presents almost insuperable 
difficulties to the interpreter with regard both to its intrinsic meaning and its connections with its 
context.”  
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8:1 (or at least 8:1a) belongs to the previous section, 7:23-29.383 Others hold that 8:1 
begins the section 8:1-17.384 It is also possible to hold that 8:1 stands as an exclamation 
between two larger units.385 Realistically, there are two clear possibilities. First, if we 
read 8:1 as introducing the following unit, verses 2-9, in giving an outline of traditional 
court wisdom, then one must learn to unquestionably obey one’s superiors and obey the 
rules.            
 On the other hand, I favour the view that 8:1 should be read in the context of 
8:1-17, which ends with an attack by Qoheleth on those who claim to know what they 
cannot know. Therefore, the opening and closing words of Chapter 8 form an inclusio 
that in essence forthrightly lays out the boundaries of human knowledge. In fact, the 
whole tenor of this section bears out the negative associations implied by Qoheleth’s 
piercing question: Who knows the interpretation of a thing?    
  When one moves from considering the personal dogmatic knowledge claims 
made by Qoheleth, which we considered in chapter 6, to his use of the interrogative 
pronoun with the accompanying active participle of  [dy, the contrast is at once 
immediate and typical of his unpredictable turn of mind. In total, the interrogative ym 
occurs seventeen times in Ecclesiastes, sixteen of which are used in rhetorical questions 
that imply the negative response, “no one.” Paradoxically, Qoheleth’s declares clearly 
defined limits on human knowledge, yet on certain occasions he advances very robust 
dogmatic epistemological claims about God. He shows no restraint when he claims 
concrete knowledge about God and human existence, but it seems that he does not 
accord the same cognitive understanding to his fellow humans. Indeed, as Qoheleth’s 
thought unfolds before the reader he becomes more and more dogmatically assertive 
about man’s limitations and ignorance.       
 
7.3 Man cannot know the future 
                    3:22b 
     wqlx awh-yk wyX[mb ~dah xmXy rXam bwj !ya yk ytyarw
          `wyrxa hyhyX hmb twarl wnayby ym yk 
                                                
  383 So Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, 180; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 128.  
  384 So Krüger, Qoheleth, 151, Ogden, Qoheleth, 137; Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 280; Murphy, 
Ecclesiastes, 79; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 149. 
  385 See Longman, Ecclesiastes, 208. Longman sees this verse as a sarcastic exclamation of 
frustration that stands between two segments. A. Lauha, Kohelet, thinks the verse is a gloss (at 144), but 
is uncertain as to its connection with what precedes or what follows. 
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 So I saw that there is nothing better than that all should enjoy their work, for  
 that is their lot; who can bring them to see what will be after them? 
This verse concludes the section 3:16-22, which deals with human injustice (vv. 16-18) 
and the common mortality of humans and animals (vv 19-20). The “And I saw” (better 
“And I realized”) statement at the beginning of verse 22 resonates with the carpe diem 
passages in 2:24 and 3:12, which also have the bwj !ya formula. Qoheleth also calls upon 
another of his favourite terms – qlx = “portion, lot.” The “portion” which God gives to 
humans (3:13) refers to the enjoyment in their activities (with no mention of “eating” 
and “drinking” as found in 2:24 and 3:13). Then in verse 22b, a negative tone emerges. 
Qoheleth’s emphasis on human ignorance is in keeping with his dialectic frame of 
mind, but it is, nonetheless, both striking and yet vague in its meaning.  
 The term wyrxa = “after him,” has occasioned some difficulty among scholars. 
Delitzsch holds that the term refers to what happens to a person after death.386 Murphy 
states that “what will come” refers to what will happen on earth after one’s death and 
not to the next world; cf. 6:12, “under the sun.”387 A different view has been advanced 
by E. Podechard whereby wyrxa is understood to mean what will happen in the future 
within the individual’s lifetime.388 While all three views are relevant in the book as a 
whole, in the present context, following a verse that declares human ignorance of what 
follows death, the first alternative (Delitzsch) is likely in view.389     
 On this passage, vv 16-22, Whybray comments, “Since even man’s hope of 
justice is outweighed by the certainty of death and the unlikelihood that he will be able 
to experience anything good after death, he should make the most of whatever 
possibilities for a good life come his way in this world.”390 I agree with E. Lee that the 
“joy passages” have to be taken seriously, even though they are, in the main, surrounded 
                                                
 386 Delitzsch, Biblischer Commentar, 273. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, writes that the ending on 
wyrxa may be a petrified (archaic) suffix on an adverb (“afterward”), but it is more likely an ellipsis for 
“after his death.” (at 105). According to J. Lloyd, An Analysis of the Book of Ecclesiastes, the term 
means, “what is in the future.” (At 53). 
 387 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 37. So also Michael A. Eaton, Ecclesiastes (Tyndale Old Testament 
Commentaries 18. 1983. Repr. Nottinginham/Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 103. 
 388 Podechard, Lˋ Ecclésiastes, 317-19. See Fox, Qoheleth, 199, for a discussion of the issue. 
Barton, Ecclesiastes, observes, “It is too great a refinement to try to determine, as some have done, 
whether Qoheleth refers to man’s ignorance of what will happen on earth after him, or to an entire lack of 
knowledge after death.” (At 110).  
 389 Fox , A Rereading, 217. Lohfink, Qoheleth, believes that wyrxa does not mean specially “after 
death in another world,’ but simply “later.” He concludes that this seems to be directed at some of 
Qoheleth’s contemporaries whose hopes were for a “portion” that awaited them “later” beyond death. (At 
68). 
 390 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 80.  
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by an aura of negativity and pessimism.391 As Salyer has so aptly noted concerning the 
first three “joy passages,” their use “. . . in the space of just over 20 verses is a way of 
front-loading the theme for the central part of Qoheleth’s discourse, making sure that 
the reader has been duly trained to answer Qoheleth’s rhetorical questions with the 
appropriate carpe diem answer.”392 Thus we may conclude that the interrogative in 
verse 22b anticipates a negative response: “no one can enable him to see,” which 
reflects the negative answer of verse 21. In this instance, Qoheleth’s predilection for 
emphasizing “man’s ignorance of the future” is not in any sense a radical interpretation 
of any wisdom precept but a well-recognized observation in Wisdom literature and in 
the Old Testament generally. 
                 6:12b  
                     `XmXh txt wyrxa hyhy-hm ~dal dygy-ym lXa 
 For who can tell them what will happen after them under the sun? 
The first question in this sentence was considered above, now again in 6:12b Qoheleth 
picks up a theme that resonates throughout the monologue: mankind’s inability to 
discern what will happen in the future. As in verse 12a, Qoheleth’s probing question 
anticipates a negative response. Not only does no one know what is good for 
humankind (verse 12a), no one can tell man what will happen on earth after he is gone 
(verse 12b).           
 The contrast between Qoheleth’s attitude to the injustices of his time and the 
transforming power of the prophetic word of prophets such as Isaiah, Amos, Micah and 
Hosea, is most remarkable. In this connection, Qoheleth “shows both how profoundly 
he differs from the prophets whose entire purpose it was to make known God’s will for 
the present and the future and also how his book differs from apocalyptic literature, the 
purpose of which was to make known what will happen in the future.”393  
 For Qoheleth at any rate, man cannot know the future under the sun because life 
is lbh (verse 12a). Nor does Qoheleth know anything about an afterlife. All this is 
because God made it incomprehensibly so. As far as Qoheleth was concerned, it appears 
                                                
 391 Lee, The Vitality of Enjoyment, esp. 123-139. 
 392 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 304.  
 393 Loader, Ecclesiastes, 73. In Leo Perdue’s view, “Wisdom and Apocalyptic: The Case of 
Qohelet,” in Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the Biblical Tradition (ed. F. 
García Martínez: BETL 168; Leuven, University Press, 2003), 231-58, “Qohelet strongly opposed much 
of the teachings of the traditional sages, and he was strongly against the major themes of the apocalyptic, 
including especially knowledge of divine character and activity, eschatological judgement of the 
righteous and the wicked and life after death.” (At 251). 
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that the futuristic, eschatological proclamations of classic Old Testament prophecy 
(prefaced by the words, “Thus says the Lord”) had no currency in either the mind or the 
experience of this learned sage. It would appear that, for him, the voice of prophecy was 
now silent.      
                         7:14 
    hz-tm[l hz-ta ~g har h[r ~wybw bwjb hyh hbwj ~wyb
      `hmwam wyrxa ~dah acmy alX trbd-l[ ~yhlah hX[ 
 In the day of prosperity be joyful, and in the day of adversity consider; God has made the  
 one as well as the other, so that mortals may not find out anything that will come after 
 them.  
We considered 7:14 in chapter 4, but under the present heading the emphasis is, once 
again, on man’s ignorance of the future (verse 14c). In verse 14a human experience is 
viewed in two categories: hbwj = “good,” and h[r = “misfortune, evil, adversity.” This is 
how the sages assessed the realities of life. Here again, Qoheleth emphasizes the 
dialectical nature of God’s sovereign activity by employing ~g har, but his call to enjoy 
the good times in life is in keeping with the spirit of the other “joy passages.” As 
Longman puts it,  “Qoheleth advises his listeners to enjoy themselves on a good day, 
while making the best of a bad day. God made both, and no one can change what God 
has done.”394 Or as Barton has it, “God has so mingled good and evil that man cannot 
tell what the future will be.”395       
 Kathleen Farmer comments that in 3:22 and 6:12 Qoheleth merely questioned 
the possibility of our knowing what comes after us under the sun. “Here in 7:14 he 
asserts that God deliberately keeps us from such knowledge.”396 Certainly in the 
presence of God’s mysterious activity humans are impotent. Since man cannot contend 
with God (6:10), and is unable to straighten what has been made crooked (1:15a), the 
reader is enjoined to act wisely within the boundaries set by a sovereign God.397 
  There is an alternative translation for the last clause in the Vulgate: “that man 
may not find just complaint against him.” (Cf. similar reading in Symmachus).398 It is 
not clear, as Crenshaw has pointed out, how this reading improves the meaning of this 
verse, ‘for the bewildering array of good and evil hardly prevents human beings from 
                                                
 394 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 192. 
 395 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 141. 
 396 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, 177. 
 397 The term wyrxa = “after him,” which occurs in 3:22 and 6:12, refers to what will be in this 
world. So Barton, Ecclesiastes, 141; Ogden, Qoheleth, 121; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 240, et al.  
 398 See Whitley, Koheleth, 66, for discussion.   
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finding fault with the creator.’399 But according to Murphy this rendering yields better 
sense as it suits the style of Qoheleth’s understanding of God who is beyond human 
calculation. ‘There may be a certain implicit irony here: as if God were keeping human 
beings off balance by an erratic performance.’400       
                8:6-7 
           jpXmw t[ Xy   #px-lkl yk  6
                   `wyl[ hbr ~dah t[r-yk 
                            hyhyX-hm   [dy wnnya-yk  7
                 `wl dygy ym  hyhy rXak yk 
 For every matter has its time and way, although the troubles of mortals lie heavy upon  
 them. Indeed, they do not know what is to be, for who can tell them how it will be? 
Moving on to 8: 6-7, these two verses comprise four clauses each of which is introduced 
by the particle yk that have occasioned some scholarly comment.401 Chapter 8:2-5a 
offers advice on matters relating to surviving in the royal court. Qoheleth concludes by 
confirming that the wise man will know the time and the way (verse 5b). His reference 
to t[ echoes the famous poem about appropriate “times” in 3:2-8.     
 In verse 5b Qoheleth sets forth a commonplace dictum of traditional wisdom, 
but he cites this only to attack it.402 The first half of the verse 6 repeats the statement in 
verse 5b about jpXmw t[ Xy (cf. 3:1). Then in verses 6-9, as Whybray has noted, 
Qoheleth radically reinterprets the phrase in terms that he expresses elsewhere, 
especially in 3:1-15.403 His conviction is that there is a right time for everything but 
such times are only known to God who has concealed such information from his 
creatures (verse 7). Qoheleth again drives home his negative message about human 
ignorance of the future.404 As Salyer observes, “Verses 6-7 present yet another blank to 
                                                
 399 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 139.  
 400 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 66. 
  401 See Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 1, 106-7; Michel, Untersuchungen, 201-3, for 
discussion. 
  402 Fox, A Rereading, disagrees. He states (at 279), “In insisting that the future is hidden, Qohelet 
is using, not challenging, traditional wisdom. Proverbs too insists that man cannot know the morrow 
(27:1; cf. Sir 11:19), and this is a commonplace of Egyptian Wisdom. But Qohelet alone seems oppressed 
by the ignorance.” 
  403 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 132.  
 404 According to Barton, Ecclesiastes, the claim that no man knows in verse 7, “. . . is not as in 3:22 and 
6:12 simply a reference to the fact that the future is unknown, but to the fact that no one ever knows what an 
irresponsible despot will do.”  So also Enns, Ecclesiastes, 90. E. H Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, gives two possible 
interpretations (at 177), “(i) The evil of the man (of the oppressor) is heavy upon him (the oppressed); (ii) though 
there is a time and a judgment, yet the misery of man is great, because (as in the next verse) he knows not when it 
is to come.” 
	   151	  
the reader. Verse 6 reminds the narratee/reader of the limits of time broached in 3:1-8. 
Verses 6b-8 pull from the text’s horizon of values the theme of humanity’s 
epistemological limits (verse 7) and our common mortality (verse 8).”405 
                 10:14b 
               hyhyX-hm ~dah [dy-al
                 `wl dygy ym wyrxam hyhy rXaw
     
 No one knows what is to happen, and who can tell anyone what the future holds? 406 
Verses 12-15 form a sub-unit with no obvious connection with 10:1-11. The contents of 
10:1-20 are very similar to the traditional wisdom sayings in Proverbs (cf. 10:8, 21; 
15:2, 7; 18:7; Sir 20:13; 21:15-17). This brief collection of proverbs in verses 10:12-15 
denigrates folly. What is especially interesting, as Enns has pointed out regarding the 
meaning of verse 14b, (bearing in mind the near parallels in 6:12; 7:14; 8:7, and 9:1 and 
5) is that, “What is different here is that in these other passages ignorance of the future 
is not restricted to fools, whereas here it is.”407 The object of [dy is hyhyX-hm = “what is to 
be” - the unknown future. Qoheleth observes that self-destructing fools do not know 
when to shut up (verses 12b-14a). Then follows the declaration that no man knows what 
will be after him, which is consolidated by an incisive rhetorical question. And the 
anticipated answer is, “No man knows.” Again it is evident that this formulaic repetition 
is a trademark of Qoheleth’s rhetoric. 
                        11:1-2 
         ~ymh ynp-l[ $mxl xlX  1 
           `wnacmt ~ymyh brb-yk
                
           hnwmXl ~gw   h[bXl qlx-!t  2                                      
        `#rah-l[ h[r hyhy-hm    [dt al yk 
 1 Send out your bread upon the waters, for after many days you will get it back.  
 2 Divide your means seven ways, or even eight, for you do not know what disaster  
 may happen on earth. 
These verses (each commencing with an imperative) announce a new literary unit, 
contrasting with the subject matter and tone of 10:1-20. There is general agreement that 
                                                
  405 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 349. 
  406 Some Hebrew MSS, LXX, Symm, Syr, SyrH, and Vulg read hyhXm for hyhyX-hm, thus shifting 
from the future to the past tense. Most scholars follow the MT, which is almost certainly correct. The use 
of the imperfect [dy-al  makes it unlikely that the past is meant since people do know what has happened  
(so Seow, Ecclesiastes, 319). According to Whybray, Ecclesiastes, he interprets (at 156) hyhyX-hm = “what 
is to be,” as referring to future events in life, and wyrxam hyhy rXaw = “what will be after him,” as referring 
to the future after this life, as in 3:22.” But there is no reference to death in this context, wyrxam could be 
taken to mean “afterwards,” which could include the future in this life. So Fox, A Rereading, 307. 
  407 Enns, Ecclesiastes, 102. 
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these two verses belong together, and grammatically and syntactically they attract few 
problems. However, their interpretation, particularly verse 1, has occasioned 
considerable debate. Verse 1a is especially well known in popular parlance, but what do 
the words, “Send forth your bread upon the waters, . . .” mean?    
 Various proposals have been made. Some scholars think that the sage is 
encouraging investment in maritime trade;408 others see in these words a commendation 
of philanthropy.409 This approach has in its favour a parallel in the late Egyptian 
Instruction of Ankhsheshonq: “Do a good deed and throw it into the river; when this 
dries up you shall find it.”410  In other words, one should do a good deed and forget it, 
then when times are hard, such an act will pay off, perhaps in an unexpected way.  
 Whatever the exact meaning Qoheleth had in mind, the crucial clause follows in 
verse 2b, “. . . for you do not know what misfortune may occur on earth.” The 
uncertainties may lie in one’s favour (verse 1), but even if one takes necessary 
precautions, such careful strategies cannot guarantee security (verse 2b). Neither the 
outcome, nor the effectiveness of one’s plans can be taken for granted in an uncertain 
world.           
  From an epistemological viewpoint, it is very significant, as Ogden has 
observed, that “the concepts of ‘finding’ and ‘not knowing’ are programmatic and 
central to the thought of vv. 1-2.”411 [In the chapter to follow we will be addressing 
these topics, especially with regard to Qoheleth’s use of the verb acm = “to find”]. In 
these two verses, especially in 2b, as far as Qoheleth is concerned, the limits of human 
cognition have been firmly set.    
 
                11:6 
                   $dy xnt-la br[lw $[rz-ta [rz rqbb
                hz-wa hzh rXky hz ya [dwy $nya yk
                  `~ybwj dxak ~hynX-~aw 
  In the morning sow your seed, and at evening do not let your hands be idle; for you do not 
  know which will prosper, this or that, or whether both alike will be good. 
                                                
  408 So Gordis, Koheleth, 329-30; Eaton, Ecclesiastes, 159-60; Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 158-59; 
Longman, Ecclesiastes, 256; Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 337; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 178-79; Murphy, 
Ecclesiastes, 106-7, and others. A. H. McNeile, An Introduction to Ecclesiastes (Cambridge: CUP, 1904), 
states (at 84) that, “There can be little doubt that the words refer to trading – to those “who do business in 
great waters.”  
  409 So Seow, Ecclesiastes, 335; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 181; Krüger, Qoheleth, 191-93. 
  410 Lichtheim, AEL, 111, 174. 
  411 Ogden, Qoheleth, 200. 
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With this verse, Qoheleth draws this segment to a conclusion. Following on from 11:1-
2, the sayings in 11:3-5 deal with rain, falling trees, sowing and gestation. In verse 6 
Qoheleth returns to the theme of sowing (cf. verse 4). In fact verse 6 is similar both in 
form and meaning to verses 1-2.412 Gordis believes verse 6 is a warning against 
indolence;413 certainly it is an exhortation to be active.414 But Qoheleth goes further than 
mere exhortation as he provides a motive for action in 6b.       
  Some scholars have taken the words, Sow your seed, to refer to sexual 
procreation. H. Graetz, following the Talmud and Midrash (Yebamoth, 62b), takes it to 
mean “Beget your children in youth and even to old age, whether in or out of 
wedlock.”415 More recently, Anthony Perry has taken a similar line of thought.416 Both 
views are possible, but on balance the context here is principally agricultural.417 A. D. 
Power suggests that “morning and evening” in verse 6 are to be taken figuratively, i.e., 
from youth to old age.418 I take the whole verse to be an illustration of what happens in 
the farming community. Fox takes “morning” and “evening”/ “this or that” to be a 
merism, thus including the whole day.419 But it is unlikely that sowing was to be carried 
out from morning until evening without interruption.     
  Be that as it may, the essential grammatical meaning of verse 6, closing as it 
does this unit, is clear. Notwithstanding human ignorance about life under the sun, 
especially regarding what will happen in the future, one must remain active. There is no 
point waiting around for the best moment (verse 4). Since no one knows what will 
happen in the future, one must get on with life’s activity and hard work. With this 
philosophy of life one has a better chance of good success. Verse 6, in effect, 
recapitulates the advice given in verse 1 and rounds out the teaching of this unit: despite 
human ignorance of divine mysteries (verse 5) and the impossibility of knowing what 
will happen in the future, one should compensate for this by being busy with multiple 
                                                
  412 As noted by Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 160.  
  413 For example, the imperatives in this verse, “Sow your seed,” and “let not your hand go slack” 
recall those in verses 1 and 2, “Send forth,” and “Give a portion.”  
  414 Gordis, Koheleth, 322. 
  415 Cited in Barton, Ecclesiastes, 184. 
 416 A. T. Perry, Dialogues with Kohelet: The Book of Ecclesiastes (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 161. 
  417 See Ogden, Qoheleth, 204 for further details. 
  418 Power, Ecclesiastes, 119. 
  419 Fox, A Rereading, 315.  
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activities.           
 Qoheleth’s advice is motivated by uncertainty. For him one can never know how 
things turn out; nor is it possible to understand the action of God – it is beyond human 
calculation. Yet, one cannot feel paralysed by such reflections. Despite his pessimism, 
Qoheleth is no advocate of laziness or inactivity; in this respect he stands firmly in line 
with a traditional value found in Wisdom literature. Fox succinctly sums up verse 6: “In 
structure and message, 11:6 recapitulates 11:1f. and thereby rounds out the unit with its 
central teaching: compensate for ignorance by preparing for multiple eventualities.”420 
7.4  Man cannot know what God is doing in the world   
                11: 5 
           xwrh $rd-hm [dwy $nya rXak 
            halmh !jbb ~ymc[k
              ~yhlah hX[m-ta [dt al hkk
             `lkh-ta hX[y rXa  
 Just as you do not know how the breath comes to the bones in the mother’s womb, so you 
 do not know the work of God, who makes everything. 
Seow has correctly seen this segment as another of Qoheleth’s rhetorical set-ups.421 In 
verses 3-4 the impression is given of the human ability to know. But these verses are 
surrounded by a frame of negativity in v 2 and vv 5-6, thus emphasizing human 
cognitive limitations.         
  In the interpretation of 5b the question arises: are two distinct entities referred 
to, e.g., (i) the unknown course of the wind, xwr, and (ii) the development of the human 
embryo? Since xwr means “wind” in 4a, does the meaning stay the same in 5a, or is the 
latter to be rendered life-breath? Fox opts for the latter thus giving the sense of one 
illustration.422 But as Barton points out, the phrase, lkh-ta hX[y rXa can be rendered, 
“who makes both.”423 This would give the following translation, “As you do not know 
what is the way of the wind or how the bones are formed in the mother’s womb, so you 
do not know the work of God, who does all things.”424 Either way, as Crenshaw has 
                                                
  420 Fox, A Rereading, 315. 
  421 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 344. 
 422 Fox, A Rereading, 314-15. 
  423 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 183-4. 
  424 The MT supports two illustrations, although the syntax is awkward. As Gordis argues, 
Koheleth, (at 331-32) if two illustrations are referenced here one would expect the copula waw to begin 
the clause commencing with ~ymc[k thus giving ~ymc[kw. However, parallel comparisons introduced by k 
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noted, “Emphasis certainly falls on human ignorance, whatever the number of divine 
mysteries.”425 Just as man is ignorant of the causes of wind change, so also is he 
cognitively limited in his understanding of the development of the embryo in a 
woman’s womb.          
  This is but another forceful reminder of human ignorance (temporality) in the 
face of the mystery of God’s sovereignty (eternality). Of this pericope, 11:1-6, Seow 
aptly sums it up: “Qohelet moves from the elements of nature, to the wonders of life 
coming into being, ultimately to theology: wind is unpredictable (11:4), the life-breath 
is a mystery (11:5a), and God is inscrutable (11:5a).”426 It is an undeniable fact that the 
topic of man’s ignorance in the face of a sovereign and distant God is a crucial 
characteristic of Qoheleth’s thought, especially, as we observed earlier, in the latter half 
of the book.        
7.5 Qoheleth and Scepticism     
Given that Qoheleth adamantly places these restrictions on human knowledge, there is 
much discussion in the scholarly literature in respect of Qoheleth’s alleged scepticism. 
This topic, however, runs into the same problem of definition as we found with 
“empiricism” in chapter 3. In her comprehensive study Annette Schellenberg refers to 
the lack of a definition of scepticism in Qohelethian studies.427 She admits that pinning 
down an acceptable definition is far from easy, and so her approach is to explore 
Qoheleth’s ideas as they unfold. James Crenshaw does, however, venture the following 
definition: “On the one hand, skepticism addresses itself to a specific theological 
situation; in short, it signifies a crisis of faith in God. On the other hand, the skeptic also 
isolates a wholly different kind of bankruptcy – the loss of faith in human beings.”428 
This seems a rather esoteric understanding of scepticism. W. H. U. Anderson holds 
                                                                                                                                          
without the copula waw are found in Deut 1:17 and Song of Songs 1:5. The MT is supported by the 
Targum, LXX and Vg.  
  425 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 180. 
  426 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 345-6. 
 427 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 45-50. At page 47 she is critical of Martin A. Klopfenstein, “Die 
Skepsis des Qohelet,” TZ 28 (1972): 97-109, who proceeds to discuss Qoheleth’s scepticism without 
attempting to define the term. But this critique can be applied to other commentators. However, she 
recognizes the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory definition and adopts her own solution by exploring 
Qoheleth’s ideas from which she draws her own conclusions.  
 
 428 Crenshaw, “The Birth of Skepticism in Ancient Israel,” in The Divine Helmsman: Studies on 
God’s Control of Human Events, Presented to Lou H. Silberman (ed. James L. Crenshaw and Samuel 
Sandmel; New York: Ktav, 1980), 1-19, (at 9).  
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scepticism to be, “That disposition which attacks dogmatic assertions (of truth or 
absolute knowledge) with doubt and questions.”429 This definition, like Crenshaw’s, is 
too generic and very narrowly focused. Anderson’s terminology is too limiting due to 
the very strong terms he employs, though he does catch the importance of doubt and a 
questioning spirit, which are implied in scepticism.     
 In a very insightful essay, John F. Priest accepts that scepticism is best 
understood as, “. . . an intellectually articulated challenge to the ultimate legitimations 
of society; that is, a radical questioning of the religious, philosophical or ethical 
presuppositions upon which society rests.”430 He describes how pre-Exilic life in Israel 
was undergirded by, (i) the notion that she was a covenant society living in compliance 
with divinely sanctioned customs and commandments, and (ii) a view of history that 
saw in the outworkings of history the purposeful activity of their God. These notions 
were gradually fused together over time. After the Exile, these twin themes were 
radically called into question. As Priest puts it, “This bifurcation of this fusion during 
and after the Exile opened the door to articulated Israelite skepticism . . .”431 These are 
interesting ideas but his working definition of scepticism is linked too closely to a 
religious, ethical perspective. However, when he states that the scepticism of Qoheleth 
ends as pessimism, pure and simple, I believe he is nearer the truth about Qoheleth’s 
outlook on life.432 
 It is Michael Williams who helpfully distinguishes between philosophical and 
practical scepticism.433 The philosophical sceptic holds as irrefutable the view that 
knowledge is impossible. On the other hand, the practical sceptic questions received 
opinion, and will suffer from doubt or uncertainty but can still maintain that certain 
knowledge is possible in life’s ongoing journey. Qoheleth’s epistemic claims are far 
removed from the ideas one finds in scholarly disputations relating to philosophical 
scepticism. If the description of Qoheleth as a sceptic is to hold then he could be 
                                                
 429 Anderson, “What is Scepticism and Can It Be Found in the Hebrew Bible?,” SJOT 13 (1999): 
225-57, (at 233). For a more general and useful discussion of scepticism see Michael Williams, 
“Skepticism,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 35-69.  
           
 430 Priest, “Humanism, Skepticism, and Pessimism in Israel,” AAR 36 (1968): 311-26, at 319. 
 431 Priest, “Humanism,” 321. 
 432 Priest, “Humanism,” 324. 
 433 Williams, “Skepticism,” 35.  
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appropriately viewed as a practical sceptic, as defined above.434   
 From the evidence thus far surveyed in this study, for Qoheleth certain 
knowledge is possible as he claims to have a wide-ranging knowledge about God. But 
what he does deny is that humans can have accurate knowledge in certain defined areas 
of life (examined in subsections 7.3 and 7.4 above). Qoheleth does not explicitly invite 
his readers to suspend belief, but that is what occurs when he poses four rhetorical 
questions concerning a problem of succession (2:19); the destiny of the human spirit 
after death (3:21); what is good for humans (6:12); and the problem of interpretation 
(8:1).  
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter our interest centred on three aspects of Qoheleth’s exposition: (i) his use 
of the rhetorical question, [myd ym = Who knows?, (ii) his claim that man cannot know 
the future, and (iii) his assertions that man cannot know what God is doing in the world. 
It was found that the vast bulk of this evidence came from the second half of the book 
where Qoheleth comes to adopt a more negative tone and stance as to what his fellow 
humans know, or do not know. In examining all four rhetorical questions relating to the 
verb [dy, Qoheleth’s conclusions were negative on every count. He aggressively grabs 
the attention of the reader by deploying the rhetorical question as an instrument to 
reinforce his negative outlook.      
 Under the two remaining headings Qoheleth keeps up the pressure in order “to 
accent the theme of humanity’s epistemological limitations.”435 In stating that humans 
are incapable of knowing what God is doing in the world, and in emphasizing man’s 
inability to know the future, it cannot be concluded that Qoheleth is in any meaningful 
sense a radical, unorthodox Jewish sage. The Hebrew Bible, along with extant Near 
Eastern literature, is replete with such observations concerning human finitude. In this 
respect, Qoheleth, in reaching these negative conclusions, was mainly giving vent to 
                                                
 434 For possible influences on Qoheleth see Leo G. Perdue, Wisdom Literature: A Theological 
History (Louisville: Westminster John Knox), 161-216. He holds to a third century dating for the book 
and socially situates Qoheleth in “the educated aristocracy in upper-class Jerusalem.” (at 177). He further 
states (at 184) “The philosophical tradition most akin to Qoheleth’s worldview was that of Greek 
Skepticism.”, but he does acknowledge that unlike the Greek sceptics, Qoheleth believed in the existence 
of God. Perdue makes a valiant attempt at placing Qoheleth in the larger zeitgeist of the pervasive 
influence of Hellenization. His string of rhetorical questions (at 183) to bolster his arguments sounds like 
special pleading. At one point (at 178) he claims “The joy or happiness that comprises the central 
teaching of this book is often found in Greek philosophy.” Yet no argument is presented to defend this 
assertion. That the joy theme is a central teaching of the book is a topic in much dispute among 
commentators. 
  435 The phrase is from Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 366. 
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beliefs that would have been held by many of his contemporaries.436  
 From these observations, one may ponder whether Qoheleth reached these 
conclusions about human limitations on empirical grounds? To answer this question, I 
think we need to go back to the beginning of the book. In chapter 1.1, I drew attention 
to what I believe is a very important factor in the thought of Qoheleth, namely, that his 
particular understanding of the world has a direct bearing and influence on his 
epistemology. In 1:2 we saw how the fivefold emphasis of the hebel theme was 
immediately followed by his programmatic, rhetorical question in 1:3, a question that 
was concerned with the possible profit attached to human toil. This question is not 
immediately addressed in the following verses, but in the narrative that follows in 
chapter 2 the issue surfaces about human toil and the material outcomes that may ensue 
from it. This is so much a serious predicament in the mind of Qoheleth that he repeats 
the !wrty question in 2:22, and again in 3:9.        
 In considering the experiences of Qoheleth in chapter 2, it emerged that what 
gave him particular anguish was the fact that as a man of inventive entrepreneurial 
achievement, he had accumulated a considerable personable fortune in the form of real 
estate and material possessions. This fact alone would not cause cognitive problems for 
most people. But for Qoheleth, we found that the real problem was not the amount of 
wealth he had accrued from his business ventures, with all the immense toil that was 
involved in realising it; no, it was the deeply disturbing reality attached to his own 
mortality: he did not own his property in perpetuity because on some future occasion he 
would be taken from it. The heir to his fortune might not be known to him, and could be 
a wise person or a fool, and this twin realization was like rubbing salt on the wound, as 
it were. In sum, the problem that caused Qoheleth such inner torment was the 
impossibility of outright ownership.        
 It is amazing that before Qoheleth came to properly introduce himself in 1:12 he 
gave expression to his pressing concerns at the very beginning of the book, which must 
have conveyed to his readers the huge significance he attached to these ideas, ideas and 
thoughts revolving around the key terms of lbh, lm[, and !wrty. It would be impossible 
from this point in time to know how Qoheleth’s original readers would have viewed 
                                                
 436 As Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 132-47, has amply demonstrated. He writes, “. . . 
much of what seems radical in Ecclesiastes, when it is read as part of the biblical canon, seems much less 
unusual when it is considered in the context of ancient literature more broadly.” (At 136). This is 
especially the case with the Greek lyrical poet, Theognis, some of whose sentiments are reminiscent of 
Qoheleth’s observations. Weeks goes on to observe (at 140) that “Qohelet may have seemed far from 
shockingly new and radical to the original readers of the book.” 
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Qoheleth’s attitude to human achievement and property ownership. It is doubtful if 
many people connected with his ideas. For what we find in these early expressions of 
his thought is an esoteric understanding of life that is essentially very self-centred. High 
human achievers in life would, on the whole, be only too willing for their family 
members, or relatives, to take over the reins in due time, thus sustaining the family 
enterprises for another generation. This family dimension is wholly missing in the 
sages’s outlook.437 By whatever means one may venture to account for such views in an 
acknowledged wise man (12:9), his peculiar understanding of the world is, I believe, a 
leading factor in shaping his ideas on God, human knowledge, and human achievement.
 We have surveyed a diverse range of claims that Qoheleth presents about human 
limitations concerning the future, and God’s activity in the world.  On both counts it is 
difficult to see how he could have reached these assertions by an empirical 
methodology. Thus, for example, when Qoheleth posed the rhetorical question in 6:12a, 
“Who knows what is good for mortals . . .?” he already gave the answer to it in the joy 
passage in 3:22. But Qoheleth’s advocacy to enjoy life, which he repeats at various 
intervals in the text, cannot be deemed to have an empirical basis. There is no doubt that 
he experienced pleasure in eating, drinking, and enjoying the fruits of his toil (cf. ch. 2). 
But this well meaning advice is, in essence, mere personal recommendation: in a word, 
personal opinion.          
 When Qoheleth adamantly confirms that (i) no human can know what will 
happen in the future, and (ii) humans cannot know what God is doing in the world, such 
declarations are not derived directly from sense experience. Of course, Qoheleth’s 
assertions about the future and God’s activity contrasts sharply with the claims made by 
the prophets who spoke as “Thus says the Lord.” Not only did the prophets tell 
disobedient Israel what was going to happen, they imparted knowledge to Israel 
regarding what God was going to do in the future with reference to their destiny. Divine 
disclosure, while prominent in the prophetic literature, is, as we pointed out, completely 
absent in the life of Qoheleth. In his time the authentic voice of the historic prophets 
was silent. This leaves us with one conclusion about Qoheleth’s claims about human 
limitations. He did not arrive at these conclusions via divine revelation, nor by empirical 
means, but by his own intuition; and many Old Testament writers comprehensively 
                                                
 437 Frank Zimmermann, The Inner World states (at 2) that, “All the signs point to the fact that 
Qoheleth was a married man and had a child, a son. Zimmermann’s reason for this opinion is less than 
adequate. I think that it is more likely that Qoheleth was unmarried; he appears to me that he was far too 
self-centred to be married. 
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confirmed that intuition. In brief, Qoheleth’s assertion about human limitations was 
innate, and reflected commonly held public knowledge. But what is unusual about 
Qoheleth is the very intense manner by which he expresses his epistemic claims.  
 It is now time to move forward to consider another important verb which has an 
obvious epistemological dimension, namely, the verb acm = “to find.”  
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PART 3.   QOHELETH’S USE OF THE VERBS  [dy AND  acm 
 
Chapter 8: The Verb acm = “to find” 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, and the following two, I propose to carefully consider a crucial aspect of 
Qoheleth’s epistemological methodology: his repetitive use of two very important 
verbs, which, by their very nature, have great potential in demonstrating to what, if any 
extent, he can be termed an empiricist. Unquestionably the frequent use of these two 
verbs - acm = “to find,” har = “to see,” – point to a man enamoured by experiential data. 
In this chapter, our concentration will be focused on Qoheleth’s use of acm = “to find.” 
8.2 The verb acm: 3:11       
Integral to the whole process of determining any theory of knowledge is the concept of 
“finding.” In Qoheleth’s case, we have a man who was deeply committed to an 
intensely personal quest to seek out wisdom and knowledge. And like all researchers, 
Qoheleth had a very strong sense of intellectual curiosity, of that there is no doubt.
  As already indicated in chapter 6, the verb acm occurs seventeen times in 
Ecclesiastes.438 Its equivalent in Greek is εὑρίσκω = “I find,” from which we derive the 
term “heuristic,” meaning discovering things for oneself. This verb fittingly reflects 
Qoheleth’s intellectual quest as set out in 1:17; 7:25, and 8:16. When he launches out to 
arrive at !wbXx = “the sum of things” (7:25), the verb acm would undoubtedly be central 
to his enterprise.         
  Of the seventeen instances of acm, four are not empirically significant. For 
example, in 9:10 there is the injunction, “Whatever your hand finds to do, . . .” where 
the imperfect is found (acmt). In 9:15 the assertion is made that a poor man was found 
(acm) in the city, which he eventually saved from its enemies. Then there is the well-
known instruction in 11:1 where the assurance is given that if one sends forth one’s 
bread upon the waters, in the course of time wnacmt = “you will find it.” Again the 
imperfect is used. And finally, in the epilogue, 12:10 the author, writing in the third 
person, says #px-yrbd acml tlhq Xqb = “Qoheleth sought to find pleasing words,” where 
                                                
 438 See the exhaustive study by S. Wagner, acm, in TDOT V111 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1986): 465-83. For an overview of this verb see Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 171-76. 
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the infinitive is in evidence. The remaining thirteen occurrences are all germane to our 
inquiry as to the nature of Qoheleth’s epistemology. Remarkably, nine of these thirteen 
occurrences are found in chapter 7. Of the remaining four references to acm, three are 
found in 8:17, and one in 3:11. Thus we have the following to consider: 3:11; 8:16-17, 
and 7:14439, 23-29. Epistemologically, these three passages, especially the latter, are 
crucially important in the exposition of Qoheleth’s thought.    
           
                      3:11 
            rXa ylbm ~blb !tn ~l[h-ta ~g wt[b hpy hX[ lkh-ta
                          `@ws-d[w Xarm ~yhlah hX[-rXa hX[mh-ta ~dah acmy-al 
 He made everything suitable for its time; moreover he has put eternity440 into their minds, 
 yet they cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end.   
The verb acm can, of course refer to the simple physical act of finding, as in the 
exclamation, “Look, I have found a watch!” Fox’s translation renders the meaning of 
acm as “to grasp,” and I think correctly, as in this verse acm is cognitively significant, 
i.e., it is used in its intellectual sense, meaning “to grasp, to understand.” 441 As Schoors 
has observed, this verb belongs to the semantic field of knowledge denoting research 
and experiential knowledge, especially when one considers the appropriate context of 
Qoheleth’s self-proclaimed intellectual quest.442  The simple connection of “seeking” 
and “finding” God is present in both Testaments (cf. Matt 7:7).443 The author of Isa 55:6 
                                                
 439 Chapter 7:14 was considered in chapter 4 under the sub-heading, “God as Creator,” and in 
chapter 7 under the sub-heading, “Man cannot know the Future.” In this latter case the verb acm appears 
in the Qal imperfect form.  
 440 I see no good reason to follow the NRSV here with regards to the translation of  ~l[h. This 
term is found seven times in the book: 1:4,10; 2:16; 3:11,14; 9:6; 12:5. The sense of “eternity” is found in 
the immediate context at 3:14, and throughout the book.  
  441 Fox, A Rereading, 192. See also A. Ceresko, “The Function of Antanaclasis (acm= “to reach, 
overtake, grasp”) in Hebrew Poetry, Especially in the Book of Qoheleth,” CBQ 44 (1982): 551-69. In four 
passages, 7:14; 7:23-24; 7:29 and 8:17, Ceresko suggests that acm should be taken in its intellectual sense 
“to grasp, learn, understand.” He explores the way Hebrew poets and Qoheleth subtly exploit the 
ambiguity inherent in this verb through the rhetorical figure of antanaclasis, i.e., the repetition of the same 
word with a different meaning. Ceresko claims quite a range of meanings for acm: (arrive, reach, overtake, 
seize, grasp, understand, find, acquire). Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, has pointed out (at 176), 
that Ceresko’s overall thesis of a very expansive semantic range for acm is based more on the putative 
translation of Ugaritic cognate verbs rather than on semantic analysis. However, I do agree with 
Ceresko’s claim that in four cited passages above, acm has the meaning, “grasp, understand” in the 
intellectual sense.  
 442 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 172. 
 443 See the interesting article on “searching” and “finding” by H. Spieckermann, “Suchen und 
Finden: Kohelets kritische Reflexionen,” Bib 79 (1998): 304-331. Spieckermann’s study is an overview 
of Old Testament texts dating from the time of the exile, related to the issue of searching and finding God 
and noting the use of the verbs acm and Xqb in the process. For example, in Deut 4 any one who searches 
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cautioned his readers to “Seek the Lord while he may be found, . . .” which implies that 
there is a fitting time (Eccl 3:1-8) for the Lord to be found: he may be found, but he 
may not. Job was also in some difficulty about the hiddenness of God, according to 
Zophar in his speech in 11:7. And the prophet Hosea warned the people that they could 
seek the Lord, but he would not be found (5:6). These few examples point to the fact 
that Qoheleth was not unique in his finite understanding of God’s nature and activity in 
the world.           
 The unique phrase acmy-al rXa ylbm = “yet they cannot find out . . .” presents 
another crux interpretum.444  It is important how this is interpreted, as Ogden has 
observed, due to the fact that it determines how one views the divine actions.445 Does 
this phrase introduce a purpose clause, or a result clause? If it is the former, then since 
God has placed ~l[h in the human heart, humans would be unable to understand God’s 
activity. If, however, the latter understanding is to be preferred, reference is being made 
to the limitations of human knowledge.446 I am persuaded that the phrase should be 
rendered as a purpose clause thus meaning that it was God’s intention that man would 
never fully be able to comprehend his activity, past, present or future. This 
interpretation tends to fit in better with Qoheleth’s cutting claims elsewhere about 
man’s epistemological limitations and the actions of an inscrutable deity.   
 This puts Qoheleth in a very different position when one compares his negative 
knowledge claims with those of the prophets when they spoke as “Thus says the Lord.” 
There is a vast epistemological chasm between Qoheleth and the knowledge claims 
made in Isaiah 46:10 where the Lord declares “the end from the beginning and from 
ancient times things not yet done.”447 On Qoheleth’s part, the epistemological deficit is 
                                                                                                                                          
for the Lord will find him, while in Ezekiel 34, God goes in search for man. Spieckermann demonstrates 
that in these and related texts, to search and find God are premised on the assumption that God allows 
himself to be found. See also Wagner, TDOT, 477-78, where he states that later Wisdom Literature 
reflects on the possibility and impossibility of finding God, most notably in Job and Ecclesiastes. 
 444 For a discussion of this phrase see Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 1, 147-48. 
 445 Ogden, Qoheleth, 60. 
 446 LXX, Vulg, Targ, and Syr render the phrase as a result or final clause. Crenshaw, 
Ecclesiastes, (at 98) suggests that there appears to be paronomasia between ylbm and  ~blb, which might 
account for Qoheleth’s selection of this rare negative particle. He adopts the purpose clause theory, 
rendering the phrase, “because of which . . .” By contrast, Ogden, Qoheleth, 60, adopts the latter 
approach, as does Batholomew, Ecclesiastes, 167, et al. The diverse responses of various scholars to 
difficult interpretational issues in Qoheleth is but a reflection of their overall stance as to whether 
Qoheleth was an optimist (so Ogden, Bartholomew, Lauha, Whybray, Fredericks, Lohfink ), or a 
pessimist (so Crenshaw, Longman, Anderson). 
  447 Similar statements are found in Isa. 41:22-23, 26; 42:9; 44:7-8; 48:3. 
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staggering in its negativity by comparison, running counter to much of the Old 
Testament affirmations of faith and to the revelation of God to Israel. Leo Perdue’s 
summation is notable in this context.  
 The inability to discern divine activity undercuts both the theologies of salvation history and 
 cultic ritual, which represented and reactualized in sacred drama deeds of divine redemption. 
 And the failure to perceive a coherent pattern for historical time, so evident in prophetic and 
 historical texts in Israel, results in the fragmentation of experience and the loss of collective 
 and individual identity. The human quest for identity and self understanding within a 
 common tradition requires the integration of temporal phases (past, present, and future) as a 
 unity. . . . . With the loss of memory, experience does not achieve unity through time. 
 Rather, experience fragments into disconnected pieces of isolated perceptions. All that remains 
 is the immediacy of the present moment.448 
This assessment does bring out something alluded to earlier to the effect that Qoheleth 
was regarded as something of a loner, a man disengaged from the core sinews of 
Israel’s statehood, history and institutions. Hartmut Gese has perceptively observed 
“According to Koheleth, the essence of the person is determined not only in that one 
perceives oneself as an individual but also in that one sets oneself against world affairs 
as a stranger to the world.”449 When one considers the self-absorption of Qoheleth, 
which is evident in the “I” narrative throughout the monologue, it is easy to envisage 
Qoheleth as a man who is disenchanted, detached and alienated.450   
  In verse 11a God’s creative activity is acknowledged, ~lw[ is placed in man’s 
heart (11b), and the consequence is that man cannot comprehend the nature of divine 
activity. Francis Holland takes ~lw[ to mean “darkness/ignorance” and interprets verse 
11 in the fuller context of 3:1-15 as follows: “In the face of this deliberate withholding 
of ontological knowledge (this heart of darkness) which overshadows the Time Poem, 
humanity has little choice but to seize the moment (carpe diem), which itself is at the 
disposal of God who may deny it . . .”451 This is a perceptive interpretation since it 
seeks to put Qoheleth’s claim in 11c into its fuller context, namely, the poem on 
                                                
  448 Perdue, Wisdom and Creation: The Theology of Wisdom Literature (Nashville: Abungdon, 
1994), 217-18. 
 449 H. Gese, “The Crisis of Wisdom in Koheleth,” in Theodicy in the Old Testament (Issues in 
Religion and Theology 4 (ed. J. L. Crenshaw; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983): 141-53 (at 143). 
 450 On this aspect see N. K. Haden, “Qoheleth and the Problem of Alienation,” CSR 17 (1987): 
52-66. Haden links the modern notion of alienation with Qoheleth’s use of lbh. “Perhaps the greatest and 
most significant affinity between the modern dilemma of alienation and Qoheleth’s experience is to be 
found in the word “vanity” (hebel).” (at 56). James G. Williams, “What does it Profit a Man?, 179-93, on 
the other hand believes that the word ~lw[ is at the centre of existence. ~lw[ is the component which 
makes the human species distinctive: it gives man a link with God. Yet God’s nature and  activity (work) 
remains a mystery. This leads to “the unhealable alienation of man from the world” (at 182). Hartmut 
Gese, “The Crisis of Wisdom,” offers (at 148-9) another interpretation by suggesting that man’s 
alienation in the world is overcome through the fear of God.  
 451 Francis Holland, “Heart of Darkness: A Study of Qohelet,” PIBA 17 (1994): 81-10, (94-5).  
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appropriate times (verses 1-8), God “doing” and “giving” (verses 10-11), and the 
invocation to joy (verses 12-13).        
  So addressing our principal question: what is the basis of these claims, 
especially in verse 11c, from an epistemological viewpoint? Thomas Krüger writes:  
 “If human beings cannot fully comprehend the work of God (v. 11b), the statement that God 
 “made everything beautiful in its time” (v. 11a) cannot be “empirically verified.” It cannot 
 be derived from experience but rather formulates a perspective-taken from tradition (Genesis 1) 
 -that makes the interpretation of experience possible.”452 
In other words, Qoheleth in this section, especially in verses 10-15, is but giving vent to 
his own doctrinal, confessional statements about humanity’s epistemological nature and 
the activity of the deity. Once again we can observe that Qoheleth’s observational 
powers (i.e., his optical mode of perception), which are so emphatically stressed in the 
monologue, played no part in making such a claim that is found in verse 11c. In this 
instance there was no empirical base for making such a claim. Rather, it was grounded 
in inherited tradition and teaching, the conduit for which were acoustic signals 
(auditory), rather than by visual (optical) stimuli.       
8.3   Introduction to 7:23-39 
In this critically important section Qoheleth once again engages himself with innermost 
reflection as he had done earlier (cf. 1:16; 2:1, 15a; 3:17-18). This time he speaks with 
devastating candour and lays bare his consciousness to the reader. In Craig 
Bartholomew’s assessment these verses “are an important crux for understanding 
Qohelet’s epistemology and Ecclesiastes as a whole.”453  
                7:23-29 
            
             hmkxb ytysn hz-lk  23    
                   `ynmm hqwxr ayhw hmkxa ytrma 
         `wnacmy ym qm[ qm[w  hyhX-hm qwxr   24 
                 !wbXxw hmkx Xqbw rwtlw t[dl yblw yna ytwbs   25
           `twllwt twlkshw lsk [Xr t[dlw 
                     hXah-ta twmm rm yna acwmw   26                
                          hydy ~yrwsa hbl ~ymrxw ~ydwcm ayh-rXa 
            `hb dkly ajwxw hnmm jlmy ~yhlah ynpl bwj 
           tlhq hrma ytacm hz har   27
                   `!wbXx acml txal txa 
                                                
 452 Krüger, Qoheleth, 88. 
 453 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 269. 
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                            ytacm alw yXpn hXqb-dw[ rXa   28
             ytacm @lam dxa ~da 
                `ytacm al hla-lkb hXaw 
              ytacm hz-har dbl   29 
            rXy ~dah-ta ~yhlah hX[ rXa
            `~ybr twnbXx wXqb hmhw 
  23 All this I have tested by wisdom. I said, “I will be wise,” but it was far from me. 
 24 That which is, is far off, and deep, very deep; who can find it out?   
 25 I turned my mind to know and to search out and to seek wisdom and the sum of things, and to 
 know that wickedness is folly and that foolishness is madness.    
 26 I found more bitter than death the woman who is a trap, whose heart is snares and nets, whose 
 hands are fetters; one who pleases God escapes her, but the sinner is taken by her.   
 27 See, this is what I found, says Qoheleth, adding one thing to another to find the sum, 
 28 which my mind has sought repeatedly, but I have not found. One man among a thousand I 
 found, but a woman among all these I have not found.     
 29 See, this alone I found, that God made human beings straightforward, but they have devised 
 many schemes. 
Qoheleth invokes in the space of only eight verses, the language of “finding/not 
finding” with passionate rhetorical force that is unparalleled in the book. The writing in 
this segment reflects a man totally obsessed with his intellectual enterprise as can be 
seen from the following terminological data.  
    acm (“find”) occurs an amazing eight times in this segment (at 24, 26, 27 (2x), 
           28 (3x), 29), and nine times in Chapter 7, cf. 7:14  
   Xqb (“seek”) is found three times (at 25, 28, 29)     
  !wbXx (“calculation, sum”) is used two times (at 25, 27) 
         twnbXx (“devices”) once at 29 (plural form of !wbXx?) 
    rwt (“search”) appears once at  25        
   ytysn (“test”) once at 23  
   har (“see”) is found twice in the imperative form at 27, 29    
    [dy (“know”) also occurs twice in the infinitive form at 25  
   bbs (“turn”) once at 25 
These facts profusely demonstrate that this passage is very rich in experiential data. As 
Eric Christianson has commented, “This grouping of ‘quest’ verbs suggests that the 
forthcoming conclusion is paramount, for Qoheleth has enlisted all of his powers of 
observation to discover it.”454 However, as for determining the meaning of this crucial 
passage there is, unsurprisingly, little or no consensus among scholars.   
 It can, I suggest, be truthfully said that while there are several passages in 
                                                
 454 Christianson, A Time to Tell, 94. 
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Ecclesiastes that pose serious problems for the exegete, this pericope takes the notion of 
a crux interpretum to a new level. Roland Murphy views this unit as “one of the more 
difficult and perhaps one of the more notorious passages in Ecclesiastes.”455 According 
to Stuart Weeks, much of this passage “is desperately obscure,”456 and in Norman 
Whybray’s judgment, there is no question that the sequence of thought in this unit is, at 
times, very difficult to follow.457 Few scholars would dissent from these observations. 
Despite the acknowledged difficulties, my aim will be to attempt to ascertain the 
general sense of the passage and in doing so to concentrate on exploring Qoheleth’s use 
of the verb acm and its related terms listed above.  
8.4   7: 23-24 
This unit is the first time, since 1:12-2:26, that we find Qoheleth presenting a first-
person report of (i) his stated objectives, (ii) his methodological execution, and (iii) his 
findings (outcome). While the passage bristles with interpretational problems, as noted 
above, James Crenshaw offers a neat summary of the main issues to be addressed: “This 
section discusses two profound mysteries: wisdom and woman. Both mysteries defy 
understanding, wisdom because of its remoteness, and woman because she cannot be 
found.”458 This assessment is only partly correct, as it is clear that Qoheleth’s 
understanding of man (~da dxa in v 28, and ~dah in v 29) is also a very significant 
topic.           
 To what does the term hz-lk = “All this” in verse 23 refer? The immediate 
reference appears to be the preceding section, i.e., the wisdom dialogue in 7:1-22, but 
there is lexical similarity with 1:13. In both texts, the verb ytysn = “I test,” and the noun 
hmkxb = “by wisdom” occur. Also, as Fox has noted, the words in 1:13 - ~ymXh txt wX[n 
rXa-lk [l are equivalent to hyhX-hm in 7:24, and this latter phrase refers to the same 
thing as hz in verse 23, i.e., “all that happens in life.”459     
  Qoheleth affirms at various points in his autobiography that he has wisdom, and 
that he carried out his investigations by wisdom (hmkxb). In fact, he makes the 
stupendous claim that he had acquired more wisdom than any of his predecessors 
                                                
 455 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 77. 
 456 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 100. 
 457 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 123. 
 458 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 144. 
 459 Fox, A Rereading, 263. So also Seow, Ecclesiastes, 270. 
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(1:16), and that it remained with him as he became rich (2:9). Yet in 7:23 he states that 
hmkxa ytrma = “I said I will be wise,” which is then followed by his denial of human 
understanding that suggests he did not succeed in his determination to become wise.460 
Fox proposes a solution to this seeming contradiction by suggesting that there is a 
difference between the wisdom Qoheleth aimed at but did not reach, and the wisdom he 
did possess. He writes, “Only in 7:23 and 8:1a does Qohelet use a form of ~kh to 
indicate the unobtainable type of wisdom, and he does this in order to create a semantic 
paradox which seizes the reader’s attention.”461     
 In a recent exposition of this passage Aubrey Spears picks up on this putative 
semantic paradox in verse 23 and offers a sustained narrative critical reading of the 
passage.462 For him the result of this semantic paradox is only resolved in verse 29. His 
reading rejects Fox’s attempt to explain the alleged “explosive paradox” in verse 23 by 
advancing two types of wisdom. Instead, Spears believes that,  
 In vv 23-24 the reader was disoriented by the destabilizing confession of Qoheleth’s lack of 
 wisdom. Immediately, Qoheleth began to recast his entire journey by describing his quest in 
 terms that set before the reader the moral weight of wisdom and folly (v 25), and the moral 
 condition of Qoheleth, himself (v 26). V 27 then teasingly initiated a reorientation with regard to 
 the nature of Qoheleth’s “wisdom.” Finally, in v 29 this reorientation is complete, as Qoheleth 
 utilizes a skilful wordplay to identify his own search as an evil scheme that has distorted his 
 “uprightness.” Thus, the reader is presented with the answer to the lingering question since 
 v 26: What is Qoheleth’s transgression? His transgression is his search!463 
Spears concludes by saying that the reader is led on a journey to experience Qoheleth’s 
ironization of his own empirical epistemology. “It is his commitment to the autonomy 
of individual reason that has led Qoheleth down the path to Folly. God is not to blame 
for Qoheleth’s failure (v 29). The source of blame is Qoheleth’s empiricized search for 
“Wisdom”.”464           
                                                
 460 This verse contains the one single instance of the cohortative (hmkxa) in the monologue. 
According to Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes (at 145), “It expresses strong resolve, indicating that the 
determination to acquire wisdom was no flippant remark. Qohelet intends to submit to personal discipline 
in order to reach a worthy goal. But he achieved only the recognition that he had set the sights too high.” 
 461 M. Fox and B. Porten, “Unsought Discoveries,” 28.  
 462 Spears, Theological Hermeneutics, 122- 95. Spears also refers (at 177) to the semantic 
paradox in verse 23 as “an explosive paradox.”  
 463 Spears, Theological Hermeneutics, 186. 
 464 Spears, Theological Hermeneutics, 187-88. Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, follows a similar line 
of reasoning. He writes (at 269), “In Eccl 7:23-29, the reader is led on a journey to experience Qoheleth’s 
ironization of his own empirical epistemology.” Also (at 275) he observes, “Ecclesiastes 7:23-29 
demonstrates that starting with an autonomous epistemology is not wisdom but folly and will lead one not 
to truth but right into the arms of Dame Folly.”  
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  I am not convinced by this thesis. Spears, like Martin Shields,465 does not 
present a rounded view of Qoheleth’s understanding of wisdom. Qoheleth is openly 
acknowledged as a wise man, as is clear from the epilogue in 12:9 (~kh tlhq hyhX rtyw), 
and though Qoheleth found that wisdom was ineffective in various areas of life, he also 
made many positive comments about its utility (cf. 2:13; 7:11, 12, 19; 8:1b, 5; 9:1, 13-
16, 18a; 10:10). Wisdom is Qoheleth’s avowedly preferred methodology by which he 
relentlessly pursues his intellectual enterprise (1:13; 7:23).  In Qoheleth’s judgment, as 
in Job’s, there is much that escapes human cognizance. It is, therefore, very difficult to 
see how Qoheleth’s search for wisdom should be categorized as “a transgression,” or 
“an evil thing,” as Spears asserts.466 Roland Murphy’s view on this issue is most 
apposite. 
 Obviously Qoheleth was a sage in the traditional sense; the entire book testifies to his deep roots 
 in the wisdom tradition. But the tests he put it too made him realize that he was not truly wise or
 did not possess the wisdom he sought for. Because he could not understand what God was doing 
 in the world (3:11; 8:17), his affirmation of failure in v 23 is quite in order. He does not 
 distinguish between degrees of wisdom, but it is clear that he set his sights higher than the 
 tradition, and he is all the more strict in his judgment (e.g., 8:17b).467   
Gordis refers to “hokmah par excellence” as against practical Wisdom.468 I do not think 
this attempt to solve the contradiction is convincing, as it is difficult to find such a 
distinction in Ecclesiastes. As Weeks has observed,  
 What we do not find elsewhere in Ecclesiastes, however, or anywhere else in biblical literature 
 for that matter, is the notion of some special wisdom par excellence, which can be applied 
 successfully to philosophical or cosmological questions in a way that ‘ordinary’ wisdom 
 cannot. Nothing that Qohelet has said or will say, furthermore, leads us to suppose that he would 
 at any stage have accepted the possibility either of some special or of ‘normal’ wisdom 
 permitting humans to understand the workings of God or the world.469 
Verse 24 proceeds to expand on the inability of Qoheleth to comprehend hyhX-hm = “that 
which exists,” a phrase which “seems to refer to the true inwardness of things, the 
reality below all changing phenomena.”470 Qoheleth intensifies this notion of human   
                                                
 465 Shields, End of Wisdom. According to Shields wisdom gets a bad reception in the OT, apart 
from Proverbs. (At 7). He states that the epilogist (12:9-14) is the author of the book and uses Qoheleth’s 
words in the monologue to discredit the “wisdom movement.” (See 47-109). Shields’ thesis is not 
convincing due to his flawed understanding of the wisdom tradition. 
 466 Spears, Theological Hermeneutics, 186. 
 467 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 72. Fox, A Rereading, cites (at 264) Murphy’s view approvingly. 
 468 Gordis, Koheleth, 280. 
 469 Weeks, Unpublished script on Ecclesiastes. 
 470 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 146. 
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finitude by the spatial metaphor of ‘depth’, (qm[ qm[w = ‘and deep, very deep’),471 an 
idea echoed in Job 28:12-22. The word qm[ connotes something unsearchable, 
impenetrable, as in Ps 64:7 [MT]. The verse ends with the rhetorical question, “Who 
can find it?” which “acts as an assertion that no one can reach out far enough to touch 
wisdom or penetrate deeply enough to lay hold of it. Qohelet generalizes from his own 
experience: if I cannot be wise, no one can.”472     
  
8.5   7: 25-29 
Verse 25 opens with the verb yblw yna ytwbs, literally, = “I turned, and my heart, . . .” 
which seems to point to a change in a new direction, a new arena of experience.473 The 
intense seriousness, and strenuous aspirations of his investigations is clearly 
communicated by a string of infinitives, all laden with experiential value, notably, t[dl 
(x2), rwtl, Xqb. The object of this focused activity was !wbXxw hmkx = “wisdom and 
solutions/calculations.”474 In v 25b Qoheleth seeks to determine the difference between 
wisdom, the evil of folly, foolishness, and madness. The syntax here is very difficult. 
 In verses 26-29 Qoheleth ratchets up the rhetorical temperature with an intense 
and unparalleled deployment of the verb acm that appears six times in these two verses. 
Of these, one is in the infinitive form, and of the remaining five, three confirm a 
positive outcome from his quest, but on two occasions his search ends with negative 
success. “In his quest for the abstract, all he finds, though, are people: the dangerous 
woman of 7:26, the one man in a thousand of 7:28, and the human behaviour described 
in 7:29.”475          
                                                
 471 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, states (at 145) that the repetition of this adjective constitutes a 
superlative (cf. GKC, §133k); so also Gordis, Qoheleth, 281, Seow, Ecclesiastes, 260, contra Fredericks 
and Estes, Ecclesiastes, who states (at 180) that the duplication of an adjective like qm[ does not amount 
to a superlative, citing GKC, §133l in support.  
 472 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 145. Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, take a contrary view. 
Fredericks writes (at 183), “His [Qoheleth’s] rhetorical questions in 7:24 and 8:1 are motivating 
challenges to the wise, not sighs of cynical fatalism.” The different attitudes demonstrated in these two 
accounts is explained by the fact that Crenshaw views Qoheleth as having a dark vision of reality, while 
Fredericks displays more optimism about Qoheleth’s outlook on life. 
  473 The frequently used term bl = “mind, heart,” normally takes the accusative particle ta( (cf. 
2:20). The phrase is difficult without emendation, but it has the support of LXX and Syr. BHS suggests 
inserting the verb !tn thus giving rwtl ybl !wtnw, so Longman, Ecclesiastes, 202, who cites 1:17 as a 
precedent. On the other hand many MSS, Targ. and Vulg. read yblb = “in my heart.”  
 474 In the Hebrew Bible, the term !wbXxw is found only in Ecclesiastes. It also occurs in 7:27 and 
9:10. For a discussion see Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 445-57. 
 475 Weeks, Ecclesiastes: OBC, 426.  
	   171	  
 Verses 23-25 give a very strong indication to the reader of the intensity with 
which Qoheleth brings to his journey of exploration, which is strongly reflected by the 
reiteration and diversity of the verbs denoting intellectual effort. A crucial issue to 
address in verse 26 is the meaning of the term, hXah = “the woman.” Whoever is in 
mind here, the description of the woman points to a very powerful and dangerous one as 
intimated by the terms “snares,” = (~ydwcm), “nets,” = (~ymrx), and “fetters/bonds,” = 
(~yrwsa). On a first reading of this passage one could easily draw the conclusion that 
Qoheleth had a negative attitude about women. As Graham Ogden has noted, many 
commentators hold that Qoheleth does not trust the female, or certain types of 
women.476          
 Hence, the charge of misogyny has been laid against the learned sage. But how 
is the term, hXah = “the woman,” to be interpreted? Is it to be taken in a literal or 
metaphorical sense? Various proposals have been offered. Some regard the reference to 
include all women in general.477 Specific kinds of woman such as a harlot, or an 
adulteress, have also been suggested.478 Others think that a particular kind of woman is 
in view, e.g., Qoheleth’s wife.479 Fox takes the meaning in a literal sense and is 
categorical in his understanding of the passage: “Despite the valiant efforts of some 
exegetes, this passage remains irreparably misogynistic. The fact that Qohelet lists 
woman alongside other pleasurable things in 9:9 (and, for that matter, 2:8) does not 
buffer the acidity of the present passage.”480      
 According to William Brown, Qoheleth esteems the male over the female, even 
                                                
 476 Ogden, Qoheleth, 130. 
 477 So Ginsburg, Coheleth, 387; Delitzsch, Biblischer Commentar, 326-28; Gordis, Koheleth, 
282-84; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 204; Fox, Qoheleth, 242; _________. A Rereading, 266-69; Zimmerli, 
Predigers Salomo, 208-9; Michel, Untersuchungen, 225-38; Lohfink, Qoheleth, 101-02;_______ , “War 
Kohelet ein Frauenfeind? Ein Versuch, die Logik und den Gegenstand von Koh., 7:23-8:1a 
herauszufinden,” in La Sagesse de l’Ancien Testament (ed. M. Gilbert; BETL 51; Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1979), 259-87; Zimmerman, The Inner World, 29-30.  
 478 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 146; Eaton, Ecclesiastes, 116; Shields, The End of Wisdom: 187; 
Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 125; O. Loretz, Qoheleth und der alte Orient: Untersuchungen zu Stil und 
theologischer Thematik des Buches Qohelet (Frieburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1964), 115, 205; I. Provan, 
Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs (The NIV Application Commentary; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 154, 
157; Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 157; Barton, Ecclesiastes, 147. 
 
 479 Davis, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 205. 
 480 Fox, A Rereading, 266. I think one cannot summarily dismiss the implications of 9:9 in the 
way Fox does. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, comments (at 146) that, “the unflattering attitude toward women 
is balanced by awareness of the joys of a happy marriage. Qohelet also encourages enjoyment of the 
woman whom one loves (9:9).”   
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by a little, and is therefore “misogynistic to the core.”481  And Tremper Longman’s 
conclusion is that Qoheleth is a misogynist.482 From another angle, Mark Sneed views 
Qoheleth as in a deconstructed mode.483  He states that the many experiential verbs 
found on this passage imply mastery (in Freudian terms).  According to Sneed, 
“Women represent the irrational for Qoheleth. He avoids them as he would Dame Folly. 
Scholars have attempted to rescue the famous passage of 7:25-29 from its misogyny, 
but to no avail.”484         
  It is difficult to see how such comments are justified from a reading of the 
passage in question.  There is no clear textual warrant for regarding Qoheleth as 
viewing women as being irrational. And the claim that Qoheleth avoids women as he 
would Dame Folly, is but another example of the diametrically opposed interpretations 
that this book elicits from commentators. For example, both Spears and Bartholomew 
hold that Qoheleth was captured by Dame Folly.485 Yet Sneeds states the contrary! On 
the other hand, some scholars have sought to salvage Qoheleth’s reputation from the 
charge of being a woman hater.486        
  The allegation that Qoheleth was a woman hater is, I suggest, rather overdone. 
One cannot easily dismiss, as Fox does, the very positive reference to woman in the 
“joy passage” in 9:9 (and possibly in 2:8). An out-and-out misogynist would be very 
unlikely to give expression to the sentiments of human love between a man and a 
woman that is movingly presented in 9:9.       
  However, if we place this passage in a wider hermeneutical context outside 
Ecclesiastes then it could be helpful to consider the influential personification of 
                                                
 481 Brown, Ecclesiastes, 84. 
 482 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 206. Longman elaborates (at 207) that Qoheleth’s comments are full 
of tensions and “thus I have characterized him as a confused wise man whose voice is not to be identified 
with the teaching of the canonical book.” D. Garrett, “Ecclesiastes 7:25-29,” CTR (1988): 309-21, has 
endeavoured (at 311) not only to staunchly defend Qoheleth’s reputation but also “to defend the Bible 
from the accusation of misogyny.” For him the context of chapter 7 refers to marriage and what Qoheleth 
is doing is merely acknowledging the fact that sometimes men experience grief in their marriage 
relationships. This is a strained reading of the text as the notion of marriage is foreign to the passage. 
 483 Sneed, “(Dis)closure in Qoheleth: Qoheleth Deconstructed,” JSOT  27 (2002): 115-26. See 
also his “Qoheleth as “Deconstructionist,” ” OTE 10 (1997): 303-11. 
 484 Sneed, “(Dis)closure in Qoheleth,” 122. 
 485 Spears, Theological Hermeneutics, 192; Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 274. 
 486 For example, N. Lohfink, “War Kohelet ein Frauenfiend?,” 259-87;_______, Qoheleth, 100-03; 
K. Blatzer, “Women and War in Qoheleth  7:23-8:1a,” HTR 80 (1987): 127-32; T. Krüger, “ “Frau 
Weisheit” in Kol 7:26,” Bib 73 (1992): 394 -403; J. Y. S. Pahk, “The Significance of rva in Qoh 7,26: 
“More Bitter Than Death is the Woman, If She is a Snare,” in Schoors, Qoheleth in the Context of 
Wisdom, 373-383.  
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wisdom in Prov 1-9 where there is a significant correspondence between the woman 
mentioned in verse 7:26 and her counterpart in that work. Verse 26 refers to hXah = “the 
woman,” which suggests that the reader would know who the woman is. Furthermore, 
the feminine noun, twlksh = “the folly,” in verse 25, is the most likely referent in the 
immediate context. The identity of the woman could therefore be taken to mean the 
personification of Folly in Prov 9:13-18. Just as in Proverbs the one who pleases God is 
said to be able to escape from the nets of folly, “but he who is offensive shall be taken 
by her.” (7:26). On this reading, we may conclude that Qoheleth has succeeded in the 
second part of his stated search.       
  Verse 27 is most unusual particularly because of the third person insertion, ‘says 
the Qoheleth.’ Various explanations have been advanced for this phenomenon,487 but I 
adopt the simple solution that the author, very conscious of Qoheleth’s intensity at this 
stage of his endeavours, is but being emphatic in indicating the significance of his 
findings to date. As Fredericks puts it, “It is a climactic point of some sort, and probably 
indicates a more profound moment of reflection.”488     
  Verse 28 has attracted much attention and has invoked some unusual 
interpretations.489 It is not easy to grasp the meaning of this difficult verse due to certain 
ambiguities. One issue concerns the interpretation of the relative pronoun rXa. Some 
commentators regard it as referring back to !wbXx = “solution/answer” at the end of verse 
27 as the relative particle. However, in Murphy’s view, it could be regarded as 
introducing a new statement that points to something that Qoheleth did not find. “Our 
translation indicates that he rejects a saying that is demeaning to women. V 29 contains 
his verdict on all human beings, men and women alike, and would be anticlimactic after 
a misogynistic statement.”490         
                                                
 487 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, states (at 344) that the interruption is dramatic. According to Salyer, 
the implied author earlier lampooned Qoheleth in the so-called Royal Experiment (Chapters 1-2) where 
the verb rwt was used. It now appears in 7:25 , and he adds (at 344), “By having the narrator refer back to 
the verb rwt used in 2:3, the implied author deftly resumes that lampooning here.” In Salyer’s view 
Qoheleth employs a radically self-centred epistemology, and views Qoheleth as a misogynist. He writes 
(at 346), “All attempts to lessen the misogynist effects of the text should therefore be seen as misreadings 
of the text’s intention. The point of the text is to let such sentiments speak for themselves.” How texts 
speak for themselves is not clear from Salyer’s analysis. It seems to me that texts have to be interpreted, 
and that demands intentional activity on the part of the exegete.  
 488 Fredericks & Estes, Ecclesiastes, 185. 
 489 See references at f/n. 486, above. 
 490 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 77. A similar point is made by Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, (at 147), “The 
assertion in 7:29 that God made humankind upright favors this interpretation.” However, he goes on to 
state that this understanding of woman does not seem to harmonize with the misogynism underlying 7:28, 
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 In interpreting verse 28a it had been traditionally assumed that Qoheleth found 
no “good” or “wise” women, and in many translations, liberties are taken to introduce a 
moral-type adjective, such as “upright” before ~da and hXa, as in the NIV.491 But this 
translation, while it may add some clarity, has no basis in the Hebrew text 
whatsoever.492 In any case, as Whybray has so perceptively noticed, “The 
commentators, in interpreting it [verse 28] have failed to notice that it does not state 
what it is that the speaker has sought, and which he has, or has not, found in his 
extensive research. . .”493         
 In trying to resolve the impasse in explaining this verse, Seow states that the 
remark in verse 28b is intrusive in the passage: “The sudden polemic is out of place, for 
the passage is concerned with the dangers of Folly and the elusiveness of Wisdom.”494 
He further observes that the word ~da for “man” as opposed to “woman” is out of 
character for Ecclesiastes, as in all other instances where a specific person is mentioned 
Xya is used. Also, in the very next verse ~da is employed and there it refers to all 
humanity.          
 Moreover, Seow also holds that, in terms of logic, verse 28b contradicts verse 
29, the “only” at the beginning of verse 29 makes sense only when it follows verse 28a 
directly – without the intrusive comment in verse 28b. Thus, “Omitting v 28b, the 
reader would not miss a beat. We conclude, therefore, that verse 28b was a marginal 
gloss that had been inadvertently incorporated into the body of the text.”495  Seow’s 
concluding remarks on this unit are: - 
 Thus vv 25b-26 are balanced by vv 27-28a. The former concern Folly; the latter concern 
 Wisdom. It appears, however, that in the end neither Folly nor Wisdom is a real option for the 
 mortal: the one is deadly, but the other is elusive. It is in such a crazy game of hide-and-seek that 
 humans find themselves. They are pursued by Folly, a pernicious hunter from whom they must 
 try to escape but cannot, even as they try desperately to find the one who will keep them safe, 
 namely Wisdom. But wisdom eludes.496 
                                                                                                                                          
where women are responsible for their own distortion.” This comment only has some force if one 
assumes that there is misogynism underlying 7:28b.   
 491 The NIV renders 7:28b as follows,  “. . . I found one [upright] man among a thousand, but not 
one [upright] woman among them all.” 
 492 So Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, 179; Weeks, “Ecclesiastes,” 426. 
 493 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 127. (Original italics). 
 494 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 274.  
 495 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 274. 
 496 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 275. 
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This interpretation has one serious flaw: there is no warrant to posit the theory of a gloss 
with respect to the explanation of verse 28b. It is all too easy to obviate difficult 
passages in this book by advancing the glossator theory, which lacks any consistent 
external criteria whereby an objective judgment can be made.   
 Qoheleth has not found the !wbXx but he emphatically claims in verse 29 that he 
has come to a considered judgment about humans. This is made very clear by the 
unusual use of dbl = “only/alone,” which is the only occurrence in the Hebrew Bible 
where it introduces a main clause.497 It is as if Qoheleth was drawing to the reader’s 
attention the heightened awareness of his discovery.     
  In interpreting verse 29, attention has been brought to bear on the meaning of the 
terms rXy and twnbXx.  The former term, which has the meaning “to be straight, upright, 
level,” is, in Hertzberg’s opinion, devoid of any ethical content where it is used of 
human beings (as here); it simple means, “simple, uncomplicated.”498 This seems 
unlikely in the context. When used of humans in the Hebrew Bible, in most cases rXy 
does have an ethical and religious connotation.499 Even though God has made humans 
upright/straight, they have proved unable to remain upright - ~ybr twnbXx wXqb hmhw. This 
sentence is also susceptible to different interpretations.     
  Two issues are important to note. First, how is hmhw to be interpreted? If w is to 
be taken as the adversative “but,” then humans have fallen from this high moral status 
(rXy) and have sought out ~ybr twnbXx “many devices.”500 Some see an illusion here to 
Genesis 6:5 where human wickedness is described prior to the Flood, which is 
                                                
 497 Fox, A Rereading, 271. 
 498 Hertzberg, Prediger, 159.  
 499 So Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 127; Longman, Ecclesiastes, 207; Ogden, Qoheleth, 134. 
Fredericks, Ecclesiastes, observes (at 186), “. . . [Gen 3] where humanity was created morally upright but 
fell to its spiritual and physical death.” Fox, A Rereading, 272, renders ~ybr twnbXx = “great solutions,” 
and also views rXy in a non-moral way. He observes, “He [Qohelet] is, rather speaking of a flaw common 
to humanity generally, namely the tendency to seek answers and make calculations. Qohelet is the prime 
example of this, for he sought a !wbXx and got himself all tangled up in the computations.” 
 500 According to BDB, 364, the term twnmXx is the plural of a singular noun, !wbXx = “device, 
inventions.” Contra Gordis, Koheleth, 281. Gordis holds that twnmXx has the meaning of “devices” in verse 
29 and in 2 Chronicles 26:15 (the only other reference to this term in the Hebrew Bible). However, in 2 
Chronicles the context points to the meaning of “war machine.” Nevertheless, the Septuagint reads 
λογισµοὺϛ  πολλούϛ  (many arguments) and the Vulgate infinitus . . .  quaestionibus (with many 
questions) thus taking twnbXx in its primary sense of “calculations” or “questioning.” Since twnbXx presents 
a contrast to rXy in the context, Whitley’s rendering is “. . . but they pursued many questionable things.” 
Koheleth, (at 70).  
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feasible.501 But if w is merely viewed as an ordinary conjunction – “and” – then the 
meaning could have a more positive nuance. Since man has been created upright then 
humans “have gone on from that point to search out many ways to explain things,”502 
This implies that “twnbXx are not base schemes of the human mind, a departure from its 
‘upright’ state; they are attempts to deduce meaning (cf. v. 25). This leads to the 
conclusion that Qoheleth takes a positive view of humanity and of the struggles to 
comprehend existence?”503         
 In summary, what did Qoheleth find, and what did he not find? There is no 
doubt that he was in a serious mood of searching, as the language of this unit makes 
abundantly clear. In verse 26 he claims to have found (i) a dangerous woman “more 
bitter than death.”; (ii) one man in a thousand, in verse 28a; and (iii) in verse 29 he has 
found all humans corruptible, even though God made them upright. But he did not find 
“a woman among all of these” in verse 28b. Overall, we conclude that Qoheleth finds it 
virtually impossible to find wisdom, which he sought so incessantly, and he continues 
to be perplexed about what is going on in the world.      
8.6  8:16-17         
                     8:16-17 
      rXa !yn[h-ta twarlw hmkx t[dl ybl-ta yttn rXak   16
         `har wnnya wyny[b hnX hlylbw ~wyb ~g yk #rah-l[ hX[n   
      awcml ~dah lkwy al yk ~yhlah hX[m-lk-ta ytyarw   17 
          ~dah lm[y rXa lXb XmXh-txt hX[n rXa hX[mh-ta
        `acml lkwy al t[dl ~kxh rmay-~a ~gw acmy alw Xqbl  
 16 When I applied my mind to know wisdom, and to see the business that is done on earth, 
 how one’s eyes see sleep neither day nor night,     
  17 then I saw all the work of God, that no one can find out what is happening under the sun. 
 However much they may toil in seeking, they will not find it out; even those who are wise claim 
 to know, they cannot find it out. 
                                                
  501 So Longman, Ecclesiastes, 207; Daniel J. Treier, Proverbs: Ecclesiastes, 196. Longman 
notes the term tbXxm = “thoughts” is related to twnbXx as both words are formed from the verbal root !wbXx 
= “to think, to calculate.”  
 502 So Ogden, Qoheleth, 134. However, the majority of commentators adopt the adversative 
meaning, which I suggest is the correct interpretation. 
 503 Ogden, Qoheleth, 134. This conclusion is in keeping with Ogden’s view of Qoheleth as an 
optimist rather than a pessimist. I very much doubt that Qoheleth had a wholly positive view of humanity, 
3:18; 4: 1-3; 4:4; 5:1[ET]. As Ellen Davis, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes writes (at 205), “Humanity is the sole 
part of creation that can “devise many schemes” (v. 29) and willfully depart from the intention of its 
Maker.  Moreover, Koheleth’s experience suggests that moral perverseness is overwhelmingly more 
common than integrity.”  
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These two verses bring to a conclusion the discourse of 6:10- 8:17. In presenting his 
case Qoheleth finishes with an intense rhetorical flourish that disallows any concession 
to epistemological certainty about understanding God’s activity in the world. In this 
brief unit Qoheleth reiterates the severe limitations of human cognition that are 
expressed elsewhere (3:11; 7:14, 25, 27-28).504 In fact these two verses are laden with 
the three key verbs of epistemological significance: acm (3x), [dy (2x), and har (2x). In 
addition, the verb Xqb is found in 17b, and in 16b Qoheleth describes his goal in 
language reminiscent of 1:13; 2:12, and especially 7:25, 28, 29. In this, another crucial 
epistemological passage, there is a growing intensity of expression with Qoheleth’s 
dogmatic assertions to such an extent that they virtually jump off the page.  
 George Barton and other scholars see verse 16b as the protasis, and verse 17 as 
the apodosis, with the last part of verse 16 regarded as a parenthesis. Fox translates 
verse 16 as such, thus leading smoothly into verse 17.505 An interpretational issue here 
concerns the subject of the phrase har wnnya = “he does not see.” Fox states that since 
there is no antecedent for the third person, and emendation to the first person is called 
for.506 Thus, he regards Qoheleth as the subject, indicated by the person pronoun “my.” 
This has the effect of eliminating the tension between the first person in verse 16a and 
17 and the third person in 16b.        
  Leong Seow proposes another solution to the problem. The clause in verse 16b 
is disruptive and in his view it properly belongs immediately following “under the sun” 
in verse 17.507 Understood in his way, this rendering also makes good general sense. 
Seow notes that deprivation of sleep is a motif in the ancient Near East for religious 
fervour; people who describe their total dedication to certain tasks speak of their efforts 
day and night and how they deprive themselves of sleep.508 This means that the 
emphasis here is on the sage’s complete commitment to the task of finding out the 
                                                
 504 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, suggests (at 138) that these two verses may have been an editorial 
insertion placed here to give a more systematic presentation of Qoheleth’s thought. This is not, however, 
necessary. The verb [cm in this context is used in a very negative sense and is linked to the preceding 
context, and in what follows. As noted by Krüger, Qoheleth, (at 163) the theme “limited knowledge” is 
taken up later in 9:1, 11-12, and plays an important role in previous texts, especially in 7:23-29. 
 505 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 157. Ogden, Qoheleth, writes (at 153), “Presumably, people are so 
preoccupied with their business that they never have the chance to sleep or rest properly.” For the unique 
expression “seeing sleep” see Whitley, Koheleth, 77; Barton, Ecclesiaastes, 157; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 
157. 
 506 Fox, A Rereading, 289. 
 507 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 276-77, 289. 
 508 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 289. 
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mystery of the nature of divine activity in the world.     
  Graham Ogden has forwarded a different interpretation. Since Qoheleth says 
sleep was in his eyes, day and night, he was therefore unable to see. If Qoheleth himself 
is the subject, then he failed to see or comprehend as he had hoped. This frustration was 
due to the fact that there was always sleep in his eyes. Ogden takes ‘sleep’ as a 
metaphor for blindness to facts (Prov 20:13; Job 14:12). Consequently, Qoheleth 
confesses that he was so obtuse, so blind, that he could not see the answer.509 This is not 
a persuasive solution to the problem; I agree with Fox on this issue as the tone of his 
translation seems more in keeping with the remarks in 7:23f, i.e., it is impossible to 
understand “what God makes happen.”510      
  The certainty expressed in verse 17 is laced with a triple dose of acm, which sets 
forth in the most dogmatic terms the limits of human knowing. The verse begins with 
the verb ytyar = “I saw” which has the meaning “I realized”, thus indicating a mental 
state of personal reflection in respect of ~yhlah hX[m-lk = “all the work of God.” It is to 
be noted that the verb Xqb = “to seek” is grammatically linked with acm, which would 
point to the depth of Qoheleth’s intention to pursue his intellectual quest. Also worth 
mentioning is the presence of the verb [dy = “to know” (in both verses 16 and 17). 
These infinitives are not related to what Qoheleth claims to know, however, but refer to 
his mental state as to what he intends to undertake.      
  In assigning meaning to each of the occurrences of acm, Anthony Ceresko 
translates the first and third occurrences as, “to grasp, to understand.” But in the second 
occurrence, he explains that the context and the collocation of acm with Xqb call for the 
translation, “to find.” Thus he renders 17b, “However much man may toil in seeking, he 
will not find.”511 He argues that Qoheleth is using acm in antanaclasis mode here, i.e., 
the repetition of the same word in two senses. But as Schoors has observed, Xqb is used 
here in denoting intellectual research and thus acm is to be understood as “to grasp, 
                                                
  509 Ogden, Qoheleth, 153. The observation by K. Galling, Der Prediger, is worth citing here. 
“Das singuläre Bild vom “Nichtsehen des Schlafes” ist für die Nacht unter gegebenen Umständen 
verständlich; aber:  wer sucht des Tages den Schlaf!” (at 113) – “The singular image of the “not-seeing of 
sleep” is understandable for the night under the circumstances, but whoever seeks the day to sleep!” 
There is a tinge of irony in verse 16 due to the fact that when one’s eyes are open they cannot see if they 
are closed for sleep! See Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon, 206. 
 510 Fox, A Rereading, 289. Ogden’s proposal to take the term sleep as a metaphor seems strange 
when the term is juxtaposed with “day and night.” As Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, has noted (at 153), 
“. . . the not seeing here can hardly refer to the search itself, as it is immediately followed by the claim 
and I saw.” 
 511 Ceresko, “The Function,” 567. 
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understand.”512          
  Qoheleth makes reference in verse 17 to ~yhlah hX[m-lk = “all the work of 
God.”513 His stupendous claim is that he has considered (ytyarw = “then I saw”) all of 
this. This is a personal statement he makes about his intellectual enterprise. But 
reference is also made to XmXh-txt hX[n rXa = “all that happens under the sun.” This is 
applicable to a more collective audience: mankind. Is the “work of God” (divine 
activity) and “all that happens under the sun” (human activity), one and the same 
activity, or are two separate entities in view?      
  Norman Whybray signifies that Qoheleth here equates the work of God with the 
work done under the sun, that is, God controls the events of human history.514 James 
Crenshaw holds that this verse “equates God’s work with activity on earth – elsewhere 
Qohelet only implies that whatever occurs is God’s doing.”515 Daniel Fredericks charts 
the parallels of 8:16-9:1 with similar material in 1:13-2:3 and 7:23-29 and concludes 
that the distinction between divine and human actions is fairly clear, but in verses 16-
17, the works of God are in view.516 Norbert Lohfink makes the following observation 
on verse 17:   
 This verse is very important in understanding the whole book, because it makes the action of 
 God equivalent to the activity “that is carried on under the sun,” something that was to be 
 surmised in any case from the use of passive formulations in many other texts. What is 
 especially meant is all human activity. This then is at the same time always divine activity. 
 Yet precisely in this dimension it is impenetrable for humans, above all when we ask about the 
 “all” of divine activity.517 
In response to this claim, Thomas Krüger writes,  
 . . . the text can be understood in the sense that within the framework of “what is done under the 
 sun,” both human and divine activity occur without the difference between the two being erased: 
 because the realm of “what is done under the sun” comprises, among other things, divine activity 
 that (at least in part) escapes human knowledge (cf. 3:11; 11:5), this realm is not completely 
 transparent for human beings.518 
                                                
 512 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 176. 
 513 The expression, “the work of God” is also found in 7:13 and 11:5. In 3:11 Qoheleth speaks of 
“the work which God does” which is the object of a negative clause which stresses man’s ignorance.  
 514 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 139. Seow, Ecclesiastes, also agrees. He writes (at 293), “The 
mention of “all that has been done under the sun” anticipates the many references to the activities of the 
righteous and the wicked, as well as the activities of God. . . . (and, at 294), “Thus, vv 10-17 elaborate on 
what is meant by “all that is done under the sun” – that is, activities human and divine.”  
 515 Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 157. 
 516 Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, 205. 
 517 Lohfink, Qoheleth, 110-111. 
 518 Krüger, Qoheleth, 164. 
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Krüger gives an alternative explanation whereby verse 17a is aimed at the situation in 
3:11, that the limits of human knowledge go back to the actions of God, which by 
implication acknowledges that the activity of God does not coincide with that of human 
beings, but rather sets its limits. In other words, on this interpretation, Qoheleth 
pointedly attributes to the sovereign action of God the human limitation of 
understanding divine activity.519         
 I am inclined to agree with this latter approach which is also adopted by Fox when 
he translates thus, “. . . man cannot grasp anything that God makes happen, that is to 
say, the events that occur under the sun, . . .”  But it must be acknowledged that 
Qoheleth nowhere insists that man is in a state of absolute ignorance, and he himself 
gives expression as having grasped and found many things: “Qohelet is asserting that no 
one can understand the rationale of events in life as a whole.”520 A similar view is 
expressed in the famous poem by Paul in 1 Cor 13:12: “Now I know in part; then I shall 
understand fully, even as I have been fully understood.”521   
8.7  Summary and Assessment  
When a writer sets out on a personal investigation and announces his “findings”, it will 
be evident that the verb acm = “to find” will have obvious experiential importance, 
especially when that verb is densely used in the space of seven verses. This term, of 
course, can attract a semantic range that allows the author a certain linguistic flexibility. 
Thus we observed that acm can refer to the physical act of finding an object, as in 
someone saying, “Look, I have found my watch.” There is also the meaning that acm 
has the sense “to grasp, understand,” as in 3:11.     
  It is very difficult, however, to see how Qoheleth could have come to the 
                                                
 519 This interpretation is followed by A. Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 131-35; contra Luca 
Mazzinghi, “The Verbs [cm and Xqb in Qohelet,” in The Language of Qohelet in its Context: Essays in 
Honour of Prof.  A. Schoors on the Occasion of his Seveneth Birthday (eds. A. Berlejung and P. van 
Hecke. BETL 164. Louvain, Paris and Dudley, MA; Peeters and Dept. of Oriental Studies, Louvain, 
2007), 91 -120, who states (at 112), “Here [v 17] Qohelet does not want to affirm that God must be 
considered directly responsible for the epistemological limit that afflicts man. The impossibility of 
understanding the action of God leads directly to the failure of knowledge and human activity. The 
problem is on man’s side, not on God’s.” Wagner, TDOT, (at 478) states that “The expression “work” 
must be taken in the broad sense of God’s activity in nature, the cosmos, and history, activity that comes 
about unquestioned and uninterrupted according to its own plan and meaning, without any human being – 
and be he ever so wise – being able to fathom and understand it . . .” 
 520 Fox, A Rereading, 289. Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, make a similar point (at 205), 
“Qoheleth hardly argues anywhere that we can know nothing about God and what God does.” As we 
discovered in Chapters 6 and 7, Qoheleth made many knowledge claims about the deity. 
 521 The major difference between Paul’s statement about human limitations and Qoheleth’s is 
that Paul’s is situated in an eschatological perspective, but this dimension is missing in Qoheleth’s. 
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conclusion he did in 3:11 by empirical means, for it is not a state of affairs that is 
verifiable (or falsifiable) by human experience. The first part of the verse –“He [God] 
has made everything suitable for its time . . .” is a theological claim that is in keeping 
with Israelite monotheism. The last part of the verse affirms that humans “. . . cannot 
find out what God has done from the beginning to the end.” also concurs well with the 
witness of other Old Testaments writers. The novel claim by Qoheleth in this verse is 
that God has “. . . put eternity into their minds, . . .”, a claim not found elsewhere in the 
Old Testament.         
 Given these observations, the conclusion to be drawn is that in making the 
claims in 3:11, Qoheleth is essentially declaring a personal belief about the nature of 
God’s transcendence, and human finitude. It therefore does not constitute a proposition 
that can be viewed as a true belief that is justifiable in epistemological terms, as 
explained in chapter three. The sage certainly believes what he writes about God and 
human limitation, and he certainly holds that what he believes is true. But the statement 
made in 3:11, from an empirical perspective, cannot be accorded justified status, due to 
the fact that the state of affairs so described is beyond the boundaries of human 
experiential knowledge. Other criteria relating to epistemic justification may be found 
to enhance the status of these claims, and this is an issue that will be considered later in 
this study.           
 In 8:16-17 the claim that a wise man cannot find out what is going on in the 
world is not a new theme, but it is delivered with a rhetorical force and intensity that 
brilliantly captures the attention of the reader. These two verses are a most emphatic 
denial of the availability of human knowledge. Verse 16 tells us nothing about how 
Qoheleth reached his conclusion regarding his insomnia; this opinion is another 
instance of hyperbole, as is his claim to have seen all the things done under the sun and 
observed all the work of God. Verse 16 is immediately followed by “. . . a crescendo of 
skepticism, three times accenting the phrase, “not find out.” ”522 Here we have rich 
irony for we have a declaration of certain knowledge on Qoheleth’s part decisively 
pointing out the serious knowledge limitations of the wise.     
  There cannot be any doubt that acm is a key word in this pericope, and 
Qoheleth’s thrice-fold use of these staccato-type assertions conveys to the reader the 
impression of a man whose mind is steeped in dogmatic certainty, as well as resigned 
negativity. There clearly is a strong experiential/knowledge dimension to the verb acm, 
                                                
 522 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 352. 
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and the inclusion of the experiential related verbs, [dy, har, and Xqb, - within the scope 
of two short verses - assuredly points to a man passionately striving for epistemological 
certainty.           
 Notwithstanding these dogmatic assertions about God and human kind, it is 
difficult to conclude that Qoheleth reached these conclusions on empirical grounds. 
Man’s limitations are common knowledge in Old Testament literature, and since human 
beings are universally recognized as cognitively limited, Qoheleth’s strident claims in 
8:16-17 are not instances of specific knowledge emanating from his peculiar personal 
experiences under the sun.         
 Finally, 7:23-29 is a passage that strikes the reader as being saturated with a 
plethora of experiential language: Qoheleth seeks, searches, tests, finds, turns, sees, and 
wants to find the sum of things. What was Qoheleth looking for, and what did he find? 
The “I” narrative comes to the fore especially in these verses: “I tested”, “I turned”, “I 
found” (x4), “I have not found” (x2). The strongest sense of intellectual enquiry 
pervades this pericope; the only other comparable section of the book where Qoheleth’s 
ego is so prominent and intense is in Ch. 2.523      
 When Bartholomew writes, “Verses 23-39 are an important crux for 
understanding Qoheleth’s epistemology and Ecclesiastes as a whole.”,524 I would agree 
with the first sentence of this assessment, but not the second part of his claim. This 
latter view tends to attach an importance to these verses that somehow transfers over to 
the rest of the book. That, I suggest, is not so. Bartholomew describes Qoheleth’s 
epistemology as “autonomous.”525 He further explains that Qoheleth is engaged in a 
quest for “certain knowledge resulting from logical analysis of personal experience and 
observation.”526 He goes on to indicate that Qoheleth epistemology is one of general 
autonomy, not just empiricism.527 “Observation is a major element in Qoheleth’s 
epistemology but so too are experience and reason.”528 In other words, I take it to mean 
                                                
 523 See Isaksson, The Language, 167 for the frequency of the suffix conjugation forms used by 
Qoheleth. Ch. 2 stands out above all others in this respect. 
 524 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 269. 
 525 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 271. 
 526 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 274.   
 527 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 275. 
 528 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 55. 
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that Bartholomew holds that Qoheleth was an empiricist in his methodology. From the 
evidence thus far educed from Qoheleth’s epistemic claims it is submitted that this 
appraisal cannot stand up to critical scrutiny, and I will in due course return to this issue 
towards the end of this thesis to substantiate my view.    
  When we turn to consider the language and intent of 7:23-29, first impressions 
suggest that a strong case can be made out that Qoheleth was deeply involved in pursing 
his own, deeply personal quest by an empirical methodology. The experiential richness 
of the language would appear to confirm this. Yet on reflection, two factors militate 
against this perception. First, Qoheleth refers to God in v 26c (‘one who pleases God 
escapes her), and in verse 29 (. . .  I found that God made human beings straightforward 
(upright), . . .’).  These are claims to divine knowledge that do not have, nor could ever 
have, an experiential grounding. If anything, they are counter-experiential.  
  Secondly, how one interprets this very challenging passage will be crucial to any 
assessment of the nature of Qoheleth’s knowledge claims. Thus, if we take this passage 
in a literal sense we will more than likely come to view Qoheleth as an irredeemable 
misogynist, thus following scholars like Fox, Brown, and Longman, et al. But if we 
broaden our hermeneutical vision by extending the literary context of this pericope to 
the personification of wisdom in the book of Proverbs, then our conclusion would lead 
to a different understanding. I favour the latter interpretation. The essence of Qoheleth’s 
problem was that he was engaged in an intellectual exercise to find Lady Wisdom, 
which turned out to be a notable failure. He sought wisdom by the methodology of 
wisdom and hopelessly exclaimed, “but it was far from me.”   
  Following on from this important verb in Qoheleth’s lexicon we will turn to 
examine the verb har = “to see” that potentially has even greater experiential 
significance due to its very high visibility in the monologue. This task will occupy our 
attention in chapters 9 and 10 to follow. A summary of this material with concluding 
remarks relating to this key verb will be given at the end of chapter 10.  
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PART 4.  QOHELETH’S USE OF THE VERB har 
 
Chapter 9: The Verb har = “to see” (Part 1) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
It is a very noteworthy fact that the author of Ecclesiastes uses the verb har = “to see” 
with phenomenal regularity. Not only is it employed a staggering total of 47 times; it 
also enjoys a wide distribution throughout the book, occurring in every chapter in one 
form or another.529 In her monograph, Annette Schellenberg has noted that its relative 
frequency underscores the fact that its intensive use in the book exceeds its average use 
in the Old Testament by a factor of 3.5.530 She further remarks that this is all the more 
surprising in that this verb is well attested in other Wisdom literature.531 On these facts 
alone it is true to say, in the words of one commentator, “Qoheleth is deeply interested 
in experience and observation. The author is a keen and intelligent observer and 
commentator, both of the material world and of human behaviour.”532  
 What is unusual about Qoheleth as a writer is that he invites his readers to see 
things, but he does not, on the whole, invite people to hear things, or be told things. 
What he does not do is to say, “I have heard that,” or “I have learned that.” As earlier 
noted, Qoheleth never, at any point, uses the verb [mX in the first person to refer to his 
own personal activities, as Pierre Van Hecke has observed.533 Antoon Schoors has quite 
correctly pointed out that har, in combination with [mX expresses the totality of 
perception.534 The phenomenon of the frequent parallelism of these two verbs in the 
                                                
 529 According to H. F. Fuhs, TDOT, 212, there are over 1300 occurrences of har in the Old 
Testament, of which 1129 are in Qal form. Fuhs states (at 213) that the verb occurs in all the books of the 
Old Testament except Zechariah, and that the usage of the verb in Ecclesiastes as opposed to Proverbs is 
noteworthy as it is found 47 times in the former shorter book, against only13 in the latter, which is a 
much more substantial work. According to Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 59, har is found a mere 
three times in Proverbs.  
 530 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 181. 
 531 Contra, Fuhs, TDOT, 213. See f/n. 529 above. 
 532 B. Boyle, “ ‘Let Your Garments Always be White’ (Ecc 9:8): Time, Fate, Chance and 
Provident Design According to Qoheleth,” ABR 55 (2007): 29-40, (at 29). 
 533 P. Van Hecke, “The Verbs har and [mX in the Book of Qohelet: A Cognitive-Semantic 
Perspective,” in The Language of Qohelet in its Context: Essays in Honour of Prof. A. Schoors on the 
Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday (OLA 164; eds. A. Berlejung and P. Van Hecke; Leuven: Uitgeverij 
Peeters en Departemant Oosterse Studies, 2007), 203.  
 534 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 59. 
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Hebrew Bible raises the question as to the relationship between ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing.’ 
Kraus once commented, “. . . in early Hebrew tradition hearing takes undisputed priority 
over seeing and all other forms of sense perception.”535 There is no question that 
“hearing” would take precedence over “seeing” in certain domains such as instruction 
and learning the law. But the act of ‘seeing’ was vital in the very early traditions of the 
patriarchs, most notably with Abraham, and later with Moses at Mt. Horeb.  
  However, as Fuhs has noted, when har and [mX occur together, “. . . the texts 
either refer to a unitary personal act of perception (Dt. 29:3[4]; Isa. 6:9ff.; Jer. 5:21; 
Prov. 20:12; Eccl.1:8) or establish the priority of seeing over hearing (Gen. 45:27; I K. 
10:7; Ps. 48:9[8]; Job 42:5).”536 In Ecclesiastes the only time that these two cognitively 
related verbs occur together is at 1:8. “The eye is not sated with seeing, nor the ear filled 
by hearing” (1:8b).537 Thus, from the very outset, Qoheleth emphasizes the generally 
acknowledged limitations of human perception.    
 Qoheleth is acutely interested in what is happening XmXh txt = “under the sun,” 
a phrase which is repeated twenty-nine times.538  Schellenberg has pointed out that the 
critical difference between “hearing” and “seeing” is that the latter term is distinguished 
by “the immediacy of the experience” (die Unmittelbarkeit der Erfahrungen).539 
“Hearing” is a mode of perception that is, by its very nature, mediated and thus indirect; 
“seeing,” by contrast, is at once immediate and very direct.  There is no doubt that the 
immediacy of “seeing,” as opposed to “hearing,” is, for Qoheleth, foremost in his 
perception of the world. In Van Hecke’s opinion,      
    . . . it is precisely the intentionality and focusability of the visual perception that favoured the 
 use of har as persuasive cognitive term in the book of Qohelet. While [mX as a cognitive term is 
 more receptive, viz. understanding what is given, har implies activity and intentionality which 
 fit very well with Qohelet’s project of active examination and observation, as it is expressed by 
 many of the first-person verbs in the book.540 
                                                
 535 Cited in Fuhs, TDOT, 216. 
 536 Fuhs, TDOT, 216. 
 537 In both cases the verbs are in the Qal infinitive construct form.  
 538 The similar phrase ~ymXh txt = “under heaven,” occurs three times at 1:13; 2:3b; 3:1; and 
#rah-l[ = “upon the earth,” occurs five times at 5:1 [MT]; 7:20; 8:14,16; 11:2.  
 539 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 181. 
 540 Van Hecke, “Verbs har and [mX in Qohelet,” 214. Van Hecke’s interesting article highlights 
the fact (at 211-212) that the Hebrew verb [mX has both a static meaning  (“to hear”) and an intentional, 
active meaning (“to listen to”), though the two meanings are not always distinct. In a similar way, har has 
both a static, perceptual meaning “to see” and an active, intentional meaning “to look at.”  
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Since ‘hearing’ is by its very nature a largely passive experience it plays a minor role in 
Qoheleth’s very activated enterprise. It becomes clear from examining the textual 
evidence that Qoheleth’s observations derive from a very focused and intentional 
intellectual quest for an understanding of the world. Consequently, these occurrences of  
[mX are not significant for our study. I will, therefore, turn to consider Qoheleth’s very 
deliberate observational outlook that is reflected by his use of har, but before doing so, I 
would like to make some general observations about the act of seeing.541 Our specific 
interest is to explore the semantic range of the verb har. 
9.2  Some Remarks on “Seeing”        
In chapter 1 we drew attention to Qoheleth’s view of the world. For Qoheleth, events in 
the world have to be perceived within the framework of things really never stopping, 
even if there were immensely long intervals between their occurrences. These events 
will reoccur as they have in the past (1:9-10). For Qoheleth, the natural phenomena 
“serve as evidence for his conclusion that human perception is necessarily limited 
(1:11).”542 Thus, what Qoheleth “sees” in the world is fundamentally conditioned by his 
world-outlook.         
 Expressions of “seeing” can be but something visual:- “I saw that it was 
snowing.” could simply refer to a mere visual experience of a natural phenomenon. 
Similarly, when Qoheleth makes the observation that when a tree falls to the north or to 
the south, it will lie where it falls (11:3b), at least two of his senses are engaged, 
namely, optical and auditory perception. Since this phenomenon is common or public 
knowledge, Qoheleth would not have been the first person to arrive at this conclusion 
purely by his own observation and quest for knowledge.    
 But consider the following: “I saw a whole new way of looking at the problem.” 
In this situation someone is expressing something fundamentally cognitive that he or 
she has arrived at by his or her own individual experience and use of reason. This new 
knowledge presumably came about as the result of insight from observation, experiment 
and reason. However, it should not be assumed that where one has a purely visual 
experience that this is of necessity distinct from cognitive activity; both may, or may 
                                                
 541 My remarks in this section were stimulated by J. Barr’s, The Semantics of Biblical Language: 
________, Comparative Philology; S. A. Groom, Linguistic Analysis of Biblical Hebrew (Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 2004); and discussions with my supervisor, Professor S. Weeks.   
 542 Weeks, An Introduction, 114. 
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not be, inextricably tied to each other.543 Thus, in 2:13 Qoheleth writes, “Then I saw 
that wisdom excels folly . . .” this statement implies that Qoheleth came to a conclusion 
on matters of personal interest that was consonant with traditional wisdom thinking. In 
this instance there is no indication that Qoheleth had engaged in physically seeing some 
phenomenon. Here, the sage is engaged in cognitive reflection and critical evaluation, 
and not necessarily in an empirical act of seeing (Cf. 2:24). But in 4:1, 8:10 and 10:7 
Qoheleth reports that he has seen something visually.   
 Consider the statement, “When I saw the secret door, I saw how I could extricate 
myself from the burning building.” Both instances of “saw” in this sentence are 
different in meaning, but the sentence is tied together by the two “saw” verbs. Hence, 
“saw” is not being used to describe the same phenomena –the first use is a visual 
sighting of a physical object; the second use is of cognitive signification because it 
involves consideration, realization, comprehension and understanding of a perceptual 
and practical problem. In this example, the second “saw” verb could be equally 
rendered, “I realized” or “I came to the conclusion.”  In this example, the empirical act 
of seeing cannot be separated from the cognitive activity of critical evaluation. 
 One is also mindful that in the study of words there is always the danger of the 
“dictionary fallacy,” by which I mean, when a Hebrew word is converted into an 
equivalent English word the assumption might be made that somehow the English word 
is going to be absolutely equivalent to the Hebrew term. For example, when Qoheleth 
states, “I see,” is this an indication of an object that he only physically sees with his 
eyes, or is it something of cognitive significance? In 1:14 he states, “I have seen 
everything that is done under the sun; . . .” Here, “I have seen. . .” could be rendered, “I 
have examined.” If Qoheleth’s claim is meant to be true experientially, then that 
statement cannot be true. Is he exaggerating, lying, or is he using the word “see” in a 
different way?  It is most unlikely that the sage is deliberately lying, but he is quite 
capable of employing hyperbole as a literary technique. Thus, if one says that there are 
some cases where Qoheleth is said to have “seen” something, does “seen” have this 
sense everywhere it occurs?          
 With the term har one could easily not appreciate what is going on with its 
                                                
 543  It is important to note that the Fuhs, TDOT, 214-15, and Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 183, hold 
that visual perception is the most important source of information on which knowledge is based. 
However, they add that the distinction between sensory perception and cognition is very difficult to make. 
Van Hecke, “Verbs har and [mX in Qohelet,” (at 213) adds that though visual perception might constitute 
an important portion of the information feeding our cognition, it is not the only source, and arguably 
maybe not the most important, as much of our cognition information is acquired by hearing.  
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manifold meanings. For example, in 1:10 Qoheleth declares, “See, this is new?” The 
demonstrative term hz = “this” has no obvious antecedent. It could be anything. To 
exclaim, “Look, I have found a pencil!” is purely visual. But the statement, “Look at the 
mess we are in now!” does not necessitate taking the imperative “Look” to refer to a 
visual experience; it has the meaning “consider/ think about.” The speaker is cognitively 
engaged. The meaning of “looking at” in English and Hebrew is going to be determined 
by the implicit or explicit object. And when Qoheleth simply says, “This,” in 1:10 it 
means that “Look/See” could have any one of a range of appropriate meanings, 
depending on what one thinks “This” refers to. It could refer to “physical visualization,” 
it could be “mental consideration,” it could be “cognitive” – “comprehension.” The 
understanding of the verb most likely will be specified by the context, but it may be left 
open. In our example above in 1:10, it is difficult to know if har is “comprehension,” 
“visualization,” or whatever, without knowing what hz = “this” is.    
 Following on from these observations, it would, therefore, not be good linguistic 
practice to use the context of one verse to determine the meaning of the same word in 
another verse (cf. Qoheleth’s use of lbh, for instance). Qoheleth could be claiming to 
see something visually in one verse, but that does not mean that if he uses the same 
form three verses later, he is saying that he necessarily saw something visually. There 
could be a range of reasons that are only made more precise by the contextual 
information. It would be easy to accept that Qoheleth’s use of har was important in his 
outlook due to its prominent position in the book, but to attempt to assign a single 
meaning to it on the basis of those places where Qoheleth actually saw an object or 
phenomenon, would be to commit a semantic error that could skew the interpretation of 
the passage(s) under review.        
  From the above considerations, it is clear that the verb har is a multivalent term, 
and, in one way or another, it is possible to render the verb by any of the following.544 
                                                
 544  Loader, Polar Structures, discusses (at 18-28) the various genres present in Ecclesiastes and 
identifies a Gattung or basic literary unit by the term, “observation.” This is defined by sentences that 
contain har and [dy, and a few other related verbs.  He remarks (at 25) that “observation is marked by a 
first person singular style.” This presupposes that har = “to see, observe,” has the same meaning 
throughout the book. In a similar fashion Stephan de Jong, “A Book on Labour: The Structuring 
Principles and the Main Theme of the Book of Qoheleth,” JSOT  54 (1992): 107-16, in presenting an 
analysis of the structure of the book, holds (at 108) that there is an alternation of “observation” and 
“instruction” complexes throughout the entire book. Michel, Untersuchungen, after a more lengthy study 
of the issue states (at 21), “Das Verb har kann hier nur, “(prüfend) betrachten" bedeuten,. . .” Thus for 
him, har can only mean “to consider, examine.” While I would not deny that Michel’s rendering of har 
does work in many instances, it cannot be fully reconciled to Qoheleth’s diverse employment of the term 
throughout the book. 
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 “I saw (the empirical act of seeing)” 
 “I realized.”         
 “I considered.”        
  “I found”         
 “I perceived”         
 “I experienced.”        
  “I understood.”        
  “I learned.”         
 “I came to the conclusion.”       
 “I observed (critically).”       
 “I examined.”         
 “I recognized.”        
  “I discovered.” 
Since har is deployed so widely in the book, it is clear that Qoheleth has a deep and 
intensive interest in “seeing,” whatever that entails.545 On that premise I now propose to 
examine Qoheleth’s claims to knowledge by exploring what he claims to have “seen.” I 
regard the following statement by Fuhs as providing a sound procedure to follow: “The 
acts of apprehension generated by har thus cover a broad and complex range of 
meanings . . . The nuances of each text must be examined individually.”546  
9.3 Common Forms of har        
On the face of it, the 47 occurrences of the verb har in Ecclesiastes strongly suggest 
that the author has a deeply absorbing interest in experiential data. Prima facie, that 
would point to a strong empirical methodology on Qoheleth’s part. Whether this view 
can be sustained remains to be proven, however. Noting above the many subtle shades 
of meaning that this verb attracts, and bearing in mind its strong association with human 
perception, it would not be surprising to learn that not all of its 47 occurrences refer to 
what Qoheleth claims to have seen. The fact is that har only occurs 21 times in the 
                                                
 545 Ogden, Ecclesiastes, states (at 43), “The verb ra’ah is one of Qoheleth’s key words, and 
regularly applies to his observation of life. It speaks of more than casting a casual eye over things; it 
connotes a scientific and empirical examination of the realities of human life.” How regular is regular? I 
shall endeavour to show, in this and the next chapter, that while har is a prominent verb in Qoheleth’s 
lexicon, his deployment of it is far short of “scientific and empirical.” 
 546 Fuhs, TDOT, 216. 
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monologue with Qoheleth as subject.547 It is, therefore, a startling fact that over half of 
the 47 occurrences of har are not directly related to Qoheleth’s epistemic claims. One 
would not have expected that over half the occurrences of this verb are employed in a 
variety of common usage. The 21 instances of har that remain to be considered are all 
germane to the sage’s epistemology. It is now time to examine these in this and the next 
chapter. First of all we will consider three scenarios in which Qoheleth appears to make 
some astounding claims as to what he “saw.” 
9.4 “Seeing” Everything That Is Done Under The Sun 
On three separate occasions Qoheleth makes claims with universal implications. As 
noted on chapter two, at the very commencement of the monologue he writes, 
                 1:14 
       XmXh hxt wX[nX ~yX[mh-lk-ta ytyar
             `xwr tw[rw lbh lkh hnhw 
 I saw all the deeds that are done under the sun; and see, all is vanity and chasing after wind.  
After some critical reflection on the natural world in 1:4-8,548 we now are confronted 
with Qoheleth’s reflection on human experience encapsulating “the entirety of human 
doing.”549 Issuing such a comprehensive declaration of this commanding nature so early 
in his speech raises the notion in the reader’s mind that no mortal is capable of “seeing” 
everything under the sun.550 Qoheleth, of course, is well able to employ hyperbole to 
persuade his readers of his very idiosyncratic approach to the problems of life. 
 In verse 13b, he mentions the heavy burden that God had put on the human race, 
and in this verse that ends with the lbh theme, “. . .we are provided with a preview of 
things to come, and the words of Qohelet from here and throughout the book to 12:7 
                                                
 547 These are 1:14; 2:13, 24b; 3:10, 16, 22; 4:1, 4, 7, 15: 5:12 [MT]; 5:17 [MT]; 6:1; 7:15; 8:9, 
10, 17; 9:11, 13; 10:5, 7.    
 548 Ogden, Qoheleth, observes (at 39-40), “We are left with the clear impression that the object 
of his research refers to all human activity, rather than to situations in the natural world, a fact which 
correlates with the basic question asked in 1:3.” 
 549 Fischer, Beobachtungen, 76. Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, writes (at 72) “True to the teaching of 
the sages, Qohelet proceeds by personal observation, eyes open to reality as it presents itself. Unlike his 
predecessors, however, Qohelet claims that he has taken note of everything that transpires on earth.” 
 550 As Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, puts it (at 273), “While the probable intent of such a claim was to 
authorize the narrator’s right to speak, its actual effect is to raise suspicion in the reader who correctly 
surmises that such a claim is beyond any single ‘I’.” And (at 277), “A man who claims to have 
experienced all things can hardly be expected to partake of humility.” 
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must be understood in this light.”551 But all that this verse tells us is that Qoheleth 
reached his own, very personal negative conclusions about all that happened under the 
sun.552 We are, as it were, in the realm of personal opinion, not verifiable observations 
that inexorably lead to public knowledge that has been, and can be, empirically 
validated. The frustrating aspect of this statement is that Qoheleth does not spell out to 
the reader how he came to such a conclusion, nor is there any specificity as regards to 
what he actually did see.        
  It is interesting to observe that at the beginning of the monologue, Qoheleth has 
not engaged in an extensive and sustained examination of seeking and searching out by 
wisdom all that is done under the sun (cf. 1:13). The programmatic verse in 1:3, and 
God’s gift to human kind of [r !yn[ with its implied negative answer in 1:13b, and the 
emphatic lbh conclusion in verse 14, is substantive evidence that reveals a man who 
already had his mind made up about the nature and consequences of his very private 
enterprise.      
               7:15 
                          ylbh ymyb  ytyar lkh-ta
                   `wt[rb %yram [Xr Xyw  wqdcb dba qydc Xy 
   
 In my vain life I have seen everything; there are righteous people who perish in their 
 righteousness, and there are wicked people who prolong their life in their evil-doing.  
It has been well said that the section 7:15-29 provides some of the more startling 
glimpses into Qoheleth’s thinking,553 a view that, at least, has been heavily endorsed in 
our consideration of 7:23-9 in chapter 8. Qoheleth has by now established a 
configuration of observation and reflection, and once more, in this segment 7:15-18, he 
highlights another case of life under the sun that warrants the attention of his readers.554 
  Most commentators view verse 15 as the beginning of a new section.555 
                                                
 551 Enns, Ecclesiastes, 39. This ties in with the observation that the themes and ideas presented 
in 1:2 to 3:15 foreshadows the key topics that are addressed later in the book. 
 552 Regarding the “events that occur under the sun,” the question arises as to what this entails. 
According to Murphy, Ecclesiastes, (at 13) “The “deeds” are the events that make up the fabric of human 
life, and they are inseparable from the “work” of God that will be explicitly mentioned later (7:13; 8:17). 
 553 Enns, Ecclesiastes, 82. 
 554 Ellermeier, Qohelet 1, understands (at 74) this section to be a reflection composed of (i) 
observation, (ii) rhetorical questions to admonitions (verses 16-17), and (iii) advice (verse 18). 
 555 So Whybray, “Qoheleth the Immoralist? (Qoh 7:16-17),” in Israelite Wisdom: Theological 
and Literary Essays in Honor of Samuel Terrien (ed. John G. Gammie et al.; New York: Scholars Press, 
1978), 191-204, esp. at 202. In his 1989 commentary, Ecclesiastes, he changed his position (at 119-20) 
and now suggests that verse 15 may be an independent short pensée. 
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Qoheleth claims to have seen everything (ytyar lkh-ta), whereupon he immediately 
signals his despair and negativity by the uncharacteristic way he applies his favourite 
lbh theme to his life - ylbh ymyb.556 Qoheleth thus moves to consider another of his 
observations introduced by the ever-recurring root har. Fox’s translation limits this to 
refer to the general observation relating to the righteous and the wicked, i.e., “I have 
seen both of these things.”557 (Cf. 2:14 for similar use of lk). Conversely, it could mean 
“everything” in the sense that “I have seen everything in my lbh life” (cf. 1:2; 12:8). 
Whatever may be the case, what follows amounts to a contradiction of the traditional 
theory of retribution (verse 15b), which then opens the way for the advice tendered in 
verses 16-17.          
  So once again, when Qoheleth uses the verb har in 7:15, it refers to observation 
and reflection.558 In some instances, which we will consider shortly (4:4, 7, 15, and 
8:10), Qoheleth’s observation is accompanied by a lbh conclusion. However, in 7:15 no 
recourse is made to the negative cosmic theme, and in verse 18 Qoheleth appears to 
revert to a more orthodox position by emphasizing the importance of “fearing God.” 
 The claim that Qoheleth makes at the beginning of this verse – that he has seen 
everything - seems very overblown as he posits a singular state of affairs. Furthermore, 
in making this statement about the righteous and the wicked, there is an issue about 
causation. Qoheleth is very clear-cut in his assertion that “righteous people” actually 
bring about their own demise. This assumes a causative connection. How is it possible 
to prove on an evidential basis that a righteous person brings about one’s demise? No 
reasons are offered.          
 Even more bizarrely, he states that “wicked people” extend their days by being 
evil. How can any man or woman be in a position to know that one reality – wicked 
people doing evil acts – is causatively connected to another – having a long life? Such a 
putative state of affairs is beyond human proof. In this instance, Qoheleth did not “see” 
                                                
 556 As Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, has it (at 339), “Qoheleth’s jaded mood is evident in his 
characterization of his own life as another example of hebel, with bîmê heblî (‘my brief days’) 
presumably referring to the fleeting or transitory qualities of breath which underlies the metaphor latent in 
the term.” 
 557 So also Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 120; Seow, Ecclesiastes, 252; Ogden, Qoheleth, 121; Loader, 
Ecclesiastes, 86; Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 69. Contra Brown, Ecclesiastes, who says (at 80) 
that Qoheleth’s “purview is global.” It should be noted that Qoheleth’s admonitions apply not only to 
righteousness and wickedness but also to wisdom and folly. 
 558 Ogden, Qoheleth, states (at 119) that “Observation and reflection are of the essence of the 
sage’s methodology, and the term har is Qoheleth’s term for this . . .” 
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something physical in the optical sense. This statement is but another example of a 
personal opinion that did not emanate from an empirical epistemology.  
                 8:17a
  
                       ~yhlah hX[m-lk-ta ytyarw
       XmXh-txt hX[n rXa hX[mh-ta awcml ~dah lkwy al yk 
 . . . then I saw all the work of God, that no one can find out what is happening under the sun. 
  
In chapter 8 we considered this statement in the context of 8:16-17 when examining 
Qoheleth’s use of acm = “to find.” Here our concentration is on what Qoheleth claims to 
have seen. Schoors has observed that, “The syntactical situation of ytyar is rather 
complicated.”559 However, our proposed resolution of identifying the object of ytyar 
agrees with Krüger (see chapter 8) in that Qoheleth attributed to the sovereign action of 
God the human limitation of understanding divine activity.560 In saying that Qoheleth 
saw (ytyar) man’s ignorance of divine activity, he was simply saying that he “realized” 
the severe limits of human cognition. In other words, Qoheleth came to a conclusion 
drawn from foundational premises about the nature of God and man that can only be 
viewed as a personal statement of belief. It is therefore very difficult to describe 
Qoheleth as an empiricist in this instance. Such an all-embracing theological statement 
is not verifiable in an empirical sense.  
9.5  har In The Context Of The Joy Passages 
In three of the seven “joy passages,” 2:24; 3:22 and 5:17 [ET 5:18], the verb har is 
found six times.          
                  2.24 
      bwj wXpn-ta harhw htXw lkayX ~dab bwj-!ya
         `ayh ~yhlah dym yk yna ytyar hz-~g wlm[b 
 There is nothing better for mortals than to eat and drink, and find enjoyment in their toil. 
 This also, I saw, is from the hand of God 
In chapter 4 we examined 2:24-26 as the first “joy passage” concentrating on God’s 
giving. In 2:24b Qoheleth concludes with his personal statement:-“This also, I saw, is 
from the hand of God,” where the particle hz refers to the “better/than saying” in part (a) 
of the verse. The term bwj in v 24a is another favourite word of Qoheleth’s and is a 
direct response to Qoheleth’s aspiration as expressed in 2:3b “. . . until I might see what 
was good for mortals to do under heaven during the few days of their life.” 
                                                
 559 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 71.  
 560 See chapter 8, f/n. 519. 
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 Diethelm Michel is correct when he concludes that Qoheleth is not referring to 
an observation, i.e., the verb does not indicate the empirical act of seeing.561 However, 
while he understands ytyar as meaning “consider, examine,” (here and throughout the 
book), I believe ytyar is better rendered, “to realize.”562 The use of the pleonastic yna 
with ytyar lends a very emphatic tone in the context of what is the first sustained 
theological reflection in the monologue. What is very interesting about the surrounding 
context of this joy passage is that in chapter two there are more occurrences of the lbh 
theme than in any other chapter in the book, appearing seven times in all.563 Verse 24 is, 
by itself, a very positive theological statement, but it is set in an arena of negativity 
found in the preceding verses, and especially in verse 26, where the arbitrary nature of 
God’s giving is followed by the lbh theme. We therefore conclude that Qoheleth’s act 
of seeing in this verse is essentially a theological observation that is impossible to verify 
– or falsify – by human experience.  
                 3:22 
        wqlx awh-yk wyX[mb ~dah xmXy rXam bwj !ya yk ytyarw
        `wyrxa hyhyX hmb twarl wnayby ym yk 
  So I saw that there is nothing better than that all should enjoy their work, for  
  that is their lot; who can bring them to see what will be after them? 
We have already considered 3:22b in chapter 7 under the sub-heading, “Man Cannot 
Know the Future.” Here in 3:22a we have a positive recommendation from Qoheleth 
that humans should enjoy their work “for that is their lot/ portion.” This verse is the 
climax of the section 3:15-22 and echoes similar comments found in the two previous 
joy passages, 2:24-26 and 3:12-13. But the phrase wqlx awh-yk = “for that is their lot” is 
the new ingredient. qlx is one of Qoheleth’s important terms, occurring 8 times in the 
book.564 According to Kurt Galling this term as used by Qoheleth is but a technical term 
for the space assigned for human existence.565 Seow gives this a concrete socio -
                                                
 561 Michel, Untersuchungen, “Auch das habe ich betrachtet (!), daß dies aus der Hand Gottes 
kommt.” = “I have also considered this to come from the hand of God.” 
 562 So Fox, Qohelet, 335. 
 563 2:11, 15b, 17b, 19b, 21b, 23b, and 26b. It is also interesting to note that the phrase often 
associated with lbh, - xwr tw[rw lbh hz-~g - is found in 2:11, 17b, and 26b. Also in 21b, lbh is joined with 
the phrase hbr h[rw to describe a succession problem. 
 564 2:10, 21; 3:22; 5:17-18 [ET 5:18-19]. 9:6, 9; 11:2. See Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 
(198-200). According to Schoors (at 200) the term has the typical meaning of referring to “man’s portion 
in this life under the sun, which mainly consists in the enjoyment potential of one’s wealth, but which 
also includes such things as human feelings.”  
 565 Galling, Prediger, 89. “qlx ist für Q. geradezu terminus technicus für den der menschlichen 
Existenz zugewiesenen Raum.” Galling’s definition is too broad and lacks specificity.  
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economic setting in the Persian period suggesting that the term refers to a plot of land or 
other valuable assets.566 The term literally means “portion/lot,” but Qoheleth uses it in 
different ways.567 Generally, however, it has a positive meaning in Ecclesiastes. One 
final point, the use of the asseverative yk = “indeed/surely,” (also found in 3:12, and in 
2:24) reflects the seriousness of his call to enjoyment.     
  As with the previous two joy passages above, in 3:22a Qoheleth is not engaged 
in an empirical exercise. He is well inside the boundaries of expressing private opinion 
when he, once again, issues this positive call to enjoy life under the sun. In other words, 
the use of the verb ytyar in this verse does not of itself indicate that Qoheleth literally 
observed a physical phenomenon. Qoheleth’s advocacy of enjoyment in this context is 
an uplifting, personal response to the depressing reality attached to the litany of human 
wickedness, injustice, and the common fate of animals and humans described in 3:16-
21. 
                   5:17 
        hpy-rXa bwj yna ytyar-rXa hnh 
            wlm[-lkb hbwj twarlw twtXlw-lwkal
         wyh-ymy rpsm XmXh-txt lm[yX
                   `wqlx awh-yk ~yhlah wl-!tn rXa 
 This is what I have seen to be good: it is fitting to eat and drink and find enjoyment in all the 
 toil with which one toils under the sun the few days of the life God gives us; for this is our lot. 
The verb ytyar occurs twice in this verse. First, it is found in the perfect form, bwj yna 
ytyar-rXa = literally, “. . .what I myself have seen to be good.” The use of the pleonastic 
yna, and the interjectionary “hnh” at the beginning of the verse, adds a very emphatic tone 
to Qoheleth’s claim. The second occurrence of har is in the infinitive construct form, 
hbwj twarlw = literally, “. . . and to see the good,” but normally rendered “. . . and find 
enjoyment.”           
 The contents of this verse are another direct response to Qoheleth’s experimental 
outlook recorded in chapter 2:3b, similar to the sage’s response at 2:24 noted above. 
The meaning of har in both forms is not confirmation of a physical act of ‘seeing.’ In 
                                                
 566 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 132-33. But see Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, (198-200). 
According to Schoors (at 200) the term has the typical meaning of referring to “man’s portion in this life 
under the sun, which mainly consists in the enjoyment potential of one’s wealth, but which also includes 
such things as human feelings.” For a fuller discussion of the meaning of qlx see Fox, A Rereading, 109-
11. 
 567 For example, it refers to riches in 2:21 and 11:2, i.e., something in one’s possession only 
during this life. But see 9:9, where qlx means neither riches nor land. And in 9:6, where, according to 
Fox, A Rereading, 293,  “Man’s portion includes his feelings, among them his love, hatred, and envy. 
One who has these has a “portion in all that happens under the sun.”  
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keeping with our comments under the sub-heading 9.2 above, the verb har could be 
rendered “I found” in both cases. Indeed, ytyar could also be translated, “This is what I 
know to be good.” But whether this verb is to be rendered “know,” “see,” or “find,” 
there cannot be any doubt that Qoheleth is not in engaged in an empirical experiment. In 
these three instances the verb har does not refer to the empirical act of seeing. The 
meaning is rather indicative of a very personal reflection whereby Qoheleth came to 
“discover/realize” or “reached a conclusion” how humans should live their lives on 
earth.568 In all three cases, it is not possible to view Qoheleth as an empiricist due to the 
fact that the advice he offers is his own personal recommendation.   
 We will now proceed to the next chapter to examine the remaining occurrences 
of har, which will be followed by a summary and an assessment of this important verb 
in Qoheleth’s epistemology.  
 
 
  
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 568 Contra Michel, Untersuchungen, who, as noted earlier, prefers to render har throughout by 
“consider, examine.” But he still posits (at 190) the possibility of the meaning “to realize” in 5:17. See 
Whitley, Koheleth, (at 55) who renders ytyar “I have discovered.” 
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PART 4.  QOHELETH’S USE OF THE VERB har 
 
Chapter 10: The Verb har = “I see”  (Part B) 
 
The remaining occurrences of the verb har to be considered in this chapter fall into 
three categories:  
 (i)  Evils Observed,  
 (ii) Wisdom Observed, and  
 (iii) Socio-Political Realities Observed 
10.1 Evils Observed 
There are five occasions where Qoheleth claims to have seen examples of 
evil/wickedness. 
          5:12-13 [ET 5:13-14]
         
        XmXh txt ytyar hlwx h[r Xy 12
               `wt[rl  wyl[bl rwmX rX[ 
            [r !yn[b awhh rX[h dbaw 13
           `hmwam wdyb !yaw !b dylwhw 
 12 There is a grievous ill that I have seen under the sun: riches were kept by their owners to 
 their hurt,          
 13 and those riches were lost in a bad venture; though they are parents of children, they have 
 nothing in their hands. 
This observation comes in the passage 5:9-16 [ET 5:8-15] that appears to be a separate 
unit focused on the acquisition and retention of wealth with its associated problems. The 
inadequacy of riches is clearly spelt out in verse 9. The next verse comments on the 
accumulation of wealth that results in a vacuum in the life of the owner. The immediate 
response to this state of affairs in verse 10b is an echo of the programmatic question in 
1:3 and 3:9. The vacuum is further emphasized in verse 11 where the labourer enjoys 
his sleep but the rich cannot get their sleep due to the worry of losing their wealth.569 
  Verse 12 triggers a discussion that ends at verse 16. Qoheleth begins with the 
existential particle Xy that gives the impression that an objective fact is to follow. As 
Antoon Schoors has noted, “Qoheleth often uses Xy to introduce a case which 
                                                
 569 Gordis, Koheleth, notes (at 252) that, “The guarding of wealth entails anxiety and care.” 
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exemplifies what he has seen under the sun.”570 In robust language reference is then 
made to hlwx h[r = “a grievous evil.” This phrase “communicates to the reader 
something of Qoheleth’s emotional horror of the thought of having it all and not having 
any personal peace.”571 Here ytyar has the meaning of “I observed/perceived.” But the 
question arises, what was the grievous evil that Qoheleth observed? Are two separate 
evil situations envisioned in the verses that follow, or just one?   
  Bo Isaksson presents two assessments, though he does remind the reader that 
this is one of those passages that offers the interpreter two possibilities without 
sufficient evidence to choose only one.572 The first view is that verses 12-13 provide a 
single example of one person whom Qoheleth has observed. Secondly, verse 13 
explains the “sick misfortune” of verse 12. Isaksson favours the view that verse 13 
“constitutes a general statement in connection with the preceding verse. The scenario in 
5:13 serves to depict the general truth about the vanity of labour.”573 Longman opts for 
another interpretation based on the repetition of hlwx h[r in verse 15a. He states 
“Qoheleth gives two different scenarios, both of which are evil and which are united by 
the futility of wealth.”574 The first scenario in verse 12 describes the tragedy of the 
person who hoards all his money; the second in verse 13 refers to riches lost through an 
unspecified adventure. The situation so depicted is evil575 as it brings harm to the 
individual.           
 The Hebrew text of verses 13-14 is ambiguous for it is not clear which 
statements refer to the father and which to the son. Whatever the case, the essential 
point is that Qoheleth’s purpose was to draw attention to the reader with dramatic 
emphasis, ‘the futility of an obsessive devotion to money-making by pilling up a series 
of exaggerated expressions of misery, thus providing an effective contrast to his recipe 
for happiness in the verse which follows.’576 The last three verses of chapter five are a 
                                                
 570 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 181. 
 571 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 319. Ogden, Qoheleth, observes (at 88), Qoheleth’s purpose in citing 
this case is to bring the theme of materialism’s inability to answer human need into direct relationship to 
his search for yitrôn (5:15).” 
 572 Isaksson, Studies, 95.  
 573 Isaksson, Studies, 96. 
 574 Longman, Ecclesiastes, 166. 
 575 The so-called “evil” does not necessarily infer immoral actions to the person who caused the 
loss. 
 576 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 102. 
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ringing approval of the joy theme.        
 This pericope once again reveals how deeply Qoheleth feels about human toil, 
and the wealth it can generate. Yet he becomes disconsolate when he reflects on the 
effects of bad business decisions that lead to cataclysmic loss, for both father and son. 
“The fact that the victim had a son who would normally have inherited his father’s 
fortune and social position increases ‘the grievous evil.’ ”577    
  In this scenario Qoheleth mixes value judgment with observational facts. He has 
clearly known and observed wealthy people but he does not elucidate as to how riches 
can cause (har) misery/distress to someone. This assessment is the sage’s personal 
opinion, a value judgment. Bankruptcy alluded to in verse 13 is a catastrophe for 
anyone, especially where a family is involved; but need that misfortune act as a premise 
upon which Qoheleth draws his ever-recurring lbh conclusion? Given Qoheleth’s 
entrepreneurial successes as recounted in chapter 2, which were not achieved without 
onerous toil and stress, it seems odd that Qoheleth is unable to bring himself to 
appreciate that, notwithstanding the extenuating circumstances of a failed enterprise, a 
person with a strong and steely character could rise to a new challenge and start again, 
as many people have done, then and since. In other words, a lbh conclusion does not 
ineluctably flow from the scenario outlined in these verses.      
                         6:1-2 
          `~dah-l[ ayh hbrw XmXh tht ytyar rXa h[r Xy 1 
      wXpnl rsx wnnyaw dwbkw ~ysknw rX[ ~yhlah wl-!ty rXa Xya 2 
              yk wnmm lkal ~yhlah wnjylXy-alw hwaty-rXa lkm 
              `awh [r ylxw lbh hz wnlkay yrkn Xya 
 1 There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, and it lies heavy upon humankind:  
 2 those to whom God gives wealth, possessions, and honor, so that they lack nothing of all 
 that they desire, yet God does not enable them to enjoy these things, but a stranger enjoys 
 them. This is vanity; it is a grievous ill. 
These two verses appear in the unit 5:9 [ET 5:8] – 6:9, which can be described as a 
reflection on possessions.578 Once again the particle of existence (Xy) introduces another 
example of an evil (h[r) at the commencement of verse 1, and at the end of verse 2 the 
said example is worthy of the double description, lbh and [r ylxw.579 These verses mirror 
                                                
  577  Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 123. 
 578 See Fredericks, “Chiasm and Parallel Structure in Qoheleth 5:9-6:9,” JBL 108: 17-35, for a 
detailed rhetorical analysis of this unit.  
 579 A number of MSS read hlwx h[r but this is viewed as a scribal accommodation to link it with 
a similar phrase in 5:12 [ET 5:13]. See Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 104, and Barton, Ecclesiastes, 134. The 
ancient versions endorse the MT. 
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5:17-18 [ET 5:18-19], sharing similarities but also significance differences.580 
Commenting on 6:1-2, William Brown writes “This example constitutes an arbitrary 
reversal of what is described in 5:17, in which Qoheleth claims wealth and its 
enjoyment as gifts of God.”581       
 Qoheleth’s observations are certainly in stark contrast to the scenario depicted in 
5:17-19. Several important points are made. First, it is God who gives dwbkw ~ysknw rX[ = 
“wealth, and possessions and honour.” Second, these three terms are found in their 
application to Solomon in 1 Chr 1:11-12, though as Ogden has noted, the more obvious 
parallel is with Qoheleth’s own description of his own success in 2:1-8.582 And third, 
despite having all these material riches, and leaving nothing to be desired, this man was 
unable to enjoy it all.         
 The evil referred to in verse 1 is depicted as `~dah-l[ ayh hbrw = “and it lies 
heavy upon mankind.” This phrase, which is uncertain in meaning, is unusual and 
appears again in 8:6. Gordis supports the translation of hbr as “common, prevalent.”583 
This would view the term as referring to quantity, but it also can denote qualitative 
greatness. Both views are possible since this evil can afflict any person at any time. In 
2:24-26 Qoheleth refers to an arbitrary deity who permits some to enjoy what they 
possess, but not others. But, ironically in 6:1-2, a stranger (yrkn) will be favoured to 
enjoy the benefits.584 The term yrkn usually means a foreigner or non-relative, though it 
could mean someone inside the family. There is uncertainty in reference here as there is 
in determining the causes thwarting the man’s enjoyment of his fortune. Whatever the 
reality is in both instances, the fact remains that Qoheleth’s theological assumption is 
that all material wealth, possessions and the accompanying social status derive from 
                                                
 580 Seow, Ecclesiastes, (at 224-25), summarizes these as follows: (i) one is positive, (5:17-18); 
the other [6:1-2] negative; (2) one is universal, the other particular; and (3) one indicates the rule, the 
other the exception to the rule. Isaksson, Studies in the Language, at 122, elaborates on item (3), 
“Therefore, the general rule that people are allowed to enjoy their wealth is an expression of the sole 
grace of God. In 6:1-2 on the other hand, the evil that is considered, and which weighs heavily on man, is 
the possibility of exceptions to the rule.” 
 581 Brown, Ecclesiastes, 64. 
 582 Ogden, Qoheleth, 96. 
 583 Gordis, Koheleth, 257. Longman, Ecclesiastes, opts for “frequent” (at 169). 
 584 It is an interesting fact that the verb !tn = “to give” occurs a total of twenty-five times in the 
book. Twelve times it is used with God as the subject. As Murphy, Ecclesiastes, has pointed out (at  
lxviii), God is very active in Ecclesiastes. With reference to mankind, the object of God’s giving includes, 
“an evil task” (1:13b); “wisdom, honour and joy,” (2:26a); “gathering and heaping,” (2:26b); “to the one 
who pleases God,” 2:26c; “business to be busy with,” (3:10); “a consciousness of the eternal,” (3:11); 
“the days of one’s life,” (5:17[ET 5:18 ]; 8:15; 9:9); “riches, wealth, possessions,” (5:18 [ET 5:19] ); 6:2); 
“the spirit of life,” (12:7).  
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God’s sovereign hand.585       
 Qoheleth makes several references to wealth and the implications of its 
possession for humans in the monologue, but these two verses are soaked with 
negativity: the spirit of the joyfulness of life is completely absent. To assess the 
situation so described with terms like h[r, ~dah-l[ ayh hbrw, yrkn, lbh, and [r ylxw, leads 
one to the conclusion that Qoheleth’s evaluation of life stems, not so much from an 
empirical base, but is located in his own theological presuppositions and psychological 
predilections.               
                     8:10 
               wabw ~yrbq ~y[Xr ytyar !kbw
                               wX[-!k rXa ry[b wxktXyw wklhy Xwdq ~wqmmw
                                                            `lbh hz-~g 
 10 Then I saw the wicked buried; they used to go in and out of the holy place, and were  
 praised in the city where they had done such things. This also is vanity. 
The rendering given by the NRSV of this verse represents a common understanding of 
Qoheleth’s observation. But as Krüger as noted, “Verse 10 is among the most difficult 
verses to understand in the book of Qoheleth.”586 The verse begins with !kbw, which 
means “thus/then,” and is only found elsewhere in the OT in Esth 4:16. Its function here 
is to introduce a new section. That much is clear, but the rest of the verse as a whole is 
far from certain in its meaning.        
 The real difficulty is determining what Qoheleth saw. Is Qoheleth making an 
observation about the wicked (evil), or is he highlighting the different outcomes 
between the wicked and the righteous? There is no doubt, as John Jarick has noted, 
“Koheleth undoubtedly began by talking about the wicked (MT ~y[Xr, LXX  avsebei/j) but 
was he still talking about such people towards the end of the verse?”587 Scholars are 
divided on this question.        
 As it stands the MT is very difficult to decipher. Many scholars have sought a 
clearer meaning by adopting an emendation to the text. For example, Murphy renders 
the verse: “Then I saw the wicked buried. They used to come and go from the holy 
                                                
 585 Treier, Proverbs & Ecclesiastes, comments thus (at 177), “Given the ascription of divine 
agency, it almost appears as if God is to blame, preventing these folks from enjoyment by withholding the 
power to do so. Such is an instance of probably the most difficult theological conundrum within the book: 
God’s sovereign determination not to allow certain people to enjoy their wealth being termed “evil.” 
 586 Krüger, Qoheleth, 159.  
 587 Jarick, Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes (SBLSCS 29; Atlanta: Scholars 
Press, 1990), 211. 
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place! But those were forgotten in the city who had acted justly.”588 This translation 
retains the verb wxktXyw = “were forgotten,” but it emends the text by supplying the 
adverb “justly,” the equivalent of which is not found in the Hebrew text. Scholars who 
adopt the opposite view, like Longman, have their translation referring only to the 
wicked: “Thus, I observed the wicked buried and departed. They used to go out of the 
holy place, and they were praised in the city where they acted in such a way.”589  
 Stuart Weeks suggests that the term ~yribuq. = “buried” or “tombs,” was mistaken 
for the original word ~ybireq. = “approaching, coming near.”590 His rendering is, “And 
then I saw wicked people who approach and enter a holy place: they walk about and are 
praised in the city for having done so. This too is an illusion.”591 Weeks goes on to 
suggest that Qoheleth is probably implying that when the wicked present themselves 
and linger before God at the holy place/Temple, they almost invite retribution – “tempt 
fate,” as it were – and that when none comes, they leave safely with their reputations 
actually enhanced.          
 This is presented by Weeks as a tentative explanation and it is a plausible 
attempt to resolve a very difficult text. It should be noted, however, that the lbh 
conclusion points to a situation that for Qoheleth is frustrating and troubling. There is 
also the fact that the preceding and following verses indicate some kind of injustice that 
is being referred to. In that light I think Whitley’s rendering is persuasive, “And then I 
saw the wicked brought to their graves, while the righteous depart life without decent 
burial, and are forgotten by the community.” 592     
  The juxtaposition of the righteous and the wicked is found elsewhere in the book 
and the behaviour and circumstances of both groups causes Qoheleth great anguish. In 
any case, whatever the meaning of this verse, the important issue is that Qoheleth saw a 
                                                
 588 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 79. So also Ginsburg, Coheleth, 398-99; Delitzsch, Biblischer 
Commentar, 338-39. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, seems to favour the balance of the wicked being contrasted 
with the righteous (at 136); Seow, Ecclesiastes, 276; Lohfink, Qoheleth, 105; Whitley, Koheleth, 76; 
Gordis, Koheleth, 295; Fox, A Rereading, 282: Krüger, Qoheleth, 158. Ogden, Qoheleth, seems to accept 
this interpretation (at 146-7). Contra, Power, Ecclesiastes, 102-103. 
 589  Longman, Ecclesiastes, 216. So also Barton, Ecclesiastes, 153; Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 
289; Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, 188, 190; McNeile, Ecclesiastes, 106; Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 
178-80; Crenshaw, Ecclesiastes, 153. 
 590 Weeks, Unpublished script on Ecclesiastes. This was earlier suggested by F. C. Burkitt, “Is 
Ecclesiastes a Translation?” 25-26. This suggestion is followed by many commentators. For a discussion 
of the issues see J. Serrano, “I Saw The Wicked Buried,” CBQ 16 (1954): 168-70 and Whitley, Koheleth, 
74-76. 
 591 Weeks, Unpublished script on Ecclesiastes. 
 592 Whitley, Koheleth, 76. 
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situation that involved, at least, the wicked, who were the subject of public praise when 
that should not have been the case. For Qoheleth, the resultant incongruity was another 
instantiation of lbh.          
 In this instance it is safe to say that Qoheleth physically observed people in the 
city, in a literal sense. Other sages, I am sure, would have had occasion to observe such 
goings-on as well. But observing the burial of wicked people in a holy place, when 
previously such individuals were applauded in the city, does not necessarily have to 
lead to a lbh conclusion. This is but another example of a very negative conclusion that 
is driven by Qoheleth’s pessimistic outlook on the world.  
                             10:5-7 
                  XmXh txt ytyar h[r Xy     5
                                                                      `jylXh  ynplm acyX hggXk 
                   ~ybr ~ymwrmb lksh !tn   6
              `wbXy lpXb ~yryX[w  
                              ~ysws-l[ ~ydb[ ytyar   7
                  `#rah-l[ ~ydb[k ~yklh ~yrXw 
                   
 5 There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as great an error as if it proceeded from  
 the ruler:          
  6 folly is set in many high places, and the rich sit in a low place.   
  7 I have seen slaves on horseback, and princes walking on foot like slaves. 
Once again Qoheleth employs the particle of existence (Xy) to introduce another 
phenomenon that he has observed “under the sun.” This is yet one more of his example 
stories in which Qoheleth identifies an “evil” which, on this occasion, is situated in the 
higher echelons of society. In verse 5 notice is given that a ruler (who is not specifically 
mentioned) is responsible for an error (hnnXk),593 the results of which lead to social and 
political instability in the body politic (verses 6-7).      
 The issue at stake seems to be in the nature of unwise appointments made by the 
ruler. Fredericks suggests that this mistake is “probably a directive that put inept people 
in responsible positions – the same thoughtless, culpable sort of mistake that the fool 
gives as his useless defence to the temple (5:6).”594 That may be so, but whatever the 
exact circumstances that Qoheleth has in mind, the Sitz im Leben is one where, “The 
                                                
 593 The consonant k on hnnX is, in Crenshaw’s view, Ecclesiastes (at 170) to be understood as 
asservative (cf. GKC §118x). So also Gordis, Koheleth, who states (at 319) that the kap in hnnXk is not to 
be rendered “like, as,” but “indeed.” See also Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 98. Contra, Ogden, Qoheleth, 181-2. 
Various attempts have been made to indentify the ruler but without success, see Barton, Ecclesiastes, 171. 
 594 Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, 221. The term hnnXk denotes a thoughtless error, the kind 
of behaviour associated with a fool. Thus error could be rendered oversight. See, Ogden, Qoheleth, 181. 
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world seems to have gone mad; the normal order of things seems to have been turned 
upside down.”595         
 What appeared to be happening in Qoheleth’s society was that he observed a 
reality that constituted a reversal of expectations. The rich were demoted while fools 
were elevated to high positions in the governance of the county. Yet, a ruler was 
expected to be wise and to promote and implement principles of justice in society; 
indeed, the ruler (King) was held to be the source and fount of justice. But slaves are 
now on horses, the ownership of the latter signifying wealth and social prestige; and 
members of the ruling classes (princes) now walk on foot likes slave (verse 7).596  
 This observation is but a negative evaluation of wisdom, or to put it more 
directly, it represents a deconstruction of traditional wisdom.597 As Leo Perdue 
comments,   
 This classic depiction of a “world upside down,” in which the normal social order has become 
 topsy-turvy, subverts the structured world of the sages, where the wise succeed and prosper 
 and the fools fail because of their own stupidity. The absurdity of the present social order  
 demonstrates the impotency of wisdom to steer a rational course toward certainty and well-
 being.598 
Not for the first time did Qoheleth utilize an example story to expose the vulnerability 
of wisdom. Notwithstanding, Qoheleth is but pointing out that in his society, decisions 
that are made at the highest level can come to destabilize the social order eventually 
leading to political and social chaos.599      
 As Salyer has noted, the unit 10:5-7 represents the last observation in the 
book.600 With the observed level of inversion in society, one might have expected 
                                                
 595 Seow, Ecclesiastes, 325. Many scholars refer to the scenario depicted in 10:5-7 as “a topsy-
turvy world.” R. Van Leeuwen, “Proverbs,” in The New Interpreter’s Bible (ed. L. E. Keck, 5:17-264, 
Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), comments (at 254) “it is an instance of the world upside down, a pattern of 
inversion or chaos that is found throughout the world from ancient times to the present.” See also Van 
Leeuwen, “Proverbs 30:21-23 and the Biblical World Upside Down,” JBL 105 (1986): 599-610. For a 
remarkable parallel to this unit that occurs in the Egyptian The Admonitions of Ipuwer, see Lichtheim, 
AEL 1, 149-62.  
 596 Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, comments (at 322) that, “Horses were costly and were used 
mainly for military purposes or to carry nobles and kings.” 
 597 So Bartholomew, Ecclesiastes, 322. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, remarks (at 101) “There may be a 
middle - or - upper class scale of values reflected in these judgments. At the same time they illustrate the 
uncertainty of the courtier, despite wisdom: things do not turn out the way one expects.” 
 598 Perdue, Wisdom and Creation, 231. 
 599 Seow, Ecclesiastes, discusses well (at 324-25) these aspects of this unit. For a useful 
discussion on societal issues see Krüger, Qoheleth, 183-85. See also in this vein, Lohfink, Qoheleth, 126; 
Fredericks, Ecclesiastes, (at 221), where he observes this unit raises questions about ‘elitism’ in the ANE 
world, a social concept Qoheleth seems to endorse.   
 600 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 363. 
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Qoheleth to invoke his lbh conclusion, as he did in 6:1-2 (though not at 5:12-13). 
However, on this occasion his observation is one of deep self-interest:- “The only value 
expressed here is the well-being of the economically advantaged, a position that is 
hardly attractive.”601 Chapter 10:5-7 is, therefore, another example of Qoheleth’s 
observations, in this instance, one that is conditioned by his own social class and 
personal outlook. In none of these four units (5:12-13; 6:1-2; 8:10, and 10:5-7) can it be 
said that Qoheleth derived his propositional statements from an exclusively empirical 
base. They are statements made principally reflecting his personal assumptions, 
observations, and opinions.  
10.2  Wisdom Observed 
Under this heading we will consider 2:13-14a, and 9:13; both refer to the significance of 
wisdom, but in very different ways. In 2:13-14a there is a positive appreciation of 
wisdom.           
                    2:13-14a 
                           twlksh-!m hmkxl !wrty XyX yna ytyarw 13
            `%Xxh-!m rwah !wrtyk  
      %lwh $Xxb lyskhw wXarb wyny[ ~kxh   14a
           
 13 Then I saw that wisdom excels folly as light excels darkness.    
 14aThe wise have eyes in their head, but fools walk in darkness.   
  
We examined 2:14 in chapter 6 under the sub-heading, “Qoheleth’s Dogmatic Claims to 
Knowledge.”  Our main concern there was to determine what Qoheleth claims to have 
known. Here, the question is focused on what Qoheleth claims to have seen in verse 13. 
  In verse 12, Qoheleth turns (yna ytynpw) to observe (twarl) wisdom, madness and 
folly, which, particularly with the pleonastic use of yna, indicates that he is intent on 
conducting an investigation as thorough as possible. The context in which this positive 
appraisal of wisdom is given is important. A brief reference to madness and folly is 
made in 1:17, and now at 2:13-17, the sage returns to the same topic by first considering 
the relative worth of wisdom and folly. This is immediately followed by the problem 
associated with successors to property (2:18-23).      
  It is a most salient feature of the passage 2:12-23 that the term lbh occurs an 
amazing five times. Very noticeable also is the prominence of another of Qoheleth’s 
key words- lm[, which in its noun and verbal forms is found no less than nine times.  
Another word typical of the sage is hrq = “to meet, to befall,” and the related noun hrqm 
                                                
 601 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 363. 
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= “accident, chance.” The former occurs in 2:14, 15; 9:11, while the latter is also found 
in 2:14, 15; 3:19 (x3); 9:2, 3.602 Thus, the very positive approval of wisdom in 2:13-14a 
is surrounded by a wall of negativity; and in 2:14b we have what is arguably the most 
effective put-down on wisdom in the book – the wise and the foolish die.  
 When Qoheleth states that he “saw” (yna ytyarw) the superiority of wisdom in 
verse 13, we may ask how was this conclusion reached? Wisdom is an abstract quality, 
which by definition cannot be visually seen by the naked eye. To claim that one has 
seen wisdom is to say that one has seen an example of wisdom in action. But assessing 
what is and what is not wisdom is a value judgment. Whether Qoheleth is citing a 
proverb or not in this instance is immaterial, the key issue is that these verses are a set-
up that leads to his reflections on death, a familiar topic that surfaces in verses 14b-23. 
Qoheleth concludes by saying that he hates life (v17) as well as toil (v18), and for 
humans, life is full of pain, vexation, and insomnia. This is another example of 
Qoheleth’s dogmatism that ends, once again, with a lbh conclusion. Qoheleth’s ‘seeing’ 
in this case had not an empirical foundation per se. His belief does not measure up as 
secure knowledge but is the result of his own instinctive opinion. 
                  9:13 
              `yla ayh hlwdgw XmXh txt hmkx ytyar hz-~g  
 I have also seen this example of wisdom under the sun, and it seemed great to me.  
This verse introduces another example story (cf. 4:7-8), which Etan Levine describes as 
a burlesque of governmental “sagacity.”603 Neither is this anecdote bereft of a strong 
hint of irony.604 In the story, Qoheleth pointedly focuses on wisdom and its 
effectiveness, a story that is built on striking contrasts. In verse 14 reference is made to 
a small city (hnjq ry[) which was surrounded by a powerful king (lwdg $lm). The 
outcome of this stand-off appears to be obvious as it was overwhelmed with great siege 
works (~yldg ~yrwcm). This suggests that a large army was on stand-by. Despite the 
hopeless outlook, the city is saved by the actions of a poor, wise man. No details are 
given, but his skilful use of wisdom highlights its value. In a way, this example story is 
linked to 9:11 where the sage observes, “the battle is not to the mighty.” Against 
insuperable odds the wisdom of a poor, wise man effected the successful lifting of the 
                                                
 602 For a stimulating article on hrqm see Peter Machinist,  “Fate, miqreh, and Reason,” 159-75. 
 603 Levine, “The Humor in Qohelet,” ZAW 109 (1997): 71-83 (at 77). 
 604 So J. Lavoie, “La philosophie politique de Qo 9,13-16,” ScEs 49 (1997): 315-28 (at 27). See 
K. Dell, The Book of Job as Sceptical Literature (BZAW 197; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991). For her, (at  
144) verse 16a gives the moral of the story but Qoheleth gives his own modification at verse 18b. 
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siege.605             
 Yet, this striking fact remained for Qoheleth, a fact that burdened him greatly 
(verse 13b, = yla ayh hlwdgw): in the face of the power of the poor man’s wisdom, the 
fickleness of humans ensured that no one remembered his incredible achievement (verse 
15c). Poignantly, Qoheleth writes, “Yet no one remembered that poor man.” Verse 16 
closes this unit in a traditional manner “I said, “Better wisdom than might,” yet the 
wisdom of the poor man is held in contempt, and his words are not heard.”  
  This anecdote well illustrates wisdom’s power (wisdom is better than might – 
verse 15a), and its vulnerability (no one remembered the poor wise man – verse 15b). In 
the two remaining verses of this chapter, Qoheleth confirms the desirability of wisdom 
when comparing the wise with fools (verse17), but adds a qualification in verse 18b, to 
the effect that while wisdom is better than war, “but one bungler (dxa ajwxw) destroys 
much good.”         
 Again we can detect that Qoheleth is not setting out in this example story to 
make an observation in an objective, empirical sense. He has a point of view about 
wisdom that here is qualified. This passage is really another set-up for Qoheleth to vent 
his own very personal opinion about wisdom, and he comes to that task with a negative 
pedigree that is evident from the early material of the book.    
10.3  Socio-Political Realities Observed      
In a series of passages Qoheleth makes a range of observations and reflections on the 
political and social realities of his time. 
 
                   3:16 
              XmXh tht ytyar dw[w
               [Xrh hmX jpXmh ~wqm
                `[Xrh hmX qdch ~wqmw 
  Moreover I saw under the sun that in the place of justice, wickedness was there, and in the 
 place of righteousness, wickedness was there as well. 
                                                
 605 The phrase awh-jlmw has occasioned scholarly discussion. Some argue that the verb refers to 
the sage’s potential, rather than his actual success. Seow, Ecclesiastes, notes (at 310) that the verb jlm 
(Piel perfect) is used here to indicate a hypothetical situation (what might have happened).  See also 
Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 148. Whybray holds that the translation “he could have delivered the city) fits in 
well with the next verse (verse 16); also Hertzberg, Der Prediger, 186-7. Contra Gordis, Koheleth, states 
(at 311) that the hypothetical interpretation is “ruled out by the rest of the verse, “and no one remembered 
the poor man,” which would be meaningless if no saving act had actually taken place.” Fox, A Rereading, 
also prefers the interpretation (at 300) that no one remembered what Qoheleth had in fact accomplished, 
which I think is correct. 
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Qoheleth introduces a new topic by the use of ytyar dw[w = “Furthermore/moreover, 
again, I saw (observed),” which, in Barton’s view “is but loosely connected with the 
survey of times and seasons.”606 The next unit, 3:10-15, is deeply theological in tone, 
the deity being referenced no less than nine times. From reflections on God as creator 
and giver, Qoheleth now moves to present his first (but not his last) reference in the 
monologue to the presence of injustice in human affairs.     
 The sage identifies a serious problem in human jurisprudence: where one 
expects to find justice (presumably equitable judgments in law courts) the ugly features 
of injustice and wickedness are prominent, and where one looks for righteousness 
(presumably in Temples) there is also wickedness. The repetition of [Xrh hmX not only 
indicates the seriousness of the matter for Qoheleth, but adds a certain poignancy and 
solemnity to his observation.607 As Gordis puts it, “. . . the repetition of the phrase [Xrh 
hmX has a sombre power, reflecting the intensity of Koheleth’s feeling on the 
subject.”608 It is important to note that, as Whybray has observed, Qoheleth is not 
asserting that corruption is endemic in society in perpetuity.609 But the sage does claim 
that he has observed instances of injustice and political corruption.    
  Qoheleth responds in verse 17 to this state of affairs: just as there is a time for 
everything (cf. 3:1), so there must be a time for God’s judgment, as stated in verse 17b. 
The fact that Qoheleth insists on the reality of divine judgment would, I suggest, have 
been a common view in his day, but in the context of 3:16-21, we are in the realm of 
theological affirmation. We have tentatively suggested that the injustice and the 
wickedness alluded to in verse 16 is that of the law courts and Jewish piety. Yet there is 
some ambiguity attached to what Qoheleth actually saw, or observed. But whatever the 
exact nature of the phenomenon he claims to have observed, it is very interesting to note 
that his assertion in verse 17 about the certainty of God’s judgment, is not a proposition 
that was extrapolated simply from his observation. Qoheleth has the habit of setting his 
observations in line with a worldview that he has established in part, or entirely on 
dogmatic or doctrinal grounds.        
                                                
 606 Barton, Ecclesiastes, 108. Weeks, Ecclesiastes, states (at 68) that 3:16 “moves on both to a 
different topic and to the more disconnected style that characterizes the rest of the monologue.” 
 607 So Loader, Ecclesiastes, 42. 
 608 Gordis, Koheleth, 234. 
 609 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 77. Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, observes (at 134), “We enter on another 
phase of the seeker’s thoughts. The moral disorder of the world, its oppressive rulers, its unjust judges, 
and its religious hypocrisies, oppress him even more than the failure of his own schemes of happiness.” 
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 The reality of God’s judgment would have been a fixed point in the mind of 
Qoheleth’s contemporaries. But on Qoheleth’s part there is not an iota of empirical 
evidence presented anywhere in Ecclesiastes for the assertion that God judges humans. 
What in fact Qoheleth is doing is not using observation as the basis of belief; he is 
setting observations and beliefs next to each other in order to draw conclusions about 
things that cannot be seen. 
                           4:1 
                                        ~yqX[h-lk-ta haraw yna ytbXw
                 XmXh txt ~yX[n rXa
           ~xnm ~hl !yaw ~yqX[h t[md hnhw
             `~xnm ~hl !yaw xm ~hyqX[ dymw 
  Again I saw all the oppressions that are practiced under the sun. Look, the tears of the  
  oppressed - with no one to comfort them! On the side of their oppressors there was power – 
  with no one to comfort them.   
Qoheleth now moves to highlight a second injustice. In 4:1-3 there is a brief but moving 
treatment of human oppression. The sage claims to have seen “all the oppressions under 
the sun.” This sounds like hyperbole, though Fredericks suggests that Qoheleth “did not 
see all the oppression, only all kinds of it.”610 Whatever the case, in this unit Qoheleth 
“was passing, to use modern terms, from egoism to altruism, thinking more of the 
misery of others than of his own enjoyment.”611 It is undoubtedly true that this verse 
offers a penetrating observation of injustice of one group lording it over others.612  
  While there is a lack of detail as to the nature of the oppression and the identity 
of the oppressors, yet Qoheleth’s use of language is striking. There is (i) a threefold use 
of the root in qX[;613 (ii) the dramatic use of hnhw = “And behold,” the placement of 
which is used at a crucial point in the verse to create maximum emotional impact; (iii) 
the inclusion of the very emotive words ‘tears’ and ‘comfort;’ (iv) the skilful repetition 
of the phrase ~xnm ~hl !yaw. And finally, there is the change from the prose to the poetic 
form (from 1a to 1b). “All these features combine to produce an effect of emotional 
                                                
 610 Fredericks and Estes, Ecclesiastes, 128. (Original italics). According to Seow, Ecclesiastes 
(at 186), “the author intends to convey the sense that he saw the persuasiveness of oppression.” 
 611 Plumptre, Ecclesiastes, 138.  
 612 From a sociological perspective, Lohfink, Qoheleth, observes (at 68-69) that 4:1 is about “the 
exploitation, by wealthier classes, of the people settled on the land and of the handworkers living in cities. 
. . . The use of violence was not at all excluded, especially in the case of debt slavery.” A similar, though 
more extensive analysis along this line is F. Crüsemann, “The Unchangeable World: The ‘Crisis of 
Wisdom’ in Koheleth.” in God of the Lowly: Socio-Historical Interpretation of the Bible (eds. Willi 
Scottroff ; Wolfgang Stegemann. New York: Orbis Books, 1984), 55-77. 
 613 “The iteration “rings like a knell of doom.” (Kirk), cited in Gordis, Koheleth, 239. 
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intensity which is rare in Qoheleth.”614        
 This observation of the debilitating effects of the actions of powerful elements in 
society gives rise to a depressing reflection on Qoheleth’s part (verses 2-3). There is no 
doubt that death and its negative effect on human achievement is something that deeply 
troubles Qoheleth. But he now expresses the opinion that the dead are better off than the 
living (verse 2), and in verse 3, he goes further by saying that it is better to have never 
existed, thus avoiding seeing the evil that exists under the sun. As Loader has put it, 
“No man could put the futility of life and the dead-end despair of man in words more 
bitter than these.”615          
  Both 3:16 and 4:1 are concerned with the miscarriage of justice. As in 3:16, here 
also in 4:1, Qoheleth claims to be an eye-witness (hara) of the social polarity that exists 
between the oppressed and the oppressors. It is to be noted, however, that the sage’s 
despair and empathy is not derived from direct suffering, but solely from his own 
private post of observation. Schellenberg comments that 4:1-3 is best described as 
observation with free reflection (Beobachtung mit freier Reflexion).616 Qoheleth refers 
to an empirical reality, political and social oppression, which he poignantly observes, 
but he then proceeds to make this observation the starting point for further reflection. In 
other words, the main point is not that there are oppressions; rather, for Qoheleth this 
observation acts as a hook on which to hang his major point - in the presence of such 
evil, one would be better off dead, or better still, that one was not born at all. 
  There is no necessary logical connection between his observation and the 
negative and despairing conclusion he draws from that observation. Just as we noted in 
our comments on 3:16 above, in this instance Qoheleth makes a personal observation, 
whereupon he advances a statement of his own personal opinion about the living and 
the dead. But that depressing conclusion voiced in 4: 2-3 is in no way essentially 
                                                
    614 Barton, Ecclesiastes, comments (at 114) that, “The deep emotion which the tears of the 
oppressed excited in Qoheleth is evidence of his profound sympathies with the lower classes.” Salyer, 
Vain Rhetoric, holds (at 304) that in this verse, “Qoheleth is at his rhetorical best here, rising to new 
heights of character.” See also Whybray, Ecclesiastes. Jacques Ellul, Reason for Being: A Meditation on 
Ecclesiastes (trans. J. M. Hanks; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), comments (at 82-3), “He [Qoheleth] 
does not say “they have no comfort,” but rather “they have no comforter” (4:1). Abstract comfort in such a 
situation would amount to still another illusion, or vanity.”                       catches an important insight here. He writes (at pp. 82-3) that Qoheleth’s choice write  
 615 Loader, Ecclesiastes, 48. Treier, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, suggests (at 160) that “it is ironic 
that only someone living could experience and express the conviction about being better off nonexistent; 
Eccl. 4:3 deconstructs itself.” 
 616 Schellenberg, Erkenntnis, 169. Schellenberg’s study highlights three different types of 
argumentation: (a) by induction, as in 1:13-15; (b) falsification, as in 7:15-18; and (c) observation with 
free reflection (Beobachtung mit freier Reflexion). 
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derived from the descriptive social comment presented in verse 1. His conclusions stem 
not from the pathos of the oppression of the poor but are the arbitrary, depressing 
opinions that are a reflection of his own privileged outlook.   
 Qoheleth was not in a unique position to observe human greed and social 
injustice in his day. In previous times the social prophets of the eight-century BCE 
invoked the judgment of God on their fellow Israelites for their unjust treatment of the 
poor. The result was the eventual destruction of both Judah and Israel. On this occasion, 
despite his lamentations for the oppressed, Qoheleth offered no programme of political 
and social reform. He appears as a distant, objective observer: he bewails the stark 
reality, but offers no hope for change. In this instance there is no doubt that Qoheleth 
“saw” something in the physical sense. But the raft of negative conclusions that he drew 
from the abuses of political power do not logically follow from an empirical base. 
                         
                                          4:4 
         ayh yk hX[mh !wrXk-lk taw lm[-lk-ta yna ytyar
                            `xwr tw[rw lbh hz-~g wh[rm Xya-tanq
  
 Then I saw that all toil and all skill in work come from one person’s envy of another. This 
  also is vanity and a chasing after wind.        
On this occasion Qoheleth enters the arena of social comment by imputing motives to 
his fellow humans. When Qoheleth states that yna ytyarw = “And I saw. . .” he is not 
referring to the physical, empirical act of ‘seeing’ something tangible (cf. 11:3b). He is 
firmly within the terrain of private opinion. Given the pleonastic use of yna, this would 
suggest that Qoheleth was assigning special importance to his negative assessment of 
human motivation.617 That may or not be so, but there are differing opinions as to what 
Qoheleth means by this observation.        
 How is the term tanq to be interpreted? The root hanq means “jealousy,” “envy,” 
“ardour,” “rivalry,” depending on the context.618 Whybray suggests that the meaning is 
probably “rivalry” or “competition,” and quotes the famous line in the Talmud (Baba 
Bathra) – “Rivalry among scribes increases wisdom.”619 Ogden follows in a similar 
                                                
 617 For Qoheleth’s use of yna see Isaksson, Studies in the Language, 163-71. The use of this 
personal pronoun is by no means the only way to add emphasis, cf., W. T. Claassen, “Speaker-oriented 
functions of ki in Biblical Hebrew,” JNSL 11 (1983): 29-46. As Isaksson remarks (at 167), “In some 
places where yna would be expected, it is omitted. In other places where it is found, the importance or 
emphasis of the clause is not obvious.”  
 618 BDB, 888. 
 619 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 83. 
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manner, though is a little less certain: “There is nothing in the context nor in the two 
terms [hanq and lm[] themselves to suggest that the challenge to excel is unhealthy, 
though that is always a possibility.”620 Murphy is more forthright. Some people 
succeed; some do not. “Behind it all he [Qoheleth] sees envy at work. This is the dark 
side of human activity (cf. Prov 14:30).”621 It is, of course, true that rivalry/envy has 
both positive and negative consequences, but I think that the opinion expressed in 4:4 in 
its immediate context, has very negative and cynical overtones.   
  It is interesting to note a touch of irony in 4:4-6. Qoheleth as “king” in Chapters 
1-2, made the claim that he had surpassed all his predecessors with his wisdom and 
great deeds (1:16; 2:7, 9). Naturally, as a wise man he wanted to secure an advantage 
over the fool (2:13-16), and in 2:18-23, according to Crüsemann, “. . . clearly it is envy 
of his successor that turns life bitter for him.”622 But as “king,” Qoheleth derided his toil 
and the social goods that accrued from it as lbh, and a striving after the wind; yet in 4:4 
hanq is criticized in exactly the same terms - xwr tw[rw lbh.623 Qoheleth’s use of the verb 
ytyar in 4:1 is not an empirical sighting of a phenomenon, natural or otherwise, but a 
piercing and very negative opinion about his contemporaries in a society characterized 
by a boisterous and competitive spirit (cf. 10:19).       
            4: 7-8     
             `XmXh txt lbh haraw yna ytbXw  7 
                            wl-!ya xaw !b ~g ynX !yaw dxa Xy  8
              rX[ [bXt-al wyny[-~g wlm[-lkl #q !yaw 
              hbwjm yXpn-ta rsxmw lm[ yna ymlw 
                         `awh [r !yn[w lbh hz-~g 
 7 Again I saw vanity under the sun:       
 8 the case of solitary individuals, without sons or brothers; yet there is no end to all their toil, 
 and their eyes are never satisfied with riches. “For whom am I toiling,” they ask, “and 
 depriving myself of pleasure?” This also is vanity and an unhappy business.  
  
The words at the beginning of verse 7, haraw yna ytbXw = “And I turned and saw,” (Cf. 
4:1) herald a new topic. The very personal nature of this observation is conveyed by the 
sage’s use of the pleonastic yna. Another interesting feature of these verses is that they 
contain several of the key terms and phrases of Qoheleth’s lexicon: lbh (x2), XmXh txt, 
                                                
 620 Ogden, Qoheleth, 72. Fredericks, Ecclesiastes, is of the opinion (at p. 133) that, “. . . it is 
Qoheleth’s observation that the advantages from toil are envied by others to a point of possible tragic 
oppression and confiscation of the fruit of one’s labours (cf, Exod 20:17).” Davis, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 
comments (at 190), “A competitive spirit drives us to excel; Koheleth rightly names it “envy.”  
 621 Murphy, Ecclesiastes, 38; Longman, Ecclesiastes, also takes (at 137) a similar view. 
 622 Crüsemann, “Unchangeable World,” 68. 
 623 So Krüger, Qoheleth, 96, and Treier, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, 161. 
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bj, lm[ (x2), and [r !yn[. These verses are concerned with the existential loner, the 
personification of Qoheleth himself.624 The reality described in verse 8a,b is introduced 
and enclosed by the lbh theme (verse 7 and verse 8c), with a further negative 
description (awh [r !yn[w) at the very end of verse 8. In this unit Qoheleth’s observation is 
centred on toiling in loneliness. The solitary figure is introduced. His isolation is 
emphasized by the words ynX !yaw dxa Xy = “one without a second.”625 This contrasts 
sharply with the importance of community in verses 9-12.    
 While having no ties of kinship, the loner’s toil is unrelenting in pursuit of 
amassing great wealth. Some people never can get enough of riches but in a vivid 
moment of reflection Qoheleth employs the striking question in the first person, lm[ yna 
ymlw = “So for whom am I toiling?” This shift from the third to the first person may be 
indicative of Qoheleth’s inner struggle of the lonely person and the relentless toil that 
brings no lasting benefit.626 Working unceasingly to pile up great resources of riches, 
especially as one has no heirs, points directly to a lbh conclusion. Farmer touches on 
the universality of this scenario: “This ancient description of an individual who has no 
living heir but who works hard and lives frugally in order to amass wealth resonates 
with reality in the contemporary world.”627       
  In these verses Qoheleth is without doubt touching on features of life under the 
sun that are not confined to the third century BCE. Overall, I think the reason for the 
question is clear: there is no real purpose in amassing great wealth and depriving 
oneself of life’s pleasures if there is no relative or friend to share that wealth with, in the 
present or in the future. For Qoheleth, there is only one response to the situation: XmXh 
txt lbh haraw yna ytbXw.         
 In this unit we are firmly in the realm of personal opinion. Qoheleth claims to 
have seen another example of lbh, but this is yet again another demonstration of the 
                                                
 624 I agree with Fox, A Rereading, where he says (at 222) that “. . . the interjection in the middle 
of v. 8 shows that Qohelet is speaking out of his own experience.” Contra Gordis, Koheleth, who remarks 
(at 242) that the second half of verse 8 is a striking illustration of a quotation without an introductory 
formula. Whybray, Ecclesiastes, denies (at 86) that this interposed question is biographical. Seow, 
Ecclesiastes, thinks (at 188) that Qoheleth imagines the miser is the person asking the question. 
 625 The term !ya occurs three times in this verse thus driving home to the reader the theme of 
isolation. The phrase denotes a man with no friend, wife, or business partner. Much speculation surrounds 
the meaning of this phrase. See Ginsburg, The Song of Songs and Coheleth, (at 326-7) for a discussion. 
 626 According to Barton, Ecclesiastes (at 115), “Qoheleth suddenly drops the indirect discourse 
and transfers us to the soul of the miser, perhaps to his own soul, for this may be a bit of personal 
experience.” 
 627 Farmer, Who Knows What is Good?, 165. 
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negative value he puts on human activity on earth. And how does Qoheleth know that 
some people are never satisfied with riches? To make such a claim is improvable. This 
scenario depicts the mind of a very lonely man. Notably the observation is framed at vv 
7a and 8b by the lbh motif. It is most fitting that a very special set of circumstances, 
involving an atypical family, can so easily elicit from Qoheleth a lbh conclusion. This 
is a further example of how an overpowering lbh mindset can skew a sage’s 
argumentation. The scene he describes is neither a necessary nor a sufficient empirical 
basis to warrant such a negative conclusion.       
                        4:15
              XmXh txt ~yklhmh ~yyxh-lk-ta ytyar
                `wytxt dm[y rXa ynXh dlyh ~[ 
  I saw all the living who, moving about under the sun, follow that youth who replaced  
 the king; 
 
Chapter 4:13-16 is another very difficult passage in the book to unravel. As Addison 
Wright puts it, “The interpretation of this passage is a very tangled thing. The use of 
pronouns and the use of verbs with unidentified subjects as well as a very terse style 
combine to create a number of ambiguities internal to the story.”628 No sustained 
attempt will be made to unravel this very obscure pericope, but my immediate concern 
is to examine what Qoheleth claims to have “seen” in verse 15.629 In order to address 
this issue we will attempt to give the gist of the context.     
 The unit opens in verse 13 with another comparative sapiential proverb, which 
determines the advantage of the first element over the second, i.e., better A than B, i.e., 
a wise but poor youth is contrasted with an old but foolish king.  In typical wisdom 
terminology, being wise goes with age, but youth and poverty do not, which means that 
wisdom and old age are not synonymous. This is an inversion of conventional wisdom 
teaching.         
                                                
 628 A. G. Wright, “The Poor But Wise Youth and the Old But Foolish King (Qoh 4:13-16),” 
CBQ 29 (1997): 142-54, at 142. See also M. V. Fox, “What Happens in Qohelet 4:13-16,” 1-10; D. 
Rudman, “A Contextual Reading of Ecclesiastes,” JBL 116 (1997): 57-73. Rudman holds (at 62) that “the 
youth who emerges from the prison is not a usurper but a general counselor in the general tradition of 
Joseph or Daniel.” The text of verse 15 is far too ambiguous to reach such a conclusion. W. A. Irwin, 
“Eccles 4:13-16,” JNES 3 (1944): 255-57, writes (at 255), “Its confusion of pronominal antecedents is 
characteristic of Hebrew usage at its worst . . .” Seow, Ecclesiastes, writes (at 190), “In 4:13-16 we find a 
tantalizing text.” 
 629 For a close reading of this unit see Z. Weisman “Elements of Political Satire in Koheleth 
4:13-16; 9:13-16,” ZAW 111 (1999): 547-60. His conclusion (at 554) is that Qoheleth’s “interest is to use 
examples from history to persuade his audience that there is no history: the causality operating in it is 
paradoxical, and memory, the thread connecting various threads to history, is nothing more than illusion. 
The quasi-historical anecdote provides an apt literary dress for Koheleth’s political satire on upheavals in 
government.” 
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 Regarding verse 14, many commentators try to identify the possible historical 
background and the persons that may be alluded to. Names like Joseph in Genesis and 
Rehoboam, Solomon’s son in 1 Kings 12, have been suggested.630  Despite the many 
attempts to explain these obscure references, the fact is that there is not enough detail in 
the text – aside from the lexical ambiguity in the unit – to warrant secure conclusions.631 
 Qoheleth’s use of ytyar in verse 15 is without the pleonastic yna (contast 4:4). 
Ginsburg comments that Qoheleth “. . . transports himself into the midst of the scene he 
depicts, in order to render the illustration more vivid and striking.”632 Qoheleth is 
therefore not personally experiencing the incident he describes, but merely observing it. 
Thus, when the sage writes XmXh txt ~yklhmh  ~yyxh-lk-ta ytyar, this statement cannot be 
taken to mean that he saw all humans living under the sun. Here the verb ytyar has the 
sense of “to observe, examine,” and the conclusion of this examination is found in verse 
16, which, once again, gives rise to a typical lbh verdict.    
 The major issue in verse 15 is the identity of  ynXh dlyh = “the second young 
person,” which appears to be loosely connected with 4:7-12. Various solutions have 
been proposed. Schoors give the following rendering: “The object of the examination 
are all those who are on the side of the new king and the result is: they are innumerable, 
but those who come later do not take pleasure in him.”633 I favour the assessment of 
Lohfink. 
 Generally vv. 13-16 deal with three leaders: the old king who was dislodged, the young man 
 who was released from prison in order to dislodge him, and "the next young man" who 
 "arose" in the place of the second. The rapidity of this description of a sequence of three 
 leaders, and his gently ironic presentation of the approval "of all the living who walked about 
 under the sun," underline stylistically what this is about: the fickleness of popular favor and 
 the insecurity at the top of the political ladder.634 
 
Whatever the sitz im leben of this passage and its meaning might be, Qoheleth’s 
reflections are certainly based on an experiential methodology. But as noted earlier 
there is no causal nexus that flows from his hyperbolic statement, ~yyxh-lk-ta ytyar, to 
                                                
 630 See Seow, Ecclesiastes, (at 190) for a plethora of possible names relating to the young upstart 
and the old king.  
 631 A fitting comment is made by Murphy and Huwiler, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs 
(NIBC; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1999), at 193, “In fact, the ambiguity is so embedded in the narration 
(e.g., the use of pronouns that could refer to either the king or the youth) that it may be preferable to leave 
the story unclear.”  
 632 Ginsburg, Coheleth, 332.  
 633 Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, 68.  
 634 Lohfink, Qoheleth, 73. 
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his lbh conclusion in verse 16c. It is true that Qoheleth is observing a political reality in 
life but this phenomenon does not give grounds to warrant this depressing conclusion. 
From time immemorial to the present, human fickleness has been a constant factor in 
changing political and economic fortunes, and to assume that such observed fickleness 
spawned a reflection that inescapably leads to a lbh conclusion is not of necessity 
grounded on empirical fact. In short, it is another example of Qoheleth’s opinion 
influenced by his esoteric view of the world.                                                                                             
                 8: 9 
             ybl-ta !wtnw ytyar hz-lk-ta
            XmXh txt hX[n rXa  hX[m-lkl
               `wl [rl ~dab ~dah jlX rXa t[ 
 All this I observed, applying my mind to all that is done under the sun, while one person 
 exercises authority over another to the other’s hurt.      
  
Qoheleth continues with another observation on contemporary issues, this time, the art 
of survival in the face of superior political authority. In typical fashion he writes ytyar 
hz-lk-ta. The immediate question is: what does hz-lk-ta refer to? Some critics take it to 
apply to what follows, thus viewing the phrase as the beginning of a new section.635 
 However, most commentators understand verse 9 as the conclusion of 8:2-9.  
Krüger comments, “Verse 9 summarizes the result of the preceding reflections and 
places it on the broader horizon of “everything that is done under the sun.” ”636 Also, 
the use of jlX = “power,” in verses 4, 8 and 9, points to a coherence of thought.637 
Certainly at face value, verse 9 can be understood as a conclusion to Qoheleth’s remarks 
about survival in a fragile political environment (vv 2-5), the inability of humans to 
know the future (v 7), the lack of control over one’s death (v 8a), and the lack of 
freedom from war and wickedness (v 8c). Whybray gives a good summary of the 
context of verse 9.  
 Qoheleth points out that the context for his general observations is the age in which he  
 and his readers live, which he regards as notorious for its cruel tyranny (cf. 4:1-3). Thus in  
 this final comment Qoheleth makes clear his attitude towards political authority as it 
 manifested itself in his time: on the one hand he counsels obedience and submission to it on 
 the grounds of prudence, while on the other he does not hide the fact that he regards it as 
                                                
 635 So Galling, Der Prediger, 111. “Verschiedentlich wird 9 noch zur vorangehenden Sentenz 
gerechnet, aber die konkreteBeobachtung in 10 bedarf einer Einleitung, die zunächst auf die Grundfrage nach 
dem Gebrauch der Macht hinleitet (cf. 10 5);” Zimmerli, Das Buch des Predigers Salomo, at 219-20. 
           
 636 Krüger, Qoheleth, 157.  
 637 See Michel, Untersuchungen, 98-99. Murphy, Ecclesiastes, notes (at 84) that “the phrase “all 
that is done under the sun” (cf. 1:13, 14; 2:17; etc) usually has to do with divine sovereignty in human 
events, and vv 10ff., which also deal with abuse of power, will illustrate this.” 
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 brutal and tyrannical as a particular, concrete example of human servitude in general.638 
In this instance of Qoheleth’s use of ytyar, Michel is correct to state that the meaning 
here is “examined.”639 But since the passage advocates appropriate conduct in the 
presence of a superior political ruler (8:2-6), with the accompanying reflections on 
human life (8:7-8), it cannot be doubted that Qoheleth adroitly learned the lessons of 
political survival from his personal observations.      
 Verse 6 echoes the thoughts of 3:1 –“For everything there is a season, and a time 
for every matter under heaven,”  and 1:13b – “. . . it is an unhappy business that God 
has given to human beings to be busy with.” Since Qoheleth is claiming to observe all 
that is done under the sun (v 9a), this reference of  t[, and God as giver, seems to inject 
God’s sovereignty into the discussion. Even so, at the same time, there is some 
movement left for human choice, otherwise Qoheleth’s advice would be rendered 
redundant. In the end, verse 9 concludes with the advice and reflections of Qoheleth, 
and notice is given of the painful realities attending the exercise of political authority.640 
However, all this observation and evaluation is but his very own personal assessment of 
the vagaries of political fortunes. The references to the unknowability of the future, 
power over the day of death, and t[, are all familiar themes of Qoheleth and do not 
betray an empirical methodology. 
 
           9:11-12 
           XmXh-txt harw ytbX   11
               hmxlmh ~yrwbgl alw #wrmh ~ylql al yk
                  rX[ ~ynbnl al ~gw ~xl ~ymkxl al ~gw
              !x ~y[dyl al ~gw
             `~lk-ta hrqy [gpw t[-yk
  
                             wt[-ta ~dah [dy-al ~g yk   12
            h[r hdwcmb ~yzxanX ~ygdk 
                 xpb twzxah ~yrpckw
                     h[r t[l ~dah ynb ~yXqwy ~hk 
                `~atp ~hyl[ lwptXk 
   11 Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong,  
  nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to the skillful; but time and  
                                                
 638 Whybray, Ecclesiastes, 134-5. 
 639 Michel, Untersuchungen, 98. “ytyar bedeutet hier "betrachten" und nicht "sehen."  
 640 A question arises as to who is being hurt in v 9b. Is it the one who exercises authority, or 
some others? I take v 9 as a conclusion to 8:2-6, hence, detriment is to those in power. So Seow, 
Ecclesiastes, 284. 
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  chance happen to them all.        
  12 For no one can anticipate the time of disaster. Like fish taken in a cruel net, and birds  
  caught in a snare, so mortals are snared at a time of calamity, when it suddenly falls upon  
  them. 
Many scholars regard these verses as an independent section, though, with Qoheleth, it 
is difficult at times to discern where one unit begins and the other ends. Certainly the 
open words harw ytbX = “I turned and I saw” suggest the start of a new literary unit.641 
Qoheleth acknowledges randomness in human existence by evoking the concepts of t[ 
= “time,” and  [gp = “chance” (verse 11b), which are earlier themes in 3:1-12.642 
  The emphasis in these verses is on the unpredictability and randomness of 
events. Qoheleth concedes that the swift on foot, the strong in battle, the wise, the 
intelligent, and the men of skill will normally meet with success in their exploits. Yet, 
success cannot always be guaranteed.643 For example, the swift-footed Asahel lost his 
life to Abner (2 Sam 2: 18-23), and Gideon and his men overcame the superior 
Midianites (Judg 7). No matter how talented and skilled one is, no human has a sure 
grip on successful outcomes.         
  The overall context of this passage must be borne in mind in order to appreciate 
and rhetorical force of verses 11-12. The first six verses indicate that a common fate 
awaits everyone. After a negative statement, Qoheleth reiterates his “joy” theme in 9:7-
10. For Qoheleth, the only appropriate response to the certainty of death is to enjoy life 
when the opportunities present themselves. But then, in true antithetical style, he 
immediately reverts to stress that misfortune may come upon man indiscriminately at 
any time (verses 11-12).         
 The terminology that Qoheleth employs brings home the message to the reader. 
Whereas he uses the same verb twzxah = “to grasp, to take hold,” to describe the capture 
of fish, he chooses another verb to signify the snaring of human beings, ~yXpwy = “to 
                                                
  641 Seow, Ecclesiastes, identifies (at 320) these verses as part of a larger literary unit, 9:11- 
10:15, which is divided into three different sections, 9:11-12; 9:13-10:4; 10:5-15, each commencing with, 
“I have observed.” Interestingly, harw, being the infinitive absolute, is used in place of a finite verb. Cf. 
8:9, which has the perfect form, and 4:1, 7, where the imperfect is used. There does not appear to be any 
difference in meaning. See GKC?113z. 
 642 The phrase [gpw t[ is usually taken as a hendiadys. Literally it means “time and an incident.” 
The term [gp is elsewhere only found in 1 Kgs 5:18 (ET 5:4] where it has a negative nuance. There it is 
used with [r and is similar in meaning to [r !yn[ = “a grievous ill” in Eccl 5:13. Loader, Ecclesiastes, 
makes the interesting distinction (at 111), that Qoheleth’s notion of time “refers not just to the ceaseless 
progression of hours and days but to the things that come unexpectedly and apart from human control.” 
 643 As Ellermerier, Qohelet 1/1 puts it (245), “. . . daß weder die Schnellsten für den Wettlauf 
eine Garantie haben noch die Tapfersten für den Krieg und daß weder den Weisesten ein Unterhalt noch 
den Einsichtigsten Wohlstand noch den schärfsten Denkern der Beifall garantiert ist.” 
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capture.” Fish that are caught in a net, and birds that are caught in a snare, are analogies 
that starkly emphasize the fact that humans, despite their superior abilities and 
achievements over animals, are just as helpless as members of the natural world. “What 
is particularly fascinating about the state of affairs which Qoheleth describes is that he 
argues from a theological premise, namely that it is God who determines the outcome of 
the ‘times’ (cf. ch.3).”644        
 In these much-cited verses, Qoheleth claims to have “seen” a variety of 
situations in life concerned with the unpredictability of events. His use of highly 
figurative language, while attention grabbing and memorable, does not, however, 
detract in any way from the fact that, for most observing people, calamity can suddenly 
fall upon any mortal, be it a financial personal tragedy, illness, or death (~lk-ta hrqy [gpw 
t[-yk).  What Qoheleth is observing in these verses constitutes public knowledge about 
the vicissitudes of human existence. In the words of Salyer, “ . . . much of what 
Qoheleth observes here is simple realism.”645  
10:4  Summary and Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter we drew attention to the huge prominence of the verb 
har in Qoheleth’s exposition of his ideas. This suggested that Qoheleth was enraptured 
in his outlook on the world by experience and observation. It was also noted that har 
takes pre-eminence over the verb [bX = “to hear, hearken,” the latter having no 
significant role in the book. Indeed, Qoheleth appears to give precedence to his own 
observations more than to listening to other people’s insights or advice.  
 Specific attention was drawn to the many ways that this verb may be rendered, 
thus pointing out that every occurrence of it does not necessarily indicate experiential 
significance. Indeed, on many occasions when Qoheleth employed har the context 
revealed the scenario so described did not involve any empirical observation. Since this 
verb attracts a wide semantic range, it was not surprising to learn that it has many 
common uses in Qoheleth’s language, with only 21 instances in which he appears as 
subject.           
 In examining cases in chapter 9 where Qoheleth claims to have “seen 
everything,” along with “all the deeds done under the sun,” and “all the work of God,” 
we concluded that the knowledge claims that he made were not borne of an empirical 
                                                
  644 Ogden, Qoheleth, 169. 
 645 Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 357. 
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methodology. This same conclusion was drawn regarding the three “joy passages” that 
were considered. A distinction has to be drawn between opinion and belief, and on these 
occasions Qoheleth was expressing an opinion as to how his fellow humans should live 
in the light of life’s frustrations.       
  In the present chapter we considered all the remaining instances of har covering 
evils observed, reflections on wisdom, and comments on social political matters. In one 
instance Qoheleth turns to consider wisdom, madness, and folly in 2:12. At first he 
endorses a traditional wisdom view in v 13a-14a, but this leads to a reflection on the 
same fate of the wise and the foolish. He thus hates life for his ever-recurring opinion is 
that all is lbh (v 15c). In 9:13 the example story of the poor wise man that saved the city 
causes anguish for Qoheleth: “Yet no one remembered that poor man” (v 15c). The 
failure of human memory is a feature of his outlook, but paradoxically Qoheleth appears 
to be the only one to remember this poor wise man. On both these occasions Qoheleth 
is, once again, setting out his personal judgment on wisdom. Claiming to “see” wisdom 
in 9:13 is essentially a value judgment, and the same applies to his “seeing” advantage 
in wisdom in 2:13-14a. We found that Qoheleth did not reach such conclusions by 
empirical means.          
 On four occasions we drew attention to evils that Qoheleth claims to have seen, 
two of which concern  the possession of material wealth. The context in each case (5:12-
13, and 6:1-2) points to Qoheleth’s negative conclusions being influenced by (i) his 
views about human toil and (ii) his understanding of death. Death is also implied in 8:10 
- he saw the wicked buried – and in 10:5-7 the sage claims to have witnessed the 
normative realities reversed – folly in high places, rich sit in a low place, slaves on 
horseback and princes acting like slaves. To determine what constitutes an example of 
evil requires a person to make a value judgment, and this is the case in all four 
scenarios. Additionally 6:1-2 and 8:10 conclude with the lbh theme, and to draw that 
conclusion in response to the described realities certainly involves making a value 
judgment.           
 The remaining seven passages concerned social and political observations about 
which Qoheleth felt deeply. The replacement of justice and righteous conduct with 
wickedness in 3:16 is situated in a theological context (3:17): God will judge the 
righteous and the wicked. His moving tribute to the oppressed in 4:1 is the springboard 
for his belief that one is better off dead than alive because of all the evil in the world 
(4:2-3), which is a depressing valid judgment on human existence. In the next verse 
(4:4) Qoheleth offers a cynical view of human motivation with respect to human toil. 
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Again, this leads to another personal judgment that this state of affairs is lbh. A further 
indictment on human toil comes in 4:7-8 about the loner who sees no end to his labour, 
is never satisfied with his wealth, is deprived of pleasure, and never queries his 
relentless insistence on his toil.  Once more, the lbh theme is invoked (4:8c).  
  In chapter 4:15, which occurs in the obscure pericope, vv 13-16, the scenario 
described appears to refer to a change in political leadership, and the fickleness on the 
part of the people. Yet again, a given scenario inexorably leads Qoheleth to another 
instance of lbh. Observation is mixed with dogmatism, i.e., Qoheleth’s ideas act as a 
platform for his egocentric view of the world. The context of 8:9 is another observation 
statement about political power as described in vv 2-9. While these happenings in the 
higher reaches of society were clearly observed by Qoheleth as an insider, they confirm 
information that would have been garnered by others in courtly circles. The allusion to 
God’s time in 3:1 (t[) and man’s unhappy business from God’s hand (1:13b) in 8:6, are 
elements of Qoheleth’s thought that do not emanate from an empirical grounding. 
 Finally, in the memorable and poetic words of 9:11-12 the use of t[ and [gp (cf. 
3:1-12) suggest the uncertainty and unpredictability of future events – a familiar topic in 
Qoheleth’s arsenal of beliefs about the world. Yet despite the reflective poignancy of 
the contents of these verses, Qoheleth is touching on common themes in the public 
domain. A personal commitment to empiricism is not a necessary condition to reach the 
conclusions he draws in these two verses.       
 It is now time to close in on the conclusion of this dissertation. Before doing so, 
I wish to strengthen my argument in the next chapter that Qoheleth was not an 
empiricist by briefly presenting some general observations concerning the nature of his 
argumentation. 
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CHAPTER 11. QOHELETH’S ARGUMENTATION    
__________________________________________________________
          
Regarding the nature of Qoheleth’s argumentation, there are two fundamental features 
of note. First, there is his starting point. After the superscription, and without taking 
breath, the author cites the first words of Qoheleth by the incessant repetition of the lbh 
theme in 1:2, which is linked to the !wrty problem in 1:3. Immediately following in 1:4, 
Qoheleth juxtaposes human mortality with the permanence of the physical world: “A 
generation goes, and a generation comes, but the earth remains for ever.”646 In the space 
of just three verses, Qoheleth flags up this trilogy of issues, which are dominating topics 
in the book.         
 Secondly, the “I” narrative has a huge presence in the book, and that fact alone 
assures the reader that what is to follow will be a very personal statement, something 
akin to a memoir.  Indeed, it is so personal that Qoheleth’s monologue could at times be 
justifiably viewed as a dialogue in so far as he is in dialogue with himself and his 
heart.647 We earlier noted that Qoheleth appeared not to be a person who listened much 
to what others had to say, possibly due to the role that his large ego plays in the book.648 
Never once does he proclaim, “This is what I have heard.” If, as some scholars like 
Whybray and Ogden believe, Qoheleth was addressing his students, there is little solid 
evidence in the book that reflects the cut and thrust of debate that one would expect 
between lively students and a radically minded teacher. In other words, Qoheleth 
appears not to have been a practitioner of collegiate engagement.649 Given the dogmatic 
nature of much of his assertions, I would suggest that Qoheleth’s mind was hermetically 
sealed to such an extent that he would have found it very difficult to adopt a change of 
                                                
 646 Contra Fox, A Rereading, who writes (at 166) ‘. . . the permanence of the physical earth has 
no relevance to the individual life.’ Fox takes #cdah to refer to humanity as a whole, not to the physical 
world. Fox cites other OT references in support. I disagree. I believe that the passing of the generations is 
a reference to human mortality. Death is a huge concern for Qoheleth, and consequently #cdah should be 
interpreted in that light.  
 647 Loader, Polar Structures, suggests (at 25) that there are seven examples of what he calls “self 
discourse’ in the book: 1:16; 2:1; 2:15; 3:17; 3:18; and 7:23. 
 648 Podechard, Lˋ Ecclésiastes, observes (at 195), “Le moi y devient la mesure des choses 
et c'est d'après ses besoins et ses désirs qu'on juge la vie: elle serait bonne, si le moi en sortait satisfait.” 
(The ego becomes the measure of things And it is according to his needs and desires that life is judged; 
Good, if the self came out satisfied).  
 649 Crenshaw, “The Shadow of Death in Qoheleth,” is correct when he observes (at 206) that 
Qoheleth’s journey was a lonely one. 
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position on any issue.          
 A text that is dominated by an autobiographical “I” narrative style, which in 
Qoheleth’s case reflects a “radical subjectivity,”650 runs the risk of drawing conclusions 
not based on secure premises. On occasions Qoheleth’s conclusions do not necessarily 
follow from his observations. Attention has already been drawn to the importance of the 
material in the early chapters of the book for understanding Qoheleth’s outlook on the 
world. Thus, in 1:4-7 he immediately draws attention to the natural processes of the 
world, which seems a good starting point for a keen observer of reality. He sets out to 
show the serious limitations of human perception and, in particular, the loss of human 
memory (1:11; 2:16; 9:5). What Qoheleth does is to off-set the ephemerality of human 
life against the permanence of the natural world because “each human life is too short to 
observe the true character of the world (physical and human), while each human 
memory is too short for humanity as a whole to accumulate such an understanding.651 
 How does the sage reach such an understanding? What drives Qoheleth to this 
conclusion? Just as the poem in chapter 12 is bracketed by the lbh theme (at 11:10b and 
12:8), so also in chapter one, this poem on the natural order is bracketed in similar 
fashion (at 1:2 by the fivefold lbh theme and at 1:14b). But the lbh conclusion does not 
necessarily flow from the observations and reflections found in 1:4-11. In this example, 
Qoheleth’s experiential statements are united with dogmatic assertions to reach his 
preferred conclusion.          
 Let us consider what Qoheleth says about death. This is an issue that concerns 
him greatly as can be seen from the many references (implicit and explicit) he makes to 
human mortality. These are 1:4; 2:14-16; 3:2; 3:19-21; 4:2-3; 5:14-16; 6:3-6; 7:1, 2, 4, 
17, 26, 8:8; 9:2-12; 11:8, and 12:7. It is truly a striking feature of the book that the 
subject of death, one way or another, gets a mention in every chapter except chapter 
ten.652 We have already examined 6:3-5 and 9:3-5 in chapter 6, both of which concerned 
the fact of death and the status of the dead. While referring to the fact of death in both 
passages, what Qoheleth claims to have known about the dead’s destination and their 
state of knowing/not knowing could not have been based on empirical findings. 
 It is one thing to refer to the phenomenon of human death; it is quite another to 
                                                
 650 The phrase is from Salyer, Vain Rhetoric, 240. 
 651  Weeks, Unpublished script on Ecclesiastes. 
 652 According to Schoors, The Preacher Sought, Part 2, (at 205) the verb twm occurs nine times 
and the noun tw,m± six times. He states (at 205) that the fact of dying or the state of death point to the fact 
that death plays a major role in Qoheleth. The context of the above references certainly concurs with this 
assessment. 
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claim knowledge of the afterlife. On several occasions Qoheleth merely refers to the 
fact of death, e.g., at 1:4; 2:14; 3:2, and 8:8. More often than not, however, the mention 
of the dead elicits further comments from the sage that are straightforward expressions 
of opinion. In 4:2-3 he believes that the dead are more fortunate than the living, an 
opinion that flows from his reflections on the oppressions and evil that exist in the 
world. A similar opinion is reflected in 7:1 where he states that the day of death is better 
than the day of birth, while in 7:1, 4, the house of mourning (death being implied) is to 
be preferred to the house of mirth.        
 Qoheleth offers advice to his readers in 7:17 not to be too wicked, and avoid 
foolish behaviour, to which he adds, “Why should you die before your time?” This 
question seems rather odd considering the extended poem on t[ in 3:1-8, which 
strongly rings of divine determinism. The question is premised on the assumption that 
Qoheleth appears to know that to be too wicked, or being foolish, determines the 
duration of one’s life. An epistemic claim of this magnitude could not be derived from 
empirical evidence. Rather, it comes from Qoheleth’s personal (ambiguous) belief about 
the nature of human action and its possibilities and not from his observational powers.
 In 5:14-16 (ET 5:15-17) Qoheleth points to the nakedness of humans at birth 
and at death; for him at least, that fact represents a grievous ill. The dead have nothing 
in their hand despite all their toil; nothing has really been gained. This gloomy mood is 
further intensified by the use of the language in v 17: humans spend their days in 
‘darkness, in much vexation and sickness and resentment.’ This assessment of humanity 
has despair written all over it; it is a belief that is well beyond the framework of an 
empirical methodology to establish.       
 Even when Qoheleth strikes a positive note, as he does at 11:8a, he is at pains to 
tell his fellow humans “. . . that the days of darkness (death) will be many” (11:8b). 
Whereupon, he invokes his lbh theme (11:8c).  Again we see that his strongly negative 
attitude to life colours his thinking with this value-laden opinion. Since Qoheleth 
adamantly claims that no one can know the future (cf. 3:22; 6:12; 7:14; 8:7; 9:12; 10:14; 
11:12; 11:6) - contrary to his claim that he does know the future fortunes of the wicked 
and the God-fearer (cf. 8:12-13) – yet he proclaims certain knowledge about what 
happens after death. When the dust returns to earth, he claims that the breath (xwr) 
returns to God who gave it (12:7). This statement comes at the end of the poem on 
ageing and death, thereby bringing the monologue to a conclusion with a three-fold  
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rendering of the lbh theme (12:8). Again, this is a personal theological opinion and 
conclusion, categorically stated without any supporting evidence.   
 The significant feature associated with these references to death (i.e., the fact of 
death and the condition of the dead) is that the majority of them are linked to the lbh 
theme in the immediate literary context (the exceptions being 7:17; 7:26, and 8:8). As 
indicated at the beginning of this study, the very negative mindset that Qoheleth 
brandished at the beginning of the prologue, - exemplified by the lbh theme in 1:2, the 
!wrty question in 1:3, and the reality of human mortality in 1:4 – are the constituent 
elements that drive many of his ideas to their remorseless, pessimistic conclusions. 
 Qoheleth regards his life as lbh (7:15). In fact, he goes much further down the 
road of self-abasement when he states that he hates life because of what happens under 
the sun (3:17a). He also hates life because all his toil (i.e., the results of his toil) would 
pass on to someone else, perhaps a fool, at his demise (2:18). The expression of such 
intimate personal feelings cannot possibly be attributed to an empiricist methodology. 
Such views, though deeply held, are more a reflection of his mental state, which most of 
the time, is characterized by a negative and pessimistic outlook on life.  
 Much the same can be said about other of Qoheleth’s ideas and claims. For 
example, since he is so certain about the failure of human memory (1:11; 2:16; 9:5), 
how does he know what has already happened, and how could he possibly know that 
what is to be, already exists (3:15a)? These are puzzling questions surrounding his 
ideas, particularly since in 1:16 he claims to have a secure knowledge of all his 
predecessors who lived in Jerusalem. And how does he know that no righteous man 
exists (7:20), or that something that is crooked cannot be straightened (7:13)?  
 Qoheleth is not averse to advancing his opinion on matters for which he offers 
no observation or warrant. When he remarks in 5:11 (ET 5:12) that “Sweet is the sleep 
of labourers, whether little or much; but the surfeit of the rich will not let them sleep.”  
what he is offering his readers is a very personal opinion for which no evidential basis is 
given. What he says might be true, but it may not be. The same can be said of his belief 
that all toil and all skill in work come from one person’s envy of someone else (4:4a). 
This jaundiced view of human motivation is backed up by another invocation of the lbh 
theme in 4:4b. Again, there is not the slightest justification set forth to substantiate such 
a provocative claim.           
 It also might be added that his ideas on toil and profit would not be considered  
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normative. We have already noted the close connection between the lbh, lm[, and !wrty 
themes. His negative ideas in these matters become for him the benchmark simpliciter 
for his views on human toil and profit. Few sages, and people generally, would I 
venture to suggest, concur with Qoheleth on his ideas on human endeavour and 
motivation. The same applies to his opinions expressed in 6:7 that all human toil is for 
one’s mouth, but the appetite is never satisfied. Whether one agrees with him or not, the 
fact remains that these ideas on human effort are laced with value judgments, even 
when he explicitly states that the conclusions he draws are borne of observation. But 
what Qoheleth “sees” is not necessarily to be equated with what he “observes.”  
 Stuart Weeks sums up the matter perceptively when he writes, “Qohelet does not 
typically extrapolate ideas from experience, but places his experience in the context of 
his ideas.”653 That is, Qoheleth’s ideas take the preeminence in shaping his outlook on 
the world. The inevitable result is that Qoheleth’s argumentation reflects more of his 
own dogmatic proclivities than it does external empirical evidence. James Crenshaw 
offers the observation that “. . . few interpreters would deny the overwhelming 
experiential basis of Qoheleth’s teaching.”654 At first blush that appears to be a plausible 
assessment, especially when one keeps in view the nature of Qoheleth’s stated quests, 
and the prominence of key experiential verbs, e.g., “knowing,” “finding,” and “seeing.” 
But as Crenshaw also points out, Qoheleth’s many unsubstantiated assertions are a 
departure from an empirical base. He writes, 
 The simple truth is that Qoheleth accepted an astonishing variety of transmitted teachings 
 without submitting them to the test of experience. Occasionally, he uses emphatic language, e.g., 
 “I Know,” when asserting something that none can confirm (3:14-15 and 8:12-13). One suspects 
 that rhetoric aims at obscuring faulty logic in such moments. In light of overwhelming evidence 
 of a priori knowledge in Qoheleth’s teaching, it may be necessary to qualify the claim that a new 
 era of empirical knowledge dawned when he appeared on the scene.655   
         
Leong Seow offers this assessment, “. . . Qoheleth’s “epistemology” is not entirely 
“empirical.” He does draw on traditional sources as well, specifically wisdom teachings, 
materials found in the Torah and, of course, traditions about Solomon.”656 Seow, 
however, does allows that some aspects of Qoheleth’s teaching are partly empirical. To 
what extent this is so, I will address in the conclusion to which we now turn. 
                                                
 653 Weeks, Ecclesiastes and Scepticism, 124. 
 654 Crenshaw, Qoheleth’s Understanding, 212. 
  655 Crenshaw, Qoheleth’s Understanding, 213. 
 656 Seow, “Theology When It Is Out Of Control,” Int  55 (2001), 239.  
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CHAPTER 12:  CONCLUSION 
____________________________________________________________ 
We began our study by exploring the mindset and world outlook of Qoheleth by 
examining the contents of the first two chapters of the book. In doing so we discovered 
valuable insights into the mind and outlook of a unique author by the way he employed 
key terms like lbh, lm[, and !wrty. This material set the tone for the entire book for it 
was found that the issues and ideas presented in this early material surfaced again and 
again throughout the rest of the monologue. Thus, chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation 
lay the groundwork for our study.        
 After presenting in chapter 3 a descriptive analysis of various scholarly claims 
that Qoheleth is best described as an empiricist, we undertook to offer a working 
definition of empiricism, and presented a short discussion on epistemological theory. 
Thereafter our study moved to examine the diversity of Qoheleth’s epistemic claims in 
four mains areas: (i) God, and the use of the verbs (ii) hhr, (iii) [dy, and (iv) acm. It was 
found that the theological claims regarding God’s nature and activity were a matter of 
personal belief and opinion, not derived from an empirical grounding.   
 All three of the verbs (along with several others) had great prima facie 
experiential potential. Yet on examination, the experiential value of these verbs did not 
live up to initial expectations. If Qoheleth is to be viewed as having an empiricist 
outlook on life then I believe that description would not be out of place when assessing 
his early experimentalist phase in chapter 2. There we observe a man bent on a life of 
pleasure, and in all his business exploits he experienced the nature of hard work and the 
wealth that accrued from it. He was setting out to prove something about the nature of 
life directly related to his personal involvement in a range of projects. I have no doubt 
that he learned from it accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that he typically drew on 
his all-embracing lbh conclusion in 2:11. For the most part, however, keeping in mind 
our findings in Parts 2 to 4, it is difficult to maintain that Qoheleth was an empiricist in 
any meaningful sense.         
 In previous chapters two important issues were noted about Qoheleth’s 
knowledge claims. First, there is no evidence found in Ecclesiastes to the effect that 
Qoheleth appropriated any epistemological theory. Nevertheless, a sage who claims to 
have extensive knowledge, and simultaneously knows that his fellow humans have 
severe cognitive limitations, must be operating on the basis of some understanding of 
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knowledge acquisition and its limitations. Secondly, we observed that there were 
dangers in attempting to squeeze Qoheleth into the form a modern day epistemologist. 
No attempt has been made to follow this procedure. While it is true that the provenance 
of epistemological theory extends beyond the third century BCE, Qoheleth’s passion 
appears to have been to present his ideas and observations about life under the sun 
without the aid of any philosophical theory.      
 As we now come to bring this dissertation to a fitting conclusion, I wish to pick 
up, and briefly elaborate on, the epistemological discussion we had in chapter 3, the 
purpose being to come to a nuanced understanding of Qoheleth’s knowledge claims. We 
referred to the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. Applied to 
Qoheleth’s epistemic claims we noted that there was no ambivalence about Qoheleth’s 
assertions about God, mankind, and the world at large. For him, these claims constituted 
knowledge: he firmly believed them, and held them to be true. But he showed no 
awareness of the need to offer some justification (evidence, warrant, good reasons) for 
his claims.         
 Foundationalism is a response to the justification problem: it is a normative 
theory as to how we gain the epistemic right to believe. To recap on our discussion in 
chapter three, the metaphor of a building is employed to indicate the nature of 
foundationalism. A building has a foundation and a superstructure. Knowledge is thus 
structured like a building. There is foundational knowledge and without it there can be 
no knowledge at all. Basic beliefs are viewed as the foundation upon which all of the 
rest of our justified beliefs are built. Any belief that is basic is not actually derived from 
other beliefs.           
 Thus, beliefs that are part of the superstructure are non-basic and their 
justification is found in the justified basic beliefs in the foundation. That is to say, a 
belief is justified if, and only if, it is either a basic belief justified by the subject’s 
experience, or an inferred belief justified in some way by the support of basic beliefs. 
This approach to the regress problem acknowledges that the subject’s experience is 
significant and relevant to how justified he/she is in his/her beliefs about the world. 
 According to moderate foundationalism the non-inferential warrant possessed 
by basic beliefs need not amount to absolute certainty. That is, there is no demand that 
the proper basic belief need be infallible, or incorrigible, as is the case with strong 
foundationalism. All that is required is that the basic belief must be sufficient of itself to 
satisfy the justification condition of knowledge. Mention was also made to internalism  
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in chapter 3. According to internalism, justification is dependent solely on critical 
factors internal to the believer’s mind. That is, the only factors relevant to the 
justification of a belief is the presence of the believer’s other mental states, this being 
important since belief is a mental state, and belief-formation is a mental process. 
Related to this is another important aspect to the internalist’s position: the need to have 
a good reason (warrant, evidence) for a belief.     
 We have rejected the empiricist appellation that has been applied to Qoheleth’s 
teaching.  However, I believe that, in the light of our discussion of epistemology, 
Qoheleth best fits the description of a foundationalist who has an internalist 
understanding of justification. The ‘internalist’ label seems more appropriate for 
Qoheleth when we consider the dominance of the “I” narrative in the monologue. The 
reader is left in no doubt that Qoheleth’s understanding of the world is from his own 
personal post of observation. He claims no experience of divine revelation, no specific 
tradition to draw on, and no external realities to kick-start his experiments. The 
indispensable starting point of Qoheleth’s understanding of the world is his very own 
ideas and convictions.         
 Since we have conferred on Qoheleth the status of a foundationalist, how may 
we identify a justified basic belief to which he adherred? It can be suggested that a 
belief could be justified if its warrant is premised on certain a priori knowledge, 
knowledge that is known independently of experience. Accordingly, the most 
significant basic belief of Qoheleth, that underscores his view of the world, is the 
existence of a divine creator (3:11; 3:14; 7:14; 7:29; 11:5; 12:1). This, I submit, is the 
cornerstone of Qoheleth’s existential outlook. It is in every sense truly foundational. 
The divine presence permeates the entire contents of the book with the generic term 
~yhla occurring in every chapter, with the exception of chapter 10.    
 What, it may be asked, is the source of Qoheleth’s belief that God exists? He 
certainly does not engage in a theoretical defence of theism, as we earlier indicated. The 
answer, I believe, is to be found in his traditional upbringing. The very distinctive 
Hebrew belief that there is only one God, often referred to as ethical monotheism, was 
something that Qoheleth would have imbibed from his childhood. Of course, his belief 
in God is not characterized by personal intimacy so evident in Yahwism; but then 
Qoheleth lived at a very different time and place, far distant from early expressions of 
Yahwism.           
 In every sense Qoheleth is a rare spirit. He never speaks to God in prayer; God  
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does not speak directly to him. Nor does Qoheleth upbraid or argue with God as Job 
did. His basic belief in God as creator of all things includes the implication that God is 
the giver of life to all humans and all animals. At no time, despite his avowed hatred of 
life, and his angst and despair, he never once advocates suicide. Notwithstanding the 
absence of divine engagement on his part, there cannot be the slightest doubt that for 
Qoheleth the belief in a divine creator, the giver of all things, goes to the very core of 
his being. For Qoheleth, this basic belief is sufficient of itself to satisfy the justification 
condition of knowledge.        
 Stemming from this basic belief other non-basic (inferred) beliefs follow. One 
such belief is that, given the sovereign reality of God, human beings will be judged for 
their conduct. This is a solid belief to which Qoheleth adheres unswervingly (cf. 3:17; 
5:5 (ET 5:6); 8:12b-13; 11:9; 12:14). While the nature and timing of God’s judgment is 
not clearly explicated by Qoheleth, nevertheless, the reality of God as judge is a belief 
in keeping with the basic belief that there exists a sovereign, unchangeable, moral, and 
immortal deity whose will can never be thwarted by any human.    
 Keeping in mind that the basic belief that God exists is the foundation upon 
which Qoheleth’s inferred beliefs are built, another non-basic belief can be identified 
that is part of Qoheleth’s superstructure of knowledge, namely, that God is to be feared. 
This belief seems a natural extension from the belief that God is the supreme judge of 
all humanity. The belief that God is to be feared is most decisively observed in the 
cultic passage (4:17-5:6 [ET 5:1-5:7]). It is also mentioned twice at 8:12b-13b, and once 
at 7:18, with a strong emphasis noticeable in the epilogue at 12:13.   
 The raison d’être for humans to fear God is that God is not merely confined to 
the human sphere of activity – “under the sun.” This is forcefully notified to the reader 
at 5:2 [ET 5:1] where it reads “God is in heaven, and you upon earth . . .” While God 
resides in heaven, yet he is very active in the world of humanity, and controls the 
processes of the natural world. In the context of worship, a minimum of words is 
advised, and if vows are made they should be kept (5:2b-6) [ET 5:1-5]. Hence the 
challenging injunction in 5:6b [ET 5:7]: ‘but fear God’.    
 Another of Qoheleth’s inferred beliefs is that men and women are not only 
created by God, but are dependent and limited beings. His views about human kind run 
through every chapter of the book like a main thread running through a garment. As we 
noted in chapter four, there are 49 references to ~da in the book, with another 10 
occurrences of Xya. It is clear from the evidence laid out in previous chapters that  
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Qoheleth refers to ~da in the generic sense of humankind. While he enjoins his fellow 
creatures to enjoy life when they can, he generally does not have a lofty and noble 
opinion of them. As Tomáš Frydrych puts it, “Qoheleth’s anthropology is of a low type, 
in which [a] human being, created by God, is de facto an animal.”657 Humans have 
sought out many inventions (7:29); men’s hearts are set to do evil (8:11b); and injustice, 
oppression, evil, and unrighteous behaviour exist even in the most unlikely of places 
(3:16; 4:1; 7:15b; 8:11b, and 10:5).       
 Qoheleth’s anthropology is not far removed from the Genesis tradition of the fall 
of man in the Garden of Eden, and other accounts of human evil in the Hebrew Bible. 
Whatever the source of his belief in mankind’s tendency to do evil, it is difficult to 
believe that this sage was unaware of the Genesis story of origins. Be that as it may, it is 
clear that Qoheleth was more than able to add his own negative and pessimistic 
interpretation of reality to whatever traditions he may have known about the corporate 
theological and political experiences of Israel.   
 Our examination of the diversity of ideas, beliefs, assertions, and opinions to 
which Qohelet gave expression would suggest that while he may be viewed more as a 
philosopher of sorts, rather than as a preacher, yet it is still difficult to envisage his 
literary output being elevated to the status of a consistent and convincing body of work. 
He is too skeptical, too pessimistic, at times very conservative, at times very radical. He 
is sometimes esoteric in his views, as well as cynical, unpredictable, contradictory, 
morbid, and yet, he is compassionate, joyful, and sensitive to being alive.   
 Of course, it is very unlikely that Qoheleth (whether a fictional or real person) 
ever set out to be a philosophical theorist; a close reading of the book might suggest that 
he was an articulate person, with a large persona, only too eager to get a lot of things off 
his chest. Quite reasonably, he may have had no interest in a theory of knowledge, or 
any other kind of theory. Essentially, it could be argued that he was simply writing a 
tract for his time and place.        
 In spite of his belief in the failure of human memory, yet over two millennia 
later, many people are grappling to understand the nature and origin of his ideas and 
teaching. As we observed in chapter three, quite a number of commentators have 
asserted that in all the claims he made to knowledge, he is best viewed as an empiricist. 
That is one possible theory. But no matter what theory we adopt to explain Qoheleth’s 
epistemic claims, no theory is perfect. There will be fault lines discernible at some point 
                                                
 657 Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 160. 
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in any theory.          
 I submit that, on the basis on the evidence that has been presented in this 
dissertation, to give Qoheleth the description of empiricist is not a feasible proposition 
simply because so much of his claims could never have been established by empirical 
observation. I would contend that the view that I have presented in this thesis offers a 
more convincing account of Qoheleth’s claims to knowledge. At the most fundamental 
level he is a theist, or more precisely, a monotheist. And from that basic belief in the 
sovereign reality of God, all other inferred beliefs are justified.    
 Of course, I am conscious that moderate foundationalism has its critics, as well 
as its fault lines. But so too has the notion of empiricism, as any serious engagement 
with epistemological study will reveal. In the end, as I have acknowledged, there are 
few perfect theories about any topic relating to any human endeavour, but I believe that 
presenting Qoheleth as a foundationalist in his theory of knowledge is more plausible 
than viewing him as an empiricist.   
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